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10468 - HESI's Proposed FOF and COL

10468 - HESI's Proposed FOF and COL

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Published by OSDocs2012
Halliburton's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Halliburton's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

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Published by: OSDocs2012 on Jun 26, 2013
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12/29/2014

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2174599
V
7-24010/0002
 
PLEADINGS
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANAIN RE: OIL SPILL by the OIL RIG"
 DEEPWATER HORIZON 
" in theGULF OF MEXICO,on APRIL 20, 2010Applies to: No. 10-2771,and All Cases§§§§§§§§§MDL No. 2179SECTION: JJUDGE BARBIERMAG. JUDGE SHUSHAN
 
HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACTAND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWNOW INTO COURT
, comes Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. ("HESI") and files theseProposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT
On February 25, 2013, the Court called this matter for trial. In accordance with FederalRule of Civil Procedure 52, and based upon the evidence presented during Phase I of thislimitations trial, HESI proposes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. HESIincorporates herein, as if stated in full, the parties' Agreed Stipulations (Dkt. No. 5927), filed onFebruary 29, 2012. If any finding is in truth a conclusion of law, or if any conclusion stated is intruth a finding of fact, it should be deemed so.
Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 10468 Filed 06/21/13 Page 1 of 335
 
 i
2174599
V
7-24010/0002
 
PLEADINGS
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. BP Negligently Failed to Implement An Appropriate Process SafetySystem For The Macondo Well...........................................................................................1A. Proposed Findings Of Fact.......................................................................................11. BP Was Responsible For Process Safety On The Macondo Well,A Deepwater Well With A High Level Risk For A Blowout......................12. BP Prioritized Cutting Costs Above Safety.................................................23. BP Violated Its Own Guidelines Requiring Implementationof An Effective Process Safety Management System..................................34. BP Disregarded Warnings About Deficiencies In ItsProcess Safety..............................................................................................55. BP's Learning From Past Failures Remained Unresolved And Were Not Applied To The Macondo Well, ContributingTo The Blowout...........................................................................................7B. Proposed Conclusions of Law...............................................................................10II. BP Negligently Designed The Macondo Well and Poorly Executed The Design, Increasing The Risk Of A Blowout And CompromisingSafety Measures To Ensure Well Control.........................................................................10A. Proposed Findings of Fact.....................................................................................101. BP Violated Safe Drilling Margins And MMS Regulations.....................112. BP Poorly Planned The Macondo Well, Creating Greater Risk................133. BP Poorly Designed The Temporary Abandonment Plan,Creating Greater Risk................................................................................14B. Proposed Conclusions of Law...............................................................................16III. BP's And Transocean's Negligent Misinterpretation Of The Safety-Critical Negative Pressure Test, Which Plainly Revealed The WellWas Flowing, Was The Proximate Cause Of The Blowout..............................................18A. Proposed Findings of Fact.....................................................................................181. The Negative Pressure Test Is A Safety-Critical Test...............................182. BP's Temporary Abandonment Plans Were In Flux And Risky................20
Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 10468 Filed 06/21/13 Page 2 of 335
 
 ii
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PLEADINGS
 
3. BP And Transocean Haphazardly Set Up And Performed The Negative Pressure Test......................................................234. BP And Transocean Misinterpreted The NegativePressure Test..............................................................................................265. BP's And Transocean's Misinterpretation Of The Negative Pressure Test Proximately Caused The Blowout.......................31B. Proposed Conclusions Of Law...............................................................................33IV. Transocean's Untimely Response To Observed Indications Of A Well Control Event And Improper Diversion Of HydrocarbonsTo The Mud Gas Separator Instead Of Overboard ProximatelyCaused The Fire, Explosions, And Sinking Of The
 Deepwater Horizon
..........................36A. Proposed Findings Of Fact.....................................................................................361. From 2004 To 2009, Transocean Experienced ASignificant Number Of Well Control Events.............................................372. The August 2004
 Jim Cunningham
Incident Shared Similarities With The
 Deepwater Horizon
Incident..................................393. After The
 Jim Cunningham
, Transocean Suffered Another Similar Well Control Event On The
 MG Hulme
.......................................404. Shortly Thereafter, The
 Deepwater Expedition
Sustained A Lengthy Well Control Event..................................................................415. In The Weeks Preceding The Blowout On The MacondoWell, Shell Expressed Concerns With The Safe ConductOf Transocean's Operations.......................................................................426. Just Four Months Beforehand, The
Sedco 711
Well ControlIncident Foreshadowed The April 20, 2010 Event....................................437. Critical Lessons Learned From The
Sedco 711
IncidentWere Not Shared With The
 Deepwater Horizon
Crew.............................448. Foreshadowed By Each Of The Prior Incidents, OnApril 20, 2010, The Crew Of The
 Deepwater Horizon
 Lost Control Of The Macondo Well..........................................................479. The Transocean Drill Crew Had Primary ResponsibilityFor Well Control On The
 Deepwater Horizon
..........................................48
Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 10468 Filed 06/21/13 Page 3 of 335

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