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MILITARYREVIEW
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July-August 2001
ments. The foundation of this full spectrum cred-ibility is our ability to dominate land combat. Ourdemonstrated warfighting ability enhances deter-rence by allowing the National Command Author-ity to deter conflict and, when deterrence fails, toenter and dominate combat on our terms. Adversar-ies know they cannot win conventional, high inten-sity clashes with US forces, so the threat to Armyforces is increasingly unconventional and asymmet-ric. Threats have ready access to off-the-shelf tech-nologies that can confound our units and inflict ca-sualties as much for political effect as for tacticaladvantage. Battles will migrate into urban and com-plex terrain where US standoff weapons offer fewadvantages and the proximity of noncombatants lim-its US firepower. The elusive threat in close, com-plex terrain will challenge our leaders and their sol-diers as never before.Technology continues to change the way theArmy trains and operates. Increasingly lethal weap-ons and breakthroughs in command and controlimprove US forces effectiveness, but not uniformly.Legacy, digital and Interim forces operating in thesame area challenge commanders and staffs to com-bine their capabilities effectively. US forces lack a technological monopoly; even adversaries withouta research and development capability can purchaseremarkably sophisticated systems. Army leaders in this technology-rich environment must be able toadopt emerging capabilities and adapt them to theirrapidly changing operational environment.Success in full spectrum operations depends onleaders who consistently make better and faster de-cisions than their opponents, which means battlecommand education and training must evolve andexpand. Materiel approaches and technological ad- vances are only tools that leaders leverage. Com-manders must visualize an expanded battle space;describe it clearly; direct soldiers, units and systems to accomplish their missions; and lead from thefront. Understanding, confidence and trust betweencommanders and subordinates enable everyone toexploit opportunities, even in the absence of orders.Battle command in this new operational environ-ment requires relevant operational and educationalexperiences to train and develop leaders. The emerg-ing question is whether current Army training andleader development systems are adequate to produceleaders for these information-age battlefields.The Army established its current training doctrinein 1987 to meet Cold War needs and described itin Field Manual (FM) 7-0 (25-100),
Training the Force
, and FM 7-10 (25-101),
Battle Focused Training
. The doctrines training principles and training management process have served the Army well. Today, a primary criticism concerning train-ing doctrine is simply that leaders are not follow-ing the principles or the training management pro-cess. Increased taskings, high personnel tempo,excessive operational pace and undermanned unitsseriously degrade unit efforts to apply the doctrine.Solid training based on mission essential task lists(METL) competes with requirements for installationand community support, nonmission training andlast minute taskings. The Red, Amber, Green train-ing management process blurs and collapses whenunits are tasked regardless of their cycle. Unit train-ing is top driven, not determined at the lowest tac- tical level, and the quarterly training brief has devi-ated from its doctrinal intent as a training contract with higher headquarters.Changes in the operational environment, the Na- tional Military Strategy and force structure require the Army to reevaluate training doctrine and tech-niques. Fundamentally sound principles from cur-rent doctrine, such as standards-based METL train-ing, assessments and feedback for leaders, units and the Army, should continue to provide the founda- tion for the next generation of training doctrine.Like current training doctrine, Army leadershipdoctrine has roots more than a decade old. In aleader development study directed by General(GEN) Carl E. Vuono and completed in April 1988,GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, then Deputy Comman-dant of the US Army Command and General Staff College, concluded that the Army has two primaryleader development tasks. First, the Army must de- velop leaders who can prepare the force for war.Second, the Army must develop leaders who canapply doctrine to win battles and campaigns. A keyrecommendation of the Sullivan Study was a for-mal Army leader development system. This systemnow includes a leader development model that
Threats have ready access tooff-the-shelf technologies that canconfound our units and inflictcasualties as much for politicaleffect as for tactical advantage.Battles will migrate into urban andcomplex terrain where US standoff weapons offer few advantages andthe proximity of noncombatantslimits US firepower.
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