DH B7 Public Hearing- Improvising Defense Fdr- Day of 911 Suggested Hearing Questions- FAA

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DAY OF

9/11Suggested Hearing Questions

III. FAA

WitnessesMonte Belger:

FAADeputy Administratoron9/11 (retiredfromFAA).Mr.Belger

was the

second

in

command

on

9/11

and led the FAA

response

to the

hijackings

from the

crisis

center on the 10

th

floor of FAA headquarters. He also

participated

in theWhite House SVTSon themorningof

9/11.

Priortoassuming

the

position

of

Deputy Administrator,

Mr.

Belger

served

in the FAA's

Security Division.

Jeff

Griffith:

Deputy

Director

of Air

Traffic

on

9/11

(retired

from

FAA).

Mr.

Griffith

was the

senior

air

traffic

representative

at

headquarters

on

9/11 (BillPeacock, the Director of the Air

Traffic

Division, was out of state on business).Mr.

Griffith

participated

in

coordinating

the

response

to the

hijackingevents

from

the crisis center on the 10

th

floor of headquarters. He also participated in theWhite House SVTS. He is trained and spent most of his career as an air

traffic

controller.

John White:

Manager

of

Administrative

Affairs

for the FAA

Command Center

facility

in Herndon, Virginia on9/11(retired from FAA). Mr. White assumed theresponsibility of

facility

operations manager at the Command Center on

9/11

and

maintained an

open line

of

communications with

Jeff Griffith

and

other

FAA air

traffic

representatives

at

headquarters.

Ben

Sliney:

National Operations Manager

("NOM")

at the Herndon CommandCenter on 9/11. Mr. Sliney is currently the manager of the New York Tracon

facility.

September 11

th

was Mr.

Sliney's

first day as the

Command Center NOM.

As

NOM,

Mr.

Sliney

was

responsible

for the

oversight

of all FAA

operationswithinthe National Airspace System. He exhibited excellent judgment and

initiative

when

he

decided

(1) to

ground

all

aircraft departures nationwide,

and

(2) togroundallairborne aircraft

after

thePentagonwasattacked.He waschastised

by FAA

Headquarters

on

9/11

for

grounding

all

airborne

aircraft

without headquarters approval.

1.

Coordination Between

FAA and NORAD

pre-9/11:

Prior

to

9/11

there

was

anexchange

program between

the FAA and

NORAD, whereby

military

liaisons

were

detailed

to

serve

at

FAA,

and FAA

liaisons were detailed

to

serve

at

NORAD.

These

individuals coordinated the

day-to-day

activities between

the

agencies

— the

sharing

of

airspace

for

training exercises

and

movement

oftroops. These

liaisons were

not

trained

or

assigned

any

role

in a

crisis situation,

such

as a

hijacking.

However, their presence

on

9/11

led

many

to

"assume"

they

were the

ones coordinating

the military

response.

(a)

What

was the interaction of

FAA

and

NORAD

prior to

9/11?

How familiarweretheagencies with each other? Whatwas thecontextinwhichthe

agencies

interacted?

[Belger

or

Griffith]

(b) Prior to 9/11, were some Centers more familiar than others with the military

and

specifically NORAD? For example, on 9/11 why do you think Bostonreached out so quickly to Otis Air Force Base?

[Griffith]

(c)

Prior

to

9/11,

were

the FAA

liaisons

to

NORAD

assigned

any

role

in the

protocols relatedtohijacking response?Whynot?

After

9/11, did the FAA

modify

the role of these liaisons to include responsibilities relevant to hijackings?[Belger

or

Griffith]

(d)On

9/11,

did you

believe these liaisons

were coordinating

the

militaryresponse?

If so,

why? [Belger

or

Griffith]

2.

FAA Awareness of Increased Threat to U.S. DuringSpring/Summerof

2001.

(a)

Were

you or

your

staff

made aware

of the

fact

that

the

intelligencecommunity believed there was a heightened threat to U.S. security due to an

increased

level

of

"chatter"

by

terrorist groups during

the

spring

and

summer

of

2001? [Belger](b) Specifically, did you or your staff receive any intelligence information during

the

springorsummerof2001 regardinganincreasedrisk ofterrorist activity?

Any

information specifically regarding hijackings?

Any

information regarding

hijackings in the

United States?

If so,

what precautions

did you

take

to

mitigatethe threat? [Belger]

3.

Pre-9/11 Training

and

Exercises Regarding Hijackings.

Most

managersat

FAA

Headquarters

had little or no

recollection

of

the

protocols

in

place

on

9/11

regarding their roles

andresponsibilitiesin a

hijacking.

With

the exception

of

a

ew

individuals

from the

Security

Division, there

appeared

to be

little

or notraining

at FAA Headquarters or Command Center

regarding

hijacking

procedures.

Indeed,

when

asked to

identify

who the

hijack

coordinator

was on

9/11,

it was

difficult

to

find two

witnesses

who

identified

the

same individual.

At the

Command

Center,

no one

could remember

any

training

or

exercises

regarding

the

role

the Command Center would

play

in a

hijacking.

(a)

Prior

to

9/11,

why was

there

a

lack

of

training

at FAA

Headquartersconcerningtherolesofmanagementinresponseto ahijacking?Did thelackof

hijack

training

at

headquarters contribute

to the

confusion

on the 10

th

floor

of

FAA

headquarters that morning? [Belger or

Griffith]

[NB: A number of witnesses at FAA headquarters described the scene on

the

10

th

floor

as

confusing

and

chaotic.]

(b)

We understand that each year controllers received simulated hijack training.Why was this training limited to air

traffic

controllers? Was there training or

exercises

targeting theroleof managers all the way up the

chain

of

command?

If

not, why not? [Belger or

Griffith]

(c) Did the

fact

that there were no domestic hijacks for over

10

years lead uppermanagement to conclude that such training at headquarters was unnecessary?[Belger

or

Griffith]

(d)

Priorto

9/11,

what roleorrolesdidCommand Center

fulfill

in

response

to a

hijacking?

[Sliney or White](e) Why is it that almost all the Command Center employees interviewed by theCommission stated they

had no

recollection

of

receiving

any

training concerningthe role of Command Center employees in response to a hijack event? [Belger,

Griffith,

Sliney

or

White]

4. Crisis Management at the Command Center on

9/11.

(a)

After

the second attack on the World Trade Center, how did you collect

information

about whether there were additional hijacked or compromised

aircraft

in the

system?

What

did you do

with that information? What system

did

you

use totrack suspicious

aircraft?

[SlineyorWhite](b) Who did you think was in charge of requesting military

assistance

in responseto the

hijackings?

What specifically did you think, on the morning of

9/11,

wasbeing done in this regard? [Sliney or White]

(c)

What factors led you to issue the national ground stop on the morning of9/11?To your knowledge, were you the first person to make the decision toground all aircraft?

[Sliney]

(d) Did you, Mr. Sliney, believe that you

possessed

the authority to issue thenationalground stop without approval by virtue of your

position

as the national

operations

manager

at the

Command Center?(e) Mr.Sliney, what factors promptedyou tosubsequently decidetogroundallairborne aircraft, an action never before taken in the US? To your knowledge,were you the first person to make the decision to ground all

aircraft?

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