Heidegger in essence is telling us that we are not going on a journey of thought in its normalsense but a tour of language. Showing is what this whole treatise is about, we explore languagein order to allow it to show us that which we cannot traditionally objectively grasp. We aredirected to keep in mind simple pictures of where we have gone and the end result, if our tour issuccessful, will be the big picture the big showing of language.Keep in mind the word 'transpire' used above (in quote) that which transpires, it can be said, isthat which we come to know: that which comes to light. Knowing in the traditional sense of knowledge is not something we can do with language according to Heidegger (as we can'tseparate ourselves from language), this leaves us with 'that which comes to light' this light we are projecting through our journey as a showing of language, our way is a sort of slide show of our journey to language, a type of showing that might have benefited greatly by Wittgenstein'sconcepts of pictures.Although Heidegger thinks we can use language to show the way to language, this is a long process of peering at that which is shown then thus allowing something else to be shown etc. (along chain-linking of Showings (pictures?)), Wittgenstein's version of showing is relatively shortand uninvolved, I will write it again:
That which cannot be represented can only be shown.
For Wittgenstein little else can be said about showing, he describes it as something that merely'becomes clear' as something 'mystical'. Once this clarity occurs that which we wonder about can be said to have shown itself and we no longer doubt or wonder about it, but once this experiencehas transpired we can not explain it, we cannot say where or in what way the senseless becamesense-full (came to make sense)(6.521).This is strikingly similar to Heidegger's way in that where we arrive is not necessarily cognition, but it does give us a kind of surmise. We do not have knowledge in its traditional sense, butneither are we back at square one from which we started. The primary difference between thetwo forms of showing appears to be that Wittgenstein's form seems more private. It is a privateexperience that one cannot describe to another, at least that is the way it appears in proposition6.521. Heidegger's experience however appears to be a public tour he can be the tour guide toshow the way on our journey of showing. Now if I were to take the Tractatus as a wholeWittgenstein also shares the public nature of the showing of Heidegger:My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognises them assenseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them (6.54).In the light of this statement proposition 6.521 seems to take on different proportions. Yes wecan have a time of clarity where the senseless comes to make sense, it is inexplicable and yet itcan be a way that could successfully show others to the clarity (for why else would he havewritten it thus). This is a striking similarity between Heidegger and Wittgenstein theisomorphism is uncanny. Both attempt to take their readers on a tour-guide of nonsensetoward an ultimate goal which they hope will come to make sense to be sense-full.Wittgenstein says that the limits of our language our also and therefore the limits of our world.Egoistic solipsism is therefore not possible for the egoistic I of the solipsist is negated by theworld being
world. Wittgenstein shows this by using the example of 'the world as I found it',in this world the I does not exist it the subject can not be mentioned:
of it alone in this book mention could