US Air Force: 05%2864%29BG

Embed Doc
Copy Link
Readcast
Collections

CommentGo Back

Download

05/64

Iranian Nuclear Politics

Conflict Studies Research Centre

1

Middle East Series 05/64

Iranian Nuclear Politics: The InternationalDimensions

Dr Babak Ganji

Key Points

* The nuclear policy of the Ahmadinezhad governmentshould be analysed within the framework of the grand strategy of the Iranian state which is aimed at challenging the US in thePersian Gulf and south Asia in particular.* Since the advent of the new government, cleavages withinthe Iranian state apparatus on the nuclear issue have alsochanged. The radical-conservative camp, most notably Iran’ssupreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, would prefer Iran topursue industrial-scale uranium enrichment within theframework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There areserious differences of opinion between advocates of nuclearopacity such as Ahmad Tavakkoli, who have called for thecontinuation of talks with the International Atomic EnergyAgency, and those such as the secretary of the Supreme NationalSecurity Council Ali Larijani who seek to tighten Iran’s relations with Russia, China, India and Pakistan. In the centre right andreformist camp, some still favour talks with the EU, althoughthere have been calls for withdrawal from the NPT if the Iraniancase is referred to the UN Security Council. The Majlis,particularly the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee,is still playing an important role in the nuclear debate.* There are serious differences of opinion over grand strategy within the radical and conservative camps, usually expressed interms of the wisdom of Iranian efforts to bring Russia and Chinainto the talks. A powerful current within the state apparatus,strongly believes in self-reliance, contending that neither Russianor China will sacrifice their national interests for Iran.* The grand strategy with which Larijani was associatedcollapsed with India’s vote against Iran at the meeting of theIAEA’s board of governors. However, in the short term it is

unlikely that this will lead to domestic political change becauseLarijani’s critics are too far apart on other domestic issues.* In the aftermath of the collapse of the government’s grandstrategy, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i increased the powers of thehead of the Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. This is probably an effort to lock Rafsanjani into a radicalposition and to persuade him to endorse the government’s grandstrategy.* The Iranian leadership rejected a Russian proposalsupported by the EU which would enable Iran to carry outenrichment on Russian territory, almost certainly because it would have constrained Iran's ability to "break out" in the eventof a decision by the leadership to do so.* The Khamene'i-Ahmadinezhad coalition is likely to try toexploit the riots in France and embark upon nuclear cooperation with Venezuela to pressure the EU and the US.

Contents

Question of Grand Strategy 1Elements of the Iranian Strategy 2Bargaining Tactics or a Major Shift? 4The Implementation of the New Strategy 5Ahmadinezhad at the UN 6The Collapse of Iranian Strategy 9Larijani and his Allies Resort to Threats 10The Regional Plank of Nuclear Strategy 13Iran’s Nuclear Policy and Grand StrategyRestarted 15The Ahmadinezhad Government’s newPressure Tactics 18Larijani’s “Final Offer” and RussianMediation 19

of 00

Leave a Comment