Journal of Advanced Nursing
, 1998,
27
, 1242–1249
The qualitative-quantitativedebate: moving frompositivism and confrontation to post-positivismand reconciliation
Alexander M. Clark
BA(Hons) RN
Doctoral Research Student, Department of Nursing and Community Health, Glasgow Caledonian University, City Campus, Cowcaddens Road, Glasgow G4 0BA, Scotland
Accepted for publication 8 June 1997
CLARK A.M. (1998)
Journal of Advanced Nursing
27
, 1242–1249
The qualitative-quantitative debate: moving from positivism and confrontationto post-positivism and reconciliation
Critiques of logical positivism form the foundation for a significant number of nursing research papers, with the philosophy being inappropriately deemedsynonymous with empirical method. Frequently, proposing an alternativemethod to those identified with the quantitative paradigm, these critiques are based on a poor foundation. This paper highlights an alternative philosophy topositivism which can also underpin empirical inquiry, that of post-positivism.Post-positivism is contrasted with positivism, which is presented as anoutmoded and rejected philosophy which should cease to significantly shapeinquiry. Though some acknowledgement of post-positivism has occurred in thenursing literature, this has yet to permeate into mainstream nursing research.Many still base their arguments on a positivistic view of science. Throughachievement of a better understanding of post-positivism and greater focus onexplicating the philosophical assumptions underpinning all research methods,the distinctions that have long been perceived to exist between qualitative andquantitative methodologies can be confined to the past. Rather methods will beselected solely on the nature of research questions.
Keywords:
research, paradigms, philosophy, methodology, science
deemed here to be the philosophical. In line with defi-
TRENDS IN NURSING RESEARCH:
nitions of the discipline of philosophy, the philosophical
PHILOSOPHIES, PARADIGMS AND
levelofaresearchmethodfocusesonitsassumptionsrelat-
METHODS
ingtothemostgeneralfeaturesoftheworld,encompassingaspects such as the mind, matter, reason and proofs forToargue any proposed positioneffectively, itis imperativethataccuracy,clarityandcongruencearepresentregarding knowledge(Blackburn 1994).As will beoutlined,differentresearch methods may share or greatly differ in theirterms used. Though some concepts are discussed and usedextensivelyto framearguments (theconcept of ‘paradigms’ philosophical conceptualizations of truth.Consequently, when using a specific research method, being a prime example) this need not warrant that theauthor whole heartedly condones their use. consciously or otherwise, assumptions about philosophi-cal aspects are made. For example, if undertaking aHeideggerian phenomenological study, the philosophy
Philosophical level of research methods
whichunderpinsthisresearchmethoddictatesthatcertainperspectives are adopted regarding what it is to be aResearch methods can be described, examined and catego-rized at different levels. The most fundamental level is person. Reality is deemed to be interpretive with inquiry
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© 1998 Blackwell Science Ltd
The qualitative-quantitative debate
centred around Being. Using the concept of Being-in-the-
et al.
1986, Cull Wilby & Pepin 1987, Cushing 1994, Carr1994). Historically, nursing authors tend instead to use theworld, Heidegger emphasizes that all human existence isshaped by and cannot be disassociated from past experi- concept to categorise research methods into one of twoparadigms, the qualitative or the quantitative (Ford-Gilboeences, culture, history and even future intentions (Walters1994, Koch 1995).
et al.
1995, Carr 1994, Cushing 1994, Rolfe 1994, Dzurec& Abraham 1993, Gortner & Schultz 1988, Moccia 1988,Such a stance has extensive implications regarding truthalone. Because it is acknowledged that humans cannot be Leininger 1985).separated from their own Being, the possibility of researcher objectively in inquiry is not supported. This
Questioningthe qualitative-quantitative distinction
stance acknowledges the researchers’ influence in shapingall stages of their inquiry, with no party, such as an expert Though some distinction between methods is well placed,as will be shown, it is being acknowledged that philo-analyst or even a participant, being able to verify research-ers’ interpretive findings as being objectively ‘true’ to the sophically the qualitative and quantitative paradigms arenot as diverse or mutually incompatible as is often con-original experience (Sandelowski 1993). Participants’narratives are so prone to revision and reinterpretation veyed. Staunch identification of methods with particularparadigms may not be as accurate, or even as useful, anover time by the participant themselves, that no bench-mark can exist from which to evaluate the truthfulness endeavour as past trends would indicate. This tendencymay lead to over-simplification of methods in relation toof interpretations (Boykin & Schoenhofer 1991).The concept of ‘objective truth’ is not appropriate to this paradigms, or worse, confusion over the philosophies andassumptions that underpin particular methods.research method, because it goes against the revisionistnature of experience. This absolute rejection of ‘objec- Though empiricism has been recognized as a philosophyin itself (Blackburn 1994), it is supported here that it is besttivity’ of truth in relation to inquiry is in contrast to thatascribed to by other methods, such as experimentalists. understood as a quantitative paradigm that can be shaped by more than one philosophy. The remainder of this paperhighlights disagreement which exists regarding the philos-
Paradigm level of research methods
ophy deemed to underpin empiricism. These disputesappear to originate from regarding all empirical methods asThe philosophical aspects underpinning methods facili-tatethe categorization ofresearch methods into paradigms. being shaped by a single philosophy, that of positivism.After positivism is outlined, and its presence and influ-The concept of ‘paradigm’ was proposed initially byThomas Kuhn in 1962 (Kuhn 1970). The concept is appro- ence in nursing literature examined, it is proposed thatpost-positivistic philosophy has replaced positivism aspriately applied when a high level of professional consen-sus is recognized to exist within particular communities that which underpins most researchers’ empirical method.Examination of post-positivistic philosophy and its influ-of scientists, regarding aspects of philosophical beliefs,theories, standards for research and exemplary findings ence in nursing literature is undertaken, with reasons forits lack of acknowledgement speculated on. These reasons(Kuhn 1970, Poythress 1988). That the formation of para-digms is related to philosophical assumptions is emphas- are then formulated into guidance for researchers usingany method(s). Overall, it is noted that the strict categoriz-ized by Kuhn (1970 pp. 4–5) in his comment that:ing of methods into paradigms, can cause simplification
Effective research scarcely begins before a scientific community
and inaccuracy, as such this is a practice which should be
thinksithas acquiredfirmanswersto questionslike thefollowing:
questioned.
What are the fundamental entities of which the universe is com-posed?Howdotheseinteractwitheachotherand withthesenses?
THE NATURE OF POSITIVISM:
What questions may be legitimately asked about such entities andwhat techniques employed in seeking solutions?
DETACHMENT AND CERTAINTY
The historical evolution and nature of the philosophy of Here Kuhn highlights that in the carrying out of researchendeavour, philosophical positions are adopted about the logical positivism are comprehensively documented byGuba& Lincoln (1994), Holton (1993)andFeigl (1969)whonature of matter, what can be known, and how can thisknowledge be attained. Within paradigms, in addition to highlight how the philosophy was expressed in researchmethod. Truth in positivist inquiry is achieved throughphilosophical aspects, it is likely that consensus will alsoexist (where applicable to methods) regarding funda- the verification and replication of observable findings con-cerning directly perceivable entities or processes (Wolfermental equations, their associated theories and the basicconcepts forming these theories (Kegley 1995). 1993, Poole & Jones 1996). The perspective assumes theexistence of an objective reality, i.e. one that is indepen-The concept of paradigm is more frequently presented by nursing authors in isolation from other aspects of dent of the knower (Holton 1993) which can be accuratelyperceived through the human senses.Kuhn’s cyclical theory of scientific development (Allen
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© 1998 Blackwell Science Ltd,
Journal of Advanced Nursing
,
27
, 1242–1249
A.M. Clark
Jones 1996). This cumulative, universal, and law-centred
Correspondence theory of truth
view of science has been challenged by scientific theorists(Popper 1959, Kuhn 1970, Ziman 1991, Dolby 1996) andRelatedly, positivism adopts a correspondence view of truth, with true statements taken to correspond with the philosophers, notably David Hume (Hume 1975), knowncollectively as inductive skeptics (Landesman 1997).knowable facts of reality. Truth is therefore dependent noton belief but the correspondence of belief to facts present These challenges focused on the limitations which had to be attached to universally generalizing from a limitedin external reality. Fundamental to the stance is a rejectionof metaphysical speculations such as those concerning number of cases, highlighting particularly the situationaland perceptual factors influencing scientists’ work.
apriori
and transcendental knowledge (Feigl 1969).Phenomena such as meanings and experiences are there- Kuhn (1970), taking a more historical perspective, high-lights previous scientific explanations taken to be indubit-fore
outwith
the scope of positivism (Greene 1979,Dzurec 1989). ably true. Analysing some subsequently shown to be false(Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry and caloricProgress in scientific development, as outlined by Kuhn(1970), pointed to the inevitability of accepting the influ- thermodynamics), Kuhn proposes that those who studythese views of nature will conclude that the methods usedence of unobservable entities such as molecules, atomsand electrons. This caused the positivists to revise their were no less scientific or idiosyncratic than those used incurrent times. If these discredited theories are to beoriginal denial of unobservables to a modified form of ‘instrumentalism’. This stance deemed unobservable con- called myths:cepts to be useful for calculation and understanding
... then myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and
related to the control and prediction of observable phen-
held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific
omena.However,irrespectiveoftheirpragmaticuse,unob-
knowledge. If on the other hand they are called science, then
servables were still denied any form of real existence.
science has included bodies of belief quite incompatible with the
This antirealist stance regarding theoretical entities,
ones we hold today.
drew a fundamental distinction between observable and
Kuhn (1970 p. 2)
theoretical aspects. Though useful for control and predic-Kuhn thus illustrates the historical transitoriness thattion, that which could not be seen could not make claimsto existence. Consequently, though theories involving supposedly universally ‘true’ findings can possess. We arenever in a position to prove the universality of findings,unobservable phenomena could be used to generate pre-dictions relating to reality, they could not explain occur- as Kuhn highlights, history would warn against makingsuch a claim.rences because they were not held to exist (Gortner &Schultz 1988, Blackburn 1994, Poole & Jones 1996). Underthis view, theories had limited explanatory power.
Positivism and nursing inquiry
An additional facet of positivist inquiry which has gen-erated much criticism is its adherence to an atheoretical, Itiswellrecognizedthatinitsendeavourstobecomeestab-lished in the first half of the 20th century, nursing researchabiased view of the researchers’ involvement in theresearch process. Positivist philosophers acknowledged was dominated by the medical model and its associatedpositivist philosophy (Cull-Wilby & Pepin 1987, Nagle &and valued rationality and intellectualism but these weretempered with great focus on objectivity, globalism, Mitchell 1991, Doering 1992, Cushing 1994). A consider-able amount of agreement is apparent amongst the manyanti-individualism, un-self-conscious and non-self-reflectiveness in inquiry (Holton 1993). Dualism (or different descriptions of the positivist view. This researchwas quantitative and operated with what was known asCartesianism) and the associated capability of separating biases of the mind from the world (and thus the researcher the positivistic ‘received view’ (Carter 1985, Guba 1990,Doering 1992, Guba & Lincoln 1994).from all stages of the research process) were therefore sup-ported (Guba 1990, Holton 1993). Only if individuals When made explicit, as demonstrated by Poole & Jones(1996), the philosophical assumptions of positivism cancould achieve this total detachment could inquiry be biasfree and truly objective. Consequently, researchers were be readily questioned by historical counterexample (Kuhn1970, Guba 1990) and through the application of reason.deemed to be neutral observers who indubitably report-ed their observations free from any cultural, social or Though positivism has been noted to influence a numberof early nursing theorists work, notably Orem and Royexperiential based biases (Phillips 1990).(Nagle & Mitchell 1991), as will be outlined, positivisticconceptions of truth and inquiry have philosophically
Laws
In creating and building knowledge, positivist inquiry been widely dismissed as incompatible with nursingresearch.focused on discovering infallible and universal lawsthrough the cumulative piecing together of bits of knowl- Barnum (1994) and Rolfe (1994) report the tendency innursing literature of dichotomizing research endeavoursedge (Bronowski 1956, Dzurec 1989, Holton 1993, Poole &
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Journal of Advanced Nursing
,
27
, 1242–1249
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