International Journal of Computational Cognition (http://www.YangSky.com/yangijcc.htm)
Volume 2, Number 3, Pages 1\u201319, September 2004
Publisher Item Identi\ufb01er S 1542-5908(04)10301-1/$20.00
Article electronically published on May 27, 2003 athttp://www.YangSky.com/ijcc23.htm. Please cite this

the principle of multiple knowledge. It is claimed that current digital computers, however fast, cannot achieve true human-level intelligence, and that the Church-Turing thesis might be inadequate to encapsulate top human thinking mechanisms. We try to show this by introduc- ing and analyzing a two- and one-processing entity. Formally, we want to compare performance of a single program/process performed by a Turing machine, and two programs/processes performed by two interaction Turing machines that can dynamically change each oth- ers programs based on dynamic unconstrained input.c

Can we de\ufb01ne computing processes in animals, humans and computers? Do they formally di\ufb00er? Why are we intelligent and creative (Gomes et al. 1996, Haase 1996, Turner 1995, Wiggins 2001) and which cognitive processes di\ufb00er us from animals on one side and from computers on the other?

The best formal model of computing is the Turing machine. Digital com- puters are very good real-life implementations of formal Turing machines. The science that is interested in dealing with intelligence and consciousness in computers is arti\ufb01cial intelligence (AI). It is the science of mimicking human mental faculties in a computer (Hopgood 2003).

But while it is rather easy to reproduce several human mental abilities - like playing chess - with digital computers, it is very hard to implement true intelligence or consciousness. In recent years it is more or less becom- ing evident that the mathematical model of the universal Turing machine (Figure 1) is not su\ufb03cient to encapsulate the human mind and the brain (Gams 2001).

It is only fair to observe that there are di\ufb00erent viewpoints regarding human/computer subject (Gams et al. 1997). Even some very smart and successful researchers still say that current computers are intelligent and conscious. But this position is much less common than a decade ago, and is often denoted as \u201cstrong AI\u201d (Sloman 1992).

There are several ways of structuring di\ufb00erent AI approaches. Here we are interested inweak andstrong AI. Strong AI says that computers are in principle computationally as powerful as digital computers, while weak AI highlights practical or principal di\ufb00erences (Gams 2001). Strong AI is philosophically based on an implication of the Church-Turing thesis claim- ing - in simple words - that all solvable functions can be mechanically solved by the Turing machine (Copeland 1997). More di\ufb03cult functions cannot be solved by in our physical world existing computing mechanisms. Therefore, humans are in principle computationally as capable as digital computers. Another consequence directly following from the Church-Turing thesis is that there is no possible procedural formal counterexample or counterproof to show potential human stronger computing, i.e. supercomputing mecha- nisms.

The last two arguments dominated scienti\ufb01c human/computer debates for the last \ufb01ve decades. Not only are they theoretically correct, no widely accepted counterexample was found in real life. So, scienti\ufb01cally speaking, there is nothing wrong with the Church-Turing thesis \u2013 as long as we stay in formal de\ufb01nable domains.

The exponential growth of computer capabilities (Moore 1975; Hamil- ton 1999) is constant over more than half of the century. E.g. the speed of computing roughly doubles each 18 months. On the other hand, hu- man capabilities have been practically the same during the last century, despite some small constant growth in IQ tests in recent decades. Since computer performance grows pretty linearly on a logarithmic scale, com- puters in more and more areas sooner or later outperform humans. Re- garding symbolic calculating possibilities, computers outperformed humans practically immediately, and several other areas followed. Currently, com- puters are outperforming best humans in most complex games like chess or in capabilities like mass memory (See Figure 2).

It is hard to objectively measure intelligence, but one of the most common de\ufb01nitions is performance in new, unknown situations. The other idea is by Penrose (1991) that humans recognize intelligence based on some intuitive common sense. We shall accept this position.

i.e. linearly on a logarithmic scale. Due to the much faster growth rate, computers outperform humans in more and more complex domains, currently in mass memory capacity.

Putting this basic intelligence (or consciousness) of humans and comput- ers on the same graph, we again see that human performances remain un- changed in the last century, similar to Figure 2. But in this case, computer basic intelligence remain indistinguishable from zero over the same period (Figure 3). Growing exponentially, computers would by now have to be at least a little intelligent and consciousness, e.g. at least like a little child, if there were any correlation between speed of computing and intelligence.