Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why Author(s): Stephen D.

Krasner Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, World System Debates (Mar., 1981), pp. 119-148 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600213 . Accessed: 15/10/2011 22:24
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Transforming Regimes International

theThird World Wants and Why What
STEPHEN D. KRASNER

of PoliticalScience Department Los Angeles of California, University

weaknessof ThirdWorldstateshas made themexcepThe domesticand international They have system. emanatingfromthe international tionallyvulnerableto pressures international thesepressures Thisquest to ameliorate regimes. bytransforming attempted thestructure ofinternational organizations to capture bytheir ability has beenfacilitated of content createdby the UnitedStatesat theconclusionof WorldWar II. The specific by the South have been Third World demandsand the exceptionalunitymaintained some of the embodying conditionedby the widespreadacceptance of a beliefsystem of dependency perspectives. precepts

Introduction
have pursuedmanyobjectivesin theinternaDevelopingcountries havebeenpurely designed to pragmatic, tionalsystem. Some objectives themostpublicized economicwell-being. enhanceimmediate However, overtherestructurrelations, global bargaining aspectsofNorth-South cannotbe understood in strictly economic regimes, ing of international terms.By basicallychanging norms, rules, or instrumental principles, of goods and factors the movement thataffect in the and procedures worldeconomy,the Third Worldcan enhancenot onlyits economic but also its politicalcontrol.The emphasisthe South has well-being

Robert AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would liketo thankRichardBaum,PeterGourevitch, Stein,and Arthur PeterKenen,RobertKeohane,JohnRuggie, PeterKatzenstein, Jervis, Withouttheirhelp the arguments Studies Quarterly. the editorsof the International John Kroll providedveryable here would have been far less satisfactory. presented the data on tax structures. assistancein analyzing
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 25 No. 1, March 1981 119-148 ? 1981 1 S A

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of fourbasic regimechange is a manifestation givento fundamental countries; ofvirtually all developing weakness theinternational factors: ofvirtually all developing countries; thesystemic weakness thedomestic were created which institutions offered bytheinternational opportunities ofa acceptance powernowin decline;and thepervasive bya hegemonic orientation. a dependency embodying system belief levelall statesare accordedformal equalityas At the international The underlying power capabilitiesof states establishno sovereigns: to certain basicrights, especially withregard differentation presumptive a givengeographic area. At the same within authority sole legitimate is characterized by an unpreceinternational system time,the present in underlying large power capabilitiesbetween denteddifferentiation and small states.Never have stateswithsuch wildlyvariantnational weakstates as formal can rarely equals. Very coexisted powerresources theutilization international behaviorsolelythrough hope to influence is restructuring regime of theirnationalpowercapabilities.For them, because it offers a levelofcontrol an attractive foreign policystrategy, resources thatcouldnever be accomplished overstateswithmuchlarger normalstatecraft groundedin dyadicinteractions. through economicand politicalstrucand weaknessof domestic The rigidity factorthat has made basic is second countries a in tures developing World. Withtheexception ofa for the Third important change regime the economies of the Third World are small numberof countries, withlow levelsoffactor sectors and primary dominated byagricultural is highbecauseitis difficult to adjustto external Vulnerability mobility. are also weak; the statecannotmanipulate changes.Politicalsystems emanating those resourcesthat mightlessen the impactof pressures International environment. regimescan limit fromthe international or automatically resources to compensate vacillations provide external fordeleterious changes. systemic forthe prominence of a basic regime The thirdelement accounting offered of is the set of opportunities by the character changestrategy These organizations organizations. post-WorldWar II international that made Third World programsmore have offered opportunities The ThirdWorld has been able to turninstitufeasibleand effective. are likely to afflict any tionsagains theircreators.Such developments createdby a hegemonic power.This powerestablishes set of regimes normsand principles, but legitiitspreferred to legitimate institutions are givenindependence iftheinstitutions mationcan onlybe effective can thenbe used byweak statesto turn This autonomy and autonomy.

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disdainedbythehegemonic to purposesand principles theinstitutions power. and international opportunities Affecting both domesticincentives economicorderhas in theThirdWorld'squest fora new international been a belief systemassociated with theoriesof dependency.This not only accounting has been a critical factor, orientation intellectual unity butalso foritsextraordinary success, forsomeoftheThirdWorld's Eveneconomically transformation. associatedwithregime on questions successful developing countries with flexible domestic structures have not brokenwiththeGroup of and conservative politicalregimes such a perspectives, pervadedby dependencia 77. In an atmosphere No elements. a regime's positionwithdomestic breakcould undermine and principles thenorms ofinternaThirdWorldstateopenlyendorses even ifsome of themadopt itsrulesand procedures. tional liberalism, The ideologicalhegemony enjoyedbythe UnitedStatesat theconcluworld sion of World War II has totallycollapsed,and the alternative analyseshas forgedthe South into a by dependency view presented regime change. bloc on questionsrelatedto fundamental unified

The Variety of ThirdWorldGoals

vulnerability, and thequest The emphasisin thisessayon weakness, thatLDCs are uninterested in purely is not meantto imply forcontrol states have of a wide variety Third World pursued economicobjectives. international economic equalpolitical growth, goals. These include and arenas,autonomy in international decision-making ity,influence of territorial from external integrity the preservation independence, the dissemination of new world invasion or internalfragmentation, views at the global level, and the maintenanceof regimestability (Wriggens,1978: 37-39; Rothstein,1979: 3). They have used a wide varietyof tacticsto promotethese objectives,includingcommodity regionalcoalitions,universalcoalitions,allianceswith organizations, viomajor powers,irregular major powers,local wars to manipulate of multinational regulation lence, bilateraleconomic arrangements, nationalizationof foreignholdings,foreignexchange corporations, loans. and international manipulation, This essay does not reviewall aspectsof ThirdWorld behavior.It associatedwithconon an area wherepoliticalobjectives concentrates salient-Third Worldefforts to enhancepower trol have been highly

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of international regimes. and construction thetransformation through rules, principles, institutions, By buildingor alteringinternational imcan bothameliorate thevulnerability weakercountries and norms, capabilitiesand their posed by theirlack of national material-power and increaseresourceflows. weak domesticpoliticalstructures, Third World politicalbehavior,like all politicalbehavior,can be relationalpowerbehaviorwhichaccepts dividedinto two categories: to alter behaviorwhichattempts existingregimes,and meta-power to the abilityto changeoutcomesor Relationalpowerrefers regimes. decisionin thecourseofexplicit political affect thebehaviorof others to structure is thecapacity theenvironmakingprocesses.Meta-power the can involve are made.This structuring whichdecisions mentwithin and values(Baumnorms, arrangements, of institutional manipulation acceptstheexistand Burns,1975). Relationalpowerbehavior gartner behaviorattempts to alterthose ing rules of the game; meta-power rules. theresources availableto Outcomescan be changedbothbyaltering the regimes thatconditionaction. individualactors and by changing with relational ofstruggles requires theoutcome power fought Changing actor capability.However,such changesdo not necessarily changing in meta-power. An individual maywinmoremoney an alteration imply without therules changing to becomea better pokerplayer by learning more by attracting of poker. A politicalpartymay win more offices A statemayprevail elections. thelawsgoverning without voters altering withotherinternational actorsbyenhancin disputes morefrequently the institutional ing its national power capabilitieswithoutaltering and rulesthatconditionsuch disputes. norms, structures, Meta-power Outcomescan also be changedby changingregimes. this. it implies a to is do Successfully implemented, behavior designed who win at well. Individuals may as poker in relational power change lose at bridge;politicalpartiesthatsecureseats undera proportional be excludedbysingle-seat states districts; might system representation fromcartelized be poorerif revenue exportsmight thatsecuregreater the price of theirproductwas dictatedby those with the greatest thegamefrom An actorcapable of changing poker military capability. to single-seat, fromecoto bridge,fromproportional representation Actorsmay nomic to military capability,has exercisedmeta-power. their ownnational relational powerbyenhancing seekto enhancetheir to securemorefavorable outcomesby or they mayattempt capabilities, a meta-power designedto changeregimes. strategy pursuing

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Most studies of international politicshave implicitly emphasized relational powerbecausethey deal with warand theuse offorce. In this considerations are oflimited arena,meta-power import becauseinstitutional restraints, norms,and rulesare weak. Discussions of just war not descriptive. docrinesare prescriptive, Especiallywithregard to the reasonsforwhichwarsare begun,as opposed to thewayinwhichthey Rules relatedto tacit are conducted,regimeshave had littleeffect. somewars,butthey mutualrestraints havedevelopedduring havebeen inchoate and weak. War outcomes are determined by the relative national materialcapabilitiesforthe actors involved:what resources underthejurisdiction ofthestate,and howwellthestate are nominally is able to mobilizeand efficiently deploytheseresources. thantheuse offorce, however, havebeen In issueareas other regimes on normsand rulescan prevent more salient.Agreement suboptimal occurwhenindividual outcomesthatwould otherwise does rationality These situationsare associated, for not maximize collectiveutility. instance, withfreeridersor, to citea secondexample,withprisoners' dilemma(Stein, 1980;Keohane, 1980b).Highlevelsofeconomicactivityare impossible without predictable patterns of behavior.Such patterns will evolve into habits, usage, and conventionswith some connotations normative (Young, 1980). Wars involverelational power based on national power capabilities;nonbelligerent strategies issue to meta-power to alterregimes. areas are susceptible strategies designed in employing bothrelational ThirdWorldstatesare interested power and meta-power. Proposals forregime change,voicedbythelessdeveto exercise reflect an effort loped countries, meta-power. The objective of these proposals, of whichthe programassociated withthe New EconomicOrders(NIEO) is themostrecent International is and salient, the basic institutional to transform structures, norms,principles, and movement of goods, services, rules that conditionthe international is particularly Such transformation capital, labor, and technology. of ThirdWorldstatesto accomplish their because theability attractive theexercise ofrelational objective solelythrough poweris limited bythe exiguityof their national material-power capabilities.These alone could not resolvethe vulnerability problemsof poorerstates. Most ThirdWorldproposalsforregime changehave been made in Debates withinthese organizations have international organizations. withinstitutional notjust been concerned and rules, structures, norms, theNIEO and otherproposalsfor of resources. thetransfer However, between regime changehave been butone ofmanykindsofinteraction

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theNorthand the South. Withregardto actual resource movements, themostimportant settings have been nationaland bilateral, not universal.In such settings, developingstateshave usuallysoughtto use economicinterests. relational powerto enhancespecific Theyhavenot rawmaterials, as wellas some to alterregimes. tried (Oil and someother ofmultinational are themajorexcepnationalregulation corporations, tionsto thisgeneralization.) borrowson the EuroWhen, for instance,a developingcountry it attempts to get the best possibleterms.It does not, dollar market, the abilityof privatefinancial institutions to base however, challenge economicreturns. Whena state theirdecisionson maximizing private withtheInternational a stand-by Fund negotiates agreement Monetary to use relationalpower to adjust the termsand (IMF), it attempts It does not, however,challengethe conditionsof the arrangement. forecoof the IMF to signan accord thatspecifies authority targets between nomicpolicies.The modal formof interaction industrialized and developingareas has involvedthe transfer of resources and the exerciseof relational power,and has takenplace in bilateralarenas. Some examples of relationalpower and meta-power policies in nationaland bilateral (as opposedto multilateral) settings are shownin are further thefollowing table. Multilateral settings brokendowninto and South-South North-South arrangements arrangements. The entries in thistable are examples.However,their is meantto be in frequency The upperleft proportion to actualconditions. and lowerright cellsare takes place. the ones in whichmostactivity one of the cells is not incompatible Behaviorthatfallswithin with another.In recent behavior thatfallswithin yearstheGroup of 77 has theleast-developed forgeneralized debtrelief pressed (at leastfor states) such as UNCTAD and the United forums at universalinternational thisissueat multilateral while NationsGeneralAssembly, down-playing such as the World Bank and the IMF, where financialinstitutions Journal Oct. 4, 1976:8, 3; Rothweighted votingprevails(Wall Street to stein,1979: 161). Algeriapursued"pragmatic" policieswithrespect actedas theleaderof naturalgas exportswhileBoumedienne liquefied of different Movement. The pursuit theNon-Aligned goals in different or incoherent is not inconsistent forums (Gosovic and Ruggie, 1976: It does notreflect between 312,fora similar conclusions). disagreement who do not understand politicallyorientedforeignaffairsofficials of officials whorecognize the"realities" economics and finance ministry of ThirdWorldstrategies Rather,the variety global interdependence. manifests a variety of objectives.

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This essay is concernedwith only one aspect of Third World cell of Table 1. Developingcountries behavior-the lowerright-hand have soughtto alter regimesin a varietyof issue areas. They have to createnewinstitutional structures or to changepatterns attempted of influence, particularly structures. votingallocations,in existing They newinternational norms.And theyhavetried have soughtto establish to changerules.Many of thesequests have been successful.

ThirdWorldMotivations
ThirdWorlddemandsforregime cannotbe seeninany restructuring of economic failure.During the postwar simpleway as a reflection of developing areas has been faster period the overall rate of growth countries. thanthatofindustrialized Trade patterns havebecomemore and commodities. diversewithregardto partners Indicatorsof social infantmortality, well-being, includinglife expectancy, and literacy, in manyareas. The economicperformance have dramatically increased thepostwar of theSouth during thanthatofthe periodhas beenbetter industrialized countries duringthe nineteenth century froman enormousgap in However,the South continuesto suffer at theinternational leveland from powercapabilities social rigidity and political weaknessat the domesticlevel. Creatingnew regimesthat is one way to deal withthesestructural reflect Southernpreferences weaknesses.
INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES

There have always been small states in the moderninternational theindustrial system. Before revolution, however, there was little variation in levels of economic development. With regardto per capita income,the richestcountry was only about twiceas well offas the poorestat the beginning of the nineteenth century. Now, the richest countries are 80 to 100timesbetter off thanthepoorest. The combination of small size and underdevelopment has leftmanyThirdWorld statesin an unprecedentedly weak position. Measuringrelative powerresources is a perennial problemforstudentsof international relations.There is no simplestatistic thatadequately summarizesall aspects of national power capabilities.Resources,and conversely vulnerabilities, vary fromone issue area to another(Baldwin, 1979). The best single indicatoris a measureof

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incornational accountstatistics economicoutput. Aggregate aggregate thatcan be tappedbythestateto one poratea wide rangeof activities of purposes. extentor anotherfora variety thenumber of states, century of thenineteenth Since the beginning dramatismall states,has expanded.This trendincreased particularly WorldWarII. The following tableshows after callywithdecolonization oftheratiosofGNP ofthelargest statein thesystem to thedistribution theentry 4 other statesfortheyears1830,1938,and 1970.For instance, there for1830indicates that werefour countries inthe in thefirst column wereequal to between 20% and whose grossnationalproducts system 100% of the gross nationalproductof Russia, the largeststatein the system. In 1830,the ratio of the GNPs of the largeststate,Russia, to the are available, Denmark,was 41:1. In smalleststateforwhichfigures state,the United 1970,the ratioof the nationalincomesof thelargest theMaldives,was 97,627:1.By 1970,34% ofthe States,and thesmallest, had nationalincomesthatwereless system statesin the international thatof the UnitedStates and 72% had national than one thousandth oftheU.S. figure. Thesearestaggering lessthanone hundredth incomes a whole foronly11% the Third World as accounted In 1970, disparities. of worldGNP (Leontief,1977: 8). that Withthe exceptionof China, thereis no ThirdWorldcountry can lay claim to greatpowerstatus.However,theGNP ofthe United thanChina's.Countries proffered as regional Statesis 5.64 times larger nationalpowercapabilities. hegemonic powersdo not have impressive theGNPs of India and Brazil(thetwo largest In the mid-1970s, in the ThirdWorldafter China) wereabout the same as thoseof Spain and theKhomeini rivalled Belgium's; regime) Poland; Iran's(and thisbefore Saudi Arabia and Nigeriahad GNPs about equal to thoseof Denmark and Finland. There is littleprospectforfundamental change in the foreseeable fortheUnitedNations,Leontief In a study has estimated aggrefuture. areas of the gate and per capita incomein the year2000 fordifferent To meethis optimistic for target assumptions. world,underdifferent Leontief LDCs growth, (1977: 11) arguesthat"two generalconditions internal and are necessary: far-reaching changesofsocial,political first, in thedeveloping and second,signifiinstitutional character countries, development cant changesin the world economicorder.Accelerated oftheincomegap between thedevelreduction leadingto a substantial oping and the developed countriescan only be achieved througha were of both theseconditions."Even iftheseconditions combination the met,the gap in powercapabilitiesas indicatedby GNP between

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Northand the South would stillbe enormous.Leontief (1977: 8) estimatesthattheshareofglobalaggregate output accounted forbytheless would riseto only22% in the year2000. developedcountries is focusedon theGNP gap between theNorthand Thus, ifattention ofThirdWorldcountries is bleak.Few can hopeto South,thesituation to smallsize industrialized evenmedium countries in thearea challenge Even with rapid rates of economic of aggregateeconomic activity. theabsolutegap is now so largethatit cannotbe closedin the growth, ' foreseeable future. as a measureof powercapability has theadvanUsingGNP figures and accessibility; however, it also has the tagesof easy comparability disadvantageof obscuringpotentialvariationsin power capabilities issue areas. Yet, evenat a disaggregated is across different level,there can acteffectively thatThirdWorldcountries little evidence byutilizing only theirnational materialresources.In the area of raw materials efforts have failed-with the exceptionof oil-although cartelization stateshavehad sporadicsuccessinpushing coffee exporting up prices by in London and New York,and copperproducers inwithholding buying fortheexporters themarket. The fundamental stockfrom of problem is thatthere is a hightemptation commodities to cheaton any primary ofadditionalrevenues rewards because themarginal for cartelscheme, are veryhigh(KrasThirdWorldgovernments strappedforresources to tradein manufactures, ner, 1974). Withregard ThirdWorldexporthanindustrialized tersdependfarmoreon Northern markets countries do on manufactured countries have goods fromthe South. Northern industries thesame products, import competing capable of producing whiletheSouthdoes nothavealternative markets. Withregard to bank Mexico and Brazil,have lending, largeThirdWorlddebtors, especially theconsequencesof default. securedsome leverage through Whilethis access to creditmarkets, it has notenabled has giventhemcontinued ofcredit relations or to keepinterest them to alterthebasic nature rates arerolling debtors burdens overtheir down.2Smaller old carrying heavy new loans. debt but havingdifficulty securing There are two major exceptionsto these comments about Third is areas. The first World nationalpower capabilitiesin specific-issue
to close theabsolutegap is thattheratioofthegrowth forbeginning 1. The condition oftheGNP ofthe exceedtheratio rateofthelarger to thegrowth country rateofthesmaller LDCs, 1970seventhefastest In themidgrowing to theGNP ofthesmaller. country larger thanmostindustrialized faster times four suchas Korea and Brazil(whichweregrowing did formost forthe UnitedStates,althoughthey did notmeetthiscondition countries), Europeancountries. been payingspreadsof up to 1.5% above LIBOR whileindus2. Brazil has recently theEuro-dollar spreadsof0.5% or lesseventhough have beensecuring countries trialized states. is flushwithnew depositsfromoil-exporting market

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resources and inelasthecombination ofexcessfinancial OPEC, where to raisepriceseightfold ticdemandhas enabledThirdWorldcountries in nominal termsover the last seven years. The second is national ofmultinational countries have control corporations. Manydeveloping excluded MNCs from certain sectors,nationalizedor unilaterally and hard mineralcorporations, alteredthe concessionsof petroleum or shareofforeign nationals either theownership generally and limited in specificindustries (UN, 1978: 19-24).Controlover access to their source of leveragefor LDCs. Hosthas been an important territory access and technolnationalshave also learnedabout market country power(Huntington, 1973; ogy,whichhas giventhemmorebargaining than can be Vernon, 1971: 2; Moran, 1974). However,the pressure is limited offirms in to relocate exercised byhostcountries bytheability morehospitablecountries.3 of MNCs, fewThirdWorld oil and domestic Aside from regulation environment stateshave any abilityto altertheirinternational solely Theirsmallsize theuse ofnationalmaterial-power capabilities. through evenin specific-issue condition areas,is thefirst and limited resources, to attempt thefundamental alteration ofinternational thathas led them based upon nationalmaterial statecraft attribregimes. Conventional A meta-political utes is unlikelyto reduce vulnerabilities. strategy offers an attractive designedto alter rules, norms,and institutions ifonly by default. alternative,
DOMESTIC STR UC TURES

thathas driven The secondcondition ThirdWorldstates to attempt a of international is the weaknessof theirown transformation regimes societies The international domestic and politicalsystems. weakness of mostdeveloping as indicatedbytheir smallaggregate outputin states, withthatofindustrialized states, suggests thatthey cannot comparison theinternational influence It also suggests thatthey will directly system. be subjectto external forces thattheycannotchange.Small statesare usually more heavilyinvolvedin the world economy.In 1973,trade was equal to 37% of GNP fordeveloping coun(exportsplus imports) countries. In the same year,48 out of 87 tries,29% forindustrialized than50% (International LDCs had tradeproportions Bank for greater Reconstruction and Development, 1976:Table 3). Althoughsmall states,as a rule,are more heavilyinvolvedin the world economy,state size does not determine internalcapacityto modulate the pressuresemanatingfroman uncertaininternational
3. For an excellent review ofThirdWorldpowercapabilities with conclusions similar to thesesee Smith(1977).

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A small, adaptable state could adjust to manyregime environment. structures. Such a statecould acceptsitslack ofinfluence at theinternaofitsability to deal with tionallevelbutremain confident environmental disturbancesover a wide range of international rules, norms,and institutions. to cope withenvironmental The ability disturbances is a function of ofa country's and diversity themobility, flexibility, A counresources. factors try withhighly and diverse can absorbexternal mobile,flexible, of production, shocks.It can adjustitspattern imports, and exports to maximizeits economicreturns underdifferent environmental condibe directed tions.Adjustments might bythestateor theprivate sector. a strong The first alternative one in which the requires politicalsystem, from domestic stateis capableofresisting pressures groups, formulating a coherentstrategy, and changingsocial and economic structures a well-developed (Krasner,1978:ch. 3). The secondalternative requires withhighlevelsof communication privatemarket and information. At earlystagesof development, Social Rigidity. countries lack the to capability absorb and adjust to external shocks.This incapacity is in traditional inherent producedby rigidities structures. In an elegant with ofnational analysisconcerned problems dependence, Jowitt (1978) or statussociety. elaboratesfivecharacteristics of a traditional First, a status societyis based upon exclusivecorporategroups,whichlock within a rigid individuals structure. Second,social actionis determined by personalratherthan impersonalnorms.Different individuals are in different treated waysbecauseofascriptive characteristics. Third, the division of labor in the societyis based on assignment to specific is permanently ascriptivegroups. An individual'seconomic activity establishedby his group membership. Fourth, the ontologyof the stresses theconcrete and discrete. Generalprinciples society thatcan be are eschewed.Fifth, applied to a wide rangeof situations theworldis seen composed of "concrete and discrete elements-thatis, indivisible units-economic, social, cultural,and politicalresourcesare seen as being finiteand immobileratherthan expandingand flexible."By societies are market thanstatus-based. modern rather contrast, Interacnormsof action.The individual tionsare governed and byimpersonal ratherthan the corporategroup,are the building the nuclearfamily, blocks of the society(Jowitt, 1978: 7-10). arelessvulnerable to external Modernsocieties becausetheir changes factorsare more mobile. Better-trained workers can perform a wider varietyof tasks. More-developedcapital marketscan more readily reallocateinvestment It is easierforan industrial resources. to worker one factory movefrom to anotherthanfora peasantto shift one from

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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

employmuchless move fromagrarianto industrial crop to another, trade, ment.In his seminalstudyof thepoweraspectsof international advantagewithrespect Hirschman (1945: 28) arguesthat"theinherent ofresources liesoverwhelmingly with to all theseaspectsofthemobility as opposed to countries and trading countries thegreatmanufacturing or mining predominates." in whichagriculture traditional to modern istaking placeinthe society The transition from process. It is notunidirectional ThirdWorld,butitis a slowand difficult Most or irreversible, as eventsin Iran and Cambodia demonstrate. countries are stillin whatChenery (1979: 18,29) has called developing a traditional to a modern economy theearly from phaseofthetransition whichoccursat per capita incomelevels from$200 to $600 (in 1976 to external are vulnerable shock.Most dollars).In thisphase,societies is stillin agriculture. that,on data indicate Cross-national employment untilper output outputdoes not exceedagricultural average,industrial employment capita incomesof $800 are reached,and that industrial until per capita income is does not exceed agricultural employment $1600. oftheratiosofagricultutable showsthedistribution The following forwhichdata is available labor forall countries ral labor to industrial since greater vulnerability from theWorldBank. Higherratiossuggest laboris relatively immobile. Only 16LDCs havemovedto a agricultural in whichemployment in industry of production exceedsthatin pattern countries forwhichfigures Almost50% of the developing agriculture. workers inagriculture times as many as in are availablehaveat leastfour have not movedveryfaralong Most ThirdWorldcountries industry. to modernity. Whilethere is considerable variatradition thepathfrom oftheThirdWorld,a very tionamongthecountries sharpcleavagestill existsbetween industrialized and developing countries. ofthesocial and economicstructure The rigidity Political Weakness: in thepolitical Most central is reflected countries in developing system. in the Third World are weak. The stateis often politicalinstitutions unit.Its ability to extract as but one morecompartmentalized treated to combinediverse Efforts social the societyis limited. from resources to be frustrated unitsare likely and material bythecompartmentalized that takes place outsidethe natureof the society.Economic activity thestate Often market cannotbe effectively tappedbythegovernment.4 from is unableto resist society groups.Low levelsof pressure powerful economic to formulate effective skill and educationmake it difficult nolicies. Under conditionsof social mobilizationand low levels of
4. See Ardant(1975) fora discussionof theimportance of themarket forEuropean fiscaldevelopment.

Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES TABLE 3

133

Ratioof LaborForcein Agriculture to LaborForcein Industry

Numberof Countries >4 Developing Countries More-Developed Countries 50 3.0-4.0 10 2.0-3.9 11 1.0-1.9 15 1 1.0-0.5 8 1 <0.5 8 23

in International Bank forReconstruction SOURCE: Derived fromfigures and DevelTable 5. opment,WorldTables, 1980: Social Indicators,

thelikely outcomeis political politicalinstitutionalization, decayrather able thanpoliticaldevelopment (Huntington, 1968).The stateis rarely in waysthatwould lessenthedeleterious to adjust domesticstructures consequencesof external changes. The situationof most Third World states can be illuminated by it with that of small industrialized countries. The small contrasting have little controloverthe international environdevelopedcountries ment.Although theyhave generally placed moreemphasison internanormsthan largerstates,they and international tional organizations a major aspect of theirforeign have not made regime transformation policies.At least in part,thisis because small industrialized countries shocks. able to adjust to external are muchbetter Katzenstein eco(1980: 113-119)has conducteda studyof foreign in sevensmallEuropeanstates nomicpolicymaking -Belgium, Switzerland,theNetherlands, Austria, Norway, Denmark,and Sweden.All of to a liberaland open international thesestatesare heavilycommitted have been lower than those of large economic system.Their tariffs to protect states.They have been morereluctant industries. declining They have welcomedforeign capital. They are all subjectto external intheworld involvement becauseoftheir perturbations heavy economy. thissituation The smallEuropeanstateshave beenable to cope with theNethereffective domestic-stabilization through policies. Switzerland, an "offensive lands,and Belgiumhave been moreaggressive, following low tariffs, strategy"based on extremely high export intensities, with in industries and services inelastic and high specialization demand, rates of investment. Austria,Norway,and Denmark have pursueda towardinnovations more "defensive oriented in traditional strategy" and lowerresearchand developsomewhathigher industries, tariffs, has been mixed.Despite these mentexpenditures. Sweden's strategy thepoliticalsystems of all sevensmall Europeanstatesare variations,

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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

whichfusethe publicand the characterized by dense policynetworks sectors.These networks all groupswithin thesociety. private integrate and preventstalemate.The political communication They facilitate organization of the small states has allowed themto enjoy the economic benefitsof full participation in the international economy, theirdomesticsocial structures fromthe disruptive while insulating external consequencesthat would ensue fromuncontrolled perturbation. Tax structures offer the opportunity to illustrate Tax Structures. ofindustrialized between thepolitical differences capabilities and developing countries. Tax collectionis generally a good indicatorof the itsown society.5 of thestateto extract resources from ability Developof a ing countries collect smallerproportion their GNPs thanindustrialized statesand relymoreheavilyupon tradetaxes; the levelof state moresubject to international revenue is,therefore, economic vicissitudes. Third Worldcountries are poor and theirgovernments cannottax muchof whatthereis. In 1973totalgovernment revenue was equal to countries and 19.9% fordeveloping 33.5% of GDP forindustrialized countries. Mali was able to collectonly 1.5% of its GDP, Nepal only countrieswas 21.6% for 5.6%. The lowest figurefor industrialized Bank forReconJapan; the highest 51.7% forSweden (International curvilinear 1976:Table 7). Thereis a strong and Development, struction as a perrevenue between relationship percapitaGNP, and government centageof GNP, withrevenue rising sharply up to percapitaincomein off.6 of $2,000and thenlevelling theneighborhood There is also a strongrelationship between economicdevelopment and the natureof the tax structure. Trade taxes are relatively easy to collectbecause imports and exportsare channeled through centralized Even withsmuggling and corruption portfacilities. (often very serious tariffs and exporttaxes are easierto obtainthatdirect problems) taxes
5. The most glaringexceptionsto this generalization are levies imposed by oilon multinational countries exporting and some otherresource-producing corporations. structure of resource extraction The centralized industries makesthemeasy targets even forweak states. The calculationsin thissectionare based on UnitedNations,StatisticalYearbook, PublicFinanceTables fortotalgovernment totalgovernment revenue, and expenditures, traderevenues; NationalAccountand Gross DomesticProduct Tables for grossdomestic product;International MonetaryFund, International FinancialStatistics forconsumer and exports;WorldBank, WorldBank Atlas, 1977forpercapita priceindices,imports GNP. 6. Hinrich's wereupdatedfor56 countries (1966: 15-16)figures for1974and 1975and show the same pattern.The sharp decline in the slope at $2,000 capita is based on mid-1970s figures.

/ TRANSFORMINGREGIMES Krasner

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comskill and voluntary which require high levels of bureaucratic pliance. indicomparison A cross-national is again curvilinear. The pattern sharply declines revenue of total a as proportion that trade revenue cates withper capita incomesup to $2,000and levelsofffor forcountries withhigher percapitaincomes.Some ofthepoorestdevelopcountries deriveup to 60% of theirrevenuefromtaxes on trade, ing countries is 2% to 10%.The following countries whiletherangeforindustrialized forwhich1974data forthose48 countries equation,based on figures between oftheoverallrelationship thenature wereavailable,illustrates GNP per capita and traderevenue:
TradeRevenue TotalRevenue
=

71.6 - 17.3 (log GNP percapita) (00.00) at .01 level) (*significant

r2 = .35*

revenuesare more that developing-country It is not surprising economicsystem international in the byperturbations affected seriously between relationship The countries. of industrialized thantherevenues was examined revenue ingovernment changesintotaltradeand changes the onlyrecentperiodin whichworldtrade forthe period 1974-1975, dollarfigures, one yearto thenext.Based upon constant declinedfrom for developingand industrialized separate analyses were performed countries: For the 61 developing countries.
in Trade1974-1975) in Revenue 1974-1975)= 6.25 + .61 (% Change (% Change
(00.00) r2 = .29*

at the.01 level) (*significant

the thecalculation, from Indonesia,is dropped (Note thatifone outlier, slope changesto .64 and the r2increasesto .36.) However,forthe 24 between relationship was no significant there moredevelopedcountries, changesin revenueand trade(r2= .008). Government revenuesare but one indicatorof the impactof the of thedeveloping states.The experience worldeconomyon particular a sourcefor suggest does, however, in the 1974-1975 recession countries One ignored. thathas beenlargely abouttradevacillations their concern has beenthatthey ofThirdWorldcountries ofthepersistent complaints intrade Whilethevacillations from substantial tradefluctuation. suffer

136

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

have declined, theyare stillmuch countries experienced by developing countries. The ThirdWorld industrialized largerthan those affecting Howtheir economicgrowth. inhibit has arguedthatthesevacillations has been foundforthisclaim. One ever,no empiricalsubstantiation instability and between export evenrevealsa positive relationship study economicgrowth (Knudsen and Parnes, 1975: 7-15). in trademaynot be relatedto economicgrowth, Whilevacillations are related to thestate'sability to extract revenue. Politicalleaders they to threats that can command overresources can be moresensitive to their to the are to threats be used forimmediate politicalpurposesthanthey ThirdWorld of theircountries. economicgrowth prospects long-term with thetrading maybe rootedintheweakdomestic disaffection regime of LDCs whichnecessitate relianceon tradetaxes. politicalstructures
THE NICS vs OPEC

about weak There is one major exceptionto these generalizations in ThirdWorldcountries. The newly social structures and rigid political or NICs, havebeenable to adjusteffectively to countries, industrializing environment. theinternational Singapore,Hong Kong,Taiwan,South strategies. Korea, and Brazil have adopted aggressive export-oriented in a laissez-faire market has actedeffectively In Hong Kong theprivate has been moreactive.In In the otherNICs the government situation. the stateexplicitly decidedto promote Korea and Brazil forinstance, intheearly and moveawayfrom protectionism growth export-oriented both were able to maintainlower 1960s. Despite domesticpressure, forinternational a precondition export compeeffective exchangerates, titiveness. Throughthe 1970s,the NICs wereable to adjustto restricnationsbydeveloping newproduct lines tionsimposedbyindustralized their and diversifying exports(Krueger,1978:ch. 2; Yoffie,1980).For Korea's exports theperiod1970-1976, grewat an annualaveragerateof 31.7%,Taiwan's at 16.2%,Brazil'sat 10.3%,Hong Kong's at 8.6% and forlow-income at 14.1%.The averagerateofexport growth Singapore's LDCs forthesame periodwas -0.4%, forall middle-income countries (the categoryinto which the NICs fall) 3.8%, and for industrialized and DevelopBank for Reconstruction countries 7.8% (International ment,1978:Tables 2 and 6). successstories with The NICs are one of thetwogroupsofdramatic in the or at least transfers, to economicgrowth, postwar period. regard economicconsiderations states.Ifpurely are The otheris oil-exporting in countries, thedifference used to explainthebehaviorof developing

Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES

137

ofcountries inthese foreign policyorientations twogroupsis difficult to BoththeNICs and theOPEC countries understand. havedramatically from thepresent benefited WhilenoneoftheNICs havetakena system. leadingrole in theSouth'sefforts to restructure international regime, a numberof OPEC countrieshave been at the forefront of the Third Worldmovement. Algeria and Venezuelahavetakenleading rolesinthe Group of 77. Iraq, Libya, and now Iran are hardlydevoteesof the existing global order. WhiletheNICs and OPEC countries are comparable with regard to incomegrowth and exportearnings, their vulnerabilities to changesin the international The NICs are economyare dramatically different. economicstructures movingtowardflexible and strong politicalsysin the externalenvironment. temscapable of adjustingto shifts The now enjoyenormousbargaining OPEC countries of poweras a result the inelasticdemandfor petroleum and the low opportunity costs of controlling suppliesforthesurplusOPEC states.However, fewOPEC countries would be able to adjust to alterations in bargaining power. Theirdomestic factors areimmobile. Theirpolitical structures areweak. ofsomeOPEC countries The international radicalism is notcompatible with a conventional orientation which thedisaffection ofdevelexplains as a manifestation of theirlack of economicsuccess. opingcountries a manifestation Domesticstructural of traditional weakness, social norms,and political underdevelopment, togetherbecome a second factorthat makes international attractive for regimetransformation almostall ThirdWorldcountries. The external is inherenvironment even in the absence of any directeffort entlythreatening by more states to exercise International powerful controlled leverage. regimes by theexposureof developing countries can mitigate developing areas to some controlin a situation systemically generated changes.Theyoffer wherethe lack of domesticadjustment capacityprecludeseffective shocks. cushioning againstexternal

Systemic Opportunities
haveoccupieda dominant Demandsforregime restructuring placein not simplybecause thisapproach could comNorth-South relations, and domestic weaknessof ThirdWorld pensateforthe international offered a countries states,but because the postwarsystem developing The prominence in whichto pursuethisstrategy: to metasetting given

138

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

ofopportunities as wellas needs.The goals has beena function political that it accordedto especiallythe importance postwarliberalregime, in the ThirdWorldwithforums provided organizations, international whichto presstheirdemands. between and theunderlying powercapabiliregimes The relationship does the tiesof statescan be assessed withregardto two issues.First, ofstates powercapabiliweighted bytheir thepreferences reflect regime withor diverge maybe identical of theregime ties?The characteristics states.Second, whateffect of the most powerful fromthe preferences There powercapabilities? have on relative underlying does the regime theregime mayhaveno impact;itmayreinforce are three possibilities: theexisting distribution. distribution; or,itmayundermine theexisting in the following are summarized table. These possibilities are labelled in Table 4. First,the The fourmostlikelyalternatives ofthe The characteristics and regime maybe congruent: powerstructure states individual of by their (weighted the preferences regimereflect do not affect and there Second, capabilities. nationalpowercapabilities) of the do correscharacteristics not The regime may be incongruence: states national ofindividual bytheir weighted thepreferences pondwith does not alterrelative capabilities. powercapabilities,but the regime thepowerstructure between and stability Third,theremaybydynamic to thepreferences conform oftheregime The characteristics theregime: the existing Fourth, power distribution. of the strongand reinforce the regime between and theinternatheremay be dynamicinstability of the regime do not correspond The characteristics tional structure: and tendto undermine ofthestrong theposition of with thepreferences states. morepowerful in the postwarsystem thatduring periodsof suggest Developments to move fromcongruence hegemonicdecline,there is a propensity or evendynamic For hegemonic powinstability. towardincongruence in the involved dialectic, ers thereis a paradox, perhapsan inevitable international organizacreationof international regimes-including createsto serveits powerinitially tions. Regimesthatthe hegemonic can be seized and restructured by otheractors in the own interests system. Fully hegemonicpowers are likelyto establisha regimethat is stable.Theirnationalmaterial domrather thandynamically congruent theimpact can ignore ofregimes on their thatthey inanceis so complete to seekbroadmilieu goals. In relative Theyare likely powercapabilities. to createa dynamically a normalpoweris likelyto attempt contrast, Since itlackstheslackresources possessedbyhegemonic stableregime.

4-

40 Zs C0

Z
(4 0

~~ 0~~~. S~c ~~~~~~~~C ~~~~~ (4 )

o4
0

C4

4-0

Q t0

Q.~~

*0

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~3

140

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

thenormalpowermustbe primarily concerned with state, its enhancing nationalpowercapabilities. ofcongruence a situation from However, resulting regime creation by over timeinto one of a hegemonicstate is likelyto be transformed or evendynamic Thispattern incongruence instability. ofchangecan be theoutsetthehegemonic tracedto severalfactors. First,from poweris structures with autonomy.The compelled to provide institutional regime'spurpose is to legitimate hegemonic preferences. Legitimacy iftheregime is perceived as merely cannotbe promoted an appendageof international the hegemonic state.In the present the primary system, is their forrulesand norms sourceoflegitimacy voluntary acceptance by restsupon the conceptof individualstates. This practiceultimately of the modernera. The the dominantpoliticalprinciple sovereignty, state is the only actor whose authority is fully sovereignterritorial is indivisible, acceptedin theinternational and community. Sovereignty in principle, all sovereign statesare equal. Thereis, then,a primafacie votesequallyin international case fordistributing When organizations. thisnormis violated,as in the case of international financial instituis weakened. tions,the legitimating capacity of these organizations for a modernhegemonic state to Thus, thereis a strongpropensity wherevotingpoweris equallydisaccept international organizations an equal division tributed ofvotesopens amongall members. However, forweakerstatesto enhancetheir theopportunity influence and control within theseinstitutions. A secondendogenous factor thatprompts changein therelationship is theindependent between and powerstructure inertia regimes that can international An exceptionally developwithin organizations. rigorous concludesthat analysisof the behaviorof international organizations takeon a lifeoftheir ownand develop "Sonce established, organizations their owninner dynamics" (Cox and Jacobsen,1973:7). Thisprocessof is again facilitated ofa hegemonic independent growth bythebehavior creation. For institutions to legitimate powerduring periodsofregime a new set of rules and norms,theymustbe givenautonomyfromthe mustbe established for theselection dominant power.Objectivecriteria of staff. Goals mustbe statedin generalterms.Once thisis done,the It maygenerate its own ethos.It can can fendforitself. organization structures. It can welcome to different newclients. respond opportunity maturation is influenced As withindividuals, organizational by both and environmental Overtime theprefcharacteristics genetic pressures. erences oftheorganization and thoseofthedeclining hegemonic power maydrift apart.

Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES

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intheevolution from ofregimes congruence to inconA third factor forinternational organizations ofa gruence is thespecific consequences Thisis an exogenousconsideration, is which hegemonic power'sdecline. At thepinnacleof its considerations. generally independent of regime stateis proneto supplya disproportionate share power,thehegemonic international including organization of collective goods forthesystem, as itdrifts towardthe budgets(Olsen and Zeckhauser, 1966).However, to do this, status of a normal power it will become more reluctant forinternational to searchfornew organizations providing an incentive influence on other The hegemonic will sourcesofsupport. states power's also decline;theywill be less likelyto supportits initiatives-within One recent as wellas elsewhere. and studyof UN voting organizations various economicmeasuresof dependenceon the UnitedStates concludes that"greatU.S. economicadvantagecan no longerbe used to (Richardson,1978: generate votingsupportin the GeneralAssembly" can be seized by stateswhose 177). Thus, international organizations nationalpowercapabilitiesare limited. In the postwar period, the Third World has made international of its demands for regimechange. The organizationsa centerpiece theagendasofall majormultifuncSouth has succeededin dominating tional universal organizations.The North has been compelled to conference respondratherthan initiate.Conveningan international states.Positionpapershave places an issueon theagendasofNorthern (Wriggins, 1978: to be prepared.Votingpositionsmustbe determined 113). Debates and resolutionspresentedat international forumshave of waysfavoredby alterednorms,rules,and proceduresin a variety countries. Variousresolutions have endorsed0.7% ofGNP developing fromthe Northto the as a targetfor concessionary capital transfers South. Whilethisnormis morehonoredinthebreach,itis stillheldup as a goal thathas been acceptedbytheNorthas wellas theSouth.The of concessionalaid transferred institutions by multilateral percentage from6% in 1962to 27% in 1977(Organisation forEcohas increased nomicCooperationand Development,1978:xii, xiii,266-267).In the was no acceptedinternational norm for immediate postwar periodthere set by donors. thelevelof aid, and policieswereunilaterally countries haveused GATT to legitiIn thearea of trade,developing theindustrialized treatment. counmateconcessional Duringthe1960s, of preferences a generalized thatwould triesagreedto institute system on some productsfromdevelopingcountries.The eliminatetariffs to the GATT Articles nontarrif barrier codes and revisions of Agree-

142

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

ment negotiatedduringthe Tokyo Round provide for special and fordeveloping differential treatment countries, moresymmetalthough ricalbehavioris expectedas countries reachhigher stagesof development.These changes are a fundamental break with the two central norms ofthepostwar trading order:nondiscrimination and reciprocity. The South has enshrined newprinciples emphasizing development and fromthe old liberalrules. equity,notjust securedexceptions Southernpressureexercisedat international forumshas secured thatmajorpartsoftheglobalcommonsare acceptanceof theprinciple the common heritageof mankind.Developing countries have made claims on radio frequencies and outerspace, eventhough theydo not to utilize now have thetechnical them.Miningactivity in the capability deep seabed will be controlledby an international and authority of manganesenoduleswillbe taxed to from the exploitation revenues provideassistance to theSouth. Some developing countries havecalled ofAntarctica, fortheinternationalization their although to press ability thisclaimhas beenimpeded bythelackofa suitable international forum ofmankind (Petersen, 1980:401-402).The commonheritage is radically different fromthe prevailing before the 1960s,whichrecogprinciples ofa stateto claimunutilized areasthatitcouldoccupyor nizedtheright develop. thatbastionofpostwar Even in thearea ofmonetary affairs, conservatism,the South has had some success,at least within the regime's formal institutional theIMF. WhileLDCs did notgetan aid manager, link with SDRs, they did get an allocation based on quotas. The nationshad originally industrialized wantedvirtually to excludedevelThe partialuse of IMF gold sales to establish opingcountries. a Trust countries with Fund (whichmakesloansto developing fewconditions at concessionalinterest taxationforaid. rates)is a formof international itsconditions for The Fund has begunto liberalize stand-by agreements. inwhich thescopeand growth ofFund In an international environment, will depend in part on continuing activities of developing willingness to use itsresources, theorganization has movedto changeits countries if not its basic principles. rulesand procedures has becomemoreresponsive In generaltheinstitutional structure to in the GeneralAssembly, the South. By usingits votingmajority the newinstitutions, South has beenable to create UNCTAD and especially its interests. Even in establishedforums, UNIDO, which represent wherevotes are not equally divided,the South has changedvoting powerand decision-making procedures. Mutual veto votingarrangementsfor major decisions now prevail in all international financial

Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES

143

institutions, including the Fund. In the Inter-American Development and in theUnited of theregionallending Bank,thelargest institutions, Nations DevelopmentProgramthe Third World has a majorityof financial theInternational international votes.In thenewest institution, votesare equallydividedbetween Fund forAgricultural Development, OPEC countries,non-oil developing countries,and industrialized countries of issue areas the South has been able to alter Thus, in a variety It is difficult and procedures. to imagine similar principles, norms, rules, structures success in the absence of institutional that providedautomatic access for developingcountries.By takingadvantage of the thatthehegemonic autonomy power,theUnitedStates,was compelled to conferon international organizations duringthe periodof regime at the conclusionof World War II, ThirdWorldcountries formation have been able to alter regimecharacteristics duringthe period of betweenunderlying American hegemonicdecline. The relationship national power capabilities and regimecharacteristics has become increasingly incongruent.

BeliefSystems
and international thatarisefrom domestic Whilevulnerabilities weakforThirdWorlddemands-and international nessprovidetheimpetus the opportunity to realizethem-the formand unityof organizations thesegoals havebeenshapedbythepervasive acceptance ofdependency Most developing have explicitly orientations. countries acceptedarguto the workings theirunderdevelopment of the mentsthat attribute economicsystem rather thanthe indigenous international characterisownsocieties. has beenendorsed, ticsoftheir The belief notonly system close to the by individualstates,but by international organizations ThirdWorld,suchas UNCTAD and theUNDP, as wellas byimportant groups with claims to speak for the North as well as the South.7 in practicebut Individualstatesmay rejectdependency prescriptions lack a beliefsystem to offer in its stead. even the mostconservative orientation for Third servesimportant functions The dependency and domestically. Worldstatesbothinternationally Attheinternational have provideda unifying rationalefor level, dependency arguments
7. An important example is the reportof the BrandtCommission(Independent DevelopmentIssues 1980). Commissionon International

144

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

treatdisparateSoutherndemands. Calls for special and differential that the South has been treated by the contention mentare justified as inherently normsand rulesare rejected in thepast. Existing unjustly has been particularly orientation intellectual A coherent exploitative. organizations of usinginternational because of the strategy important goals. In such arenas the abilityto define to promotemeta-political are facilitated Such initiatives issuesand controlthe agenda is critical. framework. analytic consistent by a widelysharedand internally condipolitical are also linkedto domestic perspectives Dependency state on effective Giventhelimitations tionsin ThirdWorldcountries. Prominence wayto buildsupport. policyis an attractive action,foreign in universalcoalitionscan enhancea Third World leader'sdomestic and military, the North can rallybureaucratic, position.Castigating affords of international organizations The structure popularelements. to play on the world stage, an opportunity Third World statesmen which theycould not mount if theyhad to rely solely a platform Even if their on the domesticpower capabilitiesof theircountries. countries, more powerful a by part is as minor walk-on perceived activity it into a major role for domestic leader may transform an effective 1978: 40; Korany, 1976: 86; Good, (Wriggins, politicalconsumption 1962:7). ideological ThirdWorldleaderswho followsucha coursemustfind that resonatewiththeirdomesticpopulations.The most arguments For mostcouninternational regimes. accessiblethemes rejectexisting event thecentral historical ifnotLatinAmerica, in Asia and Africa, tries are widely and nationalism accepted Anticolonialism is decolonization. all groupsintheThirdWorld(Packenham, valuesendorsed byvirtually 1977:75-76,110;Nettl,1968:591). 1973:41; Good, 1962:5; Rothstein, A ThirdWorldleaderwho diffused. are widely arguments Dependency behaviorwill reject international supportthrough opts forenhancing for The mostvigoroussupport and institutions. rules,norms, existing counhas comefrom transformation ThirdWorlddemandsforregime to domesticpoliticallegitimacy. trieswheresuch policiescontributed oftheregime character theinternal External policyhas helpedto define forits own constituency. the is a key factorin explaining of dependency The beliefsystem maintained bytheThirdWorldin itsquestfora New unity exceptional that diversity Economic Order. Despite the substantial International to economicand politiwithrespect countries existsamongdeveloping theGroupof from defections have beenno outright there cal structures, would The NIEO program oflog-rolling. is nottheresult 77. Thisunity ofcountries involved benefit a smallnumber heavily disproportionately or manufactures. In some cases, suchas in theexportof raw materials

Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES

145

of alliance withthe industrialized policy toward OPEC, a strategy countries would be morein accord withThirdWorldeconomicinteramong ests. However, attackingOPEC and pointingto differences thebasicanalytic ofthe conclusion ThirdWorldstateswouldcontradict is widely Since thisviewpoint acceptedwithin dependency perspective. forums,it is developingcountries,not just voiced at international forevenhighly withconserdevelopedThirdWorldcountries difficult therest oftheSouthand endorse theliberal to breakwith vativeregimes order. The attitudeof Third World states toward calls for regime has only ranged fromstrident advocacy to passive transformation or alliancewith the rejection acquiescence.It has not includedoutright North.

Case Mexico: An Illustrative

the dilemmasof the Third Perhaps no countrybetterillustrates forforeign Worldand their policythanMexico. Mexico consequences in recent has experienced years.Thiswas trueevenbefore rapidgrowth the discoveryof large new oil reserves.Between 1960 and 1965 the averageannual rate of growthof GDP was 7.4%; between1965 and at annualrates growing paced thisincrease, 1973,6.5%. Manufacturing of 9.6% and 7.5% forthe same periods.The share of manufactured increased from11.6% in 1961to productsin Mexico's exportearnings 31.8% in 1972. Despite an exceptionallyhigh rate of population at 3.8% annually fortheperiod1960 increase, percapitaGDP increased Bank for to 1965 and 2.9% forthe period 1965to 1973(International and Development, EconomicData, Reconstruction 1976:Comparative Tables 1 and 8). economicperformance did not dissuade However,this impressive Mexican leaders fromactingas major criticsof the existingorder. of Luis Echeverria Underthe presidency (1970-1976),Mexico took a theNew International in formulating EconomicOrder. leadingposition Echeverria the At the 1971UN GeneralAssembly, alignedMexico with ThirdWorld.This actionbrokewithpast policy,in whichMexico had issues. Echeverria first taken a low profileon North-South generally ofEconomicRights and Duties proposedwhatlaterbecametheCharter of Statesat the 1972UNCTAD meeting. yearsofhis Duringtheinitial and thesetripsweregreeted with he travelled extensively, presidency, withinMexico (Grant, 1977). enthusiasm Echeverria's behaviorwas deeplyrootedin Mexico's international Mexico'simpressive economic structural develand domestic problems.

146

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

to did little oflargeoil reserves, theexploitation at leastbefore opment, on theUnitedStates.In dependency structural lessenherinternational wentto theUnitedStates,whileMexico 1976,55% of Mexico's exports 60% of MexiConversely, exports. accountedforonly5% ofAmerican the UnitedStates,whileMexico accountedfor came from co's imports has been partially only 3% of U.S. imports.Mexican development mostly corporations, loans. Multinational withlargeforeign financed of sectors export with themostdynamic are heavily involved American, theMexican economy.The UnitedStatesnow accountsformorethan in Mexico and theproportion directinvestment of foreign two-thirds inrecent The ratioofU.S. to MexicanGNP is about years. has increased 25:1 (Sepulveda, 1979). see their some Mexicanpolicymakers Even in thearea ofpetroleum, Ifthere American to overwhelming pressure. subject country potentially the Middle East,theUnitedStates from are further supplydisruptions look to Mexico to fillin thegap. If Mexico wereunableto do this might involvement Americamight pressforgreater usingherown resources, to suchpressures Mexicanresistance oil companies. bytheinternational the two countries. In such an a major crisisbetween could precipitate of the the United if not leverage the economic political eventuality, it is a be scenario but substantial. Such be unlikely, would may States theinternational can ignore, given notone thatMexicanpolicy-makers the the UnitedStates and Mexico.8 between structural asymmetries are a moreproximate for explanation conditions domestic However, is Mexico's colonialexperience ThirdWorldism. Although Echeverria's is shaped by itsstruggles politicalculture farin the past,thecountry's egalitarian with Spain and the UnitedStates,and the revolutionary the Revolutionof 1910.At thesame time, from ideologythatemerged thereare deep cleavages betweenthe elite and the masses. Income is have development ofMexicaneconomic and thebenefits maldistributed class.The revolutionary to themiddle ideology gonedisproportionately but it also generates a link betweenthe masses and the regime offers demandsforsocial reform. leadersa devicefor Mexicanpolitical Foreignpolicyhas longoffered in their During inherent politicalsystem. some ofthetensions resolving the 1960sMexico adopted a positivepolicytowardCastro'sCuba and to maintain independnationalist designed traditional postures pursued thisstancewas too however, policy.By the 1970s, ence fromAmerican A newpolicy to theMexicanregime. to lendmuchprestige conventional and consolidate theofficial ideology was neededthatcould reinvigorate Third Echeverria's ties betweenthe executiveand the intellectuals.
in October 1980. withMexican officials 8. Based on discussions

Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES

147

servedthesepurposes.His sponsorship Worldism oftheCharter ofthe Economic Rightsand Duties of States gave elements in the Mexican an opportunity politicalsystem to pledgetheirloyalty and support to a critical theexecutive. Such pledges form support forthestability ofthe Mexican politicalsystem (Pellicer,1975:52-53,58-59;Sepulveda,1979: Purcelland Purcell, 1980). 13ff., Echeverria'srelationshipwith the left was particularly strained because as Minister ofStateSecurity he had beeninvolved intheevents the 1968Olympic of200 students leadingto theshooting before games. Diaz Ordaz, theconservative who governed president from1964-1970, had handpicked Echeverria as his successor.Therewas a highrateof abstentionin the 1970 election,and in the Federal District(Mexico City) the oppositionPartido Nacional Agristareceived32.9% of the vote,comparedwitha nationaltotalof 13.8%(Grant,1977;7-8;Fagan, inclined Echeverria 1977:692-694).All of thesefactors towarda policy histieswiththeleft.Prominent thatcould establish advocacyofThird Worlddemandscouldenhancedomestic becauseitresonated legitimacy withtraditional Mexican ideology. However,Echeverriahardlyset Mexico along the path to radical ofThirdWorlddemands.His successor, international leadership Lopez Portillo,pursueda morerestrained policy.Whilereaffirming support theUnited somedistance from forCuba and keeping States,Mexico has a morepositiveimagetowarddirect projected foreign investment. The took care not to jeopardizetheflowof loans from government foreign theregime's banks.Domestically, tieswith Lopez Portillostrengthened thebusinesscommunity, whichhad beenstrained by Echeverria's policies (Grant, 1977: 27). In fact,even underEcheverria Mexican policy oriented to ThirdWorld internationalism. was not entirely Whilethe was presenting visibleattackon theexisting President a highly global in the Mexican government, the order,otherinstitutions particularly were encouraging of Foreign Affairs, discretebilateralties Ministry Mexico's traditional withthe UnitedStatesand maintaining roleas an the UnitedStatesand therestofLatinAmerica. between intermediary in of Industry and Commercefavorednationalization The Ministry principlebut was very sensitiveto the need for foreigninvestment (Pellicer,1975: 55; Purcelland Purcell,1980: 215-217). in Mexican policyis notrootedin and inconsistency The vacillation structure or thecontrasting ofitsbureaucratic anyfailings personalities itreflects theprofound of itspoliticalleaders.Rather, or belief systems a desireby LDCs to secure thatemergefrom countervailing pressures and development. Mexicandevelopment is critically bothindependence and capital withthe UnitedStates,its majortrading tied to relations additional willprovideMexico with partner. Development powercapa-

148

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

at a very rapidrate, bilities. But thesecapabilities, eveniftheyincrease inherent in Mexicanwill do littleto alterthe relative vulnerabilities The absolutegap is alreadytoo large.IftheUnited American relations. Statesgrowsat 2.5% annuallyforthenext25 yearsand Mexico at 5%, theabsolutegap would double and the UnitedStateswould stillbe 13 situation,which inclines times largerthan Mexico. This structural Mexicanleadersto seek international mechanisms forsecuring greater including the UnitedStates, is controlof the externalenvironment, reinforced bydomesticpoliticalideology.Especiallyin timesof stress, elements are blamedforMexico's difficulties (Purcelland Purforeign cell,1980:214-220).A radicalforeign policycan enhancethelegitimacy rulerwithleft-leaning of a particular domesticgroups.

Conclusion
The countriesof the Third World have not simplysoughthigher internalevels of resourcetransfer. They have wantedto restructure In some cases theyhave succeeded.The New Internationalregimes. of SUNFED, and theFirstand tionalEconomicOrderis thesuccessor Second DevelopmentDecades. It will be followedby otherprograms notjustwealth. with different namesbutthesameimport-control, The and probablesuccessors, cannotbe underNIEO, and its antecedents efforts within nationalpolities such stood through analogiesto reform and civilrights movements inthe as thelaborunion,consumer, welfare, based upon sharednorms;the UnitedStates. These weremovements norms oftheAmerican-created theliberal Southrejects postwar system. content to sharepowerwithin existing structures; Theyweremovements controlover new structures. the South wantseffective of the profound internaThe demandsof the South are a function tional and domestic weakness of most Third World states. These willnotdisappear.Sincemost abate butthey demandsmaytemporarily thenationalresource capabilistatesoftheSouthcannothopeto garner controlin theinternational tiesneededto asserteffective system, they institutions and norms to pressforinternational thatcan willcontinue In the environment. them some controlover the international offer willenjoysomesuccessbytaking of ofthisgoal, they advantage pursuit thatwerecreatedbythepowerful to servetheir structures institutional and other statesis ownpurposes.In this, ways,thepowerofhegemonic theyhave created.9 dissipatedby the verystructures
ofthedialectical 9. See Modelskifora provocative explication factors thatundermine the positionof dominantstates.