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DAY OF
9/11
Suggested Hearing QuestionsII.
NORAD
Witnesses
Commander
of
NORAD
and
U.S.
NorthCom,
Ralph
E.
Eberhart:
On the
morning
of 9/11
General Eberhart
was in his
office
at
Peterson
Air
Force Base
in
Colorado.
His
office
is
approximately
30
minutes away
from
the
NORADoperations center, located
in
Cheyenne Mountain.
The
highest ranking
official
atthe
operations center
was
General Findley,
a
Canadian officer.
At
8:45 a.m.
EDT
General Findley notified General Eberhart
of the first
reported hijacking. Gen.Eberhart remained in his
office
for the next hour or so; he told the Commission he
arrived at the
Mountain
shortly
after
the
shoot down
order had
been
passed.
Retired Commander
of
CONR
and
First
Air
Force, Larry Arnold:
GeneralArnold
was in his
office
at
Tyndall
Air
Force Base
in
Panama City,
Florida
when
he
received word
of a real-world
hijacking
in
progress. General Arnold phoned
the
commander
of the
Northeast
Air
Defense
Sector,
Col. Robert
Marr. Col
Marr
informed
General Arnold that
he had
placed
F-15
fighters
from Otis
AFB on
battle stations
and
wanted
to
scramble them
to
track
the
hijacked aircraft. GeneralArnold told Colonel Marr
"[g]o
ahead
and
scramble them
and
we'll
get
authorities
later."
In his
Commission interview, Arnold acknowledged that
his
testimony
in
May
2003 differed
from
the
facts presented
to him
during
the
course
of the
interview. He explained that his briefing for the May 2003 testimony wascompiled
by
Col. Scott based
on
NEADS data,
the
validity
of
which Arnold
had
accepted at that time.
1.
Evolution of the NORAD Mission and the Posture of NORAD on
9/11.
When
General Eberhart took command
of
NORAD
in
2000,
he
stated
his
priorities were
to: 1)
increase radar capabilities;
2)
improve
the
ballistic missile
defense;
and 3)
find
a "way-ahead" for
cruise missile
defense.
General Eberhartalso told
us
the
post
Cold
War
threat
was
determined
to be
ICBMs
and not
longrange aviation.
The
alert sites
and air
defense
assets decreased accordingly.
General
Eberhart stated
air
superiority
was
important,
but
there
was a
"raging
debate
"
during the 1990 's over the mission's relevance. General Eberhart
explained
that
he had
some concerns about
the
fact
the
radar picture available
to
the
FAA was in a
steady
state
of
atrophy
prior
to
9/11.
During
his
interview withCommission
staff,
General Arnold discussed
the
impact
of
the
reduction
of
alertsites
on the
mission
of
NORAD.
Specifically,
General Arnold stated that NORAD
could
provide
only
"token air sovereignty
"
once the number
of
alert sites were
reduced to
seven.
With
only
seven alert sites,
he
believed there were portions
ofthe
country, particularly along
the
southern border, that were vulnerable
to airthreats.
(a)
Given
its
posture
on
9/11,
did you
believe NORAD
was
prepared
to
defend
the
country against all airborne threats? If not, then did you voice your concerns
 
about
any
perceived
deficiencies?
Did you
thinkNORAD
was
prepared
to
defendagainst asymmetric threats
to the US? If
not,
why
not? What about
the
asymmetric
threat
of
attack
from
terrorists?
If
not,
why
not? [Gen.
Eberhart
or
Gen. Arnold]
(b)On 9/11,
what
did you
perceive
to be the
greatest airborne threats
to the US?
Did
you
think NORAD
was
sufficiently postured
to
meet these
threats?
If
not,
why
not? [Gen. Eberhart
or
Gen. Arnold]
2.
Pre-9/11 Contemplation
of Use of
Hijacked Aircraft
as a
Weapon.
GeneralEberhart told Commission
staff
that,
prior
to 9/11,
NORAD
did not
postulateterrorists controlling
an
aircraft. They
believed
the
pilot
in
control
of
the
aircraft
-would
not comply
with terrorist demands
to use the
aircraft
as a
weapon.According to General Eberhart, to the extent NORAD considered
aircraft
as
weapons,the
threat
was
always perceived
as an
external threat entering
the
U.S.from overseas.
Under
this scenario, NORAD would have more time
to
react
to
the airborne threat.
(a)
Prior
to 9/11, was
there
any
discussion within NORAD regarding
the
threat
of
hijacked aircraft
asweapons?If so, can youexplainwho wasinvolvedin
those
discussions
and
what
the
analysis
of the
threat was?
Did
NORAD
receive
any
intelligence
information prior
to
9/11 related
to the use of
aircraft
as
weapons?[Gen.
Eberhart or
Gen. Arnold]
(b) If
NORAD knew that terrorists
had
entered
our
country
and
establishedsupport networks prior
to
9/11,
would that information
have
changed
NOR
 AD's
view regardingthethreatofhijacked aircraftasweapons? [Gen. EberhartorGen.Arnold]
(c) If
NORAD
had
learned that terrorists were taking lessons
in the US to
learnhow to flycommercial aircraft, would that information have changed
NORAD's
view regarding
the
threat
of
hijacked aircraft
as
weapons? What actions might that
have
prompted NORAD
to
take? Would NORAD have sought
to
enhance
its
radar
coverage?
[Gen. Eberhart
or
Gen. Arnold]
3.
NORAD's
Training
and
Exercises Prior
to
9/11.
General Eberhart toldCommission
staff
it
was
"tough
"
to get the FAA to
participate
in
NORAD'straining
and
exercises
before
9/11.
He
said
the FAA
lacked
the
manpower
to
participate. General Eberhart also told
us
there were pre-9/11 exercise scenariosthat exercised
the
Rules
of
Engagement ("ROE") against
hijacked
commercial
aircraft
up the
chain
of
National
Command Authority
for
shoot-downauthorization.
He
further explained these exercises always contemplated therewould
be
plenty
of
time
to
obtain
the
authorization
and the
hijacked
aircraft
was
presumed
to
have
a
transponder code giving
the
aircraft's
location. GeneralEberhart also stated there
was no air
defense
training
or the
National
Capital
 
Region
prior
to
9/11,
and
that
NORAD
did not
have standing protocols
for NCR
Combat Air
Patrols
(CAPs)
because
all air threats
were perceived
to be
external.
(a)
Did NORAD ever engage in joint exercises with the FAA prior to 9/11? If so,when was the last joint exercise? What were the
lessons
learned from any pre-
9/1
1 joint exercises? Were there any issues that surfaced concerningcommunications, tracking the
aircraft
or radar capabilities? If so, how were thoseissues addressed? [Gen.
Eberhart
or Gen. Arnold]
(b)
By now, most of us have heard about the real world examples cited to in the
Joint
Inquiry report by Congress concerning the use of
aircraft
as weapons prior
to
9/11.
If
NORAD training includes preparation
for the
worst case scenario, then
why
were there no
exercises
that contemplated the need for immediate NCAapproval to shoot down a commercial aircraft? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold]
(c)
When there were real world events prior to
9/11
that presented an increasedthreat
against
the
National Capital Region,
like
a
Presidential Inauguration,
did
NORAD
provide
an air
defense
for
such
an
event?
If
not,
why
not?
If
yes, then
was
there any discussion concerning a NCR defense in light of the informationduring
the
spring
and
summer
of
2001 about
an
increased
threat
to the US?
[Gen.Eberhart or Gen. Arnold](d)
hi
the
planning
phasesof Exercise Positive
Force
01
(PF-01),
NORADreportedly proposed an event that included an
aircraft
crashing into the Pentagon.Were you aware of the NORAD proposal when it was made? If no, are you
familiar
today with
the
details
of the
PF-01
proposal?
(e) According to a person with knowledge of the Positive Force exercises,NORAD personnel usually
do not
"come
out of the
blue [with threat
scenarios],
they
usually have some
basis."
Was the proposal tied to any real worldintelligence or threat reporting?
(f)
Were
you
informed that
the
proposal
was
rejected?
If so,
what
was
yourreaction? [Gen. Eberhart]
4.
Day
of
9/11.
(a)
While you were at NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs what was yoursituational awareness of the events that were unfolding? What were your primarysources
of
information?
Who
were
you
communicating with? What noteworthyactions or decisions do you recall making while you were
still
at you
Headquarters
office
in
Colorado Springs?
(b)
What time
did you
depart
for the
Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center(CMOC)? What time
did you
arrive?
Did you
have adequate communications
of 00

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