keep the horse out of the auction sale as he intended to reserve it for his uncle, the Plaintiff.However Bindley had sold the horse by mistake. Felthouse sued Bindley claiming thatdefendant should not sell the horse to other person because there was already a contractbetween him and his nephew. The court held that there was no contract between Felthouseand his nephew because the nephew had never signified to Felthouse his acceptance of theoffer before the auction sale took place. Silence does not constitute acceptance.A rule governing acceptance is through the postal rule. It is provided in Section 4(2) of theContracts Act. It is important to determine the communication of acceptance because it willaffect the validity of the revocation either by the proposer or the acceptor.Acceptance through post is complete when the letter of acceptance is posted, even though it isnot yet received by the proposer. It is to be said that the proposer has bound to the contractwhen the acceptor posts the letter of acceptance, even though the proposer has no knowledgeof the acceptance.The contract is binding on the acceptor, irrespective of any delay or disappearance of the letterof acceptance. Section 4(2)(a) of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that the communication iscomplete as against the proposer when it is put in a course of transmission to him as to be outof the power of the acceptor, however in subsection 4(2)(b) of the same Act provides that thecommunication of acceptance is complete as against the acceptor when it comes to theknowledge of the proposer.This can be seen through the Illustration (b) of Section 4 Contracts Act 1950 whereby B accept
A’s proposal by a letter sent by post. Thus, the communication is
complete as against A, whenthe letter is posted and the communication is complete as against B when the letter received byA.This can be seen through the case of Ignatius v. Bell. The Defendant had offered to sell his landto the Plaintiff on condition that if the Plaintiff would like to accept the offer, he must make theacceptance on or before 20
of August 1912. The Plaintiff sent an acceptance by registeredpost on 16
August but the letter did not reach the Defendant until 25
August because theDefendant was away. It was held that the acceptance was exercised by the Plaintiff when hisletter was posted on 16
August. Therefore the Defendant was bound to the contract.To conclude, one can generally say that in cases of acceptance through the post, acceptance iscomplete upon posting. However, this rule that acceptance is complete upon posting may beexcluded by the express terms of the offer.