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DAY
OF
9/11
Suggested
Hearing QuestionsI. Pentagon Witnesses (National Military Command Center)Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs
of
Staff,
RichardMyers:
On the morning of9/11, Chairman Myers (then Vice Chairman) was at a meeting on Capitol Hill.Sometime
after
thesecond strikeon theWorld Trade Center, Chairman Myers
was
notified
of the
situation
and
spoke
briefly
with General
Eberhart
beforeleaving Capitol Hill. Myers saw the Pentagon on
fire
as he was returning to thePentagon; we estimate he arrived in the NMCC around 9:55 a.m.
Captain (Admiral-select)
Charles
Joseph
Leidig:
At
8:30 a.m.
on the
morning
of
9/11,
Captain Leidig "took overthe
watch"
from theon-duty directorofoperations (General
Winfield),
who was scheduled to attend a meeting elsewherein
the
building. Captain Leidig
was theNMCC's
administrative
director,
but he
was also
fully
trained as a director of operations. Captain Leidig directed theoperations team and the Air Threat Conference Call until General Winfieldreturnedto theNMCC,atapproximately 10:15 a.m.
1.
Chairman
Myers'
Experience
as
CINCNORAD.
Chairman
Myers
served
as
the
commander
of
NORADfrom
August
of
1998
until
February
2000.
(a) While you were commander of NORAD, was there any discussion ofchanging NORAD's mission to take account of new, emerging threats? If not,
why
not?(b) When
you
assumed
the
post
of
CINC NORAD
in 1998, the
number
of
alert
sites
had
already been reduced
to
seven.
Did you
believe seven
alert
sites
were
sufficient
to
perform
the air
sovereignty mission?
(c)
During your tenure
as
CINC NORAD, what were
the air
threats
you
prepared
for
and
trained against?
Did
NORAD ever train
to
shoot down
a
civilian
aircraft?
If so, was the FAA involved in those exercises?
(d) How
would
you
describe
the
relationship between NORAD
and the FAA
prior
to9/11?Did you
ever talk
to the FAA
Administrator
or
Deputy?
Was
there
any
interaction between the two agencies? If so, on what kinds of issues? What was
the
divisionofresponsibility betweentheagencies with respectto
hijackings?
2.
Planes
as
Weapons
&
Suicide Hijackings.
(a) To
your knowledge, prior
to
9/11
did DoD
ever consider
the
threat
to the
homeland posed by a suicide hijacking? [Myers]
 
(b) We have heard from a number of DoD
officials
that prior to9/11hijackingswere considered a law enforcement issue, and DoD was only to play a supporting
role
if
called
upon. What
assets
were available
to law
enforcement
to
shoot
down
an
aircraft
with a suicide hijacker in control? How could the task of responding toa suicide hijacking be assigned to anyone but the military? [Myers](c) Prior to 9/11, were you aware that the Secret Service had requested
DoD's
assistanceindevelopingairinterdiction capabilities aroundtheNational CapitolRegion? What was DoD's response to these requests? [Myers]
(d)
Last April,
the
press reported
on a pre
9-11
military exercise
-
Positive Force
-
- in which
NORAD
planners suggested a scenario involving a plane crashing intothe Pentagon. The scenario was rejected and not included in the final
version
of
the
exercise.
Can you
explain
for us
what this exercise
was
about,
and
whatintelligence
- if
any
-
was
behind
the
development
of
the
NORAD scenario?[Myers
or
Eberhart](e) Secretary
Rumsfeld
has been quoted as saying that shortly
before
9/11 thesubject
of
homeland defense
had
been
elevated
to the top of
DoD's priority
list.
What threats to the homeland were envisioned
before
9/11? What were thepriorities? What actions were being taken in this regard? [Myers][NB:"We hadbeen engagedinwhatwascalledtheQuadrennial Defense Review.So, well prior to September
11
we had been talking about the defense of thehomeland and discussing how we were going to be able to deal with that problem.
We
had elevated it to the top of our priority
list."
Secretary
Rumsfeld,
December23, 2002, Interview with DoD
Historian.]
3.
From 9:03 a.m.
to
9:38
a.m.
During
thistime
Myers
was on
Capitol
Hill
andLeidig
was in the NMCC. The
Significant
Event
Conference
convened
at
9:29
a.m.;
the Air
Threat
Conference
at
9:37 a.m.
(a)
What decisions were made at the Pentagon between the time of the secondstrike on the World Trade Center (9:03 a.m.), and the time the Pentagon was hit
(9:38 a.m.)?
[Myers
or
Leidig]
(b) During this window of time did you believe there was a threat to a nation's
capital,
or did you
think
the
attack
was
limited
to the New
York area?
[Myersor
Leidig](c) From the
staff
statement
this
morning we learned that information about an
aircraft
inbound
to
Washington
-
mistakenly thought
to be
Flight
11
- was
announced over
the air
threat conference
8
minutes
before
the
Pentagon
was
struck. Please help us understand what specifically the NMCC knew about thisplane
~
or any other plane thought to be headed to Washington
~
before the
 
Pentagon
was
hit?
Was
there
any
location information? Were
force
protection
measures
ordered
for the
building?
If
not,
why
not?
[Myers
or
Leidig]
(d)
What
was
Secretary Rumsfeld doing
at
this time? Were
you in
contact with
him
before
the
Pentagon
was
struck? [Myers]
4.
Communications with
the FAA on
9/11.
On
9/11
the FAA was
notapre-set
participant
in any
of
the
teleconferences
the NMCC
used
to
manage crisis
situations.
At the
outset
of
the Air
Threat
Conference,
Captain
Leidig asked
NMCC
operators
to
include
the FAA in the
conference.
NMCC operators firsthad
difficulty
locating secure phone
numbers for the
FAA,
and
then because
ofequipment
problems
had
difficulty
maintaining
a
secure connection between
thetwo
agencies.
The FAA was ultimately
added
to the
conference
at 10:17,
after
repeated
requests
by
NORAD.
(a)
Why was the FAA not
connected
to the Air
Threat Conference until
10:17?
Short
of
bringing them into
the
conference,
was
anyone speaking
to the FAA on a
separate line?
Why
not? [Leidig]
(b)
At any
point
in the
morning
did you
pick
up the
phone
and
say,
get me the
FAA
administrator,
so I can
understand
who in the FAA has the
best
awarenessabout which planes
are
hijacked? Help
us
understand
why
~
on a
leadership level
—
this didn't
happen early
on in the
hijackings? [Myers]
5.
Command
and
Control
on
9/11.
(a)
Chairman Myers,
from
a
command
and
control perspective,
who was in
charge
of the air
defense operation
on 9/11? At the
Pentagon,
who was in
charge
of the
situation before
you
arrived
at the
NMCC shortly before
10:00?
(b)
Do you
recall hearing
the
shoot down order conveyed
on the Air
ThreatConference? What
was
your reaction? From
a
command
and
control perspective,
did
you
believe
the
communication
from the Lt.
Colonel
in the
PEOC
was
sufficient
to
"pass"
the
order?
Did you
follow
up
with General
Eberhart or
anyone
in
NORAD
to
understand
how
they were interpreting
and
executing
the
order?
If so,
when? [Myers
&
Leidig]
(c) The Langley
pilots never received
the
shoot down order.
On the
morning
of9/11,
did you
think
the
pilots
had the
order?
Did you
think there might
be
confusion
about what
was
expected
of the
pilots?
Is it
correct that around
10:15
you
were trying
to
track down
who was in
communication with
the
pilots?
If so,
why
were
you
seeking
to
talk
to
those
in
communication with
the
pilots? [Myers]
(d)
Captain Leidig,
can you
describe
for us the
moment
in the
NMCC when
the
vice
president's
authorization
to
engage
hijacked aircraft
was
conveyed
over
the
Air
Threat Conference? What actions were taken
at
that time?
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