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Order Code RL32686
Afghanistan:Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Updated June 19, 2007
Christopher M. BlanchardAnalyst in Middle Eastern AffairsForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
 
Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Summary
Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant negativefactors in Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic order over the last 25 years.Afghan, U.S., and coalition efforts to provide viable economic alternatives to poppycultivation and to disrupt corruption and narco-terrorist linkages succeeded inreducing opium poppy cultivation in some areas during 2004 and 2005. However,escalating violence in southern provinces, particularly in Helmand, and widespreadcorruption fueled a surge in cultivation in 2006, pushing opium output to an all-timehigh of 6,100 metric tons. In spite of ongoing efforts by the Afghan government, theUnited States, and their international partners, Afghanistan is now the source of 92%of the world’s illicit opium. Preliminary surveys suggest opium output may increaseagain in 2007 based on increased production in unstable southern provinces.Across Afghanistan, militia commanders, criminal organizations, and corruptofficials have exploited narcotics as a reliable source of revenue and patronage,which has perpetuated the threat these groups pose to the country’s fragile internalsecurity and the legitimacy of its embryonic democratic government. U.N. officialsestimate that in-country illicit revenue from the 2006 opium poppy crop will reachover $3 billion, sustaining fears that Afghanistan’s economic recovery continues tobe underwritten by drug profits. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears toprovide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continueto operate in and around Afghanistan, including the resurgent remnants of the Talibanand some Al Qaeda operatives. Although coalition forces may be less frequentlyrelying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, manyobservers have warned that drug-related corruption among appointed and electedAfghan officials may create new political obstacles to further progress.President Bush personally stated in February 2007 that narcotics are “a directthreat to a free future for Afghanistan” and warned that, “the Taliban uses drugmoney to buy weapons ... and they pay Afghans to take up arms against thegovernment.” Afghan president Hamid Karzai has identified the opium economy as“the single greatest challenge to the long- term security, development, and effectivegovernance of Afghanistan.” In response, Members of Congress may be asked toconsider options for strengthening counternarcotics efforts during the term of the110
th
Congress. The Administration has requested $1.54 billion in regular andsupplemental counternarcotics assistance and related defense funding for Afghanistanand surrounding countries for FY2007 and FY2008.In addition to describing the structure and development of the Afghan narcoticstrade, this report provides current statistical information, profiles the narcotics trade’sparticipants, explores narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews U.S. and internationalpolicy responses since late 2001. The report also considers current policy debatesregarding the counternarcotics roles of the U.S. military, poppy eradication,alternative livelihoods, and funding issues for Congress. The report will be updatedto reflect major developments. For more information on Afghanistan, see CRSReport RL30588,
 Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
, byKenneth Katzman.
 
Contents
Introduction......................................................1Afghanistan’s Opium Economy.......................................2Current Production Statistics.....................................2Historical Development.........................................7Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy.......................7Taliban Era...............................................8Post-Taliban Resurgence....................................9Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy...........................9Farmers.................................................9Land Owners............................................10Traffickers..............................................10Narcotics and Security.............................................11Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan..............12Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence...............12Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy...............13Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery............15Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism.............................15Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers.............................17Consumption Markets.........................................18Trafficking to the United States..............................18Russia..................................................19Western Europe..........................................19Regional Security Implications..................................20Central Asia.............................................20Pakistan................................................21Iran....................................................22The International Policy Response....................................22Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces..............23Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements.....................23Institutions and Forces.....................................24U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan......................26Public Information........................................27Judicial Reform..........................................27Alternative Livelihood Development..........................28Interdiction..............................................30Eradication..............................................32Issues for Congress...............................................33Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle...........................33Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics...................34Defining the Role of the U.S. Military.............................35Equipment and Weaponry..................................36Mobility................................................36Redefining Eradication........................................37
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