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The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology 
Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas 
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Copyright 2006. All rights reserved. Seewww.TheNewAtlantis.comfor more information.
O
ver the past fifty years, several pivotal advances have transformedthe life sciences, including the discovery of the structure of DNA, thedeciphering of the genetic code, the development of recombinant DNAtechnology, and the mapping of the human genome. Synthetic biology isanother transformative innovation that will make it possible to build liv-ing machines from off-the-shelf chemical ingredients, employing many of the same strategies that electrical engineers use to make computer chips.Drawing upon a set of powerful techniques for the automated synthesisof DNA molecules and their assembly into genes and microbial genomes,synthetic biology envisions the redesign of natural biological systems forgreater efficiency, as well as the construction of functional “genetic cir-cuits” and metabolic pathways for practical purposes.Among the potential applications of this new field is the creation of bioengineered microorganisms (and possibly other life forms) that can pro-duce pharmaceuticals, detect toxic chemicals, break down pollutants, repairdefective genes, destroy cancer cells, and generate hydrogen for the post-petroleum economy. Although synthetic biology is chiefly an engineeringdiscipline, the ability to design and construct simplified biological systemsoffers life scientists a useful way to test their understanding of the complexfunctional networks of genes and biomolecules that mediate life processes.Today, synthetic biology is at roughly the same level of development asmolecular genetics was in the mid- to late 1970s, some five years after theinvention of recombinant-DNA technology. In June 2004, the first inter-national conference devoted to the new field, “Synthetic Biology 1.0,” washeld at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). The organizers
 Jonathan B. Tucker 
is a senior fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of  the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he specializes in biological and chemical weapons issues. He is the author, most recently, of  
War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare fromWorld War I to Al-Qaeda
(Pantheon, 2006).
Raymond A. Zilinskas 
, formerly a clini- cal microbiologist, is the director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at CNS. He is the editor of  
Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense
 (Lynne Rienner, 1999) and co-editor of the 
Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense
(Wiley,2005). Support for this paper was provided by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The authors are also grateful to the following individuals for assistance and comments on earlier drafts: Adam P. Arkin, Erika Burleson, Philip Campbell, and Steven M. Maurer. A  fully referenced version of this article appears on our website,www.TheNewAtlantis.com .
 
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claimed to have “brought together, for the first time, researchers who areworking to: (1) design and build biological parts, devices, and integrated bio-logical systems, (2) develop technologies that enable such work, and (3) placethis scientific and engineering research within its current and future socialcontext.” In addition to technical presentations, policy analysts addressedthe security, safety, and ethical issues associated with synthetic biology.The second international conference, “Synthetic Biology 2.0,” is scheduledfor May 20-22, 2006, at the University of California, Berkeley. Meanwhile,at M.I.T. and several other universities, synthetic biology has become apowerful catalyst for interdisciplinary research and teaching that bridgesthe life sciences and engineering, attracting the interest of undergraduates,graduate students, and faculty members from a wide variety of fields.Many of the enabling technologies for synthetic biology have existedfor several years. The metabolic engineering of bacteria for naturalproduct synthesis was first achieved in the early 1970s, and engineeredbacterial plasmids for biotechnology were developed during the 1980s.Genetically modified organisms with relatively sophisticated systems forgene expression and containment have been around for nearly as long.The main difference between genetic engineering and synthetic biologyis that whereas the former involves the transfer of individual genes fromone species to another, the latter envisions the assembly of novel microbialgenomes from a set of standardized genetic parts. These components maybe natural genes that are being applied for a new purpose, natural genesthat have been redesigned to function more efficiently, or artificial genesthat have been designed and synthesized from scratch.Although much of the current work on synthetic biology is takingplace in the United States, research groups are also active in Europe,Israel, and Japan, and the technology will surely spread to other coun-tries. Over the next decade, synthetic biology is likely to enter a phaseof exponential growth. Already, leading U.S. practitioners have foundedthree private companies to commercialize the technology: Codon Devicesof Cambridge, Massachusetts; Amyris Biotechnologies of Emeryville,California; and Synthetic Genomics of Rockville, Maryland.If the history of molecular biology is any guide, synthetic biol-ogy research will generate a vast amount of new information about lifeprocesses—from the role of specific genes to the metabolism of wholeorganisms—as well as numerous applications in medicine, agriculture,industry, bioremediation, and energy. And as with any powerful new tech-nology, synthetic biology is likely to create new risks for society, includingpossible unintended harmful consequences for human health or the envi-
 
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ronment, or deliberate misuse for hostile purposes. To gauge and plan forthose risks, we need to understand the current status of research and thepossible directions of future developments in the field.
Surveying Synthetic Biology 
T
oday, synthetic biology encompasses several different engineeringstrategies, including genome design and construction, applied proteindesign, natural product synthesis, and the construction of functionalgenetic circuits in cells and microorganisms. Each of these subfields isworth considering briefly.
Genome Design and Construction.
One goal of synthetic biology is to“redesign” the genomes of existing microbes to make them more efficientor program them to carry out new functions. In 2005, for example, LeonY. Chan and his co-workers at M.I.T. simplified the genome of a bacte-riophage (a virus that attacks bacteria but is harmless to humans) calledT7 by separating overlapping genes and editing out redundant DNAsequences to facilitate future modifications. In addition, a group at the J.Craig Venter Institute in Rockville, Maryland is currently redesigning thebacterium
Mycoplasma genitalium 
, which has the smallest known bacterialgenome (482 protein-coding genes, 43 RNA genes) yet possesses all of thebiochemical machinery needed to metabolize, grow, and reproduce. TheVenter Institute group is striving to develop a synthetic version of the
M. genitalium 
genome that has been stripped down to the absolute minimumnumber of genes required to support independent life. The goal of this“minimum genome project” is to build a simplified microbial platform towhich new genes can be added, creating synthetic organisms with knowncharacteristics and functionality.“Synthetic genomics” refers to the set of technologies that makesit possible to construct any specified gene (or full genome) from shortstrands of synthetic DNA called “oligonucleotides,” which are producedchemically and are generally between 50 and 100 base-pairs in length.In August 2002, Eckard Wimmer, a virologist at the State Universityof New York at Stonybrook, announced that over a period of severalmonths his research team had assembled live, infectious poliovirus fromcustomized oligonucleotides mail-ordered from a commercial supplier,using a map of the viral genome available on the Internet. In 2003,Hamilton Smith and his colleagues at the Venter Institute developed afaster method for genome assembly, using synthetic oligonucleotides to
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