China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy —Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
Summary
Despite apparently consistent statements in over three decades, the “one China”policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to differentinterpretations. Apart from questions about what the “one China” policy entails,issues have arisen about whether U.S. presidents have stated clear positions and havechanged or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in stability and democracy.In Part I, this CRS Report discusses the “one China” policy since the United Statesbegan in 1971 to reach presidential understandings with the PRC government. PartII documents the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and articulated in keystatements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. This report will be updated.Policy on the “one China” concept covers three major issue areas: sovereigntyover Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue.The United States recognized the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipeiuntil the end of 1978 and has maintained a relationship with Taiwan sincerecognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing in 1979.The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the threeU.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States“acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. U.S.policy has not recognized the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan; has not recognizedTaiwan as a sovereign country; and has considered Taiwan’s status as undetermined.The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed the U.S.relationship with Taiwan, in the absence of formal diplomatic recognition. The TRAstipulates the U.S. expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” bypeaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among the stipulations: toconsider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a threat” to the peaceand security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United States; “toprovide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and “to maintain the capacityof the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan’s people. TheTRA provides a congressional role in determining security assistance “necessary toenable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In addition, justbefore issuing the August 17, 1982 Communique, President Reagan offered “SixAssurances” to Taipei, including questions about any U.S. role in cross-strait talks.Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in peace and stability across the TaiwanStrait have been challenged increasingly by the PRC’s military modernization andmoves in Taiwan perceived by Beijing as promoting de jure independence (involvingreferendums and the constitution). President Clinton deployed two aircraft carriersnear Taiwan during the 1995-1996 crisis. President Bush has not supported Taiwan’sindependence and opposed “unilateral changes” from Beijing or Taipei to the “statusquo.” How to define “status quo” remains a question. Congress has oversight of theTRA and the President’s management of the Taiwan Strait situation. Members of Congress have supported expanded U.S. contacts with Taiwan’s high-level officialsand Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.
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