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Public StatementRelease of 9/11 Commission ReportThe Hon. Thomas H. Kean and the Hon. Lee H. HamiltonJuly 22, 2004
Good morning. Today, we present this Report and these recommendations to thePresident of the United States, the United States Congress, and the American people. Thisreport represents the unanimous conclusion of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacksupon the United States.On September 11, 2001, 19 men armed with knives, box-cutters, mace and pepper spray penetrated the defenses of the most powerful nation in the world. They inflictedunbearable trauma on our people, and turned the international order upside down.We ask each of you to remember how you felt that day—the grief, the enormoussense of loss. We also came together that day as a nation—young and old, rich and poor,Republicans and Democrats. We all had a deep sense of hurt. We also had a deep sense of  purpose. We knew what we had to do, as a nation, to respond. And we did.But on that September day we were unprepared. We did not grasp the magnitude of athreat that had been gathering over time. As we detail in our report, this was a failure of  policy, management, capability, and – above all – a failure of imagination.
Findings
We recognize that we have the benefit of hindsight. And, since the plotters wereflexible and resourceful, we cannot know whether any single step or series of steps wouldhave defeated them. What we can say with confidence is that none of the measures adopted by the U.S. government before 9/11 disturbed or even delayed the progress of the al Qaeda plot.There were several unexploited opportunities.o Our government did not watchlist future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar before theyarrived in the United States, or take adequate steps to find them once they werehere.
o
Our government did not link the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, described asinterested in flight training for the purpose of using an airplane in a terrorist act, tothe heightened indications of attack.
o
Our government did not discover false statements on visa applications, or recognize passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner.
o
Our government did not expand no-fly lists to include names from terroristwatchlists, or require airline passengers to be more thoroughly screened.These examples make up part of a broader national security picture, where thegovernment failed to protect the American people. The United States government was simplynot active enough in combating the terrorist threat before 9/11.
 
2o Our diplomacy and foreign policy failed to extricate bin Laden from hisAfghan sanctuary.o Our military forces and covert action capabilities did not have the options onthe table to defeat al Qaeda or kill or capture bin Laden and his chief lieutenants.o Our intelligence and law-enforcement agencies did not manage or shareinformation, or effectively follow leads, to keep pace with a nimble enemy.o Our border, immigration, and aviation security agencies were not integratedinto the counterterrorism effort; ando Much of our response on the day of 9/11 was improvised and ineffective, evenas extraordinary individual acts of heroism saved countless lives.Our failure took place over many years and Administrations. There is no singleindividual who is responsible for this failure. Yet individuals and institutions are notabsolved of responsibility. Any person in a senior position within our government during thistime bears some element of responsibility for the government’s actions.It is not our purpose to assign blame. As we said at the outset, we look back so thatwe can look forward. Our goal is to prevent future attacks.Every expert with whom we spoke told us that an attack of even greater magnitude isnow possible--and even probable. We do not have the luxury of time. We must prepare andwe must act.The al Qaeda network and its affiliates are sophisticated, patient, disciplined, andlethal. Usama Bin Ladin built an infrastructure and organization that was able to attract, trainand use recruits against ever more ambitious targets. He rallied new zealots with eachdemonstration of al Qaeda’s capability. His message and hate-filled ideology have instructedand inspired untold recruits and imitators. He and al Qaeda:o despise America and its policies;o exploit political grievances and hopelessness within the Arab and Islamicworld;o indoctrinate the disaffected and pervert one of the world’s great religions; ando seek creative methods to kill Americans in limitless numbers, including the useof chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.Put simply, the United States is presented with one of the great security challenges inour history. We have struck blows against the terrorists since 9/11. We have prevented attackson the homeland. We believe we are safer today than we were on 9/11 – but we are not safe.
 
3Because al Qaeda represents an ideology – not a finite group of people – we shouldnot expect the danger to recede for years to come. No matter whom we kill or capture – including Usama Bin Ladin – there will still be those who plot against us. Bin Ladin hasinspired affiliates and imitators.The societies they prey on are vulnerable; the terroristideology is potent; and the means for inflicting harm are readily available. We cannot let our guard down.
Recommendations – A Global Strategy
This Commission does not have all the answers. But we have thought about
what todo
– a global strategy – and
how to do it
– a different way of organizing our government.But, based on our thorough review of the government’s performance, and our examination of the enemy, we recommend the following elements for a counterterrorism strategy.This strategy must be balanced. It must integrate all the elements of national power:diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law-enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid,homeland defense, and military strength. There is no silver bullet or decisive blow that candefeat Islamist terrorism. It will take unity of effort and sustained and effective use of everytool at our disposal:o We need to play offense: kill or capture terrorists; deny them sanctuaries; anddisrupt their ability to move money and people around the globe.o We need to ensure that key countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and SaudiArabia are stable, capable, and resolute in opposing terrorism.o We need to sustain a coalition of nations that cooperates bilaterally andmultilaterally with us in the counterterrorism mission. We need a better dialogue between the West and the Islamic world. We also highlight the needto restrict and roll back the proliferation of the world’s most dangerousweapons.o We need to put forth an agenda of opportunity – economic, educational, and political – so that young people in the Arab and Islamic world have peacefuland productive avenues for expression and hope.o We need to join the battle of ideas within the Islamic world: communicatinghope instead of despair, progress in place of persecution, life instead of death.This message should be matched by policies that encourage and support themajority of Muslims who share these goals.o At home, we need to set clear priorities for the protection of our infrastructure,and the security of our transportation. Resources should be allocated basedupon those priorities, and standards of preparedness should be set. The privatesector and local governments should play an important part of this process.o We need secure borders, with heightened and uniform standards of identification for those entering and exiting the country; and an immigration
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