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A United States Antisatellite Policyfor a Multipolar World
ROGER C. HUNTER, Major, USAFSchool of Advanced Airpower Studies
THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THESCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES,MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FORCOMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS,ACADEMIC YEAR 1991–92.
Air University PressMaxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
October 1995
 
Disclaimer
This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest ofacademic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The viewsexpressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or positionof the Department of Defense or the United States government.This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared forpublic release.
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Contents
Chapter Page
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v
ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
vii
1 SETTING THE STAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1ASAT’s Past Arguments—For and Against . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1ASAT’s Arguments—Today and Tomorrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 CONSIDERING THE ROLE AND VALUE OFMILITARY SATELLITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 ASAT’S GENESIS: THE ARGUMENTS BEGIN . . . . . . . . . . . 9Early Arguments for ASAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Eisenhower Administration Hedges Its Bets . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Resisting ASAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10The Rise of the Satellite Interceptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Terminating the Satellite Interceptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Hedging Bets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Reconsidering ASAT’s Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Summarizing the Early Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE ASATCONTROVERSY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Soviets Initiate an ASAT Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Revitalizing the US ASAT—The Carter“Two-Track” Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Soviet Initiatives—And the Reagan Response . . . . . . . . . . . 20Soviet Satellites—How Threatening Are They . . . . . . . . . . . 21Our Growing Dependence on Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Congress Prevails—Constraining the US ASAT . . . . . . . . . . 24Summarizing the Carter and Reagan Years . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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