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UNCLASSIFIEDMonday, 11 May 2009Contributing Factors to North Korea’s Different Treatment of 2006 and 2009Taepo Dong-2 Missile Launches
Mr. Lance K. Nakayama, CIV; MAJ Steve S. Sin, USA
Summary:
Following the failed 2006 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile launch, North Korean mediaremained quiet, which the Open Source Center (OSC) assessed as normal North Koreanbehavior. According to the OSC, “Pyongyang has a long record of delaying officialpronouncements on a variety of sensitive topics, particularly those that involve the US. Forexample, when North Korea launched its TD-1 on 31 Aug 98, it issued “a low-level, tacitadmission two days after the launch followed by its official policy pronouncement four days later,which characterized the event primarily as S&T related with the potential for militaryapplication.”In stark contrast, North Korea touted its 2009 launch on the same day with North Korean medialabeling it as a “successful satellite launch.” Equally unusual was North Korea’s firstannouncement of a planned launch approximately 1 1/2 months prior to the actual event – anunprecedented occurrence. Continuing its unprecedented behavior, North Korea formallynotified the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organizationon 12 Mar it would launch a satellite between 04 – 08 Apr, and submitted two closure areas thatcorresponded to potential 1
st
and 2
nd
stage impact areas. Following the 05 Apr launch, it alsoreported on Kim Jong-il’s visit to the launch site and released photos of the visit on 06 Apr.
We assess Kim Jong-il’s assessment of the international security environment, domestic political agenda, and Kim Jong-il’s health, were all factors contributing to the North’s openness in the press regarding last month’s TD-2 launch.
Please direct your questions and comments toUSFK J2 / JIOC-K Open SourceIntelligence Branch. Phone: DSN: (315) 723-2558, Commercial: 82-2-7913-2558
 
Information contained in this document is entirely derived from unclassified, open source, information. This product is basedexclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components.This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.
UNCLASSIFIED
 
 
UNCLASSIFIEDIntroduction:
Following the failed 2006 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile launch, North Koreanmedia remained quiet, which the Open Source Center (OSC) assessed as normal North Koreanbehavior. According to the OSC, “Pyongyang has a long record of delaying officialpronouncements on a variety of sensitive topics, particularly those that involve the US. Forexample, when North Korea launched its TD-1 on 31 Aug 98, it issued “a low-level, tacitadmission two days after the launch followed by its official policy pronouncement four days later,which characterized the event primarily as S&T related with the potential for military application.”1
UNCLASSIFIED
 In stark contrast, North Korea touted its 2009 launch onthe same day with North Korean media labeling it as a“successful satellite launch.” Equally unusual was NorthKorea’s first announcement of a planned launchapproximately 1 1/2 months prior to the actual event – anunprecedented occurrence. Continuing itsunprecedented behavior, North Korea formally notifiedthe International Maritime Organization and theInternational Civil Aviation Organization on 12 Mar itwould launch a satellite between 04 – 08 Apr, andsubmitted two closure areas that corresponded topotential 1
st
and 2
nd
stage impact areas. Following the05 Apr launch, it also reported on Kim Jong-il’s visit to thelaunch site and released photos of the visit on 06 Apr.Factors such as regional and international security environment; and North Korean internalpolitical environment may have all contributed to the difference in North Korea’s treatment of the2006 and 2009 launches.
North Korean behavior prior to and after the 2006 TD-2 Launch was within historicalnorms.
•
North Korea launched the TD-2 on 05 Jul 06 (KST) without formal pre-launchannouncements or warnings.
•
On 06 Jul 06, a day after the launch, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwanreportedly warned that North Korea could launch more missiles. Kim reportedly made
 
UNCLASSIFIED
2
UNCLASSIFIED
 the comment in Pyongyang during a meeting with Professor Robert Scalapino of theUniversity of California at Berkeley who was an invited guest of North Korea from 04 to07 Jul 06.
•
On the same day, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a statement claiming that themissile launches were part of military exercises and that North Korea would take strongactions if the international community continued to pressure it – again warning of furthermissile launches.
•
No further official comment was made until 16 Jul 06, when North Korea issued a strongstatement in response the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution. According to OSCanalysis, the statement “denounced the US ‘heinous hostile policy’” and said NorthKorea would “not be bound…in the least” to the resolution. The statement also madereference to the North’s “deterrent” against US aggression which is a euphemism for itsnuclear program.
•
The North again went silent until 24 Jul 06 when
KCNA
reported that its missile launchwas ‘completely safe’. According to
KCNA
, "The DPRK launched missiles only afterairspace, land, and waters of the sea had been confirmed to be completely safe. Theirlaunches, therefore, hurt neither ships nor civilian planes, nor anyone."
•
On 25 Jul 06 North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations, Pak Kil-yon, commentedon the launches and warned of an unspecified “second round test” during an interviewwith the
Sisa Journal 
. Pak also claimed that the responsibility for North Korea’s missiletests rested with the United States and its “Republic-crushing” policy.
•
Following this statement, North Korea did not make any further statements regarding itsmissile launch.
•
On 03 Oct 06, North Korea announced its intent to conduct its first nuclear test. Sixdays later, on 09 Oct 06, it did.
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