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Monday, 11 May 2009

Contributing Factors to North Korea’s Different Treatment of 2006 and 2009

Taepo Dong-2 Missile Launches
Mr. Lance K. Nakayama, CIV; MAJ Steve S. Sin, USA

Summary: Following the failed 2006 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile launch, North Korean media
remained quiet, which the Open Source Center (OSC) assessed as normal North Korean
behavior. According to the OSC, “Pyongyang has a long record of delaying official
pronouncements on a variety of sensitive topics, particularly those that involve the US. For
example, when North Korea launched its TD-1 on 31 Aug 98, it issued “a low-level, tacit
admission two days after the launch followed by its official policy pronouncement four days later,
which characterized the event primarily as S&T related with the potential for military
application.”
In stark contrast, North Korea touted its 2009 launch on the same day with North Korean media
labeling it as a “successful satellite launch.” Equally unusual was North Korea’s first
announcement of a planned launch approximately 1 1/2 months prior to the actual event – an
unprecedented occurrence. Continuing its unprecedented behavior, North Korea formally
notified the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization
on 12 Mar it would launch a satellite between 04 – 08 Apr, and submitted two closure areas that
corresponded to potential 1st and 2nd stage impact areas. Following the 05 Apr launch, it also
reported on Kim Jong-il’s visit to the launch site and released photos of the visit on 06 Apr.
We assess Kim Jong-il’s assessment of the international security environment, domestic
political agenda, and Kim Jong-il’s health, were all factors contributing to the North’s openness
in the press regarding last month’s TD-2 launch.
Please direct your questions and comments to USFK J2 / JIOC-K Open Source
Intelligence Branch. Phone: DSN: (315) 723-2558, Commercial: 82-2-7913-2558

Information contained in this document is entirely derived from unclassified, open source, information. This product is based
exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components.
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Introduction: Following the failed 2006 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile launch, North Korean
media remained quiet, which the Open Source Center (OSC) assessed as normal North Korean
behavior. According to the OSC, “Pyongyang has a long record of delaying official
pronouncements on a variety of sensitive topics, particularly those that involve the US. For
example, when North Korea launched its TD-1 on 31 Aug 98, it issued “a low-level, tacit
admission two days after the launch followed by its official policy pronouncement four days later,
which characterized the event primarily as S&T related with the potential for military application.”

In stark contrast, North Korea touted its 2009 launch on

the same day with North Korean media labeling it as a
“successful satellite launch.” Equally unusual was North
Korea’s first announcement of a planned launch
approximately 1 1/2 months prior to the actual event – an
unprecedented occurrence. Continuing its
unprecedented behavior, North Korea formally notified
the International Maritime Organization and the
International Civil Aviation Organization on 12 Mar it
would launch a satellite between 04 – 08 Apr, and
submitted two closure areas that corresponded to
potential 1st and 2nd stage impact areas. Following the
05 Apr launch, it also reported on Kim Jong-il’s visit to the
launch site and released photos of the visit on 06 Apr.

Factors such as regional and international security environment; and North Korean internal
political environment may have all contributed to the difference in North Korea’s treatment of the
2006 and 2009 launches.

North Korean behavior prior to and after the 2006 TD-2 Launch was within historical
norms.

• North Korea launched the TD-2 on 05 Jul 06 (KST) without formal pre-launch
announcements or warnings.

• On 06 Jul 06, a day after the launch, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan
reportedly warned that North Korea could launch more missiles. Kim reportedly made

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the comment in Pyongyang during a meeting with Professor Robert Scalapino of the
University of California at Berkeley who was an invited guest of North Korea from 04 to
07 Jul 06.

• On the same day, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a statement claiming that the
missile launches were part of military exercises and that North Korea would take strong
actions if the international community continued to pressure it – again warning of further
missile launches.

• No further official comment was made until 16 Jul 06, when North Korea issued a strong
statement in response the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution. According to OSC
analysis, the statement “denounced the US ‘heinous hostile policy’” and said North
Korea would “not be bound…in the least” to the resolution. The statement also made
reference to the North’s “deterrent” against US aggression which is a euphemism for its
nuclear program.

• The North again went silent until 24 Jul 06 when KCNA reported that its missile launch
was ‘completely safe’. According to KCNA, "The DPRK launched missiles only after
airspace, land, and waters of the sea had been confirmed to be completely safe. Their
launches, therefore, hurt neither ships nor civilian planes, nor anyone."

• On 25 Jul 06 North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations, Pak Kil-yon, commented
on the launches and warned of an unspecified “second round test” during an interview
with the Sisa Journal. Pak also claimed that the responsibility for North Korea’s missile
tests rested with the United States and its “Republic-crushing” policy.

• Following this statement, North Korea did not make any further statements regarding its
missile launch.

• On 03 Oct 06, North Korea announced its intent to conduct its first nuclear test. Six
days later, on 09 Oct 06, it did.

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North Korean behavior prior to and after the 2009 TD-2 Launch differed in various ways
and had many unprecedented ‘firsts’.

• On 12 Mar, North Korea formally notified the IMO and the ICAO that it would launch a
satellite between 04 – 08 Apr, and submitted to the IMO and ICAO two closure areas
where the separated rocket stages were most likely to impact.

• At 1130 hours, 05 Apr (KST), the North launched

the TD-2 (within the proposed launch window).
The North reported on the “glorious success of
the satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 launch” a few
hours after the launch (to have a statement
released so soon after an event such as this is
an unprecedented first). KCTV 

08 April 2009 

• On 06 Apr, KCNA reported that Kim Jong-il visited the General Satellite Control and
Command Center to view the launch of the Kwangmyongsong-2 (another
unprecedented first).

• Two days following the launch, the North resumed trade with China, indicating to both
the international and domestic audiences that everything was “business as usual.”

• On 09 Apr, the First Session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) was held at
Mansudae Assembly Hall where Kim Jong-il was re-elected as the Chairman of the
National Defense Commission (NDC).

• On 14 Apr, the North’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting the UNSC’s
presidential statement, claiming that historically, the UNSC has never taken issue with
satellite launches. More significantly, the North announced that it saw no need to
participate in Six-Party Talks as they were simply a platform for infringing upon the
North’s sovereignty. In addition, the North announced it would bolster its nuclear
deterrent and restore its nuclear facilities to its original state.

• Also on 14 Apr, North Korea asked the IAEA and US nuclear inspectors to leave. The
IAEA inspectors left North Korea on 16 Apr and the US inspectors followed a day later.

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• On 17 Apr, North
Korea’s Secretariat
of the Committee for
the Peaceful
Reunification of
Korea – the state
organization that
handles inter-Korean
affairs – issued a
bulletin stating that
nuclear war on the
Korean Peninsula
was only a matter of
time.
Kim Jong-il with NDC personnel and personnel involved in the 05 April
• On 19 Apr, the North satellite launch: 1. Man who appears to be Ju Kyu Chang, 2. Jon Pyong Ho,
proposed the first 3. Kim Jong Il, 4. Kim Yong Chun, 5. Kim Cho'ng-kak, 6. Kim Il Chol.
inter-Korean talks in (Source: KCTV, 24 April 2009)
over a year. The
two sides met on 21 Apr, but the talks only lasted for 22 minutes.

• On 24 Apr, the UN imposed financial sanctions on three North Korean companies - the
Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, the Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation and Tanchon Commercial Bank. In reaction, North Korea announced a day
later that it had restarted extracting plutonium from the spent fuel rods at its Yongbyon
facility.

• On 29 Apr, North Korea announced that unless the UNSC issued an immediate apology
for its punitive actions regarding the satellite launch, it would conduct further nuclear and
missile tests and start building a light-water reactor and self-production of nuclear fuel –
an indication that it will start a uranium enrichment program. The uncharacteristically
strong Foreign Ministry statement also claimed that the UNSC sanctions were a
“declaration of war” and that the armistice the UN and the US signed with North Korea
and China at the end of the Korean War was no longer effective. The UNSC
announced the next day that it will not apologize.

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Kim Jong-il’s post-launch activities also differed.

• Following the failed launch of the TD-2 in 2006, Kim Jong-il went into seclusion for 5 1/2
weeks. At the time, Kim had made 73 public appearances for the year, a number much
larger than the 42 from the same time period the year prior. Even more significant was
the fact that he was not reported paying respects at the Ku’msusan Memorial Palace on
08 Jul 06, the 12th anniversary of his father’s death. Kim finally made a public
appearance on 13 Aug 06 when he visited a rabbit and goat farm.

• In striking contrast to the lack of activity in 2006, in the month following this year’s launch,
Kim Jong-il has reportedly been “relentless” in his public appearances. For the month
of April, Kim has made 13 public appearances – 11 since 05 Apr.

o On 08 Apr, Kim Jong-il gave on-the-spot guidance to the Samilp’o Special Products
Plant.

o The following day, he attended the First Session of the 12th Supreme People’s
Assembly at the Mansudae Assembly Hall.

o Five days later, on 14 Apr, Kim Jong-il watched fireworks commemorating the 97th
birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang.

o On 18 Apr, he gave on-the-spot guidance to the newly built Yo’ngwo’n Power Plant.

o Three days later, on 21 Apr, Kim watched a performance by the art propaganda
squad of KPA Unit 10215.

o On 24 Apr, Kim Jong-il met with scientists and other personnel who contributed to the
05 Apr satellite launch.

o On 25 Apr, Kim inspected KPA the command of KPA Unit 851 and enjoyed a
performance given by the State Merited Chorus in conjunction with the 77th KPA
Foundation Day.

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o On 27 Apr, Kim gave on-the-spot

guidance at the newly-constructed
greenhouse at the Wonsan Agricultural
College and for various sectors in
Wonsan.

o On 29 Apr, Kim gave field guidance to

KCNA 
Honored Red Flag Sojung Secondary
30 April 2009 
School, newly built in Nagwo’n County.

USFK J2 / JIOC-K Open Source Assessment. We assess Kim Jong-il’s assessment of the
international security environment, domestic political agenda, and Kim Jong-il’s health, were all
factors contributing to the North’s openness in the press regarding last month’s TD-2 launch.

Kim Jong-il’s assessment of perceived international reaction, especially from the US, and
consequences were different in 2009 in comparison with 2006. In 2006, Kim Jong-il perceived
the Bush administration as immutable and hawkish. Observing the US foreign policy decisions
that were made during the Bush administration, Kim may have had concerns about his personal
safety after the TD-2 launch in 2006. Also in 2006, the UN adopted the UNSC resolution 1718,
imposing sanctions on North Korea; however, after three years of sanctions, Kim knows, better
than anyone, that the UN sanctions were largely unenforceable and ineffective. Kim also
calculated that UNSC probably could not do much more than it has already done if he were to
launch another TD-2. This, coupled with perceived weakness in today’s US foreign policy (at
the very least the US foreign policy under Obama seems to be more reasonable and much less
hawkish), would have formed a large basis for Kim’s decision to launch the missile, and his
relatively vivacious activity level after this year’s launch.

This year’s launch appears to be very closely tied to the North Korean domestic politics. The
2006 launch was meant more as a “show of force” to the international community to gain
leverage at the negotiation table. This year’s launch immediately preceded the First Session of
the 12th SPA and Kim Jong-il’s re-election as Chairman of the NDC. Showing that Kim Jong-il
and those cadre of elites who are loyal to him are firmly in power to the North Korean society,
especially to those who may be considering competing for power, was a particularly crucial point
to be made this year to ensure continued political stability – especially after Kim Jong-il’s
supposed stroke of Aug 08 and the rumors of a North Korean power succession. In fact, the

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launch preceded the First Session of the 12th SPA by only four days – during the session, the
NDC, and therefore the military, was made stronger than the Workers’ Party, further securing
Kim Jong-il’s grip on the country. i

Kim Jong-il’s health may have been a large factor in the difference in the 2009 post-launch
behavior. Unlike in 2006, when Kim Jong-il went into seclusion for 5 1/2 weeks, Kim Jong-il
had 13 public appearances between 05 – 29 Apr, an extremely high number following a major
event such as a missile launch. Also, Kim Jong-il has made 56 public appearances between
Jan – Apr 09 compared to 35, 23, and 18 during the same time periods in 2006, 2007, and 2008
respectively. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il had made 89 and 95 total public appearances in 2007
and 2008 respectively. Based on this data, Kim Jong-il’s 2009 visit total is already 63% and
59% of his 2007 and 2008 totals. Kim’s numerous public appearances in 2009, especially in
April, seems to be designed to reassure the North Korean people that Kim Jong-il is still firmly in
control of the state’s affairs and that he is relentlessly continuing his “revolutionary struggle”
against the “hegemonic imperialists”, namely the United States, to protect the North Korean
people and preserve the sovereignty of North Korea.

i During the 12th SPA, the number of NDC members increased from eight to 13. According to ROK government
sources, the Operations, Research, and External Liaison Departments were moved under the control of the NDC –

The Operations Department was actually moved under the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF), which is

subordinate to the NDC. The Operations Department is responsible for managing espionage agents, and O Kuk-ryol,

who was named a vice chairman of NDC this year, is the director of the department. The Research Department

collects intelligence on South Korea and other nations, while the External Liaison Department is responsible for

training and dispatching agents. The Unification Front Department (or United Front Department) remains within the

Korea Workers’ Party (KWP) to handle inter-Korean dialogue and the North’s policy on the South. South Korean

experts say that this signifies the Unification Front Department has lost much of its influence within the North Korean

power structure. Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law, Chang Song-taek (believed to be the second in command) was

appointed to the NDC. Later, Japanese press reports indicated that Kim’s third son, Kim Jong-un – who many

believe has been named successor to Kim – was assigned to a low-level post within the NDC.

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References:

1. “Attention Drawn to Kim Jong Il’s Behavior Different From the 1998 Missile Crisis”, Yonhap, 19 July
2006.

2. “Defiant North Korea Acknowledges Tests”, Radio Free Europe, 06 July 2006.

3. “DPRK Envoy Comments on Missile Launches, Warns of Unspecified ‘Second Round Test’”, Sisa
Journal, 25 July 2006.

4. “DPRK FM Spokesman Says Reprocessing of Spent Fuel Rods Has Started”, Korean Central
Broadcasting Station, 25 April 2009.

5. “DPRK FM Statement on UNSC Condemning Launch, 6-Way Talks, Nuclear Deterrent”, Korean
Central News Agency, 14 April 2009.

6. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measure to Bolster War Deterrent”, Korean Central
News Agency, 03 October 2006.

7. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Refutes ‘Resolution of UN Security Council”, Korean Central News Agency,
16 July 2006.

8. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Demands U.S. Lift of Financial Sanctions”, Korean Central News
Agency, 26 August 2006.

9. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Its Missile Launches”, Korean Central News Agency, 07 July
2006.

10. “DPRK Will Bolster War Deterrent with Utmost Efforts: KPA General Staff Chief”, Korean Central
News Agency, 24 August 2006.

11. “DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Reportedly Claims DPRK ‘Can Launch More Missiles”, Yonhap, 09 July
2006.

12. “DPRK’s Initial silence on Missile Launches Not Unusual”, Open Source Center, 05 July 2006.

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13. “First Session of 12th SPA of DPRK Held 9 April; Kim Jong-Il Present”, Korean Central News Agency,
09 April 2009.

14. “FYI: Open Sources Not Observed To Carry Images of Jul 06 DPRK Missile Launches”, Open Source
Center, 15 September 2006.

15. “Kim Jong Il Activities 2002-2009”, Open Source Center, accessed 27-29 April 2009.

16. “Kim Jong-il calls regime ‘invunerable’”, Korea Herald, 16 march 2009.

17. “Kim Jong Il Observes Launch of ‘Kwangmyo’ngso’ng-2 Satellite 5 Apr”, Korean Central News
Agency, 05 April 2009.

18. “North Korea-China Border Trade Resumes After Three Day Halt”, AFP, 07 April 2009.

19. “N Korea Threatens ‘stronger Measures’ Against S Koreans in Kaesong Complex”, Yonhap, 23 April
2009.

20. “N. Korea said to be preparing for rocket launch between April 4-8”, Yonhap, 12 April 2009.

21. “N.Korea Says It Began Reprocessing Spent Fuel Rods”, Bloomberg, 25 April 2009.

22. “N. Korea Says Japanese Sanctions Will Bring ‘Disastrous’ Response”, Voice of America, 07 July
2006.

23. “N.Korea says missile launch ‘completely safe’”, Reuters, 24 July 2006.

24. “N. Korea holding S. Korean worker for criticizing Pyongyang regime”, Yonhap, 30 March 2009.

25. “N. Korea Orders U.S. Nuke Experts, IAEA Monitors in Yongbyon to Leave”, Kyodo, 14 April 2009.

26. “N. Korea Proposes Contact Over ‘Important Thing’”, Korea Times, 19 April 2009.

27. “N. Korean Leader Observes Artillery Exercise”, Yonhap, 15 March 2009.

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28. “N. Korea Seeks Light-Water Reactors in Exchange for Nuke verification”. Kyodo, 19 March 2009.

29. “N. Korea threatens nuclear, missile tests”, Yonhap, 29 April 2009.

30. “N.Korea’s Kim appears for first time since missiles”, Reuters, 13 April 2006.

31. “North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test”, VOA News, 09 October 2006.

32. “North Korea says nuclear war ‘only a matter of time’”, ITAR-TASS, 23 April 2009.

33. “North Korea vows ‘annihilating strike’ if attacked”, Reuters, 03 July 2006.

34. “Researcher Says DPRK Lacks Technology to Build Light-Water Reactors”, Dong-A Ilbo, 15 April
2009.

35. “ROK Says North Korea’s Kim Jong Il Increases Tours Despite Health Doubts”, AFP, 27 April 2009.

36. “Russia has no info on preparation for N.Korea nuclear tests”, RIA Novosti, 18 August 2006.

37. “South, North Korea quickly end first talks in over a year without breakthrough”, Yonhap, 21 April
2009.

38. “UNSC Committee Imposes Sanctions on 3 DPRK Frims as Directed by UN Presidential Statement”,
Yonhap, 25 April 2009.

39. “U.S. Extremely Hostile Act and UN ‘Resolution’ against DPRK Rejected”, Korean Central News
Agency, 26 July 2006.

40. “US nuclear experts depart North Korea”, Associated Press, 17 April 2009.

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