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T2 B4 Team 2 Workplan Fdr- 6-25-03 Workplan for Evaluating Intelligence Analysis Prior to 911 585

T2 B4 Team 2 Workplan Fdr- 6-25-03 Workplan for Evaluating Intelligence Analysis Prior to 911 585

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WORKPLAN
FOR
EVALUATING INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS PRIORTO9-11
(25
June
2003
Rev.)
OVERVIEW
Objective:
Write
a
chronological narrative
of the
IC's
efforts
to
analyze
the Al
Qaeda threat between1991 and 2001; identify and analyze
factors
that
the determined the effectiveness of these
efforts.
APPROACH
1.
Using
the
Joint Committee inquiry
as a
baseline, conduct follow-up research
to
fill
in
gaps,
clarify
items in dispute, and provide an authoritative chronology, including a version suitable for release that
will
addressthe
public's
concernsand
inform
future
policy discussions. Tasks include:
A.
Identify
and
analyze
the
players
and
their actions
1.
Consumers:
Identify
policymakers responsible
for
tasking
and
receiving analysis. Trackchanges
in
this tasking
and
their
feedback
to
1C
analysts over time.
2.
Managers: Identify and
assess
the
decisions
of
1C
managers
responsible
for analysisresponding to this tasking, and
for
planning and managing the IC's analytic resources
2.
Producers:
Identify
the individuals and organizations in the analytic communityanalyzingthe AlQaeda threat.
Identify
skills, specializations,andassignments,and howthis mix changed over time.
B.
Assessthe
IC's
analytic operations priorto9-11
1.
Assess number
and
types
of
analytic personnel assigned
to Al
Qaeda
in
CIA, NSA, otherrelevant organizations. Develop time lines, decision pointsinallocationofpersonnel.
2.
Document management decisions
and
process
for the
analytic process
in
CIA, NSA,
and
other organizations tracking
Al
Qaeda;
identifyefforts
underway during 1995-2001
to
adapt
and
focus
on new
threats; assess results
of
these
efforts.
C.
Assess
the
IC's analysis
and its
state
of
understanding
of the Al
Qaeda threat prior
to
9-11
Identify major
DI
andother
1C
products: PDBs,
NIEs,
SEIB
items,andbriefings. Evaluate
the
accuracy, comprehensiveness,
and
timeliness
of the
IC's intelligence
on Al
Qaeda
at
key
points
in
time. Document
the
information
flow -
producers,
consumers,
feedback.
Identify
and
evaluate other analytic products
and
services (e.g., internal
CTC
memorandum; operational analysis supporting border monitoring, law enforcement, other
CIA
activities)
Identify
intelligence gaps revealed
and
discussed
in the
analysis. Assess
how
this
affected
subsequent analysis and collection tasking.
2.
Identify
and
evaluate
issues
concerning
the
performance
of the
1C
in
analyzing
the Al
Qaeda threat,
especially
as these
factors
may shape the IC's abilities to monitor other threats of a
similar
nature orlevel
of
concern. Using
finding
raised
by the
Joint
Committee report
as a
starting point,
issues
to be
investigated include:
A. If the
analytic resources devoted
to Al
Qaeda prior
to
9-11 were,
as
some members
of the
Joint
Committee
suggested, inadequate, what were
the
obstacles that prevented
the
1C
from
responding more
effectively?
What resources were available? What were
the
operating
and
management procedures
for
analysis?
How did
these procedures
affect
the
ability
of
1C
 
2
analysisto
surge
and
concentrate
its
resources, draw
on all
sources
of
information, adopt
new
methodologies, etc.?
B.
What were
the
links between
the
1C
and
domestic
law
enforcement
organizations?
How did
they workon aday-to-day basis?
C.
Evaluate
the
effectiveness
of
these procedures
in
respect
to the
ability
of
1C
analyticorganizationstorespondtostrategic warning.How did the
1C
respondtostrategic warninganddeliver analysis? What
factors
determined
its
ability
to do so?
D.
If
analysis
tradecraft
and
associated management
and
operating procedures were inadequate
for
analyzing
the Al
Qaeda threat prior
to
9-11, have they been changed?
Are
they adequate
for
analyzing other
threats
thatthe
1C
will needtodeal
with
in thefuture (e.g.,
WMD,
disease, regional powers, threats using terrorist-type tactics, etc.)
E.
Evaluate
the
effectiveness
of
1C
management
of the
analytic process
e.g,
training,tasking,
SOPS,
production, coordination,
feedback,
response.
F.
Using the
results
of this analysis, develop proposals
for
addressing problems
affecting
analysis
in the
following
form:
measures that
can be
adopted immediately
by
1C
organization heads;measures that would require executive
orders
by the President to resolve
division
andassignment
of
responsibilities;
and
measures that would require action
by
Congress
to
provide
new
statutory authorities.Required resources
for
the
workplan1. Publications and documents
A.
National Intelligence Council
NIEs, SNIEs,
and other
major
products pertaining to Al Qaeda
B.
CIA
IMs,lAs,typescripts,
SEIB,
PDB
items pertaining
to Al
Qaeda
C.
CTC and IOC
analytic reports, memoranda,
and
other analytic
and
operational supportproducts pertaining
to Al
QaedaD.
NSA
reports
and
supporting data pertaining
to Al
Qaeda
E.
Planning and strategy documents by (or directing) the DI and other analytic components within
CIA,
NSA,
and DOD
intelligence organizations during 1992-2001
Interviews
A.
NSC
staff
(In
coordination with other teams
and
other Team
2
groups)
B.
CIA
Deputy Directors
for
Intelligence;
officials
responsible
for
PDB,
SEIB,
other
DI
products;
CTC,
IOC,
UBLTask
Force
analytic heads;
C.
Chairmen, National Intelligence Council;
NIO
for
Warning
and NIO At
Large
D.
Heads
of NSA/ SID and
other components responsible
for
SIGINT
analysis
on
terrorism
E.
Various
analysts
and
mid-level managers
in the
CTC,
DI
regional
offices,
and NSA
analytic
and
processing components,to beindividually identified internally
later
F. Other
CIA,
NSA,
and
1C
officials
as
required
and
available

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