According to the Antitrust Division, when a company seeks amnestyunder the CLP, it is given a “model letter” outlining the conditions andqualifications for participation. This model letter, in turn, forms the basis of asigned agreement between the Division and the amnesty recipient.
Presumably,then, Micron was given a copy of the model letter and later signed a writtenagreement to confirm its amnesty under the CLP. This agreement is the subject ofVTC’s FOIA request.Had Micron been the subject of a plea agreement, as was the case withInfineon and Hynix, a FOIA request would be unnecessary. Plea agreements arecourt documents and thus a matter of public record. Indeed, the AntitrustDivision published the Infineon and Hynix plea agreements on its website.
Amnesty agreements, like plea agreements, are contracts between thegovernment and the subject of a criminal investigation. Both provide for thedisposition of outstanding criminal charges in exchange for cooperation withongoing investigations. The only difference is that a plea agreement is subject toapproval and supervision by an Article III court, while the CLP is wholly acreature of the Antitrust Division and subject only to “prosecutorial discretion.”FOIA Exemption 7(A) applies to “records or information compiled for lawenforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such lawenforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to interferewith enforcement proceedings.”
Assuming that the Antitrust Division’sinvestigation of the DRAM market remains an ongoing proceeding, the issuehere is whether release of the Division’s amnesty agreement with Micron “couldreasonably be expected to interfere” with the investigation. Neither Ms.Richards’ letter to VTC nor any applicable case law interpreting Exemption 7(A)demonstrates that it would.The seminal Supreme Court case on Exemption 7(A) is
NLRB v. RobbinsTire & Rubber Co.
. In that case, the subject of a National Labor Relations Boardproceeding attempted to use FOIA to obtain the statements of witnesses that theagency planned to call before an administrative hearing. The Court held thatFOIA was “not intended to function as a private discovery tool,” and thatrequiring the disclosure of the witness statements would “interfere” with the
2See
Brief for Appellant United States of America,
Stolt-Nielsen v. United States
(3
rd
Cir. May 17, 2005)(available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f209100/209127.htm).3http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f209200/209231.htm (Hynix plea agreement) andhttp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f206700/206700.htm (Infineon plea agreement).45 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).5437 U.S. 214 (1978).
The Voluntary Trade CouncilPage 3
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