3Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)R
, C. J., dissenting
and Federal Governments, emphasizing that DOMA re- jects the long-established precept that the incidents, bene-fits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all marriedcouples within each State.
at 18. But there isno such departure when one State adopts or keeps a defi-nition of marriage that differs from that of its neighbor,for it is entirely expected that state definitions wouldvary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one Stateto the next.
. Thus, while [t]he States power indefining the marital relation is of central relevance to themajoritys decision to strike down DOMA here,
, thatpower will come into play on the other side of the board infuture cases about the constitutionality of state marriagedefinitions. So too will the concerns for state diversity andsovereignty that weigh against DOMAs constitutionalityin this case. See
at 19.It is not just this central feature of the majoritys analy-sis that is unique to DOMA, but many considerations onthe periphery as well. For example, the majority focuseson the legislative history and title of this particular Act,
, at 21; those statute-specific considerations will, of course, be irrelevant in future cases about different stat-utes. The majority emphasizes that DOMA was a system-wide enactment with no identified connection to anyparticular area of federal law, but a States definition of marriage is the foundation of the States broader author-ity to regulate the subject of domestic relations with re-spect to the [p]rotection of offspring, property interests,and the enforcement of marital responsibilities.
, at22, 17. And the federal decision undermined (in the ma- joritys view) the dignity [already] conferred by the Statesin the exercise of their sovereign power,
, at 21,whereas a States decision whether to expand the defini-tion of marriage from its traditional contours involves nosimilar concern.We may in the future have to resolve challenges to state