Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 1974), pp. 267-287 Published by: Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2495794 . Accessed: 28/04/2013 08:09
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SHEILA
FITZPATRICK
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therefore its ideological content mustbe Communist. The same appliedto art; but in bothcases the speed of ideologicaltransformation would be withinthe limitsimposedby a workingrelationship with the old intelligentsia. The "soft"line was not liberal.It operatedwithina framework of ideologicalcontrol through censorship, security police,statemonopoly of thepress, and restriction ofprivate publishing. There was roomfordifference of opinion amongCommunists on the properscope of activity of these institutions; and theirconduct could be criticized by Communists. But thislicensewas not extendedto the non-Communist intelligentsia, since it was the object of control. According to theconventions of the 1920s,members of the intelligentsia might petition for the redressof individualgrievances, but in doing so they were appealingforfavorand not invoking rights. to form the "soft" line made it possible for the intelligentsia Similarly, associations-butas a matter of privilege, not of right.Some culturalinstitutionswere describedas autonomous(the Academyof Sciences,the old imas happerialtheaters),but thiswas an act of favorwhichmight be revoked, The autonomouslabel pened in the cases of Proletkult and the universities. was in facta warningagainst harassment directedat hardlineCommunists, in the sense thatit could nota legal category. No association was autonomous or protest of a Communist fracexcludeCommunists againstthe organization tion within.The "soft" line mightpermitnon-Communist leadershipof an but it did not guaranteeit. association, In the 1920s official cultural policieswere carriedout as a rule by governof partyagitprop mentagencies,notby theparty.The culturalresponsibilities and press departments were narrowlyinterpreted-pressdepartments being withthe partypress,and agitpropdepartments with party largelyconcerned of party membersfor highereducation.Only schools and recommendation ofthesedepartments; and the convention could limited convention the activity the university be broken, as it was in 1924 when agitpropssupervised purge. But it was assumedthata "soft"line on culturewas moreappropriate to the than the Communist Communist government Party,and that partyintervenof the "soft"line. tionmeantat least threatened suspension If thisseemsparadoxical,it was partof the generalparadox of partyand The partyleadership relations. government was, on the one hand,formulator it was protector of thepolicieswhichthe government executed.On the other, interest. It was possible-though politiof the special partyor "proletarian" in whichthepartyleadto imaginea situation callytactless-forLunacharsky ershipwould be obligedto dissociateitselffrompolicieswhichLunacharsky, The 1924 would continueto implement. of the government, a partymember
forchildren of proletarians and sometimes withseparatecategories and "poorpeasants," and Komsomol members. forparty listing andgavea separate children ofpoorpeasants,
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turn up an "overthought, might on literature, Lunacharsky party discussion was The government infavor lineon culture. ofa "hard" whelming majority" neutrality" in art,andnotto discrimia policy ofthe"utmost bound tofollow interest. or proletarian theCommunist representing natein favor of groups forthe statemaybe moreor less "completely inappropriate But a position majority "it would for theparty"; and in thecase ofa hardline party decent critics to comeoutin andparty journals andnewspapers be natural for party critiofother viewsto severe to subject persons owntrends, defense oftheir would a quitespecific cultural line.The party and in short to conduct cism, its talent, and its culture behind[thisline],butof course putitsauthority, as such it...."2 power tosupport expect thestate itcould not for a moment and that was formulated leadership bytheparty Given government policy himself was boundbyparty he couldonlyhave that discipline, Lunacharsky theparty wouldconsciously leadership beenassuming thatin thissituation itstworoles, andthat this be dictated byconstituency separation would separate fora "hard"line. rank andfile pressure from theparty It internal enemies. The "hard"linewas thelineof"classwar" against thebourgeoisie, broadly interagainst and repressive policies meant militant intelligentsia; massofthepeasantry and nonparty thegreat preted to include of theparty to protect the"proand in culture activeintervention it meant interest. letarian" a "hard"line advocated No member oftheparty leadership consistently 1928. Its support on culture before the lower appearsto have comefrom groups suchas and Communist vigilante ranks oftheparty, theKomsomol, andthemilitant atheists Godless).It wasthe (MIilitant writers3 the proletarian Its supporters lookedbackto and provincial isolation. lineof radical youth in military ofpolitics the"soft" line theCivilWar and talked seeing terms, in the capitals The hardliners wererestless, deviation. as a kindof civilian inwiththeidea of powerand political quarrelsome, jealous,and infatuated of thelocal In theprovinces werehard-pressed by thehostility they trigue. central directives fortheirown authority and fearful whenever population, conciliation. that them toward forget "Surely, comrades, youshouldn't pushed werehandin glovewiththe thewholeoftheCivilWar theteachers during a delegate to theThirteenth at thesuggesParty Congress kulaks," protested withtheruralintellishould tionthatthelocalparty cooperate organization handin handwith went thekulak never thatthey "We must forget gentsia:
Zhiznl' gosudarstva," politikasovetskogo "Khudozhestvennaia 2. A. V. Lunacharsky, (Leningrad),1924,no. 10,Mar. 4, p. 1. iskusstva Writers (VAPP, later 3. They were organizedin the Associationof Proletarian their journal from as napostovtsy, referred to in themid-twenties RAPP) and wereoften Na postu.
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forthe whole revolution and thatabout 50 percentof our rural teachersare of the clergy.... Our rural partyforces. . . will be threatened offspring if we invite theteachers intotheparty, ifwe beginto draw themin. The teacher will get moreauthority in the village than our Communists. And, comrades, youknowwhatthatmeans,whentheteacherhas greater authority and greater trustthanour ruralCommunists. ..."4 The "hard" line on culture-the line of komnchvanstvo and spetseedstvo -was discriminatory and coercive, or contemptuous of inherited culignorant turaltradition, enthusiastic for"proletarian culture"and especially the dominanceofproletarian cultural institutions, and relatively indifferent to thestate's needforthe servicesof technical experts.Its watchword was "vigilancein the face of the class enemy,"whichto some supporters meantsimplybei intelligentov. Its tacticsrangedfronm local administrative bullying, through polenmical journalism, to backstairsintrigue in the leaderagainst vulnerablesoftliners ship. I wantto illustrate thesegeneralstatements withthreeexamplesof policy in specificareas-university enrollment, policy toward rural teachers,and literature-wherewe can observe a shifting and evolvingbalance between policiesof accommodation withthe intelligentsia ("soft" line) and pressures of the proletarian towardcoercionand protection interest("hard" line). at illiberal on The "soft"line was its nlost the issue of university enrollmentin theearly 1920s. This was in part a reaction to the eventsof the Civil of Enlightenment War period.5The Commissariat (Narkompros) had origto retainthe autonomy inallyallowed the universities theyhad receivedfrom the ProvisionalGovernment; but at the same time it had declareduniversity entrance faculties"(rabfaks) foradultworkopento all and created"workers' ers without educational The universities the necessary resented qualifications. and the Bolshevikgovernment therabfaks, as a whole, alongwithNarkompros and refused to cooperate.At the end of 1920 theywere formally deprivedof rectors were appointed The intenand Communist autonomy, by Narkompros. within tionsof Narkompros were still, thelimitsofthissituation, conciliatory; and appointees was not,and probably but the behaviorof some of its officials thegenerally of thepartyin 1921. D. P. accurately reflected belligerent temper of Moscow University withthe uncomproBogolepovtook up the rectorship
XIII s"ezd RKP (b): Mai 1924 g. 4. S. Bergavinov(Kiev partyorganization), (Moscow,1963), pp. 469-70. in the Civil War periodis discussedin my book,The 5. Policytowarduniversities Soviet Organization of Educationand the Arts Un1der Comnmissariat of Enlightenment: October1917-1921 (London and New York, 1970), and by James C. Lunacharsky, Slavic Review, to Higher Education, 1917-1921," Approaches McClellandin "Bolshevik 30,no. 4 (December1971): 818-31.
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misingstatement thatit was time "to put a most definite end to everykind of university of teaching, autonomy and freedom and not to give the professoriateany greater rights thanotherSovietemployees," and to fillthe universitieswithworker-Communists through the rabfaks, since "only Communist spetsy can puttheeconomy ofthecountry on otherrails and buildlifeanew."6 E. A. Preobrazhensky, appointedto Narkomprosas head of the technical education administration, was anotherhardliner. "At the moment," he wrote in 1921,"thereis a genuine class war at the doorsof thehigherschoolbetween the worker-peasant majorityof the country which wants to have specialists from amongits own kindin its own stateand the [ex-]governing classes and stateopenlytakesthe side of its own stratalinkedwiththem.The proletarian people."7 But Bogolepov was quickly dismissed,as was Preobrazhensky after a from the Central wave of university strikesand conciliatory intervention had Committee. When Preobrazhensky protested thatthe CentralComnmittee retreated too far and injured the proletarian cause, he foundno supporters his administrative in theleadership. Lenin criticized naiveteand thekornchvanstvo of the rabfakstudentswho supportedhim.8The policy of the Soviet at all costs except thatof government at thistimewas to avoid open conflict The old professors loss ofpolitical control. kepttheirjobs, a fairpart of their freedom of teaching, and a share in university admninistration; the appointed rectors were mild.The Communist thrust of policywas in recruitment of the student body: fromthe early 1920s therewas a verysmall "freeenrollment" and the majorityof places went to nomineesof party,Soviet, to university, and trade union organizationswho enteredeither directlyor throughthe on educational standard. rabfak, depending of koniandirovanie was supposedto fillthe universities The system with and Commmunist students without the upheavaland provoreliableproletarian cationof a major university purge. It had the considerable disadvantageof the raison d'etre of the general loweringacademic standardsand removing school. But the status of the secondaryschool was controversial. secondary of it as an irredeemably Many Communists thought bourgeoisschool which schoolwithout as a technical access to unineededto be radically reorganized constituted versity:in fact,a ratherarbitrarily partymeetingon education to this effect at the beginning of 1921. But Narkomhad passed a resolution pros, with some supportfromLenin, ignoredthe resolution;and only the Komsomolprotested.
"Vysshaiashkolai kommunizm." p. 1: D. Bogolepov, 6. Pravda,Feb. 27, 1921, Pravda, obrazovanii," "O professional'no-tekhnicheskom 7. E. A. Preobrazhensky, p. 2. Sept.10, 1921, s"ezd RKP(b): Mart-aprel'1922 g. (Moscow, 1961), pp. 85-86, 8. Odinntadtsatyi 142.
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The party'saim, as statedby Bukharinat the 1924 Party Congress,was and Comto turnthe universities intotraining schoolsfor a new proletarian as students.9 munistgoverning class by enrolling workersand Communists But theywere to be trained, forthe timebeing,by the old "bourgeois"prosoft) Narkompros superfessors under"soft"(in Bukharin's view,excessively out thatthe system of komiandirovanie was an unsatisfactory vision.It turned in its selectioneven fromthe and indiscriminate one, being ill-coordinated sociopolitical point of view. Academic standardsdropped sharply.The universitieswere overcrowded, and their graduates of such poor quality that employers complained-particularly Vesenkha, the Supreme Council of the National Economy. The last straw came with the leadership struggleof partycells came 1923-24,when the futuregoverning class in the university out almost solidlyfor Trotsky.The party leadershipdecided to purge the and those unsuccessful students student body (not thefaculty)of academically of "alien social origin,"and at the same time to conducta separatepurge to purge was rid the university cells of Trotskyites.10 The general university in the summerof 1924 by Narkomprosand the agitpropdepartconducted mentsof the party,under the supervisionof Zinoviev for the Politburo." of policywas incompatible with the "soft" The purge as an instrument and revitalization of the conline,forit meantbothdirectpartyintervention was not in a ceptof "class war" in culturaland intellectual life.Narkompros position to resistthe purgingimpulse, havingno supportforthis in the party but it did its best to defuseit. Not only did it reinstate students leadership, and the local secure of later right re-entry expelledby agitprop departments12 a denialthat"alien" students forthoseexpelled,it actuallypublished expelled on the part of fortheirsocial originwere reallyalien: "Owing to oversights somecommissions forthe reviewof the student 'alien elebody,the comment
i 9. Resolution on work anmong youth, Thirteenth Congress. KPSS v re2oliutsiiakh resheniiakh s"egdov, konferentsii i plenuf1mov TsK, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1970), p. 109. discussed thegeneral of Narkompros 10. Zinoviev university purgewiththecollegium of March 26, 1924 (Tsentral'nyigosudarstvennyi at its meeting arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi i sotsialisticheskogo revoliutsii stroitel'stva [TsGAOR], Moscow, fond2306, op. 1, d. 2945). On Trotskyism, see N. Akimov,Krasnoe studenchestvo, 1928-29,no. 14, p. 4: the Trotskyite feverfromwhich the university cells especially "Everyoneremembers in 1923-24.The partialpurgeof the partyat that timeaffected suffered primarily the werepurged as decadent morethan25 percent of whosemembers university organizations, elements." and ideologically hostile of total) were 11. As a resultof the purge about 18,000students(13-14 percent forcompletely wereremoved "ofwhich three-fourths academic failure expelled, unjustified and the restforvariousotherreasons" (Narodnoeprosveshchenie, 1925,no. 4, p. 118). had made clear,academicrequirements of Narkompros But as I. I. Khodorovsky varied to thesocial originof the student according (Praczda,May 17, 1924,p. 6). and agitprop fromSmolensk to CentralCom12. See, forexample, protest gubkom WKP 518,p. 71). mittee agitprop department, Sept.27, 1924 (SmolenskArchives,
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of some of those expelled. . . It is ment'was written on the documents 'alien element'meantpersonswho obviousthatin thesecases the description circumstances of highereducationalinstitutions underthe presentstraitened university.... The personsexpelledfrom are theleast suitable to go through does not university are not disgraced,and their expulsion fromuniversity carryany limitations of theirrights."'13 A side effect in otherareas. The of the purge was hardlineresurgence to press its chargesagainstthe "bourgeois" Komsomoltook the opportunity Party secondary school in discussionof Bukharin'spaper at the Thirteenth was subsequently obligedto reorganizethe secCongress;and Narkompros basis and formally to acknowledge thatthe ondaryschoolson a semitechnical schoolas a channelto the university.14 rabfak had replacedthe secondary In the provinces the purgegenerateda momentum whichnot only Narfounddifficult to control:it was as if local kompros but the partyleadership had been onlywaitingforthe moment to settleaccountswithuniauthorities and the whole alien bodyof the intelligentsia. The versities, schools, teachers, It was not, at experience may have been soberingforthe partyleadership.15 years of NEP, and the vocabulary any rate,repeatedduringthe remaining use. ofclass war tendedin theseyearsto drop out of official re-establishment of the "soft" line, encouraging There were otherfactors forbetter commissariats from the economic qualitygraduates notably pressure fromRykov and Sovnarkom.In the summerof 1925 and softline initiatives to allow some thousandsof engineerVesenkhaasked the CentralCommittee of ing students to studyabroad because the low standardsof Soviet univerbut provoked a re-examination of the situation sities.The requestwas refused, of specialists led by Rykov,president in universities and the training of SovAs a resulta numberof measureswere taken to raise academic narkom.16 of komandirovanie A revisedsystem was stillin forcein university standards. of 1925 by the addiin the autumnenrollment but it was modified enrollment, and techtionof two special quotas: one of 2,500 forgraduatesof secondary for distribution nical schools,anotherof 1,000 by trade unions among the "toilingintelligentsia" (otherwiseknown as "bourgeois specialists"). This as well as to raise academic the intelligentsia was surelya move to conciliate for a govwere unlikely to work withenthusiasm since specialists standards, access to university at a timeof extremely ernment whichdeniedtheirchildren
of Narkompros, of collegium Sept. 23, 1924 (TsGAOR 2306/1/3328), 13. Resolution no. 21(41), p. 2. NKP, 1924, in Ezhenedel'nik published school 1924,no. 8, pp. 5, 51, and 73. The secondary 14. Narodnoeprosveshchenie, bias" (profuklon) to the two seniorclasses,but the addeda "professional reorganization nottechnical, to university-entrance level. as general-educational, was stillclassified school smeny(Moscow, 1924), p. 108. in Partiia i vospitanie comments 15. See Bukharin's i revoliutsiia (Moscow,1926),pp.415-16. Prosveshchenie 16. A. V. Lunacharsky,
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"The policyand aims of the Soviet governhighadolescentunemploymeint. deputyin 1925 when the nlewquotas were nment," explainedLunacharsky's towardclosingaccess to higherschool to announced, "are not at all directed will further widen all exceptworkers and peasants.Each yearthe government workof the toilingintelligentsia and white-collar thepathsby whichchildren that its social base ers can enterthe school. . . . Soviet power is concerned shouldbecomewider,not narrower."'17 was abanof komandirovanie This promise was kept.In 1926 the system enrollwas thrown open to freecompetitive doned,and university enrollment but it disment.A secondary process of social selectionwas still operative, of specialists criminated since children againstonlya partof the intelligentsia, in state employment were declared "equal" in social status to childrenof But the main emphasiswas on the establishment of academiccriworkers.18 remarked, teria in university entrance.Afterall, as Lunacharskycheerfully itwas no good admitting unqualified workers and peasantsto be made "martyrs na glazai] in the university, as oftenhappens."'9 and eyesores[bel'nmo in the percentage of workersand partymembers As had been expected, the 1926 enrollment dropped,while the numbersof secondaryschool gradrose sharply. The effect uatesgoingdirectly to university ofthenew enrollment fromsecondary a normalprogression schoolto unipolicywas to re-establish back enrollment. Even the which and to cut continued adult rabfaks, versity were increasingly to supplybetweena quarterand a thirdof the enrollment, trainingadolescentsratherthan adult workers.In other words, they were school. The numberof workers' typeof secondary evolvinginto a subsidiary in the worker in the 1927 enrollchildren showedan improvement percentage ment. of the new policywas muted.L. Milkh,of the Central Hardlinecriticism Communist students in 1927 that"tlhe new conditions told Committee apparat, in universities are a retreatfromthe policy of proletarianizaof enrollment in the CentralCommittee comments But his published agitprop journal tion."20 that Narkompros was of the policy,while suggesting avoided directcriticism "soft" interpretation.2' It was always permissible givingit an unnecessarily so in this context: to attack Narkomprosfor "softness,"and particularly backingfor academic criteriain enrollVesenkha,which providedpowerful a campaign to have thetechnical faculties was at thesametimenmounting ment, fromNarkompros control to its own. But the issue of removed of universities
no. 7-8,pp. 102-3. 1925, prosveshchenie, 17. Narodnoe 30,p. 5. p. 3, andJuly May 26,1926, 18. Izvestiia, no.4, p. 14. 1927, prosveshchenite, 19. Narodnoe 1927, January of Proletstud, colnference p. 9. 20. TsGAOR 5574/5/2, no.8, p. 46. 1927, '-evoliitsiia, 21. Komnmzunistichzeskaia
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proletarianization and class war had,by 1927,been appropriated by the Party Opposition. To all appearancesthe "soft" line not only was in the ascendantat the Fifteenth PartyCongressof December1927 but was likelyto remainso. According to Stalin,"hundreds and thousandsof the toilingintelligentsia" and the industrial specialistsin particularwere eager and willing to cooperate in achieving withthe Soviet government the Five-Year Plan. BukharincongratulatedMolotov on his new understanding of the need for educational expansion.Nobodymentioned class war in the universities or took the opporto criticize tunity Narkonipros(a sure sign that the "hard" line was under constraint), and theNarkompros journal,forthefirst and onlytime, published therelevant debatesof a partycongressverbatim.22 The status of rural teacherswas a question on which Soviet attitudes werestraightforward in the leadership. and policynota matter of controversy The policywas "soft." Stalin,concluding his remarkson changingattitudes oftheintelligentsia at the Fifteenth PartyCongress,said: "I don'teven speak of the rurallaboringintelligentsia, especiallythe ruralteacher, who has long turnedtoward Soviet power and cannot but welcome the development of in the countryside."23 education Rural teachersprovidedno potential political as far as the centerwas concerned, threat so the "soft" line encountered no obstacle-exceptthatlocal authorities persistently ignoredit. It is thiscentral/ local dichotomy whichI wantto examine. The local "hard" line on teacherswas rootedin Civil War memories24 In 1918 the anti-Bolshevik and Communist teachisolationin the countryside. in the capitals, ers' unionhad gone on strike and local branches had cooperated with the White Armies. This briefly provokeda hardlinetendencyat the center, represented by the Communist splinter groupof "teacher-internationalists" which claimed rightof successionto the teachers'union. But neither nor the CentralCouncil of Trade Unions would recognizethe Narkompros and the new union which was establishedin 1919 teacher-internationalists, union25 withno restrictions on entry and nonmilitant was a mass professional
1928, no. 1,pp. 1 ff. prosveshchenie, 22. Narodnoe 23. Ibid.,p. 26. in the early years are 24. Relationsbetweenteachersand the Soviet government "The ThirdFront: The Politicsof Soviet described in detailin RonaldHideo Hayashida, in 1973), and briefly 1917-1918"(Ph.D. diss., ColumbiaUniversity, Mass Education, pp. 34-43. The major Westernwork on Commissariat of Enlightenmtent, Fitzpatrick, Geschichte der Schule und Pddagogikin Sovietschoolsin the 1920sis Oskar Anweiler, bis zum Beginnder Stalin-Ara(Berlin,1964). Russland vomEnde des Zarenreiches 25. "Union of workersin educationand socialist culture" (Rabpros). The trade choice of the "political"word "socialist"in the title, unionsobjectedto Narkompros' outof use in theearly1920s. and it dropped
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Communist leadership-a typical softlineconception.The attitudeof Narwere potentialallies of kompros was thatteachers, especiallyrural teachers, treatment. This was conthe Soviet government and deservedsympathetic firmed bya Central Committee directive in 1921 that"local partyorganizations held thateducational mustgiveup theattitude thattheyhave so farconmmonly workers are saboteurs, fortheyhave long ceased to be so iftheyever were."26 Old Bolsheviks and Kalininhad an emolike Lenin,Krupskaia,Zinoviev, tional attachment to the rural teacheras a humbleand underpaidbearer of enlightenment to the people.27But the leadershipwas also bearingin mind were few and needed supthe practicalconsideration that rural Communists portin thecountryside. At the Thirteenth Party Congressin May 1924 Zinoan official viev sponsored welcometo teachersas ruralallies of Soviet power; and Krupskaia gave a movingaccount of theirmiserableconditionsof life. conditions, higher wages, The teachers werepromised improvement in material to join the considerate treatment from local officials, and even the opportunity to the class enemy.28 party.Some partymembers saw thisas capitulation In January1925 an All-UnionTeachers' Congress-genuinely represendefensively claimed tativeof the nonparty teacher, as Narkomprossomewhat -was held in Moscow. It was given maximumpublicity and was attended all endorsing a policy byno fewer thansix Politburo members and candidates, of conciliationand deploringharassmentof teachers by local authorities. from dismissaland transfer. arbitrary Rykovpromised theteachers protection Zinoviev,"withoutsinningagainstthe tenetsof Marxism,"rejectedthe idea since "the majorityof teachers of class war against the rural intelligentsia, be accepted and nmust are part of the toilingmasses led by the proletariat, staked and the authority of the intoour milieuas toilershavingequal rights," officials on his claimthatlocal party wouldcooperate.29 CentralConmmittee dismissalsand transfers and (as Narkompros They did not. Arbitrary put it) "mockery"of teacherscontinuedto be reportedin 1926 and 1927. teachersof the vote as "alien Cases were cited of local authorities depriving of letters from the provinces elements," taxingthemlike Nepmen.A summary teachers officials treated thatparty using"command methods," concluded badly, The buoyantmood which had been oband Komsomolswere even worse.30
(Moscow, 1931), p. 180. VKP (b) Po voprosam prosveshcheniia 26. Direktivy theirservicesto the on the situation of teachers, statement 27. For an emotional and that of the Comof theircause of popularenlightenment people,and the identity i uchitel'stvo," Pravda, Apr. 24, 1924, revoliutsiia munists see Zinov'ev,"Proletarskaia pp. 2-4. (discussionof comradeKalinin's "O sel'skoi intelligentsii" 28. See V. Kolokolkin, theses),Pravda, May 20, 1924,p. 6. 1925,no. 2, pp. 39 (Rykov) and 72-73 (Zinoviev). 29. Narodnoeprosveshchenie, no. 4, p. 43; 1926,no. 1, p. 34; 1926,no. 9, pp. 85-86. 30. Ibid.,1927,
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a servedanmong teachersafterthe 1925 congressgave way to "dissatisfaction, in the years fears,and hopelessness" apathy,apprehension, feeling of burden, following.31 for this,despitethe Centralpartypolicywas not withoutresponsibility "soft" line. First,Zinoviev'swelcometo teachershad coincidedexactlywith to prevent purge (and mayhave been intended preparations fortheuniversity thata tookthepurgeas an indication a backlashin theschools). Local officials had begun,and accordingly campaign againsttheintelligentsia generalhardline children, undertook to purgethe schoolsof sociallyalien elements-expelling schoolsaltogether as "bourgeois."32 teachers, often closingsecondary disnlissing siglned backedup by a "partyinstruction prohibitionis, RepeatedNarkonmpros a reply by comradeAndreev,"were ignoredor perhapseven misunderstood: "A purge has not been conducted statedreassuringly, receivedfromTonmsk of the the begin-ning one before [in the schools],but it is proposedto conlduct A year later the impactof the purge was still being felt in school year."233 the provinces. were in constant conflict withPioneer organizations Second,theteaclhers in leaders the sclhools. This was not because the party and theirKomnsomol theCentral to attacktheteachers:on thecontrary, directed youngConnmunists in 1925 decreedthatthe Komsomolmust draw the teachersinto Coimmittee Pioneer work,and that "the chiefdutyof a Pioneer is to be an exemplary It was simplybecause the teachers, witl veryfew exceppupil in school."34 and the Pioneers,in their own understanding, tions,were not Communists in the nor the Pioneers were mass mllovements were. Neitherthe Koomsoniol the did school children who so with and those purest and joined twenties, forrevolutioni enthusiasm and class war. How could theyfight mostprimitive against intelligentshchina, theclass war exceptin theschool,againstbourgeois were eitherunheardor taken as theirteachers?Party calls for moderationi had become"degenerate" and incapableof evidencethatthe partyleadership militant leadership.35 were often being ambiguous, It is also truethatpartycalls formoderation at the 1925 teachers'congress, addressedto both sides. Buklharin, speaking, to Komsomolson politicalmatters, shoulddefer avoid "culsaid thatteachers in leadership and acknowledge Komsomolpre-eminenlce turalsuperciliousness,"
1926-28). no. 8-9,p. 103 (of theperiod 31. Ibid.,1929, NKP, 1924,no. 18(39), p. 12, and no. 21(41), pp. 8-9; TsGAOR 32. Ezhenedel'nik WKP 11, Archives of NKP collegium, Sept. 29, 1924; Smolensk presidium 2306/1/3328, Ukom,Aug. 12, 1924. of Sychevsky collegium agitprop 1924,no. 8, p. 9. prosveshchenie, 33. Narodnoe p. 194. VKP(b) po voprosam prosveshcheniia, 34. Direktivy on Komsomol and Pioneer"avaiitgardisnm," XIV s"ezd remarks 35. See Btukharin's VKP(b), 18-31dek.1926g. (Moscow,1926), p. 824.
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to the teachers behave tactfully slhould of the Pioneers,whilethe Komsomiiol Afterthe conas leadersin the school.36 theirpre-eminence and acknowledge had not gress therewere reportsfromthe provincesthat this formulation position:"The Pioneersalndtheir[Komsomol] leaders theteachers' improved life as a whole, and the teacheris afraid to sclhool fromn isolate thenmselves 'Bukharin did not order it at the teachers' because in their affairs meddle congress"' (though therewere also teachers"who were not afraid of Buschool to attackthe Pioneer leaders for disorganizing kharin"and continued
life).37
the teachergood will but no weapons of Finally,the "soft" line offered his own: the teachers'union, at both centraland local levels, was neither enough to figlt the teachers' battles. The branch strongnor professional were oftennot teachers recommendleed by local partyorganizations secretaries of thepartyor experienced admninistrabut"candidatemembers byprofession to which "ordinaryvotersare not tors"; and theirelectionwas a formality whispersand themselves to indignant to object openly,confining accustomed or dison the appointment The union had no influence ironicalsmiles."38 of the whichwas conducted by the educationdepartnlent missal of teachers, teachersrarelyappealedto the unionfor support, local soviet; and victimized "oftenact with the administrative organs . . . against the since its officials dismissalor transfer, them."In cases ofarbitrary of defending instead teachers and onlythe sel'kory indifferent," "the tradeulnion organsremaincompletely the teachers.39 defended sometimes correspondents) (rural newspaper is remarkable both of "soft" and "hlard"lines in literature The conflict bothto the relation and its apparenttriviality-itsperiplheral forits intensity It is as an exercise and to those of government. real concernsof literature in this article.40 in pure politicsthat it deservesattention oftlhe "lhard" line,emerged protagonist movement, literary The proletarian and Komsomol ofpostwardemobilization in thefirst yearsofNEP as a product
no.2, p. 140. 1925, prosveshchenie, 36. Narodntoe no. 9, p. 77. 37. Ibid.,1926, no.6, pp. 108-9. 38. Ibid.,1926, no. 9, p. 82. 39. Ibid.,1926, documented has beenadmiirably its educationial counterpart, unlike policy, 40. Literary in RobertA. Maguire'sRed VirginSoil: notably and Sovietresearch, by bothWestern Soviet Literature itnthe 1920's (Princeton, 1968), Edward J. Brown's ProletarianlEpisode
Literature, 1928-1932 (New York, 1953), and S. I. Sheshukov's Neistovyc in Rutssiani
is bor'by20-khgodov (Moscow, 1970). Since literature Iz istoriiliteraturnoi revniteli: of "hard"and "soft"lines in whichI discusstheopposition contexts onlyone of thethree I have assumedthat the treatment: a thorough in this article,I have not attempted herethanin theearlier allows me to be moreselective of thematerial relative familiarity on whichthereis littlepublished problems of thearticledealingwitheducationial sections work.
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and Communist, activism.It was young,brash,aggressive,self-consciously in the sense thatit was hostileto the old literary intelligentsia. "proletarian" of Na postut of VAPP and the founding Its first center-before theformation of the Komsomol journal Molodaia gvardiia,then -was the editorialoffice almostall undertwentyeditedby Leopold Averbakh.Its originalmembers, as adolescents away just out of (or running five, had typically joinedtheparty held withthe Red Armyin the Civil War, briefly from) gymnasium, fought and thendrifted intopoliticaljournalposition, a juniorpartyadministrative families oftheintelligentsia; all camefrom some,like Averbakh, ism.41Almost in party circles.The youngproletarians a military affected werewellconnected to the "civilian"Comantipathy styleof dressand speech,and feltinstinctive editorofthe Communist journal munists field-Voronsky, activein theliterary at Narkompros, Meshcheriakov at the State PubKrasnaia nov',Lunacharsky interest was literary politicsrather lishing House, Gosizdat.Their consuming of literature. an thanthe actual production VAPP, nominally associationof acquiringin the courseof timea mass memproletarian writers(and actually and essentially a writers), was originally bershipof aspiringworking-class foritself the funcjournalists proposing vigilante groupof youngCommunist arm of the PartyCentralComnlittee. tionof literary of NEP was "soft,"insofaras it Official literary policyat the beginning existed at all. Apart frompublishersand censorship, Narkomproswas the and its policies were inwith in closest contact institution Soviet writers, conservationist. variablyconciliatory and, in regardto the culturalheritage, it existedon a fairlysmall scale; was permitted, Privatepublishing although to the publication of Communist was not restricted authors. statepublishing had chosen to play an active interventionist Neitherpartynor government or proletarian groups: the only claims which role on behalfof Communist and the Futurists-had had been made for special privileges-by Proletkult Committee at the the Central end of 1920.42 been sharply rejectedby thepartyintoactiveintervention was to force The aim of theproletarians to replacetheexisting oftheCommunist softline in support literary movement; on behalfof witha "lhard"line implemented by theirorganization leadership in literature the party; and to enforcea "proletarian by strict dictatorship" controland access to exerciseof the censorshipand exclusive Communist and the literary publishing press. factsof VAPP's politicalcareer is that at no most of the One striking of any member of thepartyleadertimedid it enjoythewholehearted support most admired ("loved," to use whom the youngproletarians ship. Trotsky,
revniteli, p. 114andpassim. Neistovye 41. See Sheshukov, Pravda, Dec. 1, RKP (b), "O Proletkul'takh," 42. Letterof the CentralCommittee p. 1. 1920,
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Averbakh's word), rejectedthewholenotioliof proletarian culture. Kamenev, whosenamewas listedanmong sotruidniki of Na postit in its first issues,melted away. Stalin and Zinovievwere simplynot interested. The one nlemberof the leadership who seemedto be in symnpathy with the proletarians was Bukharin:culturaliconoclast and Proletkult supporter of the Civil War period, old opponent of the bien-pensant Lunacharsky on artisticquestions,43 patron of the Komsomol.But Bukharin,suffering a change of heart afterLenin's in theleadership. death, becameVAPP's mostenergetic opponent Nor could it be said thatVAPP won favorby toadyingto the Central or by unswerving with Committee, loyaltyto Stalin. Its early relationship the CentralCoinmittee on the proletarian press departmelent was intense, side, in his diarythat his but intensely hostile.In April 1925 Furrnanov reported is a traitor, because he went colleaguesin VAPP were saying,"Furnmanov to the alien (as far as literature to the goes) and hostileCentralCommnittee, of proletarialn literature enemy Vareikis,and talkedto himabout our affairs." In general,Furmanovcommented, "a tradition has been established that the in the press department, are (except for people in the Central Committee, the late Kanatchikov)beyondhope,and not onlyshouldone not maintain or withthembut one shouldattackand irritate establish any sortof contact tllem of literature.' "44 . . . 'in the interests continually the youngproletarians-likethe KonmsomolAs forpoliticalreliability, to outbreaks of oppositionism, sinceas a vigilante werenotoriously susceptible on guard against signs of party"degeneration." group theywere constantly theautumn Averbakh and LelevichwereTrotskyites Of theearlyleaders, utltil of 1924. They felt,Averbakhexplained,thatthe CentralCommittee was following a "degenerate"line while Trotsky,althoughalso "degenerate"on literarypolicy, was politicallyLeninist.45Even when Averbakh inherited the now Zinovievite Lelevichand Vardin in 1926, he VAPP leadership fromn Shatskin's did notbecomea devotedStalinist:we findhimin 1929 supporting sheer its Komsomnol VAPP's deviation. political arrogance, unfailing sUspicion
in Pravda articles call to "smashthe old theater" 43. See, forexample,Bukharin's to party protestcirculated of October16 and December16, 1919,and Lunacharsky's sochineii,vol. 3 [Moscow,1964],pp. 100-105); his clash Sobranite leaders(Lunacharsky, s"evd RKSM at the 1922 Komsonmol Congress (V Vserossiiskii with Lunacharsky 1927],pp. 127and 141). [MoscowandLeningrad, vol. 4 (Moscow, 1961), pp. 352-53.S. I. Sobraniesochinenii, 44. DmitriiFurmanov, Kanatchikov (who was in fact still alive in 1925) had headed the CentralCommittee of thetwenties; I. M. Vareikiswas its head in 1924-26. at thebeginning pressdepartment of proletarian of the achievement writers low assessment and rejection 45. Trotsky's culture" in the transitional of true"proletarian of the possibility developing on principle i revoliultsia, in 1923and in his Literatura written weremadeknown periodto socialism theendof thatyear.See LeopoldAverbakh, in Pravda toward Nashi as articles published 1927),p. 34. raznoglasiia (Leningrad, literaturnye
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of the partyleadership, of the motivesand intentions astonishedcontemporaries. What other organization would lhave"demanded" that the Central forbidPravda and Bol'shevikto criticizeit, as Averbakhdid in Committee 1927?46 And that was at a time wheniVAPP's position was dangerously closeto theOpposition's. Among the softliners, Voronskyof Krasnaia nov' was the main target oftheproletarians' writers attack, because,in theirview,he deniedproletarianl access to themainComlmunist insteadthe work literary journaland published of "bourgeoisspecialists"-the loyal non-Communist writerswhom Trotsky as "fellowtravelers."We must assume their campaignprovoked described in the Central Committee or at least attention, some sympathy, apparat,47 case against Voronskyat a since Vardin was allowed to put the proletarian in thepressdepartment oftheCentralCommittee in May 1924. specialmeeting was wholly negative: among the speakers against But the public responise VAPP were Trotsky, and Iakovlev, Bukharin, Lunacharsky, Meshcheriakov, thepress departmenlt. representing Only the BolshevikKerzhentsev, a former and thepoet Demian Bedny supported the proletarian Proletkultist, line.48 like Trotsky, But withan opponent VAPP hardlyneededfriends;and to its great good fortuneVoronsky was both politicallyassociated with the and a supporterof Trotsky's literaryviews.49Because of his Trotskyites
46. Sheshukov, Neistovye rev'niteli, p. 207. of pre-1923 Central in literary 47. For evidence Committee interest politics see A. F. in Obogashchenie Ermakov mletoda realiz'nai problemta sotsialistichlesleogo nnogoobraziia sovetskogo isklesstva (Moscow,1967),pp.356-62. of the debatewas published in K voprosuo politikeRKP(b) v 48. A stenogram literature khudozhestvennoi (Moscow,1924). 49. Maguire(Red Virgint Soil, pp.417 ff.)concludes thatVoronsky's actualparticipain theTrotskyite tioni remains opposition out thatthe label of "Trotunproved, pointing skyism" and vindictively was oftenindiscriminately applied.The same suggestion has on Voronsky. been made by some post-1956 Soviet writers There is, in fact,no hard of Voronsky's activemnembership in the post-1923 evidence but it shouldbe opposition; thatunfounded accusations of actualopposition remembered membership are characteristic of the late thirties and not of any periodof RAPP's activity. The most scholarly of in Kratkaialiteratutrnaia G. Dementlev Voronsky's Sovietrehabilitators-A. entsiklopediia, vol. 1 (Moscow,1962),p. 1046,Sheshukov, in Neistovye revniteli, p. 43, M. M. Kuznetsov "Krasnaia nov'," Ocherkiistoriirtssleoisovetskoizhurnalistiki, 1917-1932 (Moscow, 1966),p. 229-agree thatVoronsky to the 1926-28opposition belonged and was expelled in 1928forthatreason.Their common(unidentified) from theparty sourceis probably in Deiateli revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia the entry v Rossii, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1927-33): "In 1926-28 to the Trotskyite Voronsky belonged Opposition and conducted activefracin connection tionalwork, withwhichhe was expelledfrom the ranksof the VKP(b); however, laterhe brokewiththeOpposition and was reinstated as a member of theparty. in Moscowas a senior He nowworks editor of Russianand foreign classics" (vol. 5, pt.2, p. 1030). My own impression is that this entryis probably accurate.Real opposition membership was clearlyembarrassing to Voronsky's post-1956 Soviet rehabilitators, and this could explainthe hinteddoubtsto whichMaguire refers. But, if we take it that
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oppositionconnections, Voronsky'sposition on Krasnaia nov' was under constant threatfrom1924 to 1927, when he was finally ousted. VAPP-in spiteofformer Trotskyite ofitsown-did notneglect associations thisweapon. It made a strong bid "to equate Trotsky'spoliticalpositionwith Voronsky's line [on literature] and evenwiththelineofall thepartycomrades who do not supportVAPP's point of view."50What worried Lunacharskywas that VAPP's smeartacticsmightfinally discredit the "soft" line on culturealtogether. He therefore movedtowardquasi-alliance withVAPP, declaring hinmselfa literary "proletarian"51 prepared to concedeto the VAPPists everything butorganizational This caused greatoffense control. to Voronsky, who rightly believedthat the softliners hiimup as a sacrifice:"Anatolii were offering !" he addressedLunacharsky. "You have entered Vasilevich intothe Na postu thatyou are quiteat hoome abode,and it wouldseemn there.... But ifit is fated thatI mustacceptthe end, thenlet it not be fromthe hand of Averbakh."52 who had lost control of Krasnaia nov! in the autumnof 1924 Voronsky, of Raskolnikov(an Old Bolshevikand VAPP synmpawiththe appointment thizer) as coeditor, regainedit earlyin 1925; and it was probably because of himthatthe issue ofproletarian thecontroversy cultureremained surrounding on theCentralCommittee agenda.A Politburocommission headedby Vareikis Bukharin and Lunacharsky and including workedthrough amongits nmenmbers the springof 1925 on the resolution finally passed in June: "On the Policy of thePartyin the Field of Artistic Literature." Why such extendeddeliberation is notclear,as no disagreement of the commiswas necessary members anmong sion is recorded;but we do knowthatTrotskysubmitted a written memoranout his views.53 It is worthnoting thatwhileno influential dumsetting person the official attitude toward appearsto be arguingthe case of the proletarians, moresympathetic thembecomes theresolution ofthepress consistently through in May 1924,its adoptionin slightly editedform in the Thirteentl department "On the Press," the reported statements PartyCongress'sresolution of memand the eventualCentralCommittee bersof the Politburocommission, resoluin directopposition tion of June 1925-which acknowledged, to Trotsky, the in literature, to "hegemony" "historicright"of the proletariat but proposed
in 1928and readmitted from was expelled theparty as a Trotskyite Voronsky about1930, is thereexceptthe obviousone-that he had beloniged whatplausible explanation to the 1926-28 opposition? Literaturnoe 50. Lunacharsky, early1925, published vol.64,p. 35. n,asledstvo, his articlein Na postu,1925,no. 1(6), June.Lunacharsky 51. See, forexample, was in thathe had alwaysbeen an advocateon principle not insincere, of proletarian culture and reallydid objectto Trotsky's views on it. But he disliked VAPP's modusoperandi, andtherapprochement was primarily tactical. 52. Voronsky, "Mr. Britling DrinkstheCup to theDregs,"Krasntaia nov',1926, no. 5, pp.202-3. 53. Ermakov, Obogashtheenie lm,etoda, pp.276-77.
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withoutthe "bureauwritersshould earn it for themselves thatproletarian on their behalf.54 intervention cratic" solution ofparty was already involvingitself deeply in In fact the party bureaucracy in tokenof approval.One outcomeof thoughnot altogether VAPP's affairs, on literature was the decisionto create a Federationof the 1925 discussionl Soviet Writers (FOSP), includingboth proletarianand fellow-traveling for whichwas responsible press department, groups.The CentralCommittee initiativeto VAPP,55 which, organizingFOSP, passed the organizational to take it on the of Vardin,Lelevich,and Rodov, refused undertheleadership For in the federation. groundsthatVAPP was not guaranteed"hegemony" with wrestledtogether more than a year VAPP and the press department and "leftdeviation."56 As a result, VAPP emerged thedemons of Zinovievism withthe press departwitha new leader (Averbakh) and a new relationship of 1926,was headedby Gusev,an Old Bolshevik from thespring ment-which, of Trotsky from the armypoliticaladministration.57 and old enemy of writers, and the The new VAPP was willing to organizethefederation "VAPP was anxious to supportit in thisundertaking. new press department comradeGusev,withyourpermission-a is mechanically acquiring-evidently, in the federation," protestedVoronsky."Were there influence predominant in such or weretherenot,comradeGusev,attempts to organizethe federation of the were in facthanded two-thirds a way thatVAPP and its supporters that you have unleashed the young VAPP votes? . . . I will say frankly comrades, given themsuch rightsand such privilegesthat theyhave lost a . . . You have unleashedthem,comrade lost humility. sense of proportion, Gusev."58 of Krasnaia nov' was discussed On April 18, 1927,Voronsky's editorship with reports by Gusev and in the Central Committeepress department, was opposition Voronsky:"The questionof Krasnaia nov' and the Trotskyite raised.It was said thatthejournalcouldnotbe called oppositionquitesharply in the oppositionhad that Voronsky'smembership ist,but it was noticeable leftits mark. . . ."59 Raskolnikovwas once again appointedto the editorial afterwards. left and Voronsky shortly board,
1, 1925. in Pravda,July 54. Published revniteli, p. 197. Neistovye 55. Sheshukov, to the VAPP the speechby Bliakhinof the pressdepartment 56. See, forexample, Archives, WKP 257. Biulleten'V.A.P.P., no. 1, Apr. 10, 1926,in Smolensk conference, suicide,described in 1930 on the occasion of Mayakovsky's writing 57. Trotsky, in the sphere of culturalrepression(Biulleten' mnan Gusev as Molotov'sright-hand 1930, no. 11,p. 40). Oppozitsii, no. 6, pp.241-42. to Comrade Krasnaianov', 1927, Gusev," "OpenLetter 58. Voronsky, "Krasnaianov',"p. 229. Since Krasnaianov' was a journalof political 59. Kuznetsov, over anxiety as well as a literary journal,the Stalinist/Bukharinist and social comment normisplaced. surprising is neither byan oppositionist itscontrol
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of "hard" and "soft" line strenigths With Voronskygone,the respective press dethe CentralConmmittee more clearly.VAPP had brought emerged purposeof upbut forthe specific politics, literary into day-to-day partment since FOSP "hegemony," It had not aclhieved politicaloppositionisil. rooting bickerthe weightof internal uinder institution collapsedas a working simply and the thickjournals Pechat' i revoliitsiia and ing; Gosizdat,Narkompros, Novyi nir remainedunder "soft" control; and even Krasncaianov' did not as a VAPP organ.The censoring organs, after Voronsky'sdeparture function and always hardliners nmany included Glavrepertkom, and thetheatrical Glavlit kepthis gripon theatrical them.Lunacharsky had,butVAPP did not control VAPP did wlhich subject to hardlineharassment thoughcontinlually affairs, of at least fromthe autumnl rutmored not initiateor lead. Gorky's return, forthe"soft"line. reiniforcement a potentially powerful 1927,represented of in 1927 by the virtualidentity But above all, VAPP was embarrassed The chief opposiand thatofthepolitical opposition. its "hard" lineon culture supportedby Sosnovsky, tion spokesmanon culture was Preobrazhensky, The opposiVAPP leadersVardin and LelevichA.0 Vaganian,and the former this and was reflected had the degeneration that degenerated, party tionclaimed to meet the bourgeoischallengein culture.The bourgeoisie in its inability of technical and thearts,and keptits monopoly in literature supreme remained had explicitly of highereducation.Buklharin and consequent control expertise disclaimedthe conceptof culturalclass war,61and the partyhad adopted a policy of "stabilization"in culture,which meant that it had given tip the it could to a pointwlhere to raise the culturallevel of the proletariat attempt to lhad succumllbed The old the party with intelligentsia. compete effectively "right deviation," with Bukharin offeringa "classic image of cultural
to cultural policyin its thesesto the Fifteenth madeno reference 60. The opposition postu,1927,no. 22-23,p. 21). Thle locuts Na literaturnomn Party Congress(Averbakh, or disillusionof "Eseninshchliina," oni thephenomenon speech is Preobrazhensky's classicus in the Communiist Academydebatein the springof 1927: of youth, mentand decadence article in Komninunisticheskaia on this speech is to be foundin KEnorin's comment "Oppozitsiiai voprosykul'turnoi 1927,no. 6, pp. 3 ff.,and in Averbakh, revoliutsiia, 1928,no. 8, p. 10; the text is in the stenogram postut, Na literaturnonm revoliutsii," sredimnolodezh.i (Moscow, as Upadochnoe nastrocnic Academy bytheCommunist published to are developedby Lelevich,with acknowledgmielnt implications 1927). The literary put',1927,no. 21(84), journalKomirnunisticheskii in theSaratovgubkom Preobrazhensky, (Moscow, to the almanacUdar, ed. A. I. Bezymiiensky pp. 37 if.,and in his contribution 1927),pp.94ff. of Artistic Policy,"Krasnaianov', and Questions "The Proletariat 61. See Bukharin, Exand external. internal has two levels of conflict, 1925,no. 4, p. 266: "Our society and therethe class war becomes world, it standsfaceto facewiththebourgeois ternally does not followthe line of fanning our policyin genieral the country sharper.... Iniside it down...." to dampen on thecontrary, goes somewATay classwarbut,
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Hence the contemporary "crisis in culture" (Preobrazhensky's Stritvismp."62 phrase), and the prevalentmnood of decadenlce and disillusionment among Comnmunist youth. A change of tone can be observedvery shortlyafterVoronsky'scondemnation by the CentralCommittee press department in April 1927. In May theagitprop department helda meeting on tlheatrical affairs at whichthe main speakerswere Knorin,head of agitprop, and Lunacharsky. Knorin (who had joined in the attack on Voronsky) now put his weight stronglybehind Lunacharsky and the "soft"line,whichin thiscontext meantrepudiation of a belligerent policy of "proletarianization" against the traditional diirected theaters. The "hiard" line had considerable support at the meeting frommembers of the agitpropdepartments of the Centraland Moscow Comnmittees of the party,the Moscow education department, Glavrepertkom, and other bodies.But,as one speakernoted, thehardliners were intimidated by Knorin's Lunacharpaperand did notfeelfreeto attackhimI as theyhabitually attacked sky.63 Averbakhtriedthe snmear tactic of associatingsome minor softliners withTrotsky and Voronsky, and delicately raisedthe questionof whyKnorin and Lunacharsky shouldbothperceivethe mainenemyto the leftand not the right.64 To that Lunacharskyreplied (against interjections fromAverbakh and thehead of Glavrepertkom) thatone hitshardin the direction from which trouble is coming:"We have to strike a blow at you so thatyou don'tinterfere withus." He also confirmed of anotherspeakerthatthe policies the assertion of thepresent VAPP leadership were identical withthose of its oppositionist predecessor.65 Knorin in hiisconicluding speech statedfirmly that so long as Averbakhput himselfwith the ultra-left, "we cannot agree with him."66 in the springof 1928, when the trial of NEP in cultureended abruptly the Shakhtyengineersput the loyaltyof the whole intelligentsia in doubt. at a meeting Conclusions were drawnby Krinitsky, new head of agitprop, tlhe at the end of May.67The new line was the "hard" line of class war against the right"in party thebourgeois intelligentsia, struggle against"dangerfrom and government cultural policy. in all areas. A new In the course of 1928,the "soft"line was repudiated
May of debatein agitprop, 63. S. N. Krylov,ed., Puti razvitiiateatra (stenogramn p. 202 (Sapozhnikov). 1927),[Ml 1927, 64. Ibid.,pp.220-21. pp.227 ff. speech, closing 65. Ibid.,Lunacharsky's pp.245 ff. closing speech, 66. Ibid.,Knorin's i kZit'in B. Olkhovy, ed., Zadachi agitatsii, 67. Stenogram published propagandy 1928). (Moscow andLeningrad, turnogostroitel'stva
put', 1927,no. 21(84), p. 40. 62. Lelevich, Kommnunisticheskii
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policyof massiveproletarian and partyenrollment to the university came into force withtheautumn enrollment of 1928. Rykovprotested unavailingly in the CentralCommnittee that the class issue was irrelevant to the main task of expanding technicaleducation to meet industrialneeds.68The secondary schools were exposed in the party press as bourgeoiscentersof potential juvenilecounterrevolution. Local authorities, reacting as theyhad done in the university purgein 1924,tookthisas a directive to conduct"social purges"of bothpupilsand teachers(althoughno explicitdirective was ever issued,and and thegovernment continued Narkompros to condemn thepurges). Komsomol activistsharriedthe teachers; the militantatheistsattackedthem for their religious beliefs;and even Narkompros was forcedto withdraw the tolerance it had previously extendedto individualfaith."My teacherin junior class, me sixteenyearsafterI leftschool,weptand toldme tllatshe is even meeting afraidto live and workat the present time,"wrotea Voronezhreaderto the forthetsar-he droveher fiance teachers' into "She has no regrets newspaper. thegraveand so she is stillunmarried But theiconswlhich at forty. theythrew out ofthe school-this was morethanshe could bear...."69 VAPP receivedeffective powers to scourgeand chastisein the name of a in Narkompros' theparty, mounted successful campaignagainst"rightism" arts administration and had Raskolnikov(again!) appointed to its head, and a competing a fiercestruggle begani witlh fromthe Comgroup of hardliners munist oftheliterary Academy forcontrol press. in 1929; Bukharinand Lunacharskyresignedfromthe Commissariat as leaders of a "Right Opposition"in tlle party.The Rykovwere identified as rightdeviationist, "soft"line on culturewas described and the government institutions whichhad carriedit out wereextensively purged. of the "hard" line of culturalclass war over the "soft" line The victory in timewithStalin'svictory ofconciliation over his opponents in the coincided partyleadership. thatthe policyof class war was Stalin's Should we conclulde own? I thinknot. There is no evidenceto suggestthat Stalin had any fixed in culturalor and his interventions on cultural opinions policyin thetwenties, few. The story (repeated to me in educationaldebates were remarkably withan offer of support Moscow) thatin 1928 Stalinapproaclhed Lunacharsky forthe "soft" line in exchangefor Lunacharsky'slater denunciation of the Bukharin/Rykov "Right Opposition" appears to lhaveat least apocryphal truthas far as Stalin's political tactics are concerned.From 1932, Stalin revertedto policies which in outward formclosely resemblethose of the re-establishment ofacademiccriteria in university twenties: revival enrollnment, and practicalneglect of the general secondaryschool,verbal encouragement
no.2, p. 33. KPSS, 1966, istorii Voprosy 68. Lutchenko, 1928, no. 10,p. 140. prosveshchenie, 69. Quotedin Narodnoe
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of the ruralteacher, reinstatement of "bourgeois" (now "Soviet") specialists purged as class enemies,dissolutionand condemnation of the proletarian writers' and formation of a new Union of Soviet Writersunder association, Gorky's leadership,includingboth Communistand nonpartywriters. Of coursethesepolicieswere in effect vastlydifferent fromthoseof the twenties -not only because, as Stalin said, "cadres decide everything" and the old softline Bolslhevik administrators had disappeared, but because tlhe proletarian attack had fragmented the intelligentsia and destroyedits old patternsof association. If Stalinhad no interest in class war policiesas such,whydid he let the hardliners win? The answer, in politicalterms,must be that they were a in partyand government convenient weaponto use againsthis opponents and (if we assume that Stalin had a generalconcernfor the extensionof party the intelligentsia. But this fornitlation control) to intimidate may suggesta widerarea of choicethan Stalin in facthad. The proletarian "hard" line was as the politicalalternative: it was understood alreadyidentified by the party in within it. Probablyits strength thepartywas not so and had knownsupport greatas to forceStalin,or any partyleader in 1928,to acceptit (thoughthis notionof overwhelming constituency pressurecannotbe discounted, giventhe evidencewe have on local partyopinionand its interpretation incomplete by theleadership).But it was strong enoughnot to be overlooked;and coherent enoughto make any selectiveuse-such as the deal which Stalin is reported to carrythrough. difficult to have offered Lunacharsky-extrenmely As I understand the situation,Stalin accepted a predefined opposition platform and supportwhenhe movedagainsthis colleaguesin the leadership to Stalin in (say) 1934 would have in 1928,just as a hypothetical challenger and its presumptive had to do. His choicewas, giventhe platform supporters, or notto makethe move.Wl'en he did,the "soft"line on culttire whether was canceled. automatically
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