THIRD DIVISION

[G. R. Nos. 137542-43. January 20, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. REYNAN SANTIAGO y CASTILLO, appellant. DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

This is an appeal from the Joint Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City, in Criminal Cases Nos. C-53125 and C-53126, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Reynan Santiago y Castillo for violation of Section 8, Article II and Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1991. The Informations filed against appellant Reynan Santiago are quoted as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. C-53125

That on or about the 21st day of November, 1997 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1 JOSEPH DELOS SANTOS, who posed as buyer of methylamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.07 gram, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription therefore knowing the same to be such. CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

2. Criminal Case No. C-53126

That on or about the 21st day of November, 1997 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) transparent plastic bag with markings EX-C ETA containing four (4) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 911.1 grams, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug under the provisions of the above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.
3

Upon arraignment, appellant assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.4 Trial on the merits ensued. The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts: At about 10:00 oclock in the evening of November 21, 1997, an informant arrived at the Northern Metro Narcotics District Office in Bagong Barrio East, Caloocan City. He reported to Major Jose Valencia, Officer-in-Charge, and P/Insp. Daniel Oamin the rampant trafficking of shabu by appellant at Sawata, Maypajo, Caloocan City. Based on such information, the police formed a team led by P/Insp. Oamin, with PO1 Joseph delos Santos, PO2 Rommel Someros, PO1 Efferson Arceo and PO1 Emerson Adavilles, as members. PO1 delos Santos was assigned as the poseur buyer, PO2 Someros and PO1 Arceo as the back-up team, and PO1 Adavilles and P/Insp. Oamin as perimeter security. P/Insp. Oamin handed PO1 delos Santos a P500.00 bill bearing serial number DH 464448 as poseur money. It was understood that when the transaction was completed, PO1 delos Santos would place his left hand on his nape. Then, the back-up team would apprehend appellant. Then the team and the informant, riding in a red Toyota car and a motorcycle, proceeded to Sawata, Maypajo, Caloocan City. Upon seeing the appellant in the area waiting for customers, the informant briefed PO1 delos Santos then left. PO1 delos Santos approached appellant and asked, Pare, may dala ka? He showed appellant the P500.00 poseur money. After scrutinizing PO1 delos Santos, appellant took the money and handed him a small sachet containing white granules or shabu, saying, Pare, lisa na lang. He then asked PO1 delos Santos if he wanted marijuana and pointed to a plastic bag hanging on the left handle of his hopper. Upon hearing this, PO1 delos Santos made the pre-arranged signal. Immediately, the back-up team apprehended appellant, at the same time informing him of his constitutional rights. They recovered from him the poseur money and four bricks of marijuana fruiting tops. The team brought him to the Northern Metro Narcotics District Office at Bagong Barrio East, Caloocan City for investigation. Then the confiscated drugs were submitted for laboratory examination. They were positive for shabu and marijuana. The defense presented as its witnesses appellant, Roberto de Leon, Marissa Jorda and Jaime Magtalas. Appellant and de Leon testified that at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1997, they were traveling along Sawata St., Maypajo, Caloocan City going to the house of appellant's girlfriend on board a hopper or scooter, when two motorcycle riders chased and overtook them. They identified themselves as policemen, then handcuffed and frisked them. They found chocolates in their possession. The policemen brought them to the Caloocan CityGeneral Hospital and introduced them as drug addicts. Both Marissa Jorda and Jaime Magtalas testified that on the night of November 21, 1997, they saw appellant and his companion being frisked by two policemen.

After hearing, the trial court issued a Joint Decision finding appellant guilty of the crimes charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having established beyond an iota of doubt the guilt of the Accused of the offenses charged, this Court hereby renders judgment re above captioned cases as follows: 1. In Grim. Case No. 53125 for Violation of Sec. 15, Art. Ill of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, this Court, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, hereby sentences Accused REYNAN SANTIAGO y CASTILLO to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of Prision Correccional, as maximum; 2. In Crim. Case No. 53126 for Violation of Sec. 8, Art. II of the abovementioned Act, this court, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences said Accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00; and to pay the costs in both cases. Subject drugs are hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with law. No similar pronouncement was made re the seized Hopper motorcycle it appearing that the said property is owned by a third person, i.e., one Mrs. RODELIA MALICLIC, not liable for the offenses charged. Incidentally the Urgent Motion to Order the Release of the Illegally Seized Hopper filed by the Accused, to which the special prosecutor handling this case was to submit his comment/recommendation thereon will be treated in a separate order/resolution of this Court. The preventive imprisonment suffered by the Accused shall be credited in full in the service of his sentence in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. SO ORDERED.
5

In this appeal, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following assignments of error:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING APPELLANT TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE WITH STRONG AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF APPLYING THE RULE THAT CRIMINAL CASES RISE AND FALL ON THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION AND NOT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACTIVELY INTERFERING IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASE BY CONDUCTING ITS OWN DIRECT EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES INSTEAD OF LEAVING THIS MATTER TO THE PROSECUTION.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS PROVEN THE GUILT OF APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBLT."6

On the first assigned error, records show that after the prosecution had adduced its evidence, appellant filed a motion to dismiss by way of a demurrer to evidence.7 The trial court denied the demurrer, holding that the prosecution has sufficiently established a prima facie case to warrant the conviction of appellant.8 In its Decision, the trial court mentioned the issue of whether the defense by its evidence was able to overcome the prima facie case established by the prosecution which tends to establish the guilt of appellant. Appellant bewails the fact that the trial court shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. Our ruling in Bautista vs. Sarmiento,9 is squarely in point, thus:

There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to believe. When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed-the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back. A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against plaintiff who has burden of proof, he cannot prevail.
Relative to the second assigned error, appellant laments the trial judge's active participation in the proceedings by conducting cross-examination, in violation of his constitutional right to due process as enunciated in Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan.10

We carefully perused the stenographic notes of this case and found the questions propounded by the trial judge to be merely clarificatory, intended to satisfy his mind upon material points arising during the witnesses' examination. The judge, being the arbiter, may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite the trial and prevent unnecessary waste of time.11 InBarbers vs. Laguio, Jr.12 citing United States vs. Hudieres,13 we held:

The right of a trial judge to question the witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides is too well established to need discussion. The trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material facts upon which the judgment in the case should turn. So in a case where a trial judge sees that the degree of credit which he is to give the testimony of a given witness may have an important bearing upon the outcome, there can be no question that in the exercise of a sound discretion he may put such questions to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth, x x x
As to the third assigned error, appellant insists that the trial court overlooked inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He pointed out that they have different versions on: (1) the initial stages of the formation of the buy-bust team; (2) how the buy-bust team reached the target area; and (3) the initial encounter with appellant. Moreover, he assails the version of the prosecution that there were no preliminary discussions between the poseur-buyer and the appellant prior to the transaction, contrary to ordinary human experience. Appellant's contentions must fail. The inconsistencies adverted to by the appellant are trivial and insignificant and refer only to minor details. Time and again, we have steadfastly ruled that inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.14 Furthermore, we cannot expect the testimonies of different witnesses to be completely identical and to coincide with each other since they have different impressions and recollections of the incident. Hence, it is only natural that their testimonies are at variance on some minor details. Appellant likewise calls our attention to the discrepancy between the testimony and the affidavit of PO1 delos Santos. He testified on cross-examination that when the team arrived at the target area, appellant was already there. However, in his affidavit, he stated that he and the informant waited for several minutes at the place before they saw appellant and his companion. We are not swayed. Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness' affidavit and testimony do not necessarily impair his credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. 15 Besides, it appears that the

affidavit was executed by PO1 delos Santos jointly with the other members of the buybust team. At this point it is apt to stress that the findings of the trial court, having had the opportunity to personally observe the demeanor of the witnesses, are entitled to great weight and respect, absent any showing that the trial court overlooked facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the result of the case. 16 In the present case, the trial court found the evidence for the prosecution worthy of credence and we see no cogent reason to deviate from such finding. The witnesses for the prosecution are law enforcement officers who, unless shown that they were inspired by an improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, have in their favor the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.17 Thus, pitted against the categorical and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's defense of denial and frame-up miserably fails. We have consistently held that courts invariably view with disfavor denials and allegations of frame-up for these are easily concocted. They are the usual and standard defenses in prosecutions involving violation of the dangerous drugs law.18 We therefore uphold the trial court's judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Pursuant to R.A. 6425, as amended, and in line with People vs. Simon,19 the penalty for the sale of 0.07 gram of shabu is prision correctional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no qualifying circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the trial court properly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. C-53125. Under the same law (R.A. 6425, as amended), possession of 911.1 grams of marijuana is punishable byreclusion perpetua to death. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and applying Sec. 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code,20 the trial court's imposition of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. C-53126 is in order. As to the fine imposed, it is settled that courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law.21 Under Section 8, Article II of the same law (R.A. 6425, as amended), in relation to Section 20, Article IV of R.A. 7659, as amended, 22 if the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more, the imposable fine is P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. Thus, in Criminal Case No. C-53126 where 911.11 grams of marijuana were confiscated from appellant, the fine often million pesos fixed by the trial court may be equitably reduced to five hundred thousand pesos. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Cases Nos. C-53125 and C-53126, finding appellant Reynan Santiago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 8, Art. II and Sec. 15, Art. Ill of R.A. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in the sense that in Criminal Case No. C-53126, he is fined P500.000.00. SO ORDERED

Vitug, (Chairman), Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Rollo at 20; Records at 199. Records at 1 Id., at 7. Id., at 21. Rollo at 34; Records at 213. Brief for the Appellee at 1; Rollo at 58. Records at 130. Resolution dated September 25, 1998, Records at 144. G. R. No. L-45137, September 23, 1985, 138 SCRA 587. G.R. Nos. 103501-03 & 103507, February 17, 1997, 268 SCRA 332. Cosep vs. People. G.R. No. 110353, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 378. A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568, February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 606. 27 Phil. 45, 47-18(1914). People vs. Mataro, G.R. No. 130378, March 8, 2001, 354 SCRA 27; People vs. Villadares, G.R. No. 137649, March 8, 2001, 354 SCRA 86; People vs. Mustapa, G.R. No. 141244, February 19, 2001, 352 SCRA 252; People vs.Navarro, G.R. Nos. 132696-97, February 12, 2001, 351 SCRA 462; People vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 129057, January 22, 2001, 350 SCRA 11. People vs. Villadares. supra. People vs. Remerata, G.R. No. 147230, April 29, 2003; People vs. Almendras, G.R. No. 145915, April 24, 2003, citing People vs. Chen Tiz Chang, G.R. No, 131872-73, 325 SCRA 776, 790 (2000); People vs. Sy, G.R. No. 147348, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 594; People vs. JulianFernandez, G.R. Nos. 143850-53, December 18, 2001, 372 SCRA 608; People vs. Lacap, G.R No. 139114, October 23, 2001, 368 SCRA 124; People vs.Gonzales, G.R. No. 121877, September 12, 2001, 365 SCRA 17; People vs. Mustapa, supra, citing People vs. Salamat, G.R. No. 103295, 225 SCRA 499 (1993). People vs. Remerata, supra, citing People vs. Padasin, G.R. No. 143671, February 12, 2003; People vs. Julian-Fernandez, supra, citing People vs. Uy, G.R. No. 128046, 327 SCRA 335 (2000). People vs. Gonzales, supra, citing People vs. Sy Bing Yok, G.R. No. 121345, 309 SCRA 28 (1999). G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555. Sec. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. xxx 2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

x x x.
21

People vs. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 138881, December 18, 2000, 348 SCRA 526.
22

27,

2002; People vs. Johnson, G.R.

No.

SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

xxx SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. xxx SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-a, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: xxx 5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana; xxx Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correctional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. x x x.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION December 8, 1914 G.R. No. L-9726 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARSON TAYLOR, defendant-appellant. C. W. OBrien for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: This was an action for criminal libel. The complaint alleged: That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being then and there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain daily bilingual newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish languages, and known as the Manila Daily Bulletin, a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries in all of which both languages are spoken and written, and having as such the supervision and control of said newspaper, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as private individual, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and procure to be composed, printed, edited, published, and circulated in said newspapers issue of the above mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a certain false and malicious defamation and libel in the English language of and concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as follows: OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOWS CIVIL SUIT. Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the party after a family disagreement. Sensational statemen t sworn to. Mystery of Calle ODonnell fire solved and papers served. Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company. The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance. The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire. The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a success.

The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and Eugenio Martin in connection with the fire that destroyed house No. 2157 Calle ODonnell on April 4. The case in question is a sensational one to say the least, and the court is being petitioned to set aside the ruling and ci te the parties to show cause why they should not be cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud. On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle Odonnell was destroyed by fire. The house was insured for P5,000, the contents for an additional P5,000, with the West of Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz & Co. are the local agents, with an additional P1,500 with Smith, Bell & Co. The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the paid by the agents of the insurance companies and the matte r apparently dropped from the records. Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out which resulted in sensational statements to the effect tha t the destruction of the property had been an act of incendiarism in order to collect the insurance. The there was an investigation started and it resulted in sworn statements of the three persons above mentioned. Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the sworn statements and the parties are cited to appear in co urt and show cause. The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed to be in line the house at the time of the conflagratio n and which was paid for by the insurance agents, sworn statements having been made that it was destroyed in the fire, was in certain house in Montalban, where it was identified upon the sworn statements of the above mentioned. Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners. Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen last night and asked for a statement as to the case. Mr. Burke refused to talk on the case and stated that when it came to trial it would be time enough to obtain the facts. The present action came before the court on motion of Attorney Burke to set aside the judgment, which, in the original case, given the owners of the property judgment for the amount of the insurance. Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the notarial returns to the same were made yesterday afternoon, the sworn statements as to the burning of the house being in the hands of the sheriff. It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil proceedings instituted to recover the funds in the case entitled on the court records, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the West o Sctoland Association, Limited, No. 10191 on the court records. It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the recent suit brought against Ex -Governor W. Cameron Forbes for lumber supplied for his Boston home. That in this article is contained the following paragraph. To wit: . . . Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners, by which the said accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and there was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who read the same; that the statements and allegations made in said paragraph are wholly false and untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, virtue, and reputation of the said offended party as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as private individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Contrary to law.

Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was tried, found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, to pay a fine of P200. From the sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignment of error: First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and guilty of the alleged libel. Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor and publisher of the Manila Daily Bulletin. Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous articles was libelous per se. Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while finding that there was no malice. Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred to attorney Ramon Sotelo. Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the plaintiffs in case No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published. After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by the appellant, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first and second assignments of error. In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so by law. Libel is made a crime here by Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission. Said Act (No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the particular conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the persons who may be guilty of such crime. In the present case the complaint alleges that the defendant was, at the time of the publication of said alleged article the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual newspaper, etc., known as the Manila Daily Bulletin, a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries. It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher. From an examination of said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides that: Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same. By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only provides for a punishment of the author, editor, or proprietor. It would follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that the defendant in the present case is the author, editor, or proprietor of the newspaper in which the libel was published, he can not be held liable. In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that No person is represented to be either the author, editor, or proprietor. That statement of the Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record. There is not a word of proof in the record showing that the defendant was either the author, the editor, or the proprietor. The proof shows that the defendant was the manager. He must,

therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged against him, unless it is shown by the proof that he, as manager of the newspaper, was in some way directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in said alleged libelous article. The prosecution presented the newspaper, the Manila Daily Bulletin, for the purpose of showi ng the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the only proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the defendant had to the publication of the libel in question. From an examination of the editorial page of said exhibit, we find that it shows that the Manila Daily Bulletin is owned by the Bulletin Publishing Company, and that the defendant was its manager. There is not a word of proof in the record which shows what relation the manager had to the publication of said newspaper. We might, by series of presumptions and assumptions, conclude that the manager of a newspaper has some direct responsibility with its publication. We believe, however, that such presumptions and assumptions, in the absence of a single letter of proof relating thereto, would be unwarranted and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an opportunity to present proof or because no such proof was obtainable, he presented none. It certainly is not difficult matter to ascertain who is the real person responsible for the publication of a newspaper which is published daily and has a wide circulation in a particular community. No question was asked the defendant concerning his particular relation to the publication of the newspaper in question. We do not desire to be understood in our conclusions here as holding that the manager or the printer may not, under certain conditions and proper proof, he held to be the author, editor, or proprietor of a newspaper. He may nominate himself as manager or printer simply, and be at the same time the author, editor, or proprietor of the newspaper. He can not avoid responsibility by using some other term or word, indicating his relation to the newspaper or the publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the author, the editor, or the proprietor of the same. His real relation to the said publication is a matter of proof. The Solicitor-General, in his with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law places the responsibility for publishing a libel, on every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, etc. Had the prosecuting attorney in the trial of the cause believed that the defendant, even though he called himself the manager was, in fact, the author, editor, or proprietor of said publication, he should have presented some proof supporting that contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply because a person connected with the publication of a newspaper who calls himself the manager or printer may not, in fact and at the same time, be the author, editor, or proprietor. The author, editor, or proprietor can not avoid responsibility for the writing and publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself the manager or the printer of a newspaper. That, however, is a question of proof. The burden is upon the prosecution to show that the defendant is, by whatever name he may call himself, in truth and in fact, the author, editor, or proprietor of a newspaper. The courts cannot assume, in the absence of proof, that one who called himself manager was in fact the author, editor, or proprietor. We might assume, perhaps, that the manager of a newspaper plays an important part in the publication of the same by virtue of the general signification of the word manager. Men can not, however, be sentenced upon the basis of a mere assumption. There must be some proof. The word manage has been defined by Webster to mean to have under control and direction; to conduct; to guide; to administer; to treat; to handle. Webster defines manager to be one who manages; a conductor or director; as, the manager of a theater. A manager, as that word is generally understood, we do not

believe includes the idea of ownership. Generally speaking it means one who is representing another as an agent. That being true, his power and duties and obligations are generally defined by contract. He may have expressed as well as implied powers, but whatever his powers and duties are they must be defendant upon the nature of the business and the terms of his contract. There is no fixed rule which indicates particularly and definitely his duties, powers and obligations. An examination into the character of the business and the contract of his employment must be made for the purpose of ascertaining definitely what his duties and obligations are. His exact relation is always a matter of proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution is a case like the present, to show that whatever title, name or designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the author, the editor, or the proprietor of the newspaper. If he was in fact the author, editor, or proprietor, he can not escape responsibility by calling the manager or printer. It is the relation which he bears to the publication and not the name or title he has assumed, which is important in an investigation. He can not wear the toga of author of editor and hide his responsibility by giving himself some other name. While the terms author, editor, and proprietor of a newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words author, editor, or proprietor are not material or important, further than that they are words which are intended to show the relation of the responsible party to the publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or denomination. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record showing that the defendant was the author, the editor, or the proprietor of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed, the complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de officio. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Moreland, Trent and Araullo., JJ., concur.