Members’ Perceptions of the District Management Group in

the federal civil services of Pakistan

By Syed A. Akif1 and Richard C. Pratt2

ABSTRACT:

[This paper has been adapted from a larger study entitled “Members’ and Opinion
Leaders’ Perceptions of the Pakistani Federal Civil Services’ District Management
Group” undertaken as the Capstone Project submitted for completion of the MPA degree
at the University of Hawaii, USA. The actual study was carried out from August 1999
onwards.]

The District Management Group (DMG) is generally considered to be

the most prestigious of the numerous civil service “occupational groups” in
Pakistan. Even now, in a period which is generally considered to be one of
decline for the civil services,3 more than 80 percent of the candidates in the
annual competitive examination opt for DMG as their first choice.4

This study was carried out through a 80-item questionnaire distributed to

107 DMG officers (and a 50-item common version sent out to 67 Opinion
Leaders.) The primary aim of this survey was to ascertain stakeholders’
views of the DMG on a wide range of issues, both those directly related to
DMG as well as those of more general interest relating to governance issues
including the following:

1. Pakistani governance and DMG: the present and future status of

bureaucracy.
2. Pakistani attitudes, especially those of civil servants, towards democracy,
rule of law, national problems.
3. Empowered local government, decentralization and role of civil servants
as agents of change in the Pakistani public administration.
4. Relations between elected officials and civil servants – degree of
political interference/ cronyism - and their impact on bureaucratic
competence levels.
5. Reform in DMG; change of DMG nomenclature.
6. Civil services’ selection, the “ merit vs. quota” debate, contractual
employment and other issues in civil service recruitment.
7. Gender issues in the civil services.
8. Corruption: what is it; how bad is it; why is it there; improvements.
9. Officers’ reasons for joining; job satisfaction levels; postings; political
networks.
10. Training: access; quality; and recommendations for the future
11. Performance evaluation and promotions.

This paper summarizes the views of 60 DMG officers serving in the

province of Sindh (both in the federal and provincial governments) in grades
17 through 21 as elicited through the above referred questionnaire. The
views of the “Opinion Leaders” as well as a comparison between the two
groups are available in the complete paper, which is the believed to be the
first quantitative study of the Pakistani bureaucracy.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

1. What is this study about and why is it important?

For over one hundred years, the District Management Group (DMG), and its legal
predecessors, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and the Indian Civil Service (ICS),
have been considered to be the most powerful government structures amongst the various
service/functional groups of the higher bureaucracy in Pakistan.5 Indeed, most of the
older writers on the subject [Philip Woodruff, Ralph Braibanti, Frank Goodnow] have
called these officers to be “the heaven-born,” “the kept class,” and the “Brahmins of the
Bureaucracy” while the Indian Civil Service (or ICS), the predecessor of the CSP/DMG,
was itself called the “Steel Frame on Which India Rested” or the “Governing
Corporation.” Indeed, the administration of Imperial India’s 500 million people was, for
the most part, entrusted to a few hundred ICS Officers and their police counterparts in the
IPS, whose philosophical basis was in the combination of elitist roots which went back to
Plato’s Republic and imperial origins in Confucian China. As a reminder of the latter, the
civil services’ cricket club in Lahore continues to be fondly named, “The Mandarins.”
As of June 1999, the 716 members of the DMG occupied some of the most
prestigious and powerful jobs in Pakistani government employment sector, reported to be
close to three million strong. Charles Kennedy in his book Bureaucracy in Pakistan
[1987] notes that DMG was the first choice of nearly 70 percent of all civil service
probationers (training at the Academy) during the “post-Reform” period of 1974-81.6
This was itself down from the first-preference rating for the DMG’s lineal predecessor,
the CSP, which stood at 83 percent in 1971.7 According to figures specially made
available for this study by the Federal Public Service Commission, the percentage of
candidates qualifying the annual Competitive Examination who opted for DMG in the
1998 examination as their first choice stood at 82.4% for males and 80% for female
candidates.
While the DMG continues to be an organization of great public significance,
objective research on its role, especially the difference between the way its role(s) is/are
perceived by outside observers and actually experienced by the officers themselves, has
not been undertaken. Indeed, in spite of the DMG deserving serious inquiry, it is
remarkable and surprising that no scholarly research is available on the subject, let alone
a quantitative one, in spite of DMG being in existence for 27 years. This study was
undertaken to fill a vital gap by ascertaining the validity of perceptions of the DMG
expressed in the media, by opinion leaders and in DMG professional circles. Another fact
that makes this study important is the coincidence that the topics addressed herein
comprise some of the main points of the new military regime’s agenda: reforming
bureaucracy, revamping local government, addressing gender imbalance, and fighting
corruption.

2. How was this study undertaken?

This study was carried out through an 80-item questionnaire distributed to 107 DMG
officers and a 50-item version sent out to 67 Opinion Leaders. The figure for DMG
officers represents virtually the total number of DMG officers in the province (as only 8
officers could not be contacted as they were on long leaves/ on suspension and in one
case a “proclaimed absconder”.) The actual questionnaire appears at the end of this
paper. Of the 174 questionnaires distributed ninety (90) responses were received in time:
60 from DMG officers and 30 from Opinion Leaders. Due to time and resource
constraints, the population from which the DMG Officers' sample was to be drawn was
restricted to a sample of convenience in the Province of Sindh. The questionnaires were
distributed by mail and courier, and were followed by phone calls and some personal
visits (but actual filling out was not done in presence of the researcher so as to avoid any
bias.)

3. The sample
As of 29th June, 1999, the total number of serving DMG officers in grades 17 through 22
(also called basic pay scales or BPS) was 716. Thus the sample formed a substantial
8.38% of the total population. All the same, even in absolute terms
(notwithstanding its non-representativeness) the sample failed to meet statistical
validity figure of 248.8 While it is true that DMG Officers present a rather
homogenous population (by virtue of their common selection and training procedures
as well as subsequent professional experience), the sample was not representative
in terms of provincial/ethno-linguistic origins of officers. Ideally the sample
should have been drawn from the whole population9, however, for several reasons this
could not be done. In addition to time and funding constraints, the DMG Officers
Posting List is an internal document of the government and one not available publicly
(to prevent misuse in legal cases regularly brought against the government by officers
claiming restitution/ correction of their seniority positions). Moreover, the frequent
transfers of officers makes event the latest list redundant even before it is published.

TABLE GRADE WISE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NATIONAL

POPULATION OF DMG OFFICERS AND SAMPLE

Grade No. and percentage Sample statistics

/Basic of all DMG offrs No. of Sample as % of Representation Diff betw. Repres.
Pay (national pop) in respondents DMG offrs. in of this grade in national pop &
Scale the grade in the grade that grade in sample (%) sample (%)
17 130/ 18.16% 13 10.00 21.66 +03.50
18 229/ 31.98% 21 08.73 35.00 +03.02
19 169/ 23.60% 18 10.65 30.00 +06.40
20 158/ 22.07% 07 05.09 11.66 -10.41
21 21/ 02.93% 00 00.00 00.00 -02.93
22 09/ 01.26% 01 11.11 01.66 -00.40
All 716/ 100.00% 60 08.38 99.98
4. Major findings and Interpretation of the Data

The results of the survey are quite clear and require little interpretation for those initiated
in Pakistani issues, especially those related to the civil services. All considered, there
were few surprises in the data for common Pakistanis. Indeed, the issues framed in the
questions had been chosen for their ubiquity as expressed in public/ private discussions
and press coverage

♦ Questions 1 –6: General perceptions about bureaucracy & DMG's role therein:
In Pakistan only a very small number of public officials working in “prestigious cadres”
are considered “bureaucrats,” a term, which is overwhelmingly negative in its Pakistani
usage. In addition to formal office-holders, the Pakistani ruling/ decision making elite
comprises senior military officers and “bureaucrats” closely allied to the ruling political
establishment. DMG is the most powerful group within the bureaucracy. Amongst DMG
Officers, opinion about whether Pakistani civil servants still retain colonial/elitist
attitudes remains divided.
Interestingly the respondents – well informed, responsible members of the DMG
who, in all probability know the book definition of bureaucracy– do not consider all
public servants in the “bureaus” as bureaucrats but consider only a few of them to be so.
In this departure from the classical Weberian definition of bureaucracy, only a few
thousand Pakistani public officials (of nearly three million) working in “prestigious
cadres” are seen to be “bureaucrats” (while others are just public servants or government
employees). Linked with the finding that that the term “bureaucracy” is overwhelmingly
negative in its Pakistani usage, by linkage it appears that these top level public
functionaries, the bureaucrats, are held responsible for the negative image of the “civil
services” (a term which is again used only for the select group of officers who gain
employment through the Competitive Examination). This negative image of the
bureaucracy was not at all surprising in the light of day to day press reports and public
expressions about the difficulties the common citizens have in their dealings with
government offices.
Given their clout in public affairs, the senior military officers and “bureaucrats”
(above Grade 20) who are closely allied to the ruling political establishment are
considered part of the Pakistani ruling/ decision making elite. This perhaps is true of any
political system which is still in its early stages of development and much more of one in
which the drive towards maturity has often interrupted by overt military coups or internal
“soft” coups (that have blessings of external players, like the Army). Given the
bureaucrats’ openly partisan alignments and the weakness of party and governance
structures which are susceptible to external pressures, more often than not, they are quite
central to the happenings in corridors of power.
DMG Officers still consider theirs to be the most powerful group within the
bureaucracy. This – and the fact that candidates still opt for DMG as their first choice -
indicates that mental perceptions change at a slower pace than ground realities. The least
powerful group, non-formally speaking, comprises “meritorious, upright officers without
political links” and, formally it is the Postal Group amongst the established civil service
structures.

♦ Questions 7-8, 16: Elitism in the civil services/ DMG

For all its 53 years of independence, one of the biggest accusations made against civil
servants in Pakistan (by the political parties, people and media at large) has been that they
still behave like the anti-people, former colonial masters. This retention of old habits and
elitism is considered to be direct linked to the absence or very slow pace of social change
in the patterns of land holding, limited breakdown of traditional social organization, and
poor literacy levels. Nonetheless, it is clear that of whatever elitism that remains, DMG
officers espouse and practice it equally or more than other civil servants. A reflection of
the fast deteriorating status of the DMG’s erstwhile superiority (still indicated in its being
the candidates’ No. 1 choice in the Competitive Examination) was the fact that only about
one-fourth respondents considered DMG to be the “most powerful group” within the
bureaucracy. This would not have been the case, perhaps a decade ago.
♦ Questions 9-15: Democratic governance in Pakistan
Though not yet in the ignoble camp of “failed states”, many academics have included
Pakistan in the category of states ripe for failure. While numerous reasons are quoted for
this state of affairs, when asked to rank the problems facing the nation, the researcher’s
personal hypothesis about authoritarian and corrupt governance being the worst problem
facing the country was proven true. As shown by the military coup that took place during
the process of data gathering (on Oct. 12, 1999), Pakistan’s democratic credentials are
very poor. From these findings of authoritarianism and elitism, it naturally follows that
Pakistani elected office holders (should) have little or no regard for the rule of law.
While this is also true for a majority of Pakistanis in general, civil servants are regarded
as still more “democratically inclined” than politicians involved in formal electoral
activities. A possible reason for this is that a large majority of civil servants come from
the middle class while it is the land-owning feudal class which still sends forth the bulk
of politicians. Another reason is the fact that politics requires greater compromise and
expediency as compared to government work which is still based on formal rules of
business and that civil servants have traditionally been subject to jurisdiction of courts to
an much greater extent than the politicians

♦ Questions 17-20: Local Government and Devolution of Power

One of the paradoxes seen from the data was the response from the officers who
while considering elected local government essential to greater national democracy, did
not support devolution of power to locally elected officials. This was clearly an
indication of the hostile reaction shown by the bureaucracy towards the “Devolution
Plan” presented by the military rulers. Under this plan the DMG’s most prestigious role is
to be abolished and the historic legacy of the Group is now seen close to its logical end.
Another possible interpretation could be that this is an indication of the centralist
tendency supported by the bureaucratic elite.
♦ Questions 21-27, 65: Change in Pakistani governance and DMG
Nearly half the Officers said that Pakistani administration has changed much over the
past 50 years. In an earlier item many officers said that Pakistani civil servants were still
“colonial” (elitist). This response about continuation of the old order (elitism) again
contradicted the officers who thought that the administrative structure had changed. The
majority want the DMG to be reorganized. This is keeping in with the feelings expressed
in all public forums that for the nation to have any chance of a future revival, the Civil
Service-dominated administrative structure must be totally replaced with one run by
elected representatives. Even though few believe in the sincerity of the military
government to foster democracy (as twice in the past the military has promoted local
government as an eyewash designed to keep central power to itself). Indeed, the first test
- elections for local bodies in Dec 2000 - has not gone well in terms of attracting either
candidates or voters.

♦ Questions 25-27, 65: DMG: generalist vs. specialist role

Again for over 50 years there has been a great debate on the generalist vs. specialist
role of Pakistani civil services. Naturally, the civil servants have wished to reserve all the
top management posts for themselves – even when they are part of technocratic
ministries like health, education, and power. The DMG’s “jack of all” claim has generally
been countered with the “master of none” argument. Even at present DMG Officers
continue to manage all and sundry, while many professionals are left out of truly
deserved positions. In this survey, naturally, a majority of DMG officers thought that
their group was “just right” in terms of the generalist-specialist divide; in an apparent
contradiction an even greater number favored specialization in some field themselves.
Being honest to themselves DMG officers accepted that they were preferentially treated
in terms of postings. As expected, while the officers did not wish any restrictions placed
on their horizontal mobility (i.e. continue to retain high level of generalism).
Generally, there is widespread popular support for bureaucratic reorganization. If
and when the proposed local government set-up takes root, the DMG is bound to suffer
the most, as its traditional role will not only be formally disbanded but even the
coordinating position of the District Coordination officer will be opened to all groups of
civil servants. While it is natural that the DMG officers see reorganization within their
own context, the military government has been keen to cut them down to size, just as the
Bhutto government did through the 1973 administrative reforms.10
Indeed, far from even a symbolic return to the past, the new outlook is that DMG as it
was traditionally known in the ICS/CSP paradigm is now destined to be history. Already
massive inter-provincial transfers have broken the officers’ provincial power-bases, as
could only have been possible in a non-elected/ non-democratic regime where there are
no politicians to influence. A new breed of reformers from the NGO-sector have
combined with the military to bring about a big change in the way that Pakistan is
governed (several of the ministers in the new set up are from NGOs). Although much
skepticism prevails, it is better to wait and see if the proposed experiments work (without
the fundamental change in mind-set and resource availability that is required).

♦ Questions 28-30, 67: DMG's political linkages

The time frame of the responses – arriving just before or after the military coup
toppled what was generally believed to be a highly corrupt and non-transparent regime –
should be kept in mind here. The respondents thought that relations between bureaucrats
and elected politicians were “uneasy, based on mutual mistrust and interests and not on
principles.” This leads to the conclusion that both bureaucrats and politicians are to be
blamed equally for the country’s problems. Since then – after the military has been in
power for over a year – the focus of criticism has shifted against the military’s periodic
interventions which have not solved the country’s many problems. There is virtual
unanimity in both groups on the perception that sought-after postings go to those with
strong political or bureaucratic links. Perhaps, if the data had been collected now, there
would have been considerable change in this regard (as the rule of the law is being
strengthened).

♦ Questions 31-32: Change of Nomenclature/ Restoration of the CSP

 DMG Officers have long lamented the loss of their coveted service label of Civil
Service of Pakistan which is almost a religious relic with most of them. The importance
of this historical and emotional baggage can be realized by few people outside the DMG/
ex-CSP circles, especially after the PSP and FSP (Police and Foreign Service of Pakistan)
labels were re-instituted in the past decade. Most officers wish to have the CSP-label
reinstated. Perhaps as a detour around the issue, many officers also proposed the Pakistan
Administrative Service as an alternate name to DMG.

♦ Questions 33-39: Selection, Quota System, Promotion

The issue of having or abolishing geographically, linguistically or ethnically based
quota reservations in all government jobs has also been a very controversial one
throughout Pakistan’s history. An early formula of “parity” between the eastern and
western wings of the country maintained a uneasy peace until the former seceded to
become Bangladesh. In 1973, the new Constitution provided the “quota system” for 10
years to maintain Federal harmony. The period has since been extended time and again,
so much so that two years ago the results of the Competitive Examination could not be
declared due to a Supreme Court stay. While the urban intelligentsia and print media
oppose the quota, this survey shows considerable support for the quota system from the
DMG Officers, primarily because it provides a sense of justice and fair representation to
all constituents in a pluralistic federal country.
The fact that Central Superior Services/DMG selection (procedure) is considered to
be as good as possible in Pakistan or at least far better than national average is generally
accepted by common Pakistanis. The extensive opposition to the special reservation of
10% seats for armed forces personnel for recruitment without appearing in the
examination reflects a general opinion that the military in Pakistan is already over-
pampered. As expected from persons used to enjoying secure life-long employment, a
majority of officers oppose the proposal for contractual employment in the civil services.

♦ Questions 40-41: Gender Issue

 There were only two (02) female respondents amongst the DMG Officers’ sample;
this 3.33% representation was small even in comparison with the low national figure of
4.46% females in the DMG (32 individuals in 716). The low representation of females in
the DMG is thought to be a reflection of the socio-cultural perception about their lack of
effectiveness in field offices which carry a macho image and supposedly require a male
presence. So far there have been only two female Deputy Commissioners in Pakistan’s
history (of which one was from DMG). Perhaps this is reflection of the greater society at
large which is definitely male dominated and chauvinistic. The opinion of most DMG
Officers that there would be “little or no change” if more females were to be selected for
DMG may perhaps be a reflection of their experiences with female colleagues, who act as
quasi-men and defy the societal stereotype of the female (to the extent of competing
favorably with men in corruption).

♦ Questions: 42-50: Corruption in Pakistan

Economically reeling under heavy debt serving (c. 55% of the budget), high military
costs (31% of the budget) and runaway population growth, Pakistan has also been labeled
as one of the most corrupt countries in the world a rating considered to be justified in this
survey. Opinion in this category was likely to be biased as the DMG Officers, while
labeling more than 90% of Pakistani civil servants and elected politicians as corrupt had a
better opinion about themselves: DMG Officers were stated to be better to the extent that
“only 75%” of them are considered to be corrupt!
Almost every respondent felt that the level of corruption in Pakistan had increased greatly
over the past 20 years. This too was keeping in with popular belief. The strategy of
paying market-driven salaries – which is seen as an effective way to curb corruption. -
has now finally caught on with national policymakers who have begun to offer realistic
compensation in very selected areas (given the strong resource constraints).
♦ Questions 51-56: Reasons for joining DMG; satisfaction levels; future plans
While the one main reason for joining DMG which is expressed in popular circles –
social prestige (due to the Group’s role as a power broker in a largely feudal-tribal set-
up) – was validated, an equal number of respondents also cited “rapid promotion and
high horizontal mobility” as the reason for their having joined DMG. While the DMG’s
top position may still be continuing with the candidates, future recruitment in the group is
uncertain due to the new government’s devolution plan. DMG would generally lose its
raison d’etre as new local governments bodies are led be elected persons and
“coordinated” by civil servants from all groups.
The second option – in case the respondents had not been successful in landing a
DMG slot – Foreign Service – was an aberration as in fact it is generally rated much
lower (at around 5th or 6th place). The normal position of the Foreign Service – otherwise
a better paying and more sophisticated job is reflective of social conditions in which civil
servants generally join to have a strong domestic presence in order to safeguard the
interests of friends and family.
Although majority of the Officers was “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their DMG
employment, there were many contradictions in this regard: The future of DMG was
thought to be worse than its present state. A very large proportion had considered or could
consider moving away from DMG. The top two reasons cited for a possible departure
from DMG are “poor pay and benefits” and “excessive politicization.”

♦ Questions 57-58; 79-80: Family Backgrounds and Service/Political Networks

Given real life networks in the bureaucracy and political establishment, the officers’
family backgrounds are thought to be “important” for their career. It is well known that
probationary officers at the Academy are actually approached by feudal or political
families with offers of marriage that will enhance the positions of both. Thus, of the six
most important linkages that could help officers along their careers, the most important –
by a wide margin - is “family relations – like sons or sons-in-law, cousins.” Popular
belief was once again validated by way of the second response being linguistic or
provincial links.

♦ Questions: 59-61: DMG's Federal Character; Provincial Postings/ PCS

 While DMG was seen to be suffering from a lack of “Federal identity” as most DMG
officers settled down in their own provinces, paradoxically the DMG officers still did not
wish to see a disbanding of the Provincial Civil Services (PCS) nor an Indian system in
which Federal Indian Administrative Service Officers stayed in one province for long
periods.
In recent months, one of the “corrective” measures taken by the military government
has been the widespread transfer of DMG officers all over Pakistan. Some of these
officers moved for the first time in their long careers spanning two decades or more.
Thus, an attempt has been made to restore the Federal character of DMG – which had
been dented by the collusion of the officers with their political sponsors who always
blocked the Establishment Division’s orders for inter-provincial transfers. This was
perhaps only possible during their military regime.

♦ Questions 62-65: Posting Choices/ Pressures/ Specialization

Not all posts are equal in prestige and more importantly in their political utility (to
elected governments). Indeed, politics is just another name for sharing spoils (“Who gets
what, when and how.”) Therefore, no amount of rules would be able to ensure totally fair
treatment for all officers. In an earlier item, the weakest group in the system was said to
consist of officers without political clout. The feeling that competence and merit do not
count very much in postings is very wide spread. The informal connections that have
replaced the formal system are a natural bypass mechanism that has grown from the
clogged up arteries of the DMG secretariat. Most officers have been ostracized to
marginal postings or made “Officers on Special Duty” (OSDs) for not conforming to the
existing norms. As could be expected, most officers prefer a field posting as opposed to
one in the secretariats (as the former is far more well-provided in terms of physical
facilities). The fact that most DMG officers wish to specialize in some functional area is
linked to the doubts expressed about the future of DMG, a generalist civil service.

♦ Questions: 66, 68-73: Training

 The survey showed that while officers believed training to be very important for
improvement in job performance, most had received no further training after their initial
pre-service training. Thus there is general dissatisfaction with the training facilities
available to DMG officers. On the one hand there are few short training programs and on
the other hand the two long mandatory ones at NIPA and Staff College have become a
promotion formality (in which everyone who attends passes almost automatically). The
fact is that training facilities have also deteriorated considerably as the overall efficiency
of the state apparatii have gone down in the face of deep-rooted intervention in day to day
bureaucratic decisions by the political establishment (ministers, members of parliament,
ruling party officials). Indeed, all domestic training is looked as being irrelevant to
careers while foreign trainings are seen as mechanisms of nepotistic or political reward.
National training institutions also do not enjoy the reputation of being “good postings”
and are, as a result, avoided by career officers – many of whom are sent there as a
“punishment.” In contrast, “career” armed forces’ officers are posted in training
institutions. Thus there is a need to improve the image of such institutions and make
training more genuine and merit based.

♦ Questions 74-77: Performance Evaluation

Among the many problems that plague the Pakistani bureaucracy today, low morale
and loss of confidence in the system’s fairness is an important one. While officers are
generally dissatisfied with the present performance evaluation system marked by
excessive dependence on a subjective Annual Confidential Report (ACR), which is, by
and large, a reflection of personal relations with superiors than actual performance, they
are to be blamed themselves for the loss of systemic credibility. Because of their own
non-merit based incursions into the service structures (by family or political networks
which they use and encourage) annual reports have just become formalities. However the
Establishment Division is also to be blamed for not maintaining the performance
evaluation system at a functional level: Often the officers run from one officer to the
other to get their reports completed at the time of being considered for promotion.
Relaxed attitudes mean that the central office has no track of which officer was serving
under whom during the period being reported; thus fraud is quite prevalent in ACRs.
All the same, all the officers must not necessarily get the blame for violating a
theoretical code (of independent performance evaluation), but instead the senior policy
making incumbents who should take the fall for not maintaining a system even in a bare
level of operational efficiency.

LIMITATIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS

Like all studies this was not a perfect one; therefore, future researchers should consider
implementing the following recommendations (being made in the light of experience
gained in the present exercise) so as to complement and further the present study.

1. The DMG Officers sample should be more representative (of the national DMG
population). In this study, the percentage of respondent-officers belonging to Sindh Rural
and Sindh Urban domicile categories (45% and 21.66% respectively) was much larger
than the percentage of these groups in the nation-wide DMG population (9.63% and
6.42% respectively). Similarly officers from provinces having a large number of officers
in the national population (Punjab 52% and NWFP 15.5%) were under-represented in the
sample (28.33 and 1.66% respectively). There was also a skew in terms of grade-wise
distribution of respondent-officers compared to the percentage of various grades in the
national DMG population. Future researchers should, resources permitting, consider
working from this point onwards to validate the results of this study by either conducting
a more representative nation-wide survey on the national DMG population or conduct a
separate study with officers holding Balochistan, Punjab and NWFP domiciles in a way
that the grade and provincial domiciles represented in the sample are reflective of their
respective national levels.

2. Electronic data processing of responses should be undertaken, if required through a

custom designed computer database program; this would allow easy cross tabulations and
data classification as well as prevention of hazards inherent in manual tabulations.
3. The survey instrument should be redesigned to improve questionnaire length and
construction of some items. Although the length of the questionnaire (80 items over 10
pages) had always been a problem area, a deliberate trade-off had been made in view of
the desire to obtain as much data as possible in one exercise (in view of it being the first
or its kind in over two decades and the difficulty in organizing such an effort). Even
though not many respondents commented about the instrument’s undue length (in the
infrequent meetings that were held with them after they filled the forms as no such option
about the design was posed in the form itself), it is almost certain that in case of a shorter
questionnaire the response would have been better.
There were many politically loaded questions with which respondents may have felt
uneasy. Many later commented that in the Pakistani cultural setting, where academic
surveys are few and far between people always have that feeling that their responses
could be used for non academic purposes – included being reported to secret services.
Thus it is recommended to divide a long questionnaire into several short and separate
instruments to pre-empt respondent fatigue and improve quality of responses Alternately,
through better pre-testing a more convenient sized questionnaire be developed with more
detailed follow-up surveys in each of the major blocks of issues.
Important note: A problem that probably affected the survey process was the fact that the
questionnaires were returned over a period of time that stretched over the last days of the
Nawaz Sharif government and the early days of the new military regime. In the process
came what paradoxically became both an interesting and troubling aspect of this study: The
change of government became the cause of a possible bias. Many of the responses are likely
to have been affected by this turn of events, for instance, question 9 listed “corrupt and
authoritarian governance as one of responses to a question which asked as to which was the
worst problem facing the country and question 10 asked “what kind of democracy does
Pakistan have.” Other questions sought to learn what was the level of the partisan
politicization and corruption in the services or what was the attitude of (professional)
politicians and citizens towards the rule of law. Also inquired about were future dispensations
in local government.
In some of the earliest speeches the new military "Chief Executive of Pakistan" made
repeated references to all these issues. In subsequent personal comments, some
respondents actually did mention that the turn of events would have had/ did have a
bearing on their responses. Unfortunately a full record of the dates on which the
responses were received was not maintained and hence the effect of this external factor
could not be tabulated

APPENDIX: TABLE: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY DMG OFFICERS

& TEXT OF QUESTIONNAIRE

The “No.” indicates the question number in the questionnaire. Almost all questions had
an “Any other, please specify” or a “Don’t Know/ Uncertain” option (which may not be
listed or completely listed below)

No Statement/ Variable in Questionnaire Summary of

responses
1. Who is covered by the term ‘bureaucracy’ in Pakistan? Mark as many as Only prestigious
applicable (a) All government functionaries (from grades 1-22) (b) All cadres
gazzetted officers (grades 17 and above) © Only officers belonging to the
CSS/ PCS and other “prestigious” cadres (d) Only senior policy making
officers, say grades 20 and above (e) All government employees
involved in administrative work (including educators, doctors heading
govt. hospitals, even SHO’s (f) A certain class of officials demonstrating
a negative attitude towards the people by maintaining willful red-tapism and
unhelpful attitude (g) Any other, please specify
2. Generally speaking, how is the term “bureaucracy” used in Pakistan? (a) (b) 85%
positively (b) negatively (c) neutrally (d) variously (e) don’t know
3. What groups, if any, comprise the “ruling/ decision making elite” of (b) Senior
Pakistan other than the members of formal governance structures like military. Officers
assemblies and constitutional office holders? (you may check as many as (43);
applicable) (a) All CSS officers (b) Senior officers of the armed forces (d) bureaucrats
( Chiefs of Staff/ Corps Commanders) (c) The higher bureaucracy (grade 20
close to the
and above generally and all field officers) (d) Only certain bureaucrats who
are close to elected politicians (e) Members of political parties, and their
politicians (44)
extensions like labour & student unions (f) Top business people and trade
bodies like FPCCI, APTMA (g) Tribal and feudal leaders (other than
members of political parties, elected bodies) (h) Top professionals like
lawyers, media-people, educators, NGO persons, clergy (I) Any other
4. If the Pakistani “ruling elite” specifically includes DMG, what’s its 17% (40%) agree
role therein?(a)very important(b) fairly important (c) not so important
(d) the DMG is not a part of the “ruling elite” (e) don’t Know/
5. Which, if any, is the most powerful group (formal/ informal) in the DMG (27%);
bureaucracy? [open ended] politically linked
(23%)
6. Which, if any, is the least powerful group in the bureaucracy?[open] Honest, upright
(25%)
7. Generally, are our civil services still “colonial” (elitist) in their outlook? Yes 48%
(a) yes (b) no (c) don’t Know/ uncertain No 47%
8. How “colonial” (elitist) are DMG Officers compared to other civil Equally or more
servants?(a) more elitist (b) less elitist (c) equally elitist (d) 77%
don’t know/uncertain
9. How would you rank the following problems being currently faced 45% ranked (c)
by Pakistan? (No. 1 being the biggest challenge and No. 2 being the authoritarian and
next and so on) (a) Population growth: a high rate draining already corrupt
insufficient resources, (b) Poor economy (c) Authoritarian and governance as
corrupt governance (d) Lack of national consensus on basic issues No. 1
(e) Unfavorable strategic climate (f) Any other (suggest your own)
10. In your opinion, which one of the following best describes Pakistani Poor 23%; only
democracy? (a) A very good world class democracy (b) An in name 52%
acceptable “functional democracy” (c) A poor democracy (d) A
democracy only in name
11. How democratically inclined are Pakistani politicians? (a) highly Not inclined
inclined (b) somewhat inclined (c) not inclined 75%
12. How democratically inclined are Pakistani civil servants? (a) highly Somewhat
inclined (b) somewhat inclined (c) not inclined inclined 55%;
not inclined 40%
13 How much regard for the rule of law do elected Pakistani office holders Little 47%;
have? (a) Very high (b) High (c) Fair (d) Little (e) None none 47%
14. How much regard do Pakistanis generally have for the rule of law? Fair 28%;
(a) Very high (b) High (c) Fair (d) Little (e) None little 54%
15. How much regard do Pakistani civil servants have for the rule of law? Fair 45%;
(a) Very high (b) High (c) Fair (d) Little (e) None little 35%
16. Can DMG Offrs be distinguished from other equivalent bureaucrats (c) 82% said
when it comes to procedural and legal propriety? Would you say they they are better
are (a) worse (b) same (c) better (d) don’t know/uncertain
17. To what degree is elected local government essential to larger national (c) 78%
democracy? (a) not essential at all (b) a small degree (c) a large degree
18. Would you support a system of community-based administration and (b) 60% do not
police in which civil servants serving as municipal administrators support this
/ACs/ SHOs/ DSPs are replaced by elected/ employed local officials system
from within the district or division? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t know
19. If elected officials were to fill district administration/police posts, (d) 77% said no
how great an improvement would be seen in terms of less power change
excesses/ corrupt practices? (a) very great (b) substantial (c) some
(d) none
20. Would you support a decentralization that replaces the present (a) yes 48%
provinces with smaller administrative units based on present (b) No 45%
divisions/districts? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know
21. How much has Pakistani public administration changed over the past (a) 50%
50 years? (a) very much (b) somewhat (c) little (d) not at all (e) (b) 32%
uncertain/don’t know somewhat
22. If “great or substantial” how has this change been? (a) positive, for (a) 12%
the better (b) negative, for the worse (c) uncertain/don’t know (b) 69%
23. In the future, would changes in DMG (a) come from within (b) have (b)32%
to be forced from outside by elected leaders/ World Bank/ etc.(c) a (c)57%
mix of two i.e both from internal and external sources (d) any other
24. Given the choice would you want the DMG to (a) Continue as it is (c) 77% i.e. be
(b) Be disbanded totally and replaced (say by elected local officials reorganized
or the Provincial Civil Services) (c) Be reorganized (d) Any other,
25. DMG Officers serve in a very wide range of government posts. How (b) 63% just
generalist a service is the DMG in an age of specialization? (a) Too right
generalist (b) Just right (c) Not generalist (d) Don’t know/ uncert.
26. Are DMG officers treated preferentially in terms of wide-ranging (a)48%
postings? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know (b)43%
27. If “yes” to above, should restrictions be placed on DMG officers’ (a)3%
horizontal mobility? (a) Yes (b)No (c) Don’t Know (b)73%
28. What best describes the relationship between bureaucrats and (a) 08%
elected politicians ? (a) very good – mutually cordial and beneficial (c) 77%
most of the time (b) Very bad: zero sum tussle to gain control over the
other (c) Uneasy: mutual mistrust; not based on principles but
interests (d) Any other,
29. Most Pakistanis blame the politicians and bureaucrats for the (a) 20%
country’s sad state of governance; whom do you think is more to (b) 07%
blame, if any? (a) Political heads take final decisions; under (c) 58%
democratic management principles responsibility cannot be delegated
therefore they are to be blamed fully (b) Bureaucrats advice the
politicians, and hence are to be blamed more (c) Both are to be
blamed equally (d) No, the blame is not equal, instead it is _______
(state proportion) (e) Don’t know/uncertain
30. To what extent do “lucrative” or other sought after posts go to those (a) 40%
with strong political or bureaucratic links? (a) Always (b) (b) 55%
Most of the time (c) occasionally (d) rarely or never
31. Until the 1973 ‘reforms’ immense prestige was associated with (a) 62%
service labels like CSP, PFS, PSP, etc. Would you agree to a formal
renaming of the DMG as CSP? (a)Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/
32. The average DMG officer spending fewer years in the districts than 62% CSP (see
on other assignments, the group’s designation appears to be a No. 31) 17%
misnomer; would you recommend some other nomenclature? If yes, Pakistan Admin
what? [open] Service
33. The Federal civil services are selected on the basis of a quota system (a) 70%
with only 10% officers selected on merit; do you support the quota (b) 27%
system? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know
34. If you support the quota system, what best reflects your reason? (a)28%
(a) Quotas provide fair representation to all the people in a pluralistic (b)42%
country (b) Quotas give a sense of justice to all the constituents in a
federal entity.(c) Any other, [design problem: should have barred
those replying “NO” to item 33 from responding to this one].
35. If you are opposed to the quota system, what best reflects your Half of the 27%
reason? (a) The quota system is detrimental to the quality of who were
personnel in the bureaucracy (b) The benefit of system does not opposed to quota
always reach the people for whom it is designed the system is subject gave multiple
to extensive misuse (c) The system diminishes societal answers
competitiveness and institutionalizes poor governance (d) Any other,
36. Which of the following best reflects your opinion of the present (a) 47%
CSS/DMG selection?(a) As good as is possible in present-day (b) 47%
Pakistan (b) Far better than the national average for government recruitment
(c) Any other, please specify
37. 10% seats of the seats in DMG, Police and Foreign Service are reserved(b)for 82% do not
serving armed forces’ personnel who are inducted through a special processsupport this way
without appearing in the CSS exam. Do you support this? of induction
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/ uncertain
38 The FPSC comprises of official nominees from amongst retired (a) 40%
bureaucrats, educators etc. Should the FPSC be constituted in any (b) 45%
other way than at present? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/ uncertain
39. A proposal for contractual employment in the bureaucracy is being (b) 69% oppose
considered with a view to improve the quality of personnel and allow this system
quicker termination of services of incompetent or politically inducted
persons. Do you support this? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/ uncert
40. Comparatively speaking there are fewer females in DMG than others (c) 52%
CSS groups. What could be the reasons for this gender gap? Check as (d) 40%
many as applicable. (a) An anti-female bias in the selection process
(b) A reflection of the prevailing social norms- few candidates apply
for DMG (c) A perception that females would not be effective as field
officers (d) Any other, please specify [multiple answers OK]
41. If more females were to be selected for the DMG, how much would (c) 48%
this change the “quality” and “citizen-friendliness level” of the (b) 38%
administration? (a) A great deal of change (b) some change (c)
little or no change
42. Pakistan has been rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the (a) 67%
world by some international organizations. To what extent are such (b) 27% i.e. 94%
ratings justified? (a) very justified (b) somewhat justified (c) feel it is
not at all justified justified
43. How would you define corruption? (You may check more than one) A multiple
 (a) Using official stationary, cars, phones, equipment and staff for response item:
personal work (b) Receiving gifts/ cultivating socially in return for (d) 96%
immediate/ postponed favors (c) Acquiring land/ making business (c) 90%
contacts/profits as a intangible extension of official positions i.e. (e)82%
private benefit dependant upon official post. (d) Taking money/goods (b)78%
directly in return for official public work (e) Helping friends/ (a)55%
relatives cut official corners/ deprive state of revenues (f) Any other (f)10%
44. By your own definition what percentage of Pakistani civil servants (a)62%
are corrupt? (a) > 90% (b) 75% (c) > 50% (d) 25% or less (b)32%
(e) any other, please specify
45. What percentage of DMG officers are corrupt? (a) > 90% (b) 75% (a) 28%; (b)
(c) > 50% (d) 25% or less (e) any other, please specify 38% (c) 20%
46. What percentage of elected Pakistani politicians are corrupt? (a) 87%
(a) > 90% (b) 75% (c) > 50% (d) 25% or less (e) any other __ (b) 8%
47. Has the level of corruption in Pakistan changed over the past 20 (a)97%
years? If yes, has it (a) increased greatly (b) increased slightly (c)
decreased slightly (d) decreased greatly
48. Are any of the following groups of civil servants less likely to be corrupt (a)48%
than others? (You may check more than one) (d)28%
(a) females as compared to males (c)22%
(b) long term urban residents as compared to those with a rural
background
(c) members of educated families as compared to those from non-
educated ones
(d) children of prosperous middle class families as compared to those of
poor ones
(e) persons from one or more provinces/areas are more corrupt
than others (f) any other,
49. Would payment of market-driven salaries serve to substantially limit (a) 92% i.e. Yes
corruption. (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/ Uncertain
50. Are there any practically enforceable reforms (unlike filing SUBJECTIVE
Declarations of Assets) to reduce corruption? If so, please write them ANSWERS
on the reverse of this sheet. [open]
51. What was/were your reasons for joining DMG? (you may mark more Multiple res-
than one) ponses ≠100%
(a) Impressed by its status amongst available employment options (c)57%
(b) Liked the outgoing nature of the field job (a)50%
(c) Prospects for horizontal mobility and rapid promotion (b)48%
(d) Societal/peer/family pressure (e) Any other, (d)18%
52. If you had chosen another CSS group, please indicate your first five FSP, PSP, C&E,
choices by numbering the following groups. (all listed) C&T, Accts.
53. How satisfied are you with your employment in DMG at present? (a)10%
(a) Very satisfied (b) satisfied (c) somewhat satisfied (d) not (b)42%
satisfied (c)35%
54. How best can the future of DMG be described? (c)65%
(a) better than now (b) as at present (c) worse than now (b)18%
55. Have you considered or could consider leaving or “moving away” (as (a)87%
on a leave or posting in an international agency) from DMG ? (b)13%
(a) Yes (b) No
56. If yes to No. 55 above, why? (You may mark more than one) (c)70%
Excessive corruption (b) excessive politicization (e.g. lack of fairness (b)68%
in postings/ transfers) (c) poor pay and benefits (d) uncertain future (d)38%
prospects (e) lack of job satisfaction (f) availability of better options (e)28%
(g) Any other,
57. How important is an officer’s background ( e.g. a feudal or (a)52%
bureaucratic lineage) in creating connections that help the DMG (b)28%
career? (a) very important (b) important (c) somewhat important (c)12%
(d) not important (d)08%
58. Is there such a thing as the “DMG network” helping members in 1st (b)
postings and other official/personal tasks or are other linkages like 2nd (c)
family relations, linguistic, religious, ethnic stronger? Please rank in 3rd (e)
order of importance for career. (a) The DMG network (b) Family 4th (f)
relations like sons or sons-in-law, cousins (c) linguistic or provincial 5th (a)
linkages (Pashtu, Punjabi, Urdu speaking, etc (d) religious links (e.g. 6th (d)
a possible “Shia network”) (e) linkages established by having worked
together (f) Personal likes and dislikes other than those listed above
59. Spending most of their careers in the provinces and competing with (b) 47%
the PCS, do DMG officers suffer from a lack of “Federal identity”; if (a) 32%
so to what extent? (a) to a great extent (b) to some extent (c) (c) 20%
Not at all
60. Would you recommend abolishing the PCS (as DMG also has (b) 65% No
provincial quotas)? (a) Yes (b) No (c) don’t know / uncertain (a) 24% Yes
61. Would you prefer an Indian IAS-like system whereby the Federal (c) 63% No
officers (like those of DMG) are allocated a province for 25 years and (a) 30% Yes
act like PCS officers? (a) Yes (b) No (c) don’t know / uncertain
62. How much do competence and merit count in postings? (c) 47%
(a) Count very much (b) Are taken into consideration with (b) 33%
other aspects (c) Do not count very much (d) Do not count at all (d) 12%
(e) Don’t know/ Uncertain
63. Have you been ostracized to marginal postings/ being an OSD for (a) 57% Yes
not conforming? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know (b) 35%
64. Given the choice would you prefer a field posting (a) 65%
(AC/DC/Commissioner) as opposed to a secretariat/ corporate (b) 20%
assignment? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know
65. Would you like to specialize in some area (like finance, planning, etc) (a) 83%
in future? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know (b) 10%
66. Would you willingly accept a posting at a training institution (CSA, (a) 55% Yes
NIPA, etc.)? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know (b) 40% No
67. To what extent do DMG officers make efforts in establishing political (a) 63%
networks and bringing political influences to bear upon internal (b) 32%
bureaucratic decisions like postings? (a) a great extent (b) a (c) 5%
moderate extent (c) not at all (d) don’t know
68. How important is constant training for improvement in job (a) 80%
performance? (a) very important (b) somewhat important (c) not (b) 15%
important
69. How many training programs have you attended since joining 52% received no
service? ________ training after
If you received any official foreign training(s) (from the govt. and not initial pre-
those managed privately/ availed through leave) please give details service training
including duration. Please use reverse side of this sheet, if required.
70. How satisfied are you with the in-service training facilities available Design fault
to DMG officers and the role of Career Develop. & Training Wing of double question
the Estab. Division? (a) very satisfied (b) satisfied (c) in one item:
dissatisfied (d) very dissatisfied (c) 47% (d)23%
71. Would you like to have more regular training programs (say a week (a) 68% Yes
every year instead of the two long mandatory trainings at NIPA and (b) 28% No
Staff College?(a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know
72. Is selection for training opportunities, especially foreign ones, based (c) 48%
on merit? (a) often (b) sometimes (c) never (b) 35%
73. Would you favour designated special foreign trainings for DMG and (a)85%
other groups for which only intra-group competition be held (b) 8%
regularly? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know
74. Are you satisfied with the present ACR (performance evaluation) (b)85%
mechanism? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know (a) 12%
75. Is the ACR more a reflection of ? (a) personal relations with (a) 85%
superiors (b) actual performance (b) 5%
76. Would you like all categories of ACRs to be shown to/ discussed by (a) 82%
Reporting Officers with officers being reported (as in many (b) 12%
progressive organizations)? (a) Yes (b) No (c) don’t know/ uncert.
77. How do you see the recent “out of turn” promotions in the civil (b)88%
services? (a) acceptable (b) not acceptable (c) any other (a)4%
78. What is your father’s/ family occupation? Please check 22% each for (b)
(a) Agriculture (landowners/ cultivators) (b) Business/ trade (c) and (e)
(c) Civil Services (Federal/ Provincial) (d) Defence Forces
(e) Professional: Doctor/ Engineer/ Lawyer (f) Private employment
(g) Any other,
79. What best describes you; please check one in each column Largest number
____ traditionally urban _____ upper class from ex-rural,
____ traditionally rural _____ upper middle class now urban
____ rural, now urbanized _____ middle class middle class,
next urban,
upper middle cl.
1
Syed A. Akif is a member of the 1983 batch of the District Management Group; last posted as the
Additional Commissioner, Karachi, he has, inter alia, served as SDM and Political Agent in Balochistan, as
the Deputy Director Hajj, Madinah Munawwarah and Secretary Cotton Export Corp.
2
Dr. Richard C. Pratt is Associate Professor and Director of the Public Administration Program at the
University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.
3
Virtually every article in Pakistani newspapers – which are unfortunately the only regular source for
material on the civil/public services – speak in negative terms about the steady deterioration in the higher
bureaucracy of Pakistan.
4
Figure specially made available by the Federal Public Service Commission’s Research Wing for this
study.
5
This is a constantly occurring theme in virtually every book/ article on the higher bureaucracy of
Pakistan and more so those on the ICS/ CSP/ DMG lineage.
6
The figure of 69.8 represents 63 percent for DMG and 6.8 percent for the Tribal Affairs Group, a
functional analogue of the DMG. The TAG was merged back into the DMG in 1983
7
Kennedy, Charles, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1987. pp 218-9
8
http://www.questionpro.com/akira/showLibrary.do
9
One of the gurus of social science research Earl Babbie (The Practice of Social Research,
Wadsworth Publishing, 1992, p 194) “Human beings who compose any real population are quite
heterogeneous.”
10
For details see, Kennedy, Charles, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, pp. 54~108, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1987.