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North Korean Endgame: Working toward Full Political and Economic RelationsMay 01, 2009Summary.
A continuing leitmotif of North Korean regional foreign policy is to establish fullpolitical and economic relations with the US – including a peace treaty between the twocountries. This goal has been a centerpiece of North Korea’s foreign policy with the US sincethe signing of the Agreed Framework on 21 Oct 94. North Korea cites Paragraph II of the 1994Agreed Framework as the basis of its argument whenever it claims that the US is not living up to“agreed” commitments regarding North Korea. Recent North Korean events such as themissile launch, withdrawal from the 6PT, and threats to extract plutonium from spent fuel rods,conduct a 2nd nuclear test and additional ICBM launches are all designed to cajole the US intobilateral negotiations, paving the way for an eventual normalization of bilateral relations.With the change in US Administration, North Korea expected a US willingness, and perhapseagerness, to initiate bilateral negotiations. To North Korea’s surprise, the US chose instead totake the silent road – all but ignoring the North except through the multi-lateral UNSC and 6PTforums.North Korea will likely continue to “push the envelope”, believing that further elevated tension onthe Korean Peninsula will compel the US into bilateral negotiations on North Korea’s terms – which the North believes will force benefits from the US (i.e. energy aid, light-water reactors,etc.) and eventually lead to full political and economic relations with the US.
Introduction.
On 14 Apr, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks(6PT) and the restart of its nuclear program in reaction to the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) presidential statement issued on 13 Apr. The statement denounced North Korea’s 05Apr long-range ballistic missile launch which occurred in defiance of numerous warnings fromthe international community. By 16 Apr, the IAEA nuclear monitors left North Korea, followedby the US nuclear specialists on 17 Apr, leaving North Korea relatively free to resume its nuclearand missile development without the prying eyes of the US and international community. On25 Apr, North Korea announced that it has restarted extracting plutonium from spent fuel rods atits Yongbyon nuclear facility. On 29 Apr, North Korea, in its latest move to increase tension,
 
 2threatened that it will conduct additional nuclear and long-range missile tests in response to theUNSC sanctions. The vehicle used to convey the message – a lengthy Foreign Ministryspokesman’s statement – was both authoritative and unambiguous. Along with the threats,North Korea characterized the UNSC actions as an annulment of the Armistice Agreement, andconsequently, a “declaration of war.”For observers of Northeast Asian security issues there is little doubt North Korea marches to itsown drum with little concern for international decorum – as long as such measures benefit theregime. There is also little doubt North Korea conducts meticulous preparation and followsexhaustive pre-planned options in its foreign policies. The prevailing opinion regarding therecent missile launch and the latest threat of nuclear test is no different – Kim Jong-il, facingdomestic and international economic hardship, international pressure to conform, and possiblydomestic political instability, opted to forge ahead with the missile test (which North Koreaclaims was a satellite launch) and the threat to conduct additional nuclear and missile tests onlyafter precise risk/gain calculations (or perhaps miscalculations).So, what is the desired end state North Korea is seeking to achieve from the recent events ithas set in motion? The optimal end state for North Korea is direct negotiations with the US,independent of the 6PT or any other multilateral forum.
Recent North Korean experience with bilateral negotiations.
During the Clintonadministration North Korea enjoyed a certain level of bilateral relations with the US. TheAgreed Framework of 1994; 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil per annum; two light-waterreactors through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO); Jo MyongRok’s visit to the White House; and Secretary of State Albright’s visit to Pyongyang were alldirect results of US-North Korea bilateral negotiations. The inauguration of the Bushadministration in 2001, however, brought forth a significant change in US foreign policy towardNorth Korea. Unlike the Clinton administration, the Bush administration disengaged from NorthKorea and opted to deal with it only through multilateral means – such as the 6PT.The US refusal to engage North Korea in a bilateral setting, and North Korea’s provocativeattempts to force the US into bilateral negotiations (i.e. Taepo Dong-2 missile launch in Jul 06and underground nuclear test in Oct 06) continued until mid-2008. On 26 Jun 08, the USagreed, in a bilateral setting, to lift some provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act andinitiated the process to remove North Korea from the
US List of Terrorism Sponsoring Countries 
 
 3in return for North Korea’s nuclear asset/program submission and assurance it would continue6PT participation. On 27 Jun 08, with the world’s news cameras watching, North Koreademolished the cooling tower for the 5MWe nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. On 12 Oct 08, aftermuch rhetoric from the North, the US removed North Korea from the
US List of Terrorism Sponsoring Countries.
With its name removed from the
List 
, North Korea believed it was timefor the next step towards achieving elusive normalization of bilateral relations.
North Korea’s Miscalculation and Choice in Strategy.
During North Korea’s formulation ofits next US policy, it would have viewed Senator Obama’s victory over Senator McCain in the2008 US Presidential Election as an opportunity. To North Korea, President Obama appearedthat he was willing to have immediate direct dialogue with North Korea, as he made clear thathe would engage North Korea via dialogue during his presidential campaign. This led theNorth to assess the Obama administration’s North Korea foreign policy would be much like thatof its Democratic predecessor – the Clinton administration. Considering North Korea was ableto get the Bush administration to remove it from the
US terrorism list 
, it assessed that it couldachieve much higher gains in political, economic, and security fronts in direct negotiations withthe Obama administration (then it would have against Bush administration).These assessments led the North to believe that Obama’s North Korean stance would beweaker than the previous administration’s, and that the North could dictate to the US the termsof bilateral negotiations. To test its theory, North Korea offered to send a senior diplomat to theinauguration of President Obama. If the US had accepted the offer it would signal USrecognition of North Korea diplomatically and signal a willingness to deal bilaterally but, to NorthKorea’s chagrin, the US rejected North Korea’s offer on 12 Jan. North Korea issued animmediate reaction (on 13 Jan) through its foreign ministry stating that the US should firstnormalize relations with North Korea as a precondition for its denuclearization and that NKwould hold onto its nuclear weapons as long as the US backed the ROK with its own atomicarsenal. The statement also demanded that if “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula isthe issue to be settled only when the DPRK shows nuclear weapons,” then North Korea mustalso verify the presence of nuclear weapons in the ROK and the same rule applied to US troopsstationed in the ROK. North’s second reaction came on 16 Jan when it issued another strongstatement directed at the US about retaining nuclear weapons. The North stated that it willboost its nuclear deterrent and maintain its nuclear weapons as long as it remains under anuclear threat from the US.
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