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Strategy of the Militia

Strategy of the Militia

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Published by glennallyn
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Published by: glennallyn on Jun 05, 2013
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THE STRATEGIC PICTURE
Strategy and tactics are inter-related. It is important to understand the relationship between them. ManyEnglish-speakers use both words interchangeably, so those of you with no military science orientationmight have no idea what these words mean.I offer the following over-simplified analogies for those who are confused: Tactics are what you use towin a battle, strategy is what you use to win a war. In football, a power-sweep is a tactic; no-huddleoffense is a strategy. In boxing, clenching is a tactic; rope-a-dope is a strategy.Please don't take any of the above examples too literally. There are a thousand arguments against anyone of them. All I'm trying to get across is that both are equally important, yet
tactics are a component of strategy
. You might call tactics a
sub
strategy. To more clearly understand tactics, go toTHETACTICAL PICTURE.Let's take a look at our stratigic situation:Our enemy (UN/NWO forces, including the US Military) is a conventional force. Numerically they have
overwhelming
superiority. Their land forces have air support, artillery of every variety, veteranintelligence-gathering units (equipped with spy-satellites, heat-imaging devices and every other scientifically possible contraption). They have supply. They have the land, air and naval power to project their troops anywhere on Earth. They have medics and field hospitals. They have popular support (which, among other things, augments their awesome intelligence-gathering capability). In North America (which is all we can afford to worry about), either directly or indirectly, they controlevery major resource--water, food, industry, heat, electricity, information, fuel, etc.What type of force is the Patriot Resistance? Our active numbers are unknown but probably less than amillion right now. We have no air support or artillery. Our intelligence-gathering apperattus is well-dispersed but crude, vulnerable, and sometimes inaccurate (this will only get worse as the powder getsthick). We have no supply. The only means available to us to project our forces are limited, haphazard,and vulnerable. We have no field hospitals and only the most rudimentary medical skills/equipment. Weare not a conventional fighting force.The only type of warfare in which the Patriot Resistance can be effective is guerilla. We must planstrategy and adjust our thinking accordingly. Non-nuclear wars are won by taking and holding key terrain and resources. The breakdown of our situation above should tell you that we can't hope to accomplish this by fighting pitched, decisive battlesagainst the NWO. Especially since the enemy already controls this nation's key resources. The onlymethod open for us to capture those key resources and terrain is one which has been used by many anunderdog throughout history. The Russians employed it against Napoleon, the Americans employed itagainst the British, Muhammed Ali used it against George Foreman (and virtually everyone else he ever knocked out). It entails making your enemy wear himself out pursuing you, trying to destroy you (and inmany cases coming awful close). Then when your enemy is exhausted, starving, weak and careless, youmove in to speed his self-destruction, taking little bites out of him wherever possible, carving him up piecemeal (like what's been happening to our Constitution).
 
This kind of strategy requires gut-churning discipline. The defender is constantly moving backwards,taking as little damage as possible. He must resist the urge to stand toe-to-toe and slug it out. He must pick oppurtune moments, when it is most advantageous to himself, to surprise his enemy by turningfrom his retreat to let fly a brief, stinging offensive flurry before dancing out of range once again. It ismy opinion that this strategy is our best hope for victory in the coming struggle.
NAPOLEON IN RUSSIA
A good example of this military "rope-a-dope" strategy is the Russian defense against the French GrandArmy. Napoleon raised a force of some 740,000+ (though less than a third of them were actually French).Opposing these were about 450,000 Russians. The Russian soldier has never been known for hisresourcefulness or imagination (even though his courage and fierceness under fire have been noted for ages). Furthermore, Alexander's army had already been spanked badly by the French at Friedland andEylau not long before. In contrast, Napoleon had proved nigh-invincible up to this point againstnumerous European nations--his only real problem was occupying Spain (and from that SpanishResistance, we get the word
 guerilla
).At least partially aware of the poor foraging on the barren, impoverished Russian landscape, Napoleonarranged for supply lines to follow his invasion forces--something he had never needed since hiscampaign in Egypt. Napoleon's plan was to launch a 3-pronged invasion into what is now Poland. Thecentral force, under Eugene, would engage Alexander's forces and get them to commit. Then Eugenewould withdraw, enticing the Russians to pursue, leading them into a trap between Jerome's southernforce and the large northern army under Napoleon's direct command. Here the Russians would besoundly defeated in a decisive battle, Alexander would sue for peace and the Grand Army could returnto France inside a month. Napoleon's attack did not come as a suprise to Alexander, however, who had the 2 groups of his ownarmy retreat before the French could engage. All the Frogs saw of the Russians were rearguard Cossack squadrons which stung and fled, stung and fled, before the advance Cavalry screen under Murat. Napoleon's plan was already unraveling. The Russians would not stand and fight. Denied his decisive
 
engagement and quick victory, a frustrated Bonaparte pursued them some 400 miles into Russia. Thestrength of the Grand Army was already diminishing from desertion and sickness brought on by themercurial Russian summer and the breakneck pace of the march.Then the decisive engagement Napoleon desired seemed to come within reach. The Russians stoppedand dug in at Smolensk, a city surrounded by a moat and a wall 25 feet high and 10 feet thick. As theadvance units of the Grand Army approached Smolensk, Russian artillery opened up on them. TheGrand Army consolidated and, at great cost in lives, managed to breach the wall in a few places. The battle raged for 2 days before the French were able to exploit the breaches and penetrate the wall inforce. But to Napoleon's chagrin, the Russians had just withdrawn across the Dnieper River andSmolensk was in flames. As the French discovered that there was nothing left in Smolensk to plunder,Russian artillery once again fell on them, from across the river. Napoleon got his own artillery returningfire and sent a corps across the river further south in order to catch the Russians in the flank. But hefailed to encircle the Russians or even pin them. The Russians withdrew again.Almost twice as many Russians died at Smolensk as French, yet the bulk of the Russian army survivedand Napoleon saw decisive victory slip through his fingers. Incredibly, the Grand Army alreadynumbered as low as 150,000 men. Desertion and sickness had continued, now fed by hunger and fatigue.French supply lines were already stretched long and thin, and were having trouble traveling over theharsh country. Troops had been dispatched along the way to guard these vulnerable trains. Further draining manpower from the Grand Army, occupational forces had to be sliced off from the invasionforce for each city and village taken along the way. So even though most Russian towns were takenwithout a shot being fired, the conquest was taking its toll on the strength of the invading army. Napoleon pursued the Russians along the road to Moscow, his suffering troops losing discipline withevery passing mile. Then his hopes were raised again when the Russians dug in east of the KalatshaRiver and manned the forts of Borodino. He took 3 days to rest his troops and wait for his ammo tocatch up with him. A head count revealed that another 18,000 troops were missing since leavingSmolensk. Also, the attacking French now actually had less cannon than the defending Russians. TheFrench attacked across the river and, through heavy fighting, took Borodino proper. The large and smallredoubts were taken, lost, and retaken many times at great cost in lives (of course). Napoleon, whohimself was sick by now, hesitated each time an opportunity arose to strike the decisive blow. When hefinally moved to bottle up and rain fire on the main Russian force at the Great Redoubt, they hadescaped once again. Like before, the French losses were less than the Russian, but the invaders couldscarcely afford to lose another 31,000 men at this point. Comparitively, Alexander was in good shape.Russian manpower, though not as seemingly unlimited as in WWII, was readily available. And Russiansupply lines were much shorter and came through friendly territory. Alexander's army was reinforcedand resupplied while Napoleon's was sick, hungry, exhausted, frustrated, and starting to get cold as theRussian autumn swept down on them.The French resumed pursuit of the Russians and, 75 miles east of Borodino, occupied Moscow withoutfiring a shot. The city was almost deserted, save for a few civilians who set it ablaze as the Frenchmoved in. If Napoleon expected Alexander to come to terms once the capital was taken, he was sorelydisappointed. The Russian resistance was not over. Not by a long shot. Napoleon waited in Moscow asthe winter set in. His troops had loaded supply wagons with so much loot, there wasn't much room for  provisions. They finished off in a couple weeks food that was meant to last for months. Once it wasgone, they began to starve. They also found little shelter in the burned city from the growing cold.Foraging parties which ventured out into the frozen countryside around Moscow were often ambushed by Russian militia. Thousands of horses had already been marched to death getting there, and another 20,000 died from one month of cold and famine in Moscow. Napoleon ordered a strategic withdrawl back to Smolensk.

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