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Spring 1994
 / 
JFQ
7
I
ncreasingly the use of force is a last resortof industrialized nations. This is an ad-mission of defeat since war can no longerbe rationalized in economic terms. Forceis most effective when one possesses it but isnot compelled to use it. Conventional or nu-clear conflicts, the Persian Gulf Warnotwithstanding, are not worth the costs forthe losers, and in many cases not for the vic-tors. Bankruptcy, moral or financial, may bethe shared outcome for all parties to futureconflicts.The image of war, shaped over centuries,is precise, graphic, and evocative. It ismarked by battles: expenditures of bloodand treasure sufficient to achieve militaryobjectives that lead to new internationalalignments. Although this image is commonand compelling, it is increasingly irrelevant;it reflects outdated, simplistic, even roman-tic ideas about winning and losing. It is animage of war based on paradoxes thatshould be obvious on reflection, but thathave been elusive in developing new con-cepts for national security policy and mili-tary strategy.Paradoxes are variously defined as tenetscontrary to conventional wisdom, argu-ments that yield seemingly self-contradic-tory conclusions, and statements that runcounter to common sense. While much hasbeen said about the search for a new
Paradoxes of War
 By
GRANT T. HAMMOND
War is apt to defy its traditional image in the future. If the end of past wars was to win by fighting betterthan one’s adversary (violence marked by a hardware-driven, physical contest to destroy the enemy’s means),the end of future wars may be
not 
to lose by
not 
fighting an adversary (peaceful competition characterized bya software-driven, moral and cerebral contest to change perceptions). This is not simply a choice betweenconventional and unconventional images of war. We must reinvent war by redefining its nature. Armedconflict as it has been known is beyond the capacity of most nations today. Military victory no longer enjoysthe cachet that it once bore. By understanding the paradoxes of war we will help to ensure the future successof the Armed Forces.
Sum m ar y
Oil field set ablaze byretreating Iraqis.
U.S. Navy (Ed Bailey)
 
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JFQ
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Spring 1994
paradigm of national security, there is agood deal to be gained from reexaminingold paradoxes. The importance of paradoxesto understanding war is so vital as to betransforming. Future wars are likely to befought with different insights, using differ-ent means, and on different levels. Absentappropriate strategies, operational concepts,and tactics under this new set of circum-stances, the Nation will fail to prevail.
The Image of War
Perceiving war as a contest marked by theuse of force is a woefully incomplete, tragi-cally simplistic, and fundamentally flawedview. The consequences of such an image areprofound. By not graspingthe nature of war, wagingwar has become a need-lessly spendthrift exercisein lives and resources, how-ever well fought. Wars aremessy, unpredictable,costly, inefficient, and often ineffective.While war has been a major instrument of change across history, it is an increasingly un-affordable activity by most measures. It hasbeen a means of state creation and state de-struction. Slaughter on a grand scale usingunsophisticated but lethal weapons will con-tinue. Further, war will evolve into a morecarefully crafted form of conflict with a differ-ent set of dynamics than in the past.War may be transformed by changes inends as well as in means. Conflicts mayoccur in periods outwardly indistinguishablefrom peace and may not involve any forciblerearrangement of territory, interests, or re-sources. Such conflicts may be managedshifts in the
status quo
. In short, a future waramong industrialized states, even if effectiveand efficient, could be virtually invisible. Itis likely to be an information war at least inpart, waged between the perceptions of ad-versaries. It will involve legions of dataflows, competing information systems mar-shaled and sequenced like troops, aircraft,and ships. The sand table will be mental andemotional virtual war, no less deadly andreal. The Armed Forces must make major ad- justments to be successful in such conflicts.The accompanying table (Images of War) contrasts the received wisdom aboutwar with the reality. The conventional imageis the paradigm for describing, explaining,and predicting war; the unconventionalimage reflects the reality of waging war inthe future.This is not a case of either/or. We need
not 
select one image of war to the exclusionof the other. Rather, we must reformulatethe notion of war to include the unconven-tional as well as the conventional. The na-ture of wars—the arms with which they arefought, objectives for which they are waged,and means by which they are sustained—isat once more basic and complex than onewould believe.The elements of the paradoxes of warare not novel. Most have been known formillennia. Sun Tzu argued nearly 2,500 yearsago that war is based upon deception, andthat the acme of skill is to subdue enemieswithout fighting them.
1
While the reluc-tance to accept this truth is the subject of other discourses, suffice it to say that the in-sight found in these paradoxes when takencollectively leaves no alternative but to alterthe paradigm of war. Failing to do so will vir-tually guarantee the inability of the Nationto compete successfully in the post-ColdWar world. The Persian Gulf War then—which some argue the coalition forces
did not win
and Saddam’s army
did not lose
—isbut a foretaste of the disappointment to beexperienced unless we change our under-standing of war.
Conflict versus Competition
When a contest by force of arms occursthe results of peacetime military decisionsare either validated or invalidated. It is priorto a physical contest that weapons are de-signed and procured, strategy and tactics aredeveloped, and training is accomplished.Thus wars are often won or lost before a shotis fired. Great leaders, technological break-throughs, and luck may change outcomes,but such events are rare and do not consti-tute a sound strategy. The Battle of Britainexhibited all three factors but the outcomewas nonetheless extremely close.In his essay “The Moral Equivalent of War” William James stated: “The intensely
PARADOXES OF WAR
while war has been a majorinstrument of change acrosshistory, it is an increasinglyunaffordable activity
Grant T. Hammond is professor of internationalrelations and chairs the Department of NationalSecurity Studies at the Air War College. His latestbook is
Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991.
 
Spring 1994
 / 
JFQ
9
sharp competitive preparation for war by thenation is the real war, permanent, unceas-ing...the battles are only a sort of publicvindication of mastery gained during the
 peace
intervals.”
2
Thus the thing called war isnot real war, and it is won or lost, plannedor sought, fought or avoidedin the minds of those whoprepare for it in periods of supposed peace. An intervalof nonhostility is not be-nign but instead a contest inpreparedness. It constitutes the essence of the demonstration of fighting capabilitywhich we call war.
3
To wait for armed con-flict as the test of strength may be to lose. Itwill be too late to amass the human capital,materiel, and moral purpose to ensure vic-tory.
Physical versus Intellectual
If one could determine winners in ad-vance, it wouldn’t be necessary to competein order to validate previous analysis. Butthere is no absolute certainty which is thereason why the stadium, track, ring, andother venues attract the wagerer. The same istrue of wars. Billions of dollars are bet on theoutcome of contests conducted by the forceof arms. But if one knows an adversary andhis orientation; understands his culture, lan-guage, and personality; grasps his frame of reference; and shapes his choices, one mightinfluence his actions and reactions withoutresorting to force. If the acmeof martial skill is to subdue anenemy without fighting him asSun Tzu suggested, then wemust invest heavily in themental and the moral aspectsof war, not merely the physi-cal. This means that intelli-gence, deception, diplomacy,and other measures assume amuch higher priority. Knowingan adversary’s culture, religion,and perceptions is as importantas training, organizing, andequipping forces. Again, this isnot a novel insight but it is un-deremphasized. Our infatua-tion with national technicalmeans often eclipses morebasic knowledge. Cultural an-thropology may be as impor-tant to success in war as intelligence gath-ered from satellite imagery.Knowing how one’s adversary—the lead-ership and society—sees things is paramountand may well determine success or failure ina contest. The Tet offensive, although unin-tended, is an example. Despite the physicaldefeat of North Vietnamese and Viet Congforces, Tet represented a political and moralvictory of immense proportions for Hanoi.Americans had come to believe that theenemy was incapable of launching a majorattack, and subsequently many peopleturned against the government for lyingabout the conduct of the war.
Space versus Time
Most images of war are linked to destroy-ing an enemy, controlling resources, main-taining sovereignty, and rearranging territory.Yet wars are won or lost, begun and ended,and conducted in time as well as space, withtime normally the more important factor.Had Germany won a victory over Russiasooner and not had to wage a winter cam-paign, had American aircraft at Midway notfound the Japanese just prior to turning back to their carriers, and had Israel not learned toevade SAMs in the Yom Kippur war, the out-comes of those conflicts would have beenvastly different. But it is only recently andlargely through the work of John Boyd
4
that
Hammond
Images of War
Conventional ImageUnconventional Image
violent conflictpeaceful competitionphysical contestintellectual contestwaged in spacewaged in timeact of destructionprocess of creationbegun and ended by physical attackbegun and ended for moral purposefocused on adversary’s meansfocused on adversary’s perceptionstangible measuresintangible measureshardware-drivensoftware-drivendetermined by winning battlesdetermined by peacetime preparednessaim of war is to winaim of war is not to losewin by fighting betterbetter to win by not fighting
cultural anthropology maybe as important to successin war as intelligence
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