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1, JanuaryMarch 2013

Public Opinion and Military Intervention: Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya

BEN CLEMENTS

BRITAIN has participated in several military interventions of varying duration, extent and political controversy in recent years. During Tony Blairs time in ofce, the armed forces were involved in operations in Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Kosovo prior to 9/11 and in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the international response to terrorism post-9/11. Britain still has extensive military forces stationed in Afghanistan, due to withdraw from 2014 onwards, and there has been a growing wariness in domestic opinion as casualties have steadily risen since operations were stepped up in 2006. Britains military operations in Iraq formally ended in April 2009, but the issue was deeply controversial within domestic politics before and after the invasion in 2003, becoming one of the dening issues of Blairs premiership before he stepped down in 2007. Indeed, the controversy surrounding the invasion and occupation of Iraq, as well as Britains role in multinational operations in Afghanistan since 2001, has arguably led to a diffuse sense of public fatigue with overseas military interventions, accentuated by widespread economic hardship and the emergence of austerity politics. Polling undertaken on the war in Afghanistan in recent years consistently shows only a very small minority in favour of troops remaining in Afghanistan, with large majorities wanting troops returned to Britain either immediately or soon.1 An ITV News/ComRes poll carried out in SeptemberOctober 2011 found that 57

per cent agreed that troops should be withdrawn immediately, with 26 per cent disagreeing. Moreover, 71 per cent agreed that the war was unwinnable, with just 12 per cent dissenting from this view.2 In a period of decit reduction, cuts and public-sector retrenchment, it might be expected that the public are even less willing for Britains forces to be committed abroad, with the expenditure that such costly operations necessarily entail. In this context, this article assesses in detail public attitudes towards military action in Libya, the Coalition governments rst major foreign policy test. This article assesses the public mood in three areas of analysis. First, it examines attitudes in a comparative perspective, assessing views across NATO member countries, including those that did and did not play a direct military role. Second, it examines which groups in the British population were more likely to support or oppose involvement in Libya, providing a comparison with attitudes towards the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Third, it assesses how the popular mood changed over time, in respect of three indicators: support for the intervention in principle; evaluations of how military action progressed; and Camerons perceived handling of the issue. Before looking at public opinion, the article provides an overview of the Coalition governments foreign policy agenda and the wider circumstances surrounding the military intervention in Libya.
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The Coalition government and foreign policy

The Conservative party in opposition, under David Camerons leadership and with William Hague as Shadow Foreign Secretary, developed their thinking on foreign policy in signicant ways, partly as a necessary response to the foreign policy priorities and major overseas actionsboth perceived failures and successesof the New Labour governments. The renewed thinking on policies and priorities was encapsulated in the designation of their beliefs as liberal conservatism. Beech concludes that, based on this intellectual evolution while in opposition, there had been
a quite distinctive step change in the Conservative partys global view, and quite an unConservative one at that. This can be understood as a clear foreign policy discontinuity with previous Conservative leaderships since Margaret Thatcher.3

was still expected to show broad continuity with aspects of New Labours foreign policy approach, as evidenced in the Coalition Agreement, although the new government marked out a difference from the previous government in relation to liberal interventionism.6 Under New Labour, both parties had supported the war in Afghanistan under the aegis of the broader international ght against terrorism, while the Liberal Democrats had been the leading political opponents of the invasion of Iraq. Further differentiating themselves from New Labour, shortly after the 2010 general election, David Cameron and Liam Fox (then Defence Secretary), grappling with Britains role in Afghanistan, emphasised that they did not intend to intervene, Blair-style, in foreign conicts.7 Moreover, the Coalitions National Security Strategy, published in October 2010, focused on
preventing rather than on intervening in conict, and appeared to herald the end of liberal interventionism so that if a Kosovo-type situation arose, the new government might take a different approach from Blairs.8

Reecting on the politically controversial military interventions undertaken when Tony Blair was Prime Minister, in particular the divisive invasion and occupation of Iraq, Cameron argued that British foreign policy needed to show more patience and humility in future.4 In essence, and in contrast to New Labours foreign policy and military engagements, jaw-jaw would, it seemed, be given greater prominence than warwar.5 Other changes, promoted in major speeches and policy documents, included a greater emphasis on economic and commercial objectives in the promotion of the national interest, including strengthened bilateral ties with emerging economies, a rmer approach to the UKUS special relationship and a more balanced and inclusive decisionmaking process in the foreign policy arena, including a greater role for the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofce. The ConservativeLiberal Democrat coalition that took ofce in May 2010
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Military intervention in Libya

Events intruded in late 2010 and early 2011 in the form of a series of uprisings against repressive regimes and their autocratic leaders in North African and Middle Eastern countries, a phenomenon collectively labelled the Arab Spring. While incumbent leaders were forced from ofce in both Tunisia and Egypt, in Libya the military and security forces of Colonel Gadda made serious efforts to quell the armed uprisingwhich began in February 2011with Gadda adamant that he would crush the opposition and remain in power. In the context of growing calls for some form of intervention, the UN authorised a mandate for military action in the form of Resolution 1973. Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, were

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prime movers behind the Security Council resolution which went further than imposing a no-y zone, as some countries specically desired, and instead authorised all necessary measures.9 The UN resolution gave backing for air strikes to protect civilians from attacks by Gaddas forces, with action commencing on 19 March. In April, together with US President Barack Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy published a joint letter in The Times, Le Monde and The International Herald Tribune setting out the aims of international community for the Libyan intervention, which served to emphasise the wider international backing for the action undertaken.10 The intervention was broadly underpinned by an international consensus of sorts: NATO-led multinational action had the support of regional bodies, such as the Arab League. While Germany abstained in the UN vote alongside Russia and China, and was criticised by other countries for doing so, there were not the major divisions between EU member states that had occurred so visibly over Iraq. Recurrent Eurozone crises aside, the crisis in Libya provided the Coalition government with its rst major foreign policy test and the difcult and politically sensitive choice of whether to push forand commit British forces tomilitary action. It also raised familiar issues about Britains relation with the US and going the UN route to gain broad international legitimacy, versus relying on issue-specic coalitions of the willing. In stark contrast to the partisan alignments on the Iraq issuewhere the Liberal Democrats and other smaller parties were strongly opposed to the invasion in 2003, as well as the Labour party being divided internallythere was a broad domestic consensus underpinning Britains role in Libya. When the issue was put to the vote in the House of Commons on 22 March 2011, 557 MPs endorsed the government motion, with

just thirteen against (including eleven Labour members)a huge majority of 544. Justifying the rationale for British participation, Cameron made clear to the public that involvement in Libya was not merely an outbreak of do-goodery, but also hard-headed rooted in national interests, and limited in scope.11 Cameron insisted that action in Libya was necessary, legal and right.12 The Shadow Foreign Secretary, Douglas Alexander, claimed that the Labour partys stance on the issue should be informed, yet not paralysed, by the long shadow cast by Iraq.13 Both the highly controversial Iraq invasion and the longstandingand increasingly unpopular involvement of British forces in Afghanistan coloured political and media debate over the merits or otherwise of getting involved in action in the case of Libya. On the Iraq issue, in the high-stakes parliamentary vote in March 2003, the government motion passed by 412 votes to 149, with widespread Conservative backing. Despite the governments victory, what was particularly notable was the size of the rebellion by backbench Labour MPs on an amendment opposing the governments stance: they numbered 139 in total.14 The successful NATO-led campaign in Libya lasted for around seven months before it was ofcially declared that action would end on 31 October 2011. Key developments in this period included the rebels entering and assuming control of Tripoli in August, with Gadda eeing, and a succession of countries recognising the National Transitional Council as the legitimate national authority. The Libyan leader was nally captured and killed in October 2011, after rebels had moved on and attacked the last strongholds of the Gadda regime. The various aspects in which the Libyan intervention is similar to or different from previous episodes of military interventionits explicit UN backing and widespread regional and
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international support; its clearer and more urgent humanitarian rationale; its restricted military involvement, avoiding major ground operations; and the fact it offered less potential for large-scale casualtiesmake it pertinent to examine public opinion on this issue.

Public opinion across countries

Libya was a multinational effort comprising NATO members and contributions made by various other countries (such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). We can use available crossnational polling data to see whether there were clear differences in levels of support across countries. For example, considering the prominent role played on the international stage by Cameron and Sarkozy and their countries subsequent contribution to the military operations, was there greater support in Britain and France than in other European countries? Table 1 presents a comparison of overall levels of public support for several NATO member countries. In terms of NATOs European members represented in Table 1, Britain and France were fully involved in the airstrikes against Gaddas regime, along with the US; Italy and Spain limited their role to reconnaissance missions; and Germany was not involved

militarily. Results are shown for two separate opinion polls, one conducted at the turn of MarchApril 2011 (Financial Times/Harris) and the other in late April (Reuters/Ipsos MORI), several weeks into military action. Both ask about support or opposition for military action, although the rst poll also included a neutral option for survey respondents (neither). Looking at the rst poll, in which six countries were surveyed, support was highest in France, Britain and Spain (37 per cent or above), and lowest in Italy and the US. Interestingly, in the context of their governments conspicuous abstention in the UN vote, public opinion in Germany was not the most likely to be opposed to actionthe percentage found here was 39, compared with 49 per cent in Italy, where there was also the lowest proportion of neutral opinion (at 21 per cent). In the second poll (not including Germany and Spain), support is noticeably highest in France (at 63 per cent) compared to Britain (50 per cent) and the US (55 per cent). Again, support is lowest in Italy, at 40 per cent, with a clear majority opposed (60 per cent). Allowing for the difference in response options in the two polls, they produce a consistent nding in relation to the country most likely (France) and least likely (Italy) to support military action.

Table 1: Cross-national public opinion towards military action in Libya

Financial Times/Harris, March-April 2011 Support (%) US Britain France Germany Italy Spain 32 37 40 34 29 37 Neither (%) 31 28 30 27 21 29 Oppose (%) 37 36 31 39 49 34 Reuters/Ipsos MORI, April 2011 Support (%) 55 50 63 40 Oppose (%) 45 49 37 60

Note: Samples based on adults aged 1664.

Question: To what extent do you support or oppose the current military intervention in Libya? Question: Do you support or oppose the UK and allied military action in Libya?

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The Financial Times/Harris poll also gauged respondents views on possible extensions of NATOs military action (shown in Table 2). These ranged from operational changesincluding deploying attack helicoptersthrough to more far-reaching objectives, such as regime change. Table 2 shows the proportion of respondents in each country that supported, opposed or took a neutral position on different types of military action. The most popular action across countries was regime changesomething that was eventually to be realised by the rebels and the external forcesthough there was little enthusiasm for the deployment of ground troops and even less for the bombing of non-military targets, the latter option having obvious resonance with civilian casualties and collateral damage. There was stronger support for the use of attack helicopters in the US, Britain and France, and the British and French deployed these from early June. There was less support for this option in Germany, Italy and Spain.

Is there any association between the extent of European countries involvement in the Libyan intervention and public support for military action? Table 1 shows that support for military action was somewhat higher in Britain and France compared to Spain and Italy in the Financial Times poll and considerably higher than in Italy in the Reuters poll. Overall, Table 2 shows that there was generally higher public support for extending military involvement in different ways in those European countries playing a fuller military role in the Libyan interventionBritain and France than in Germany, Italy and Spain. This is evident, for example, in relation to the potential use of ground troops and the deployment of attack helicopters.

Public opinion within Britain

As well as placing opinion in Britain in a comparative context, we can assess the basis of support and opposition by examining attitudes on a cross-sectional

Table 2: Cross-national public opinion towards extending NATOs involvement in Libya

US (%) Britain (%) France (%) 11 24 65 60 28 12 20 28 51 35 35 31 Germany (%) 7 16 77 57 30 14 11 22 67 30 30 40 Italy (%) 6 11 83 56 20 24 12 19 70 22 21 58 Spain (%) 8 23 69 50 30 20 19 31 51 23 32 45

Bombing of non-military targets Support 15 19 Neither 30 28 Oppose 54 53 A regime change Support 45 49 Neither 39 37 Oppose 16 14 Deployment of ground troops Support 17 23 Neither 27 29 Oppose 56 48 Use of attack helicopters Support 39 37 Neither 35 39 Oppose 26 24

Source: Financial Times/Harris, 2531 May 2011. Note: Country samples based on adults aged 1664. Question: Do you support or oppose an extension of NATOs military intervention in Libya to include the following?

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basis. This allows us to pinpoint which social groups were more or less in favour of the Libyan intervention. In terms of the overall distribution of opinion on this question, public opinion was clearly against intervention in Libya, perhaps inuenced by the shadow of the Iraq conict and Britains on-going operations in Afghanistan (over 350 British military personnel had lost their lives by the end of February 2011, nearly all of them from 2006 onwards). Based upon gures from the British Election Studys Continuous Monitoring Survey (CMS), which has undertaken monthly cross-sectional surveys of the population since 2004, 28 per cent approved of the action, 50 per cent disapproved and 22 per cent offered a neutral opinion (excluding dont know responses). However, we need to go beyond the overall proportions approving or disapproving and look at which particular societal groups were more likely to support (or oppose) military action. We can also place attitudes towards the intervention in Libya in the context of public opinion towards Britains involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. For this purpose we can again use the CMS. Previous CMS surveys have carried questions asking about approval or disapproval for these three different interventions. Here, all of the monthly surveys which asked a question on attitudes towards each intervention are pooled to create a larger sample of respondents, enabling a more robust comparison of group differences. The questions on military intervention were asked over the following periods: IraqApril 2004 to January 2010; AfghanistanFebruary to December 2010; and LibyaMarch to May 2011. The data for each military intervention are based on responses to the following three questions: (a) Overall, do you approve or disapprove of Britains involvement in
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military action in Libya? Strongly approve; approve; neither approve nor disapprove; disapprove; strongly disapprove; dont know. (b) Please tell me whether you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britains involvement in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Strongly approve. Approve. Disapprove. Strongly disapprove. Dont know. (c) Please tell me whether you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britains involvement in the war with Iraq. Strongly approve. Approve. Disapprove. Strongly disapprove. Dont know. While all questions asked about approval or disapproval, one difference to note is that the question asking about Libya included a neutral response option (neither approve nor disapprove), which was not included in the questions for Iraq and Afghanistan. Table 3 shows the overall levels of approval and disapproval for each military intervention for a range of societal groups, classied by sex, ethnic background, education, occupation, region, partisanship and newspaper readership. The proportions giving a neutral response are also shown for the question on Libya. Each groups level of approval can be compared across the three military interventions and, within each instance of military conict, to the gure for all, representing all respondents in the pooled sample for each question. The difference in response categories for the Libya question means that we should not focus on the precise level of approval for each group across interventions; instead we should assess whether particular groups are broadly more supportive of military actions overseas. It should be borne in mind that the presence of the neutral response in the Libya question means levels of approval (and

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Table 3: Approval and disapproval of military interventions by social groups

Group category LIBYA AFGHANISTAN IRAQ

% % % % % % % Approve Neither Disapprove Approve Disapprove Approve Disapprove 28 36 20 28 25 33 26 32 25 22 20 24 22 22 23 21 22 22 50 44 56 50 54 44 53 46 53 35 45 25 35 30 36 34 38 33 65 55 75 65 70 64 66 63 67 30 37 23 30 22 27 31 30 30 70 63 77 70 78 73 69 70 70

All Male Female White ethnic group Other ethnic group Finished education: 21 or over Finished education: 20 or under Salariat Other occupatizon or never worked Lives in England Lives in Wales Lives in Scotland Conservative supporter Labour supporter Liberal Democrat supporter Other party/no party Reads tabloid most often Reads broadsheet most often None read most often Does not read a newspaper

28 29 30 33 27 34 23 25 37 39 25

22 24 20 22 21 20 23 23 19 23 22

50 47 50 45 51 45 54 52 44 38 54

34 37 41 36 43 31 26 34 36 35 34

66 64 59 64 57 69 74 66 64 65 66

30 32 30 29 44 18 22 33 25 26 29

70 69 70 71 56 83 78 67 75 74 71

Source: British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey. Weighted data. Dont know responses excluded.

disapproval) are probably lower than they otherwise would be. It is evident that there are clear differences in levels of approval across social group categories. Those likely to be more supportive across all interventions

include men and those belonging to a white ethnic group. The consistently largest differentials across social group categories are between men and women. The gaps in approval levels between men and women were as follows: Libya
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16 per cent; Afghanistan20 per cent; and Iraq14 per cent. Similarly, on the basis of ethnic background, the gaps in approval levels were: Libya3 per cent; Afghanistan5 per cent; and Iraq8 per cent. There are some differences on the basis of education: those who nished full-time education aged 21 or older (many of whom will hold a degree-level qualication) were more supportive of the intervention in Libya but less likely to approve of the war in Iraq. In terms of occupational grade, members of the salariat (those in salaried, white-collar jobs) were more likely to approve of Britains role in Libya and Afghanistan, but no more likely than other occupational grades (and those who have never been in work) to support the Iraq war. Looking at the regions where people live, it is evident that those living in Scotland were clearly more supportive of the war in Afghanistan, while regional differences were more muted for Iraq and Libya. There are also group differences in levels of approval on the basis of party loyalties and newspaper readership. The pattern of support for partisans is interesting. Specically, Liberal Democrat supporters were less likely to approve of Britains involvement in Iraq (where they took a strong anti-war stance) and Afghanistan, but were more supportive of action in Libya than Labour partisans were. The widest gap in attitudes occurred on the Iraq war, with just 18 per cent of Liberal Democrat supporters in favour compared to 44 and 29 per cent of Labour and Conservative partisans, respectively. Broadsheet readers were more likely than tabloid readers to approve of Britains involvement in Libya; conversely, tabloid readers were more supportive of the war in Iraq. There was little difference in views towards the conict in Afghanistan. To look in more detail at group divisions on the issue, Table 4 shows the associations between two areas in which
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Table 4: Approval of military interventions: Partisanship by gender

LIBYA Con (%) Lab (%) Lib Dem (%) 39 29 10 Lib Dem (%) 39 24 15 Lib Dem (%) 23 13 10 Other party/ none (%) 29 17 12 Other party/ none (%) 36 17 19 Other party/ none (%) 28 16 12

Men Approve Women Approve Difference AFGHANISTAN

46 21 25 Con (%)

33 20 13 Lab (%)

Men Approve Women Approve Difference IRAQ

47 26 21 Con (%)

53 33 20 Lab (%)

Men Approve Women Approve Difference

37 21 16

50 37 13

Source: British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Surveys. Weighted data. Dont know responses excluded. Difference: percentage of men who approve minus the percentage of women who approve.

there were often clear differences in levels of approval: sex and partisanship. It shows, separately for men and women, levels of approval (again combining strongly approve or approve) for the action in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan for the different groups of party supporters. Across supporters of the main political parties (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat), men are always more favourable towards military action, as is also the case for those who support a minor party or do not have a partisan afliation. The approval differentials between men and women are generally largest for Conservative supporters and smallest for Liberal Democrat supporters. For example, 46 per cent of Conser-

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vative-supporting men favoured action in Libya compared to 21 per cent of women supporting the Conservatives, while the gures for Afghanistan were 47 and 26 per cent, respectively. Women supporting the Liberal Democrats were most likely to approve of military action in Libya, while Labour-supporting women were most in favour of the actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Overall, across partisan afliations, men were more likely than women to support military action in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, with sizeable gaps in approval levels within each partisan category.

Public opinion over time

While we can gain considerable insight from analysing public opinion in a comparative perspective and by looking at attitudes across population groups, these both represent static analyses. As other overseas conicts have shown, the public mood can shift over time in response to real or perceived operational successes and failures abroad and political events at home. In Britain and the US, public opinion turned against the 2003 Iraq War after the initial invasion and the overthrow of Saddam
60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0 Right

Husseins regime. Similarly, public approval for Britains role in Afghanistan has fallen over time. We can build a dynamic picture of the public mood using three areas of evaluation commonly used in public opinion research: rst, support for military action in principle; second, assessments of how military operations are progressing; third, how political leaders are handling the issue. It is important to examine these separately, as even those who maintain that taking action was the right thing may shift their assessment on the issue and their leaders handling of itin a negative direction, while those who opposed the action in principle can still acknowledge when military operations are progressing well and a leader is managing the issue competently. Figures 1 3 chart public opinion over time for these three different indicators. They are based on regular online polling conducted by YouGov from the outset of the intervention in March through to the formal conclusion of the NATO mission at the end of October. Figures 1 3 show the proportions of respondents over time with (a) a positive opinion, (b) a negative opinion and (c) no opinion either way.
Don't know

Wrong

Figure 1: Public opinion towards whether it was right or wrong to take military action in Libya
Source: Compiled by the author from YouGov polls. Question: Do you think Britain, France, the US and other countries are right or wrong to take military action in Libya?

March 20-21 March 27-28 April 4-5 April 11-12 April 18-19 April 27-28 May 10-11 May 18-19 May 26-27 June 7-8 June 20-21 June 30-July 1 July 7-8 July 20-21 August 1-2 August 11-12 August 18-19 August 29-30 September 6-7 September 13-14 September 22-23 October 3-4 October 11-12 October 20-21

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80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10 0

Well

Badly

Don't know

Figure 2: Public opinion towards how military action is going in Libya

Source: Compiled by the author from YouGov polls. Question: Overall, do you think the Coalitions military action in Libya is going well or badly?

60
50 40

% 30
20 10 0 March 3-4 March 17-18 March 24-25 March 31-April 1 April 7-8 April 14-15 April 28-29 May 5-6 May 12-13 May 19-20 May 26-27 June 2-3 June 9-10 June 16-17 June 23-24 June 30-July 1 July 7-8 July 14-15 July 21-22 July 28-29 August 22-23 August 25-26 September 1-2 September 8-9 September 15-16 September 22-23 September 29-30 October 6-7 October 13-14 October 20-21

Figure 3: Public opinion towards David Camerons handling of the issue

Source: Compiled by the author from YouGov polls. Question: How well or badly do you think David Cameron has responded to the situation in Libya?

Figure 1 shows public opinion on the question of whether military action was right or wrong. This type of question measures generalised support for war, and is commonly used in surveys and opinion polls.15 There is considerable oscillation in the proportions believing that the intervention was right or wrong, and the lines often run in close proximity in April and May. During June and July the proportions against the action exceed those who support it; the reverse is the case from August onwards, as the rebels steadily gained ground and took Tripoli. There is a nal spurt of support in October, no doubt inuenced by the death of Gadda and the sense of an eventual resolution to the internal ghting. The proportion with no opinion
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March 22-23 March 29-30 April 5-6 April 11-12 April 17-18 April 25-26 May 5-6 May 12-13 May 19-20 May 26-27 June 6-7 June 15-16 June 22-23 July 3-4 July 7-8 July 18-19 July 28-29 August 3-4 August 14-15 August 18-19 August 25-26 September 1-2 September 8-9 September 14-15 September 22-23 September 29-30 October 9-10 October 13-14 October 23-24

Well

Badly

Don't know

(dont know) stays broadly the same over time. Figure 2 shows evaluations of military action in Libya (well, badly or dont know). Overall, there is greater uctuation in the public mood on this indicator and also sharper differences between viewpoints over time, showing that assessments are probably more sensitive to developments on the ground, as reported by the media and articulated by political leaders. There is an increase albeit unevenin negative evaluations in the early months of the conict; they decline sharply during August. Consequently, positive assessments of the situation rise sharply during August and then increase again in October. The sharp increase in positive evaluations

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during mid to late August clearly corresponds again to the rebel forces advance into and eventual capture of the Libyan capital, Tripoli. The spike in support in October also represents a response to the capture and killing of Gadda and the ending of major hostilities in much of the country. Figure 3 charts public evaluations of Camerons handling of the issue (well, badly or dont know). There is some decline in positive evaluations from April to June; they pick up in August and also rise again in October. Negative evaluations decline during AugustOctober. As in Figures 1 and 2, there is less uctuation in the proportions reporting no opinion. For comparison, Figure 4 shows public attitudes in the US towards military action in Libya (those who support, oppose or are undecided), with the questions wording explicitly referring to President Obamas decision. It uses data from regular polling undertaken by Rasmussen from March through to October 2011, based on nationally representative samples. The data show that the proportion opposed increased during MayJuly, but then decreased during August. Correspondingly, the proportion in favour rose in August, fell back somewhat in September, then increased again in October. There is evidence therefore that the public mood across countries
60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0 Support

changed in a similar direction at key points in the Libya operation. When examined in more depth on a partisan basis, the YouGov data show that Conservative supporters tended to have the most favourable ratings of the Prime Minister on this issue, and more positive assessments of how the military action was going. Labour supporters were consistently likely to have less positive assessments on these two indicators. Liberal Democrat supporters occupied a broadly intermediate position on these two indicators, although their levels of support were closer to those expressed by Conservative supporters than those held by Labour partisans. It is not surprising that there are sharp differences between partisan groups when evaluating the prime ministers role, as this represents a mediated issue question. These
tend to invite opinions which will invariably, if not inevitably, be ltered through pre-existing partisan loyalties or beliefs they will be politically conditioned. When faced with such a question, respondents thinking will engage both the issue at hand and a clear political reference point (such as a leader or government).16

Based on the data shown in Figure 4, there was also a partisan basis to public opinion in the US, with Democrats more supportive than Independents and Republicans of their Presidents decision
Undecided

Oppose

Aug-17

Sep-16

Oct-14

Oct-22

Figure 4: Public opinion in the US towards military action in Libya

Source: Rasmussen Reports. Question: Do you agree or disagree with President Obamas decision to take military action in Libya?

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Mar-24

Apr-07

Apr-21

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Jun-13

Jul-12

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to participate in military action (details not reported here).

respondents saying Britain should not involve itself in any way in uprisings like those in Egypt and Libya.17

Conclusion
What conclusions can be drawn for public opinion and future scenarios in which British forces could be committed to military action overseas? First, the cross-sectional prole of opinion showed that the more supportive groups included men, those from white ethnic groups and, when categorised socio-economically, those with higher educational attainment or in higher-level occupations. Attitudes are also underpinned by attitudinal factors, such as partisanship, political trust and media usage. Men were more supportive than women of military intervention across partisan categories. Second, the dynamic analysis allowed us to build a clearer picture of shifts in public opinion over the duration of NATOs involvement in Libya. While they may be shaped by pre-existing attitudes, such as party loyalties, public assessments are malleable and respond to major developments on the ground, shifting in a positive or negative direction, as was the case with previous military interventions. The shifts in British public opinion shown here may be paralleled in the popular mood in other countries that participated in the Libyan intervention. Third, what tentative comments can be made regarding public opinion, should international developments lead to a possible future intervention which raises the question of British involvement? The annual Chatham HouseYouGov Survey on international affairs (eldwork undertaken in June 2011) gauged public opinion on this topic and found:
The survey results show a striking scepticism among the general public and opinion-formers about British military intervention abroad There also seemed to be scepticism about intervention more widely, with nearly half of all 130 BEN CLEMENTS

Specically, amongst the general public, 35 per cent supported military action against Iran to prevent them acquiring nuclear weapons, compared to 47 per cent who were opposed. In relation to popular uprisings in overseas countries, 21 per cent of the general public thought Britain had a moral responsibility to support them and 17 per cent thought Britain should support them contingent on it being in the national interest, while a plurality47 per centsaid Britain should not be involved at all in such uprisings. This scepticism about military involvement overseas is underlined by the results of a YouGov poll undertaken in late August 2011 asking whether similar support to that given to the Libyan rebels should be offered to protesters in Syria rebelling against Bashar Assads regime. Just 21 per cent said such support should be offered, with 49 per cent against and a sizeable proportion (30 per cent) unsure. Across social groups, men were more likely to agree than women (27 compared to 16 per cent); differences were less pronounced for partisanship and social class.18 Evidence from the Pew Research Centres Global Attitudes Project Spring 2011 survey shows, however, that there is widespread acceptance that military force is sometimes needed to maintain order in international affairs (70 per cent in Britain), as well as substantial support for UN backing for using force to deal with international threats (67 per cent in Britain).19 Clearly, the wider body of survey evidence provides a mixed picture of public opinion on this issue. Whether public opinion would broadly support or oppose a role for Britain in a future military intervention is contingent on variable aspects of the international scene (the stated rationale for the intervention; the nature and

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extent of military operations; the role of regional and international support, including UN endorsement) as well as the domestic political situation (including the presence or absence of a partypolitical consensus and the popularity or otherwiseof the current prime minister and government). Fourth, while Libya represents a foreign policy success for the Coalition governmentand for Camerons leadership in particularits importance for public perceptions more generally is, arguably, limited. Matthew dAncona has argued:
Camerons achievement in Libya will not cement the publics image of him denitely, as, say, the Falklands did its perception of Thatcher as the Iron Lady, or as Iraq branded Blair as an absentee adventurer and congenital liar. Its impact, I think, will be subliminal: a hazy sense that this Prime Minister might, after all, be rather competent, good at xing things, brave and not bombastic.20

Set against perceptions of competence based on handling of foreign policy, however, are public assessments of the Coalition governments and Camerons performance on a range of more pressing, and less tractable, domestic issues, including economic management and the quality of public servicesthe breadand-butter concerns which inuence voting behaviour and election outcomes.

Notes
1 Based on YouGov polling data, available at: http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus _uploads/document/vtz3xqd2gf/YG-ArchivesPol-Trackers-Afghanistan-040712.pdf 2 Data available at: http://www.comres.co.uk/ polls/The_Index_(Afghanistan)_2_Oct11.pdf. 3 Matt Beech, British Conservatism and Foreign Policy: Traditions and Ideas Shaping Camerons Global View, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2011, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 361. 4 Rhiannon Vickers, The Con-Lib Agenda for Foreign Policy and International Development, in The Cameron-Clegg Government. Coalition Politics in an Age of Austerity, ed. Simon Lee and Matt Beech, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2011, p. 205.

5 Peter Dorey, Mark Garnett and Andrew Denham, From Crisis to Coalition: The Conservative Party, 19972010, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2011, p. 128. 6 Andrew Gamble, Britain in the World, in Developments in British Politics 9, ed. R. Heffernan, P. Cowley and C. Hay, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2011, p. 317. 7 Patrick Wintour, Afghanistan Withdrawal Before 2015, Says David Cameron, The Guardian, 26 June 2010. 8 Vickers, The Con-Lib Agenda, p. 212. 9 Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, David Camerons Libyan War: Why the PM Felt Gadda Had to Be Stopped, The Guardian, 2 October 2011. 10 For the full text, see: http://www. nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html?_r=1; 11 The Economist, The Ghost of Tony, 24 March 2011. 12 The Economist, Bagehot: David Camerons War, 27 August 2011. 13 Douglas Alexander, Why MPs Must Say Yes on Libya, The Guardian, 21 March 2011. 14 Tom Quinn, Tony Blairs Second Term, in Britain at the Polls 2005, ed. John Bartle and Anthony King, Washington, CQ Press, 2005, p. 4. 15 Emanuel Gregory Boussios and Stephen Cole, Do Individual Characteristics Matter? An Analysis of Americans Opinions Toward the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf and Iraq Wars, Journal of Applied Security Research, vol. 5, no. 3, 2010, pp. 279305, p. 283. 16 Maurice Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, pp. 8081. 17 Jane Kinninmont, Arab Spring: Where Next for UK Policy?, in The Chatham HouseYouGov Survey 2011. British Attitudes Towards the UKs International Priorities, p. 29. Available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/ les/0711ch_yougov_analysis.pdf 18 Results available at: http://cdn.yougov.com/ today_uk_import/yg-archives-pol-stresults-26-290811.pdf. See also the more recent YouGov survey on attitudes towards possible military action in Syria at: http://cdn.yougov. com/cumulus_uploads/document/wu3f2fqyga/ YG-ArchivesPR-YouGov-Syria-intervention-0802 12v2.pdf 19 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project, The American-Western European Values Gap, November 2011. Available at: http://www. pewglobal.org/les/2011/11/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Values-Report-FINAL-November-17-201110AM-EST.pdf 20 Matthew dAncona, Libya Wont Make David Camerons Reputation, But Its Certainly A Start, Daily Telegraph, 27 August 2011.

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 84, No. 1