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BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
 
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2007
embers of the
 synthetic biol-ogy communitymet this past Julyin Zurich, Swit-zerland. Synthetic Biology 3.0, as theconference was called, celebrated thediscipline’s continued vigor, alongwith Europe’s entry into what hadbeen a largely U.S. subject.Prominent on the conference agendawere 10 talks devoted to public policy,four of which involved biosecurity,and an entire session devoted to eth-ics. Speakers agreed that the field’ssocial and ethical consequences wouldbe as far-reaching as the science. In-deed, most scientists agree that syn-thetic biology is (or at least could be)something new under the sun. Tenyears ago, genetic engineers had tocut and paste DNA from existing or-ganisms to make new drugs such ashuman growth hormone or syntheticinsulin. Today, scientists and engineerscan create DNA from scratch.The challenge for synthetic biolo-gists is to exploit this power not just tomimic nature’s designs but also to cre-ate new ones. So far, most of the resultsare proof of principle—organisms thatoscillate with clock-like regularity orgenerate odors. But synthetic biologyis developing rapidly. Industrial-scaleprograms for building organisms thatsecrete precursors for anti-malarialdrugs and turn sunlight into energyare under way. Even more ambitiousplans—for example, organisms thathunt down and attack cancer cells—areon the horizon.Inevitably, there is a dark side tosuch technological developments. Justas personal computers brought com-puting power to the masses, syntheticbiology methods reduce the cost anddifficulty in genetic engineering andthus may present ways to slash thecost of making biologically based,genetically engineered weapons thatare vaccine resistant or combine tox-ins from different organisms. Fur-thermore, synthetic biologists havealready shown how terrorists couldobtain life forms that now exist onlyin carefully guarded facilities, suchas polio and 1918 influenza samples.Finally, synthetic biology’s efforts toreprogram life have raised concernsin some quarters that the technologycould one day be used to make radi-cally new weapons, such as patho-gens that could be narrowly targetedtoward populations with known ge-netic susceptibilities.Synthetic biologists have been debat-ing “precautionary measures” againstmisuse since at least 2004. Building onthe example of software engineers, whoturned their World Wide Web Consor-tium conventions into a surprisinglyeffective governance body, synthetic bi-ologists have explored using the field’sannual conventions to do the same forbiosecurity. Yet the community strug-gles to identify and pursue the beststrategy for guarding against misuse of synthetic biology.Many times before, science has in-spired remarkable hope for humanwelfare, and remarkable fears. Duringthe Cold War, scientists could do noth-ing to stop the Soviet Union and theWest from developing nuclear weap-ons, despite individual efforts. Everypolicy lever that mattered—funding,regulation, treaties—required govern-ment action. The terrorist threat andthe emergence of new nuclear pow-ers changed that calculus. To succeedtoday, terrorists and some nations willneed help (most likely, unwittingly)from science’s decentralized, free-wheeling, globalized networks. TheA. Q. Khan network, which sold nu-clear technology to Iran, Libya, andNorth Korea, was in many ways theprototype for this scenario.The science has changed, too. Thetwentieth century saw the emergenceof the scientific pursuits that will domi-nate this century: molecular biologyand its technological cousin, biotech-nology. Biotechnology has alreadycollapsed the traditional distinctionbetween basic research and products.Security experts rightly worry that bio-tech laboratories could similarly createorganisms that are immediately usefulas weapons, obviating the multibillion- dollar testing and development cycles
Stephen M. Maurer is an adjunct professorat the University of California-Berkeley’sGoldman School of Public Policy and director of its IT and Homeland SecurityProject. Laurie Zoloth is director of theCenter for Bioethics, Science and Societyand professor of medical ethics and hu-manities at Northwestern University.
BY STEPHEN M. MAURER & LAURIE ZOLOTH
synthesizing biosecurity
Protecting the public from the risks of synthetic biology depends on thescientific community’s will, capacity, and commitment to regulate itself.
M
Opinions
Vol. 63, No. 6, pp. 16-18DOI: 10.2968/063006004
 
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2007
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
 
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that used to deter non-state actors. Likethe discovery of nuclear fission sevendecades ago, what scientists do in theirlabs has a global impact on security.Government officials are right tothink that regulating academic andcommercial science today is nearly im-possible. Synthetic biology faces uniquechallenges as an interdisciplinary field,with elements of both engineering andbiology cultures that embrace strongvalues of open sourcing, social respon-sibility, and academic freedom. In thisenvironment, initiatives developed bythe synthetic biology community maybe more effective than government reg-ulation precisely because they are morelikely to be respected and taken seri-ously. From a policy standpoint, too,building a nongovernmental body forimplementing biosecurity policy seemslike a good investment.First, community decisions can bemade in months, not years. Second,solutions that require scientists’ consentare likely to be far less disruptive forworking labs than externally imposedrules. Finally, biosecurity policy needsto be consistent across countries,and community-based initiatives areinherently international. If synthetic bi-ologists from the United States, Europe,and Asia all agree to do something, na-tional borders won’t matter.Success depends upon the scien-tific community’s will, capacity, andcommitment to regulate itself. Whenquestions arose about the securityimplications of their work, syntheticbiologists’ initial response was to or-ganize workshops and hold meetings.But academic discourse has limits in afield in the midst of a larger biosecu-rity debate. By 2005, members of thesynthetic biology community weresuggesting that the fledgling commu-nity use its second conference to adoptconcrete security measures. A separategroup of researchers (including the au-thors) received grants from the Carn-egie and MacArthur foundations tofacilitate the process by working withthe community to identify options thatnot only could be implemented as grassroots initiatives but also already en-joyed widespread support within thecommunity. The resulting list eventu-ally included developing improvedscreening of DNA sequence orderslikely to produce known pathogens;creating mechanisms for expert out-side review before starting “experi-ments of concern” that might lead toimproved weapons; establishing anonline database for tracking accidentsand emerging biosecurity issues; andstrengthening existing lab-training,peer-review, and openness norms todiscourage rogue scientists from di-verting synthetic biology for maliciouspurposes.Despite the enthusiasm for develop-ing security mechanisms, the secondconference stopped short of a formalvote. Conference participants hadplanned to vote on instituting a rangeof security steps, but in the weeks be-fore the meeting, several membersprivately started to oppose the idea of using the conference as an expandedtown hall with a vote at the end. Someneeded more time to think about theideas. Others wereconcerned that theconference neededa constitution be-fore it could vote,or that a votemight be divisive.Some participantshesitated out of re-spect for the fierceopposition of activ-ists, some of whomannounced themorning before themeeting that theystrongly opposeda vote—even at apublic meeting thatthey could attend.The idea of scien-tists deciding howto regulate theirwork, the activistsargued, was inher-ently exclusionaryand intolerable.Conference or-ganizers did not, however, give up. In-stead, they successfully urged the con-ference audience to suggest ideas for adeclaration that would be posted on theweb. Building on the options that we
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