Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Plan of presentation
Economic effects of cultural events Methods to estimate economic effects of culture and their critiques Ex-post econometric estimation how it is designed, what it shows, first results Value of culture and arguments for public support to the arts Economic model of non-use values and results Summary
Methods to estimate value of culture and their critiques - CVM vs. EIM in cultural economics
Seaman (2006): CVM and EIM as substitutes / complements Ibid: sometimes nave, overblown EIM can be best estimators of true value of the event! Frey (2005): cultural advocates vs. cultural academics Stutzer, Luechinger & Frey (2010), Frey (2012): life satisfaction approach
Seaman (2012): The existential threat from ex post verification econometric analysis
Methods to estimate value of culture and their critiques - ex-post econometric analysis
A flourishing method in sports economics Starts: Baade & Dye (1988): Sports Stadiums and Area Development: A Critical View
Some findings Baade & Matheson (2004): Bidding for the Olympics: Fools Gold? The increase in economic activity attributable to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic games, as represented by job growth, an estimated 5,043 full-time and part-time jobs using our model, appears to have been entirely transitory, however. There is no economic residue that can be identified once the Games left town The job implications for the Los Angeles and Atlanta Summer Olympic Games were fundamentally different Atlanta Olympics created between 3.467 and 21.767 full and part time jobs Humphreys and Plummer (1995) projected that the Olympics would create approximately 77,000 new jobs in the State of Georgia with 37,000 of those materializing in Atlanta.
Methods to estimate value of culture and their critiques - ex-post econometric analysis
Main methods used (and possible to use): Panel data analysis; Treatment/Response analysis (Difference-in-differences; Instrumental variables); Dynamic Panel, GMM and Time Series analysis
Seaman (2012): There is a virtual explosion of efforts to identify empirical tracks in the sand in local employment and tax revenue data following an event. A similar task might be tried in Maribor after the year ends to see if econometric equations that attempt to isolate the unique effect of being a Cultural Capital reveal both economically and statistically significant unique effects of this honor. In the sports literature, they almost NEVER find such effects.
Ex-post econometric estimation of effects of ECoC Maribor 2012, first results, tourism visits, all cities pooled
dependent variable: tevilo dependent variable: tevilo dependent variable: tevilo dependent variable: tevilo skupnih obiskov obiskov tujih obiskovalcev skupnih noitev noitev tujih turistov Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 48015,1 4,3292 *** 30369,4 3,5552 *** 144723 4,4548 *** 83410 3,8673 *** -14153,1 2853,32 2212,1 0,002832 -0,007106 0,284998 0,836224 -3876,75 7761,501 7776,382 7767,453 -0,8476 1,9602 * 0,448 -7569,06 3263,71 2407,74 0,001648 -0,008303 0,165596 0,919506 -3802,062 7612,124 7627,005 7618,076 -0,5865 2,2768 ** 0,5064 -65843,1 3712,62 7690,63 0,006901 -0,002997 0,697175 0,554396 -4199,57 8407,14 8422,022 8413,092 -1,5112 1,3103 0,8055 -32715,5 8077,58 5863,67 0,004102 -0,005824 0,413226 0,743623 -4080,577 8169,154 8184,035 8175,106 -1,1006 3,0317 *** 0,584
const EPK_dummy time_of_treat_ epk_time_dummy R-squared Adjusted R-square F (3, 301) p value of F Log-Likelihood Akaike Schwartz Hannan-Quinn
Ex-post econometric estimation of effects of ECoC Maribor 2012, first results, tourism visits, only Maribor
dependent variable: tevilo dependent variable: tevilo dependent variable: tevilo dependent variable: tevilo skupnih obiskov obiskov tujih obiskovalcev skupnih noitev noitev tujih turistov Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 48015,1 4,3292 *** 30369,4 3,5552 *** 144723 4,4548 *** 83410 3,8673 *** 43537,2 3,9255 *** 41354,1 4,8411 *** 60504,5 1,8624 * 69842,5 3,2382 *** 2853,32 1,9602 * 3263,71 2,2768 ** 3712,62 1,3103 8077,58 3,0317 *** 27944,4 0,006685 -0,004112 0,619118 0,603152 -3568,616 7145,233 7159,772 7151,065 19,1979 *** 27136,8 0,010028 -0,000732 0,931952 0,425674 -3499,969 7007,937 7022,477 7013,769 18,9308 *** 57388,9 0,0018 -0,00905 0,165894 0,919301 -3865,841 7739,681 7754,221 7745,513 20,255 *** 58201,9 0,005266 -0,005547 0,487006 0,691579 -3756,329 7520,657 7535,196 7526,489 21,8444 ***
const EPK_dummy time_of_treat_ epk_time_dummy R-squared Adjusted R-square F (3, 276) p value of F Log-Likelihood Akaike Schwartz Hannan-Quinn
Value of culture
Total Economic Value (Peterson & Sorg, 1987): use + non-use values Non-use values (Snowball, 2008): values to people who, for whatever reason, might be non-users, but who are still willing to pay to preserve or support the public good Typology of values of culture: USE VALUE: price + part of buyers consumer surplus NON-USE VALUES: option, bequest, existence, prestige, educational (Frey & Pommerehne, 1989) + altruistic value, vicarious consumption (Bille Hansen 1997; Throsby 2001) CULTURAL VALUES: symbolic, historical, aesthetic, authenticity, spiritual, social (Throsby, 2001) + Cultural inherent values (Hutter & Shusterman, 2006)
Economics of donations
Samuelson (1954; 1955): Pareto inefficiency of private provision of public goods Warr (1982; 1983) + Bergstrom, Blume & Varian (1986): crowding-out in relationship 1:1 no help in direct fiscal redistributions in hope of achieving the Pareto equilibrium Andreoni (1989; 1990); Sugden (1984): other explanations for donors motives warm-glow altruism Brooks (2003): crowding-in can be possible under certain conditions (low level of public good provided)
BASIC MODEL
Samuelsons model: maxU ( x, G) Our model each user solves:
max Uni( xni,0, G) s.t.gni G ni G xni gni wni Ui ( xi, G, G ) : use value of the user Ui ( xi,0, G ) : non-use value of the user Uni( xni,0, G ) : non-use value of the non-user
MODIFIED MODEL
An added fourth, warm-glow component U(gi) Modified model each user solves: maxUi ( xi, G, G, gi ) Ui ( xi,0, G, gi )
s.t.gi G i G xi gi wi
Ui ( xi, G, G, gi ): use value of the user Ui ( xi,0, G, gi ) : non-use value of the user Uni( xni,0, G, g ni : ) non-use value of the non-user
Results
Non-use values act in two different directions: they cause inefficiency of the model (less donations, externality effect) and at the same time they cause more efficiency in the model (more donations, altruism effect) Yet always the externality effect predominates, therefore nonuse values always denote externalities in private provision of public goods Comparative statics: 1) users donations will almost always be higher than non-users donations; 2) if present, the crowdingout effect will be higher for the party with the higher level of donations; 3) crowding-in effect is possible under certain circumstances; 4) relationship of non-use values of the user and non-user has to be determined empirically Econometric results using previous contingent valuation study dataset confirmed the theoretical findings