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ngines of Creation - K. Eric Drexler : Chapter 12http://www.e-drexler.com/d/06/00/EOC/EOC_Chapter_12.html1 of 81/19/2007 5:08 PM
e-drexler.com
Engines of Creation
The Coming Era of Nanotechnology
STRATEGIES AND SURVIVAL
(Chapter 12)
 
Personal Restraint
 
Local Suppression
 
Global Suppression Agreements
 
Global Suppression by Force
 
Unilateral Advance Balance of Power Cooperative Development A Synthesis of Strategies Active Shields vs. Space Weapons Power, Evil, Incompetence & Sloth
 
References for Chapter 12
 
 He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for time is thegreatest innovator.
- FRANCIS BACONIN EARLIER CHAPTERS I have stuck close to the firm ground of technological possibility. Here,however, I must venture further into the realm of politics and human action. This ground is softer,but technological facts andevolutionaryprinciples still provide firm points on which to stand andsurvey the territory.The technology race, driven by evolutionary pressures, is carrying us toward unprecedented dangers;we need to find strategies for dealing with them. Since we see such great dangers ahead, it makes
 
ngines of Creation - K. Eric Drexler : Chapter 12http://www.e-drexler.com/d/06/00/EOC/EOC_Chapter_12.html2 of 81/19/2007 5:08 PM
sense to consider stopping our headlong rush. But how can we?
Personal Restraint
As individuals, we could refrain from doing research that leads toward dangerous capabilities.Indeed, most people
will
refrain, since most are not researchers in the first place. But this strategywon't stop advances: in our diverse world, others will carry the work forward.
Local Suppression
A strategy of personal restraint (at least in this matter) smacks of simple inaction. But what about astrategy of local political action, of lobbying for laws to suppress certain kinds of research? Thiswould be personal action aimed at enforcing
collective
inaction. Although it might succeed insuppressing research in a city, a district, a country, or an alliance, this strategy cannot help us guidethe lead instead, it would let some force beyond our control take the lead. A popular movement of this sort can halt research only where the people hold the power, and its greatest possible successwould merely open the way for a more repressive state to become the leading force.Where nuclear weapons are concerned, arguments can be made for unilateral disarmament andnonviolent (or at least non-nuclear) resistance. Nuclear weapons can be used to smash militaryestablishments and spread terror, but they cannot be used to occupy territory or rule people - notdirectly. Nuclear weapons have failed to suppress guerrilla warfare and social unrest, so a strategy of disarmament and resistance makes some degree of sense.The unilateral suppression of nanotechnologyand AI, in contrast, would amount to unilateraldisarmament in a situation where resistance cannot work. An aggressive state could use thesetechnologies to seize and rule (or exterminate) even a nation of Gandhis, or of armed and dedicatedfreedom fighters.This deserves emphasis. Without some novel way to reform the world's oppressive states, simpleresearch-suppression movements cannot have total success. Without a
total
success, a
major 
successwould mean disaster for the democracies. Even if they got nowhere, efforts of this sort would absorbthe work and passion of activists, wasting scarce human resources on a futile strategy. Further,efforts at suppression would alienate concerned researchers, stirring fights between potential alliesand wasting further human resources. Its futility and divisiveness make this a strategy to be shunned.Nonetheless, suppression has undeniable appeal. It is simple and direct; "Danger coming? Let's stopit!" Further, successes in local lobbying efforts promise short-term gratification: "Danger coming?We can stop it
here
and
now
, for a start!" The start would be a false start, but not everyone willnotice. The idea of simple suppression seems likely to seduce many minds. After all, localsuppression of local dangers has a long, successful tradition; stopping a local polluter, for example,reduces local pollution. Efforts at local suppression of global dangers will
seem
similar, howeverdifferent the effects may be. We will need local organization and political pressure, but they must bebuilt around a workable strategy.
Global Suppression Agreements
In a more promising approach, we could apply local pressure for the negotiation of a verifiable,worldwide ban. A similar strategy might have a chance in the control of nuclear weapons. Butstopping nanotechnology andartificial intelligencewould pose problems of a different order, for atleast two reasons.
 
ngines of Creation - K. Eric Drexler : Chapter 12http://www.e-drexler.com/d/06/00/EOC/EOC_Chapter_12.html3 of 81/19/2007 5:08 PM
First, these technologies are less well-defined than nuclear weapons: because current nucleartechnology demands certain isotopes of rare metals, it is distinct from other activities. It can bedefined and (in principle) banned. But modern biochemistry leads in small steps to nanotechnology,and modern computer technology leads in small steps to AI. No line defines a natural stopping point.And since each small advance will bring medical, military, and economic benefits, how could wenegotiate a worldwide agreement on where to stop?Second, these technologies are more potent than nuclear weapons: because reactors and weaponssystems are fairly large, inspection could limit the size of a secret force and thus limit its strength.But dangerous replicators will be microscopic, and AI software will be intangible. How couldanyone be sure that some laboratory somewhere isn't on the verge of a strategic breakthrough? In thelong run, how could anyone even be sure that some hacker in a basement isn't on the verge of astrategic breakthrough? Ordinary verification measures won't work, and this makes negotiation andenforcement of a worldwide ban almost impossible.Pressure for the right kinds of international agreements will make our path safer, but agreementssimply to suppress dangerous advances apparently won't work. Again, local pressure must be part of a
workable
strategy.
Global Suppression by Force
If peaceful agreements won't work, one might consider using military force to suppress dangerousadvances. But because of verification problems, military pressure alone would not be enough. Tosuppress advances by force would instead require that one power conquer andoccupy hostile powersarmed with nuclear weapons-hardly a safe policy. Further, the conquering power would itself be amajor technological force with massive military power and a demonstrated willingness to use it.Could this power then be trusted to suppress its
own
advances? And even if so, could it be trusted tomaintain unending, omnipresent vigilance over the whole world? If not, then threats will eventuallyemerge in secret, and in a world where open work onactive shieldshas been prevented. The likelyresult would be disaster.Military strength in the democracies has great benefits, but military strength alone cannot solve ourproblem. We cannot win safety through a strategy of conquest and research suppression.These strategies for stopping research - whether through personal inaction, local inaction, negotiatedagreement, or world conquest-all seemed doomed to fail. Yet opposition to advances will have a roleto play, because we will need selective, intelligently targeted delay to postpone threats until we areprepared for them. Pressure from alert activists will be essential, but to help guide advance, not tohalt it.
Unilateral Advance
If attempts to suppress research in AI and nanotechnology seem futile and dangerous, what of theopposite course - an all-out, unilateral effort? But this too presents problems. We in the democraciesprobably cannot produce a major strategic breakthrough in perfect secrecy. Too many people wouldbe involved for too many years. Since the Soviet leadership would learn of our efforts, their reactionbecomes an obvious concern, and they would surely view a great breakthrough on our part as a greatthreat. If nanotechnology were being developed as part of a secret military program, their intelligenceanalysts would fear the development of a subtle but decisive weapon, perhaps based onprogrammable "germs." Depending on the circumstances, our opponents might choose to attack while they still could. It is important that the democracies keep the lead in these technologies, but wewill be safest if we can somehow combine this strength with clearly nonthreatening policies.
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