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Constitutional LawGeneral Types of Arguments
TextualArgumentsHistoricalArgumentsFramersIntent
Lessimportant toOriginalists
Structure oftheConstitution(broadly)
Other Parts ofConstitution
Precedent
BroadInterpretations
Social PolicyAnd/OrConsequencesof DecisionWords andplacement
Narrow
Mix of All ofthe Above(esp. historyand text)Judicial Review&
Marshall’s Opinion in
Marbury v. Madison 
Court’s Role in
Interpreting theConstitutionReview ofEXECUTIVE &LEGISLATIVELimits &RestraintsPolitical & Discretionary ActsNon-DiscretionaryRights of IndividualsBeginning ofPolitical QuestionDoctrine
SpecificIntentAt timeTraditionNaturalLawProcesses
of Gov‟t
Contemp.Values
Mix ofOpinion
Directed to perform certainacts, individual rights,officer of the lawPolitical powers, actionsrespect the nation & not indrights
 –
conscience guidesConstitution issupreme law ofland and SCOTUSis in charge ofinterpreting
TextualDefenses
Appellate review ofdecisions arisingunder theConstitution
Issues “especiallyfor the courts”
Judges take anoath to theConstitution &must uphold(hence review)Supremacy Clause
 –
laws are made in
pursuance of the Constitution 
 
Judiciability Doctrine
AdvisoryOpinionsStandingTimeliness
Article III
 –
 
“Cases
&
Controversies”
Linked to Desirability of Judicial Review
Broad & Narrow View
 –
Policy Decision
Actual Disputebetween AdverseLitigants
“Real
& nothypothetical
controversy”
Must BringSomeChange
Hayburn Case 
No overrideby Sec. ofDef of aSupremeCourtdecision
 
Plout Case 
:No overturnby C of afinal judgment(yes toprospective& inlitigation)
CausationInjury In Fact
Lujan 
:
Failure topurchase airline
tickets… whether 
imminent enoughof a threat(speculation)
Mass v. EPA
:Congress givingpower to create IIF
 –
weight of report &whether concreteinjury is clear
Redressabiltiy
Consideredtogether generallyTriggers forStanding Problems
Generalized Grievance
:
Gov‟t failing to follow the law and
bringing suit to do so (injury in fact)
Third Party Actor
:
That gov‟t is failing to regulate some
3
rd
party -
q‟s about
causation & redressability(Allen v. Wright
 –
IRS failure on tax exemptions for raciallysegregated schools; Lujan: failure of Sec of Interior onendangered species)
Separation ofPowersProblems
:Court not havingthe ability todetermine law,concerns aboutoverstepping
Mootness
(mostflexible)
Ripeness
(like IIF)
Pre-Enforcement Review
ofStatute or Regulation(
Abbott Labs 
)
Hardship for having to wait 
*generally economichardship will allow CT topush through
Factual Development: 
*the more facts that canbe developed the lesschance of a review
Capable of Repetition yet Evading Review 
(a) every time that it comes up, itwill be short lived(b) for individual
 –
likely to find forthe exception(c) unanswered for ind v. class
Voluntary Cessation: 
(a) no realisticchance that Dwill go back toharmful conductRendering adecision is nolonger possible orpurposeful, orwould be hypo
Exceptions
As a whole, thequestion is incapable of judicial reviewA. IV, Sec. 4 =Guaranty Clause =always non-justiciable
PoliticalQuestion
Final decision wouldlead to a politicaloutcome(Both sides point
back to Marshall‟s
Opinion in MvM)
Baker FactorsTextuallyCommitted
toAnother BranchArt. I, Sec. 5Lack of judiciallydiscoverable andmanageablestandards forresolution(
competence
)
Embarrassment
Potential for anotherbranch,
policy
question, or
deference
to anotherbranch
Often occurtogether
Class Actions: 
Self-interestedparties arestilladvocating
Concrete, certain, and ripe for review
 –
normally needviolation; sometimes just never enforced or toohypothetical
 –
(a) probability that event will occur (b)hardship to parties if denied, (c) fitness of record todetermine legal issues presented
Collateral consequences 
: 
Effect will belonger lastingeven if seeminglydecided(
Poe v. Ullman 
 
 –
 no actualprosecution)
Necessary
WashingtonQuestion toJustices
:Refused toanswer b/cadvisory andnotnecessary
“Personal injury fairly traceable to the D‟s allegedlyunlawful conduct and redressed by requested relief”
(a) distinct &palpable, (b) notabstract orhypothetical, (c)personally injuredFairly traceable to theaction of D, generallymeasures Ps stake inthe outcome
Lyons 
:Failure to showthe possiblefuture injury(D: Marshall)
Whether ruling wouldbind D and have aneffect for P
Aikan 
:Access toinformation wasenough to meetstandard
Richard 
:Actual payment ofchild support notguaranteed
Notes: -Only 1 need standing -State surrender of rights 
Mass v. EPA
:Third party
Powell v.McCormack 
:House adjudicatorypower of Art I, Sec. 5,but determined onlyas qualifications notpower to not seat
Goldwater 
:Rescinding a treaty,question left forexecutive, must lookat terms ofconstitution to thisfactor
Goldwater 
:Not appropriate ifonly left toinferences, dissent(Brennan) says thatforeign relations canbe det by SCOTUS
Goldwater 
:If there would bemultipledeterminations fromdifferent branches of
gov‟t
Tied to Const.Eval through
Nixon 
:Const. did givestandards House/ Senate to act &would not beappropriate for SC todetermine
consider
 
Vertical Separation of Powers:FEDERALISM
Enumerated PowersRationale
10
th
Amendment &
States‟ Rights
RationalesEffectiveness ofthe FederalGovernmentHistorical IssuesHistoricalUnderstanding ofthe CommerceClauseArt. I, Sec 8
McCulloch v. MD 
:
Marshall gives a verybroad interpretation ofNecessary & ProperClause, importance ofConst in regulation of pplnot the states; implied/ inherent powers justified
Early Interpretation
“All leg powersherein granted”
Article IGenerally Sec. 8
Necessary &Proper Clause(17)
(must be tied topower in Sec 8)
CommerceClause
Gibbons v. Ogden 
:Broad interstate, butconsidered a broad sphereof independence*when only affects 1 stateCommerce =
„traffic‟
&
„interstate‟
,
„navigation‟
,
„intermingled‟
Area for Congressional Regulation = intermingledand sharing among state commerce
1890s to 1937:State Sovereignty
(1)
Narrow definition of „commerce‟
(2)
restrictive of „among the states‟
(3) Cong violates 10
th
when in area of states
1937 to 1990s:
Broad Nat’l Power 
Wickard v. Fillmore (1942) 
:Broad interstate, but considered a broadsphere of independence - *when only affects1
state”
; disband ideas of directness,production, et al
1990s to Today:Shift Back
 –
Cong. Limits
Exclusively StateRights for SomeSpheres & 10
th
 amd back in actionManufacturing v.CommerceDirect v. IndirectBright LineApproachesMore of aSpectrumApproach toDeterminingCongressionalPowerVery few limits onCongressionalPower, started byG. DepressionLimits to C reg based on effect on 1 state =completely internalPrevent federaltyranny
Enhance democraticrule closer to pplStates as laboratoriesfor projectsElections will be limit,not 10
th
amd
Protection of States‟
RightsSenators no longerelected by state govt
EC Knight 
: direct effects test
 –
 mfer is not commerce, no reg ifw/ no effect on other state
Carter Coal 
: commerce goingelsewhere is NOT subject toregs when inside state
TX Railway 
: intrastate cannotdamage industry in anotherstate (move to intra)
Stream ofCommerce
ALA Schechter 
: not SOCamong states, not direct
10
th
Amendment Limits: Next Page
NLRB v. Jones (1937) 
:Steel production regs; statute defines
“affecting commerce”
- effect on commerceNOT the injury needed for inspection
Look at effect oncommerce, not injury itself
Darby (1941) 
:Overturn Dagenhart, intrastate which soaffect interstate commerce or the exercise ofpower of Congress over to make legitimateend
 –
w/in Cong power
Effect on interstatecommerce generally
Broad “Among the States”
Regulation Permitted
Heart of Atlanta (1964) 
:Moral wrong allowed for regulation, disruptiveeffect that racial discrimination has had oncommercial intercourse
 –
 
means must bereasonably adapted to the end permittedby Const.
Katzenbach (1964) 
:Within state = completely within and does notaffect other States & not interfering with othergoals of govt; - the interstate nature of therestaurant permitted regulation
Hodel (1981) 
:Strip-Mining: Regulation permitted so long asrational basis by Congress for regulating
Perez (1971) 
:Loan-sharking, Congressional enactmentand basis for regulation (even criminal)
CongressionalAuthorization
Federalism protectsindividuals
Madison‟s Double
Security
Noneconomic criminal willlikely fail under Comm ClMust be tied to CongressAuthorizationNot traditional stateactivity (fam, ed, land)Congress should giveexpression of justification10
th
Amd = Limit oncommandeering and stateacting for fed govtChannels affirmed for reg
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