4.with these particular branches and these leaves,5.in this particular spot in the forest,6.and which came from a particular acorn at a particular moment in time.If I touch the tree with my hand,1.the resistance which I encounter is this resistance,2.just as the sound I hear in striking the bark is this sound.Our external senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch) put us in contact either with something which is proper and peculiar to the object of one sense and which each sense perceives to the exclusion of allothers (
), for instance, color in the case of sight; or else the common object (
) of more than one sense, for instance, shape in the case of sight and touch. But in every casethe reality perceived by sense is always endowed with individuality.The same is true of those sensations which are called internal, and which originate, in the scholasticsystem of classification.1.from sense-memory (a),2.from sense-consciousness (b),3.from instinct (c),4.or from imagination (d).These are simply so many labels attached to psychological facts which have been duly observed andnoted. A few examples will make this clear.(a) Sense-memory: When I have ceased to look at the oak tree, there remains in me an after-image,which is said to be ‘preserved’ in memory, since I am able to ‘reproduce’ it. We thus possess inourselves a storehouse of after-images received through the senses which can be reproduced either spontaneously, or at at the command of the will. It is clear that these vestiges of past sensations,retained and produced in this way, are individualized just as the original sensation. If I picture to myself and oak tree, it will be a picture of
oak tree. In the same way, when we realize that a sense perception, or a conscious act of our physiological life, has a certain duration, or takes place after another activity, this realization, which itself involves sense-memory, is once more individual andsingular, and presents us with
particular time. The recognition of past time involves reference to particular psychological events, following each other.(b) Sense-consciousness: Moreover, when I look at an oak tree, something tells me that I see. I amaware that I am seeing. My sense perception is followed by ’sense consciousness,’ and the content of this sense-consciousness is particularized. Again, the complex sense cognition of this oak tree as anobject is the result of the coordination of man perceptions coming from different senses: the height of the tree, the roughness of its bark, the hollow sound which its trunk gives when struck. There is reasonto attribute to the higher animals and to man a central sense, which combines the external sense perceptions, compares them, and discriminates between them. But, in this case also, the result of theseoperations is individualized, and if we compare for instance two complete sense perceptions of oak trees, each is itself and not the other.(c) Instinct: We can apply the same to the way in which we recognize that a certain situations isdangerous to us or otherwise. We posses a discriminating power which estimates certain concreteconnections between things. We naturally flee from fire, and a shipwrecked man clutches instinctivelyto a plank, much in the same way as a lamb looks upon a wolf as dangerous, and a bird considers a particular branch of a tree as a suitable resting-place for its nest. This act of sense knowledge is alwaysrelated to a particular, concrete situation.