AGORA:FUTURE IMPLICATIONSOF THEIRAQCONFLICTGORA:FUTURE IMPLICATIONSOF THEIRAQCONFLICT
Charter'snormsandreform of itssystemicfeatures.Afirstreasonthat she finds itprema-ture topronouncethedeathof Charter law isthat thelegalcaseforthe use offorceagainstIraqis much closerthanthe criticsacknowledge:in Resolution1441,SecurityCouncil mem-bers leftopenthepossibilityofmilitaryactionwithout asubsequent authorizingresolution,or at leastagreedtodisagreeonthispoint.Second,the coreof theCharter remainsviable,because allstates andtheir informedpublicscontinue toplaceaheavyburdenofjustifica-tionintermsoftheCharter on those who use orproposeto use force.Third,theChartersys-temis flexibleenoughtoevolve to meetchangingconditions. Stromseth then turns to con-creteproposalsforaddressingthedaunting challengesof thepresentandfuture,includingterrorism andweaponsof massdestruction.Inplaceof the Bushadministration'sopen-endedpreemptiondoctrine,Stromseth recommends intensified effortstoenlist collectivesupportfor U.S.initiatives,inthe first instancethroughregionalself-defenseorganizations.She alsomakesspecificproposalsforrevitalizingtheSecurityCounciltoimproveitscapabilitiestomeetthreats topeaceandsecurity.Weencourageour readers tocarryon thisdebateinclassroomsofinternationallaw,inthepress,intheircommunities,and incommunications withtheirelectedrepresentativesand otherpublicofficials.
LORIFISLER
AMROSCHANDBERNARD
H.OXMAN"
PREEMPTION,IRAQ,ANDINTERNATIONALLAWPreemptioncomes inmanyforms and what we think of itdependson the circumstances.One statemaynot strike anothermerelybecause the secondmight somedaydevelopanabilityand desiretoattackit. Yet few wouldcriticizea strikein themidst of anongoingwaragainsta secondstate'sprogramtodevelopnewtypesofweapons.Between thesetwo exam-pleslie countlessfactpatterns.In theend,each useofforcemust findlegitimacyin the factsandcircumstances that thestate believeshavemade itnecessary.Eachshouldbejudgednot onabstractconcepts,butontheparticulareventsthatgaverise to it.Whilenationsmust not usepreemptionas apre-text foraggression,tobefor oragainstpreemptionintheabstract is amistake.The use offorcepreemptivelyissometimeslawful andsometimesnot.1OperationIraqiFreedomhas been criticized as unlawful becauseitconstitutespreemption.Thiscriticisms unfounded.OperationIraqiFreedom was andis lawful.An otherwise awfuluseofforcedoes not become unlawfulbecause it can be characterizedaspreemption. OperationIraqiFreedomwas conductedin aspecificcontext thatframes thewayit should beanalyzed.This contextincluded the nakedaggressionbyIraqagainstitsneighbors,its efforts to obtain
*Editorsin Chief.Thelegalbasisfor the doctrine ofpreemptionis setoutinPresidentBush'sNationalSecuritytrategy:Forcenturies,internationallawrecognizedthat nations neednot suffer an attack beforetheycanlawfullytakeaction todefendthemselvesagainstforcesthatpresentanimminentdangerof attack.Legalscholarsandinternationaljuristsoftenconditionedthelegitimacyofpreemptiononthe evidenceofanimminentthreat-mostoftenavisiblemobilizationofarmies, navies,andair forcespreparingto attack.
THENATIONALECURITYTRATEGY FTHEUNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA5(Sept17,2002),availableat<http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.The notionofpreemptionisinherent in therightofself-defense,recognizingthe needtoadapttheconceptof imminence tothecapabilitiesandobjectivesoftoday'sadversaries.The useofforcepreemp-tivelyin self-defenseistherightofeachstateand does notrequireSecurityCouncilaction. Incalculatingwhetherthe test ofimminencehasbeenmet,itwould beirresponsibletoignorethatthese adversaries"relyonacts of terrorand,potentially,the useofweaponsof massdestruction-weaponsthatcan beeasilyconcealed,eliveredcovertly,ndused withoutwarning."d.(emphasisadded).In the case ofIraq,PresidentBushmade clearthatthe UnitedStatescouldalwaysproceedinthe exerciseof its inherentrightof self-defenserecognizedinArticle51 ofthe UnitedNationsCharter.SeeReportin ConnectionwithPresidentialDeterminationUnderPublicLaw107-243,reprintedn149
CONG.
REC.H1957,H1958(dailyed. Mar.19,2003)(onresolutionauthorizinguse offorceagainstIraq).
Charter'snormsandreform of itssystemicfeatures.Afirstreasonthat she finds itprema-ture topronouncethedeathof Charter law isthat thelegalcaseforthe use offorceagainstIraqis much closerthanthe criticsacknowledge:in Resolution1441,SecurityCouncil mem-bers leftopenthepossibilityofmilitaryactionwithout asubsequent authorizingresolution,or at leastagreedtodisagreeonthispoint.Second,the coreof theCharter remainsviable,because allstates andtheir informedpublicscontinue toplaceaheavyburdenofjustifica-tionintermsoftheCharter on those who use orproposeto use force.Third,theChartersys-temis flexibleenoughtoevolve to meetchangingconditions. Stromseth then turns to con-creteproposalsforaddressingthedaunting challengesof thepresentandfuture,includingterrorism andweaponsof massdestruction.Inplaceof the Bushadministration'sopen-endedpreemptiondoctrine,Stromseth recommends intensified effortstoenlist collectivesupportfor U.S.initiatives,inthe first instancethroughregionalself-defenseorganizations.She alsomakesspecificproposalsforrevitalizingtheSecurityCounciltoimproveitscapabilitiestomeetthreats topeaceandsecurity.Weencourageour readers tocarryon thisdebateinclassroomsofinternationallaw,inthepress,intheircommunities,and incommunications withtheirelectedrepresentativesand otherpublicofficials.
LORIFISLER
AMROSCHANDBERNARD
H.OXMAN"
PREEMPTION,IRAQ,ANDINTERNATIONALLAWPreemptioncomes inmanyforms and what we think of itdependson the circumstances.One statemaynot strike anothermerelybecause the secondmight somedaydevelopanabilityand desiretoattackit. Yet few wouldcriticizea strikein themidst of anongoingwaragainsta secondstate'sprogramtodevelopnewtypesofweapons.Between thesetwo exam-pleslie countlessfactpatterns.In theend,each useofforcemust findlegitimacyin the factsandcircumstances that thestate believeshavemade itnecessary.Eachshouldbejudgednot onabstractconcepts,butontheparticulareventsthatgaverise to it.Whilenationsmust not usepreemptionas apre-text foraggression,tobefor oragainstpreemptionintheabstract is amistake.The use offorcepreemptivelyissometimeslawful andsometimesnot.1OperationIraqiFreedomhas been criticized as unlawful becauseitconstitutespreemption.Thiscriticisms unfounded.OperationIraqiFreedom was andis lawful.An otherwise awfuluseofforcedoes not become unlawfulbecause it can be characterizedaspreemption. OperationIraqiFreedomwas conductedin aspecificcontext thatframes thewayit should beanalyzed.This contextincluded the nakedaggressionbyIraqagainstitsneighbors,its efforts to obtain
*Editorsin Chief.Thelegalbasisfor the doctrine ofpreemptionis setoutinPresidentBush'sNationalSecuritytrategy:Forcenturies,internationallawrecognizedthat nations neednot suffer an attack beforetheycanlawfullytakeaction todefendthemselvesagainstforcesthatpresentanimminentdangerof attack.Legalscholarsandinternationaljuristsoftenconditionedthelegitimacyofpreemptiononthe evidenceofanimminentthreat-mostoftenavisiblemobilizationofarmies, navies,andair forcespreparingto attack.
THENATIONALECURITYTRATEGY FTHEUNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA5(Sept17,2002),availableat<http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.The notionofpreemptionisinherent in therightofself-defense,recognizingthe needtoadapttheconceptof imminence tothecapabilitiesandobjectivesoftoday'sadversaries.The useofforcepreemp-tivelyin self-defenseistherightofeachstateand does notrequireSecurityCouncilaction. Incalculatingwhetherthe test ofimminencehasbeenmet,itwould beirresponsibletoignorethatthese adversaries"relyonacts of terrorand,potentially,the useofweaponsof massdestruction-weaponsthatcan beeasilyconcealed,eliveredcovertly,ndused withoutwarning."d.(emphasisadded).In the case ofIraq,PresidentBushmade clearthatthe UnitedStatescouldalwaysproceedinthe exerciseof its inherentrightof self-defenserecognizedinArticle51 ofthe UnitedNationsCharter.SeeReportin ConnectionwithPresidentialDeterminationUnderPublicLaw107-243,reprintedn149
CONG.
REC.H1957,H1958(dailyed. Mar.19,2003)(onresolutionauthorizinguse offorceagainstIraq).
2003]003]55757
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