Matabuena v.

Cervantes [GR L-28771, 31 March 1971] En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a commonlaw relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs. 1. Prohibition of donation between spouses apply to common-law relationship While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy (JBL Reyes, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 1954). The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage. 2. Spirit of the law Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus disposiciones.' It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. 3. Lack of validity of donation does not result in exclusive right of plaintiff on property The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage. She is therefore his

widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.

People v. Santayana GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25) Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as Special Agent by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms Held: The appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v. Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellants appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional release; with costs de oficio.

People v. Estenzo GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651) First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended by Republic Act 6236. Aotes claim that since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to 31 December 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until 31 December 1980. The judge denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in undivided interest in equal share of each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed the instant petition. Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening of Cadastral Proceedings. Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. If RA 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by reference to RA2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so included in RA 6236. Thus, RA 6236, the very law on which Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents contention. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968, no similar provision is found in RA 6236 expressly extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for by the RA 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, RA2061, expressly did. Truly, the extension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different from filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent Judge and reiterating the 28 September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court; without pronouncement as to costs.

Mutuc v. Comelec GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228) First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase and the like. Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase and the like. Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words and the like.). Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited. The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute resolution of 3 November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without pronouncement as to costs.

People v. Manantan GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684) En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General. Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

Lopez vs. CTA GR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850) En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplier invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently, however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of 23 May 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court. From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal. Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly appealable to the Court of Tax Appeal. Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal mentions among others, those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. While there is really a discrepancy between the two sections, it is more reasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of Customs. If persons affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, under the Customs Law found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code, and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision would, not only be gravely affected but even destroyed. The Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the legislature. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the Customs Law and RA 1125, the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs; with costs.

Sanciangco v. Rono GR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___) En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 took no part Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17 May 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the Citys Sangguniang Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner informed ViceMayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to the Minister of Local Government Jose A. Roo, who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy. Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latters filing of a certificate of candidacy for the Batasan. Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more than one construction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading any person holding public appointive office or position, is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed. A statutes clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the President as a member of the Citys Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for, holding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.

Capati v. Ocampo [GR L-28742, 30 April 1982] Second Division, Escolin (p): 4 concur, 2 on leave. Facts: Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. On 23 May 1967, Capati entered into a sub-contract with the Dr. Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, whereby the latter, in consideration of the amount of P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications indicated therein. Ocampo further bound himself to complete said construction on or before 5 June 1967. Ocampo, however, was only able to finish the construction on 20 June 1967. Due to the delay, Capati filed in the CFI Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages (Civil Case 3188) in the sum of P85,000.00 with interest, plus attorneys fees and costs. Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract which provides that all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga. The lowe court dismissed the complaint. Hence the appeal. The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order, and ordered the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against defendant-appellee Ocampo. 1. Where personal actions may be filed The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Said section is qualified by Section 3 of the same rule, providing that by written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another. 2. May only permissive The word may is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term may be connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. May is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. In the case at bar, the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the CFI Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See related case in Nicolas v. Reparations Commission: May is not mandatory). Since the complaint has been filed in the CFI Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Kintanar vs. Bell Telecoms [G.R. No. 126526] First Division, Hermosisima Jr. (J): 2 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part. Facts: On 19 October 1993, Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. (BellTel) filed with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) an Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority (NTC Case 93-481). At the time of the filing of this application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted a legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications service. Since BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service Only GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of formal awards of service area assignments in April and May 1994. On 25 March 1994, RA 7692 was enacted granting BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority to carry on the business of providing telecommunications services. On 12 July 1994, BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application (NTC Case 94-229) praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system. In the second application, BellTel proposed to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in 10 years using the most modern and latest stateof-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100% digital local exchange telephone network. BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application docketed as NTC Case 93-481. In an Order dated 11 July 1994, this earlier application was ordered withdrawn, without prejudice. BellTels second application was opposed by GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation, Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc., Midsayap Communication, Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone Corporation, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom and Telecommunications Office. On 20 December 1994, BellTel completed the presentation of its evidence-in-chief. On 21 December 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in support of its application. Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation. On 6 February 1995, the CCAD submitted to Deputy Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum manifesting that based on technical documents submitted, BellTels proposal is technically feasible. Subsequently, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of BellTel. On 29 March 1995, it was declared that BellTel has the financial capability to support its proposed project at least for the initial 2 years. Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and expressly signified their approval thereto. In view of the favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft 10 of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for the issuance of a provisional authority, BellTel filed on 5 May 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional Authority. No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, on 12 May 1995, BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion reiterating its earlier prayer. In an Order

dated 16 May 1995, signed solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the two pending motions of BellTel, set the said motions for a hearing on 29 May 1995. On said date, however, no hearing was conducted as the same was reset on 13 June 1995. On the latter date, BellTel filed a Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve), praying for the promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to BellTel, on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. On 4 July 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. On 17 July 1995, BellTel filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the aforestated Order dated 4 July 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate. On 26 July 1995, the Court issued a Resolution referring said petition to the Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section 9, par. 1 of BP 129. On 23 September 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated decision, granting BellTels petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition, setting aside NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 for being contrary to law. BellTels petition for mandamus was also granted, directing the NTC to meet and banc and to consider and act on the draft order within 15 days. Chairman Kintanar and the opposing telecommunications companies filed their separate petitions for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the instant consolidated petitions for lack of merit; with costs against petitioners. 1. NTC is a collegial body; Vote requirement NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. 2. Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. Having been organized by EO 146 as a three-man commission, the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime. 3. Historical milieu of the NTC: CA 146 as amended by RA 2677 On 17 November 1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act 146 which created the Public Service Commission (PSC). While providing that the PSC shall consist of a Public Service Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law made it clear that the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the Deputy Commissioner could act only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service Commissioner. As amended by RA 2677, the Public Service Commission was transformed into and emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment provided that contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of rates shall be decided by the Commission en banc. 4. Historical milieu of the NTC: PD 1 (Integrated Reorganization Plan) On 24 September 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed, into law, PD 1 adopting and approving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which, in turn, created the Board of Communications

(BOC) in place of the PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was composed of 3 officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. On 25 January 1978, the BOC promulgated its Rules of Procedure and Practice in connection with applications and proceedings before it. 5. Historical milieu of the NTC: EO 546, merger of BOC and the Telecommunications Control Bureau as NTC On 23 July 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order 546, creating the Ministries of Public Works, and of Transportation and Communications, merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau into a single entity, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of EO 546 provides that the Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an economist. The Executive Order took effect on 24 September 1979 . However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and Practice. Consequently, the then existing Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC. 6. Historical milieu of the NTC: Opinion of Justice Secretary (Puno) entitled to great weight but not conclusive upon the courts The opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight. However, the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts. The Puno Opinion that the NTC is not a collegial body is not correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not specifically state that the NTC was a collegial body, and neither does it provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasijudicial functions. But the absence of such provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of said Rules, the BOC (now the NTC), a case before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a member thereof who is tasked to prepare and promulgate his Decision thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full membership of the BOC in which case the concurrence of at least 2 of the membership of the BOC is necessary for a valid Decision. 7. Historical milieu of the NTC: BOC Rules are NTC Rules, Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. NTC While it may be true that the BOC Rules of Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order 546, however, the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure before the NTC when it was established under Executive Order 546. This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA 200 when it declared that: The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on 25 January 1978 by the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of NTC govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then, now NTC. 8. Commission defined A Commission is a body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to perform some public service. (City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission versus Public Housing Administration, 261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page 286). A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or service . . . (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is persuasive authority that a commission is synonymous with board (State Ex. Rel. Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wabash County, 109 Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596). 9. Statutory Construction: And construed The conjunctive word and is not without any legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a surplusage in

the law. It means in addition to (McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus Adams, 167 Northwestern Reporter, 330, page 332). The word and, whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another. From the context of Section 16 of Executive Order 546, the Commission is composed of a Commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners; not the commissioner alone. 10. Statutory Construction: Every part of statute should be given effect In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed. Herein, if it was the intention of President Marcos to constitute merely a single entity, a one-man governmental body, instead of a commission or a threeman collegial body, he would not have constituted a commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the 2 deputy commissioners. 11. Use of word deputy does not militate against the collegiality of the NTC Even if Executive Order 546 used the word deputy to designate the 2 other members of the Commission does not militate against the collegiality of the NTC. The collegiality of the NTC cannot be disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the membership thereof. Such nominal designations are without functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. 12. NTC Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 void NTC Circular No. 1-1-93, Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93, and the Order of Kintanar declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are contrary to law and thus null and void. Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. The fact that implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are an erroneous interpretation of EO 546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power. 13. Courts cannot refrain from duty to nullify illegal regulations Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of EO 546 that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations. 14. Only the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar are indispensable parties in the action for certiorari In its certiorari action before the Court of Appeals, BellTel was proceeding against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar for the formers adherence and defense of its one-man rule as enforced by the latter. Thus, only the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar may be considered as indispensable parties. After all, it is they whom BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the court for having acted in grave abuse of their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 15. Oppositors not absolutely necessary in an action for certiorari, as the action does not go into merits of the case; Claim of non-joinder of indispensable parties untenable The oppositors in NTC Case 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as

chairman of NTC because the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors cause could not be significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the merits of a case, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of at least two members of the commission. All that Court of Appeals passed upon was the question of whether or not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion, and so the Supreme Court must review and ascertain the correctness of the findings of the appellate court on this score, and this score alone. 16. Mandamus does not control discretion Jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety of mandamus in causing a quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a case already ripe for adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition. As to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm outside the office of the special civil action of mandamus. It is elementary legal knowledge, after all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion. Herein, when the Court of Appeals directed Commissioners to meet en banc and to consider and act on the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel, said court was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial body, and the subject of the deliberation of the 3-man commission would be the said working draft which embodies one course of action that may be taken on BellTels application for a provisional authority. The appellate court did not order the NTC to forthwith grant said application. 17. No evidence proffered that working draft was obtained by BellTel was obtained through illegal means The working draft was said to have been prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante of the Legal Department of the NTC; initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr. Edgardo Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez. No one among the aforementioned persons has renounced the working draft or declared it to be spurious. Petitioners have not proffered a single piece of evidence to prove the charge that the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel was obtained by the latter through illegal means. In the ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation than in the instant proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal question.

Alfon v. Republic [GR L-51201, 29 May 1980] Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was registered at the Local Civil Registrars Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle, Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor. She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioners prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of first name but not the surname. The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon; without costs. 1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusively The word principally as used in article 364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. In the case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father. 2. Grounds for change of name The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong v. Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion, the petition of name should be granted as the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon since childhood.

Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985] Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 5 concur Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal Case 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527. The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on 18 August 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25 days. In each criminal case the sentence was 3 months and fifteen 15 days. Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is disqualified for probation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than P200). The court denied the application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant petition. The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due course to the petitioners application for probation; without costs. 1. Previous applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission of a crime The statute relates previous to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime. When the accused applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application. Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the crime.

National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985) F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service? HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned and controlled corporation. The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered. This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements. "Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. xxx For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service. xxx The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1, Art. XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed

Demafiles v. Comelec Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967) Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159 FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision. ISSUES: 1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7. 2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. 3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return. HELD: RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualified is devoid of meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. The law states any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on the said body. Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular.

Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga Case No. 16 G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10, 1975) Chapter VI Page 259, Footnote No. 43 FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleumbased products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum products, contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipalities may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. is entitled to a refund. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance, but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. It is evident from the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from imposing sales and specific tax, with the exception of gasoline, there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress, in excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes.

People v. Mejia Case No. 111 G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 (July 7, 1997) FACTS: Sec. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: Sec. 14. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when the owner, driver, or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: 1. W/N the phrase is killed covers both homicide and murder. 2. If the crime was frustrated murder, would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death? 3. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense. HELD: The words is killed make no distinction between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. The killing, whether it is homicide or murder, cannot be treated as a separate offense and only serves to qualify the carnapping. The phrase is killed refers only to consummated murder, and not frustrated murder. Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. 14 by means of violence or in intimidation of persons.

Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs [GR 30264, 12 March 1929] En Banc, Malcolm (p): 6 concur Facts: Paragraph 141 of the Tariff Law of 1909 provides that the manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem tax, while paragraph 197 provides that vehicles for use on railways, and detached parts thereof, are subject to 10% ad valorem. Dust shield are manufactured of mixed wool and hair, and are used in railroad cabins of the Manila Railroad Company. The Insular Collector of Customs decided that dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for. Judge del Rosario overruled the decision of the Collector of Customs and held that dust shields should be classified as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to classify them under paragraph 141 of the same section of the law. It thus affirmed the appealed judgment in its entirety, without special taxation of costs in either instance. 1. Nature of dust shields Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair mixed. The component material of chief value is the wool. The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oil deposited therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. Dust guard, which is the same as dust shield, is defined in the work Car Builders Cyclopedia of American Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p. 41, as follows: A thin piece of wood, leather, felt, asbestos or other material inserted in the dust guard chamber at the back of a journal box, and fitting closely around the dust guard bearing of the axle. Its purpose is to exclude dust and to prevent the escape of oil and waste. Sometimes called axle packing or box packing. 2. Burden of proof on the validity of a legal collection of duties upon who questions it The burden is upon the importer to overcome the presumption of a legal collection of duties by proof that their exaction was unlawful. The question to be decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but whether the importer was right. 3. Interpretation of statutes levying taxes do not extend their provisions; in case of doubt It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import. In the case at bar, taking account the purpose of the article, it is acknowledged that in reality, it is used as a detached part of railway vehicles. 4. Particular enactment must be operative over the general one in the same statute Paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general language are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.

Almeda v. Florentino Case No. 10 G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965) Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67 FACTS: RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947), provides in its Sec. 14 that the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the members thereof On June 18, 1960, RA 2709 amended Sec. 12 of RA 183. On the strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as amended, the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent Florentino to the position, purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter. ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended.

Laxamana v. Baltazar [GR L-5955, 19 September 1952] First Division, Bengzon (p): 7 concur Facts: In July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended, vice-mayor Jose T. Baltazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the provincial governor, acting under section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code (RA 180), with the consent of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who immediately took the corresponding official oath. Thus, the quo warranto petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the quo warranto petition with costs. 1. Section 21(a) derived from Section 2180; supplements, not repeal, Section 2195 Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that upon the occasion of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election received the highest number of votes. Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code provides that whenever a temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the same shall be filled by appointment by the President if it is a provincial or city office, and by the provincial governor, with the consent of the provincial board, if it is a municipal office. The portion of Section 21(a) relating to municipal offices was taken from section 2180 of the Revised Administrative Code. Thus, when the office of municipal president (now mayor) became permanently vacant, the vice- president stepped into the office. Likewise, when the municipal president is suspended, the vice-president takes his place by virtue of Section 2195. Sections 2180 and 2195, thus, supplemented each other. It must also be noted that paragraph (a) of section 2180 applied to municipal offices in general, other than that of the municipal president. 2. Contemporaneous and practical interpretation of re-enacted statute sWhere a statute has received a contemporaneous and practical interpretation and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. The rule here is based upon the theory that the legislature is acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute, especially when made by an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of administering or enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the interpretation upon reenactment. The incorporation of Section 2180 of the Revised Administrative Code as Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Law did not have the effect of enlarging its scope, to supersede or repeal section 2195, what with the presumption against implied repeals. 3. Particular over general Even disregarding their origin, the allegedly conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the light of the principle of statutory construction that when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former (Sec. 288, Act 190). Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. In the case at bar, section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in the office of mayor, must prevail over the general terms of section 21(a) as to vacancies of municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be deemed an exception to or qualification of the latter. 4. Particular not repealed by general statute unless there is manifest intent to repeal such A special and local statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter

is manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions, of such earlier statute. Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. 5. Executive Construction given weight by Court The contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the executive officers charged with its execution deserves great weight in the courts. In the case at bar, the Department of the Interior and the office of Executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of provincial and municipal governments, even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, have consistently held that in case of the suspension or other temporary disability of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by operation of law, assume the office of the mayor, and if the vice- mayor is not available, the said office shall be discharged by the first councilor.

Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan [GR L-21516, 29 April 1966] En Banc, Reyes JBL (p): 9 concur, 1 on leave Facts: Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise (RA. 399, 18 June 1949), for an electric light, heat and power system at Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms and conditions established in Act 3636, as amended by CA 132 and the Constitution. It was also issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission on 18 March 1954. On 1 October 1950, Ordinance 7 imposed a 2% on the gross sales or receipts tax of any business operated in the city. This ordinance was amended by Ordinance 11 (14 December 1950), by enumerating the kinds of businesses required to pay the tax. It was further amended by Ordinance 131 (16 May 1961) by modifying the penal provision, and further by Ordinance 148, approved on 11 June 1962 by including within the coverage of taxable businesses those engaged in the business of electric light, heat and power (sic). On 13 April 1960, Ordinance 104 was enacted, making it unlawful for any person or firm to cut or disconnect the electrical connection of any consumer in the city of Butuan without his consent. The issue on the gross sales tax was raised with the CFI Agusan (Special Civil Case 152; Petition for declaratory relief), the court declared Ordinance 7, 11, 131 and 148 of the City of Butuan unconstitutional and ultra vires, as far as they imposed a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of the business of electric light, heat and power of Butuan Sawmill. The court also annulled Ordinance 104 for being unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the direct appeal on questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision with costs against appellant City of Butuan. 1. Taxation of franchise beyond citys taxation power. The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the City of Butuan to tax the franchised business of Butuan Sawmill (see Section 2, Act 2264). The inclusion of the franchised business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the city of Butuan within the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter; nor can the power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise, since its charter did not expressly nor specifically provide any such power. It must be noted that the franchise was granted by act of the legislature on 18 June 1949 while the citys charter was approved on 15 June 1950. 2. Earlier special over the latter general Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.(State vs. Stoll; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty). 3. Construction must consider other provisions of the same act; and its effects Subparagraph (j) of the section 2 (RA 2264) specifically withholds the imposition of taxes on persons paying franchise tax. Further, the citys interpretation of the provision would result in double taxation against the business of the franchisee because the internal revenue code already imposes a franchise tax. The logical construction of section 2 (d) of RA 2264, that would not nullify section 2 (j) of the same Act, is that the local government may only tax electric light and power utilities that are not subject to franchise taxes, unless the franchise itself authorizes additional taxation by cities or municipalities. 4. Ordinance 104 an invalid exercise of police power The passage of ordinance 104, prohibiting the disconnection of any electrical wire connected to any consumers building with the power plant, without the consent of the consumer, except in case of fire, clear and positive danger to residents, or order of the authorities, is an unwarranted exercise of power

for the general welfare The ordinance compels the electric company to keep supplying electric current to a company even if the latter does not pay the bills thereof, and to that extent deprives the company of its property without due process. How the general welfare would be promoted under the ordinance has neither been explained nor justified. The general welfare clause was not intended to vent the ire of the complaining consumers against the franchise holder, because the legislature has specifically lodged jurisdiction, supervision and control over public services and their franchises in the Public Service Commission, and not in the City of Butuan.

Arayata v. Joya Case No. 9 G.R. No. L-28067 (March 10, 1928) FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the Government for such. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed some of the lots to respondent F. Joya as administrator. Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. His widow, herein petitioner, was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and distribution. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16, the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120s full conveyance of the property to the widow. HELD: Act 1120 prevails. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition, disposition, and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil Code. The Civil Code is a general law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The special law must prevail.

City of Manila vs. Teotico City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968. Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA Concepcion, J.: Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages. Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico. Ruling: Decision affirmed. In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good conditionand manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."

David v. Commission on Elections Case No. 85 G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997) Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105 FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELECs schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The COMELECs basis is R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. ISSUE: 1. What the term of office of barangay officials is. 2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. HELD: 1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997. 2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials.

US v. De Guzman Case No. 297 G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95 FACTS: Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice, nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the legislative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made prior to his trial.

In RE exemption from SSS coverage: Archbishop of Manila v. SSC [ GR L-15045, 20 January 1961] En Banc, Gutierrez-David (p): 5 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 reserves vote Facts: On 1 September 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social Security Commission a request that Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, as amended (Social Security Law of 1954). Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution 572 (s. 1958), denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution 767 (s. 1958); hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5 (c) of RA 1161, as amended. The Supreme Court affirmed Resolution 572 and 767, s. 1958 of the Social Security Commission, with costs against appellant. 1. Definition of employer, employee, and employment (as defined in law) The term employer as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government (par. *c+, sec. 8), while an employee refers to any person who performs services for an `employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services (par. *d+ sec. 8). Employment, according to paragraph [j] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc. 2. Ejusdem generis applies only if there is uncertainty The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. In the case at bar, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employeremployee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded. The definition of the term employer is, thus, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit within its meaning. Had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an employer in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it. 3. Intent of legislature: exemption excluded in new law When RA 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j], subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of RA 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law. 4. Intent of law limited to corporations and industries The discussions in the Senate dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily

explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain. 5. Valid exercise of police power; Social justice The enactment of the law is a legitimate exercise of the police power, pursuant to the policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people. 6. Inclusion of religious organization does not violate prohibition on application of public funds for the benefit of a priest; does not violate right to disseminate religious information The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. Even assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement, death or disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provision of the Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee. Further, the contributions are not in the nature of taxes on employment. Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

National Housing Authority v. Reyes Case No. 85 G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983) FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00, but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price. The petition for Certiorari is granted.

Paat v. Court of Appeals Case No. 95 G.R. No. 111107 (January 10, 1997) FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal logging operations. He insists that only the Court can do so, citing Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads The court shall further the order of confiscation in favor of the Governmentas well as the machinery, equipment which are illegally used ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705. HELD: No. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. 68a. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.

Villegas v. Subido [GR L-31711, 30 September 1971] En Banc, Fernando (p): 8 concur, 2 took no part Facts: In a letter dated 3 June 1968, the Secretary of Finance (Romualdez), authorized the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila (Gloria) to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective 1 June 1968. In AO 40 (s. 1968, 17 June 1968), Mayor Villegas of Manila, directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer, on the ground that Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation. On 1 January 1969, Mayor Villegas appointed Manuel D. Lapid, chief of the each division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila, as Assistant City Treasurer. In a 1st indorsement dated 14 February 1969, the Commissioner of Civil Service (Subido) disapproved the appointment of Lapid, basing his action on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated 19 September 1968 to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Section 2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Section 4 of the Decentralization Law, RA 5185. On 25 February 1969, Mayor Villegas and Lapid filed the instant petition for prohibition, quo warranto and mandamus, with application for writ of preliminary injunction, praying that judgment be rendered to declare illegal and void ab initio the authorization given by Romualdez to Gloria to assume the duties of assistant city treasurer of Manila, and that a writ of mandamus be issued to the Commissioner of Civil Service commanding him to approve the appointment of Lapid to the said office in accordance with the Civil Service Rules. It was not until the filing of the petition that Gloria was nominated by the President of the Philippines to the position of Assistant City Treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly confirmed. After the case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings and the documentary exhibits stipulated by the parties, the lower court rendered its decision on 4 August 1969 dismissing the petition. Hence this appeal by way of certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, without pronouncement as to costs. 1, Officers and employees distinguished The Revised Administrative Code distinguishes one in that category from an officer to designate those whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, may be considered to involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined by law or not. In the case at hand, the Assistant and City Treasurer is an officer, not an employee. 2. Pineda v. Claudio does not apply The principle, that undue interference with the power and prerogatives of a local executive is sought to be avoided considering the City Mayors primary responsibility is for efficient governmental administration, was announced in connection with the appointment of a department head, the chief of police, who necessarily must enjoy the fullest confidence of the local executive, one moreover whose appointment is expressly vested in the city mayor. The principle therein announced does not extend as far as the choice of an assistant city treasurer whose functions do not require that much degree of confidence, not to mention the specific grant of such authority to the President. 3. Implied repeals not favored; Standard to determine repeal Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended (See US v. Reyes, 1908). It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it

irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal. 4. Subsequent general statute does not repeal a special enactment unless intent is manifest A subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant. This is so even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. (see Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 1919). At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. 5. General and special laws distinguished A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class.