consti grapilon Rules of exponents A Review of the Operations of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights ...

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION Angara v. Electoral Commission Peo v Vera YNOT VS IAC SALONGA VS CRUZ PANO JAVIER V COMELEC Supremacy PEOPLE V VERA Summary: People vs. Vera justiciability heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal cas e Political Question Accused is informed why he is proceeded against. Held: YES. The unchallenged rul e is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained. Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial Review Ynot vs. IAC justiciability Section 5 [2] (a), the decision of lower courts declaring a law unconstitutiona l is subject to review by the Supreme Court Political Question Accused is informed why he is proceeded against. Held: YES. The unchallenged rul e is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained. Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial Review Ynot vs. IAC justiciability Section 5 [2] (a), the decision of lower courts declaring a law unconstitutiona l is subject to review by the Supreme Court Political Question Accused is informed why he is proceeded against. Held: YES. The unchallenged rul e is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained. Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial Review Ynot vs. IAC

justiciability Section 5 [2] (a), the decision of lower courts declaring a law unconstitutiona l is subject to review by the Supreme Court Political Question Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial Review Salonga v Cruz Pano justiciability FACTS: A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila Political Question Facts: one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building Found in Lovely's possession b y police and military authorities were several pictures taken at the birthday pa rty of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Ange les suburb.Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where char ged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property.. Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial Review Salonga v Cruz Pano justiciability Bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the d eath of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's The next day, newspapers c ame out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salon ga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial Review Javier v Comelec Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trialfor these murders. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting theOpposition can didate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party. Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial Review Javier v Comelec Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trialfor these murders. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting theOpposition can didate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party. Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial Review Salonga v Cruz Pano justiciability Bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the d eath of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's The next day, newspapers c ame out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salon

ga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involv ing a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceed ing involves an ia Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILpeo v ferrer Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA 1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines 1.) The Congress u surped the powers of the judge Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILpeo v ferrer 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organiza tional guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILpeo v ferrer Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attaind er, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bil l of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILBAYAN v. ZAMORA A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act Facts: The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others , the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated Supremacy The Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILBAYAN v. ZAMORA ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Sectio n 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution? HELD: Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving fore ign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Ar ticle VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purp ose of determining the number of votes required Supremacy Estrada pardon barred him from running Estrada pardon barred him from running, lawyers say Former president Joseph Estrada

Two private lawyers on Tuesday asked the Sandiganbayan to clarify whether or not the presidential pardon given to former president Joseph Estrada after his conv iction for plunder in 2007 allowed him to run for elective office. Estrada, who ran but lost a presidential bid in 2010, has again filed a certifi cate of candidacy this time for mayor of Manila.

Supremacy Estrada pardon barred him from running In A Motion for Determination and Interpretation of Judgment in the Plunder Case in Relation to the Conditional Pardon, lawyers Fernando Perito and Nepthali Alipo sa said Estrada may have violated the conditions of the pardon granted by then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo when he decided to again seek elective positio n or office. Supremacy Estrada pardon barred him from running to no longer seek any elective position or office. Hence, the pardon did not resto re his right to run for any elective office. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayans imposition of the accessory penalty of perpetual a bsolute disqualification from holding public office was not expressly erased by t he pardon.

Supremacy Comelec warns vs. double-registrants Javier vs. COMELEC JAVIER VS. COMELEC G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22, 1986 FACTS: 1. The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent Arturo Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa election in May 1984; 2. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, Javier went to the COMELEC to prevent the impending pro clamation of his rival; 3. On May 18, 1984, the S

Supremacy Comelec warns vs. double-registrants Javier vs. COMELEC JAVIER VS. COMELEC G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22, 1986 FACTS: second Division of the COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers to pr oceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate

until further orders; 4. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petit ion filed by Javier with the COMELEC;

Supremacy Comelec warns vs. double-registrants Javier vs. COMELEC JAVIER VS. COMELEC G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22, 1986 FACTS: second Division of the COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers to pr oceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders; 4. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petit ion filed by Javier with the COMELEC;

Supremacy Comelec warns vs. double-registrants Javier vs. COMELEC JAVIER VS. COMELEC G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22, 1986 FACTS: ISSUE: Was the Second Division of the COMELEC, authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984 proclaiming Pacificador the winner in the election ? APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSITUTION: The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution are Art. XII-C, secs. 2 and 3 , which provide:

Supremacy Comelec warns vs. double-registrants Javier vs. COMELEC JAVIER VS. COMELEC G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22, 1986 FACTS: Section 2. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns an d qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial

and city officials.

Supremacy Randy David Vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo In Congress

Facts : On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of E dsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of nationa l emergency. Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrest and take-over o f facilities, including media, can already be implemented Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public protest would not be all owed, members of Kilusang Mayo Uno and National Federation of Labor Unions, marc hed. During the dispersal of the rallyist along EDSA, Supremacy Randy David Vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo In Congress

Facts : Police arrested without warrant petitioner Randolf S. David, a Proffesor of the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his co mpanion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. Issue: Whether the issuance of PP 1017 is Constitutional, Whether the provision of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, a s well as decrees promulgated by the President, and provision declaring national emergency under section 17, article VII of the Supremacy Randy David Vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo In Congress

Facts : Constitution is Constitutional. Whether G.O. No. 5 is Constitutional Whether th e dispersal and warrantless arrest, the warrantless search are Constitutional. Held: PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitute a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress Lawless violence. The proclamation is sustain ed by section 18, article VII of the constitution. However, PP 1017s extraneous p rovisions giving the President express or implied power to issue decrees to dire ct AFP to Supremacy Randy David Vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo In Congress

Facts : enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as dec rees promulgated by the President; and to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under section 17, article XII of the constitution, the Presiden t, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public util ity and private business affected with public interest. Supremacy

bAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

Facts : Bayan members assembled at Plaza Ferguson in Ermita, Manila several meters away from the US embassy Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United St ates Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Fi lipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005 Supremacy bAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

Facts : Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Phi lippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United St ates, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceed ings. Supremacy bAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

iSSUES:: Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the lippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, ates, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith ings. Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody Supremacy bAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

Republic of the Phi 1998, the United St pending the proceed of defendant L/CPL

The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United Sta tes Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal Unite d States law Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the U nited States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement th ese policymaking agreements are merely Supremacy bAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, wi thin sixty days from ratification.

Supremacy bAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, wi thin sixty days from ratification. The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed an d duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the Unite d States Senate Supremacy DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC

Is there a law which would provide for the mechanism for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution by peoples initiative? While Congress had enacted RA 6735 purportedly to provide the mechanisms for the peoples exercise the power to amend the Constitution by peoples initiative, t he Supreme Court in MIRIAM Supremacy DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 & J une 10, 1997, the Supreme Court held that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or w anting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulat ions as may be necessary to carry the purposes of this act. Supremacy LIM V EXEC SECRETARY

FACTS : Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arr iving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers purs uant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. Supremacy LIM V EXEC SECRETARY

On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying t hat respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, a nd that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent w rit of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basil an and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in acc ordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case of a ar med attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of the m. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan con stitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance w ith MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory. ISSUE : Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA. RULING : Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an imper manent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sol e encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the U S personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this a greement, and in particular, from any political activity.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003 FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Case Digest FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G.R. NO. 160261 NOV. 10, 2003 Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives ad opted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, supersedin g the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congres sabi... insufficient in substance second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impe achment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Member ISSUE: Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings s hall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of on e year." HELD: While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Re presentatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides f or several limitations Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003 FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Case Digest

These limitations include the manner of filing , required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and th e same official. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exerci se of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of che cks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS Petitioner: Manila Prince Hotel Respondent: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Facts: - The shares (31% to 50%) of Manila Hotel Corporation were sold by GSIS through public bidding. - There were two Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS bidders Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (Filipino firm) and Renong Berhad (Malay sian firm) - Renong Berhad bade higher than - Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the highest bidder, MPHC sent a ma nagers check amounting to the same bid by RB. - GSIS refused to Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS accept offer. - Petitioner prayed for writ of mandamus and prohibition. Lower court issued a r estraining order preventing GSIS and Renong Berhad from consummating the sale. - Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the highest bidder, MPHC sent a ma nagers check amounting to the same bid by RB. - GSIS refused to Supremacy LAMIBINO ET AL V COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group)commenced gathering signatures for an initiati ve petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COME LEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 673 5. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals ful filling what - Invoked by petitioners: Section 10 of Article XII. The Congress shall, upon re commendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dic tates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such h igher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. Issue: Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Arti cle 11 of the 1987 Constitution Held: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administra tion of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental an d paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system

of government, assigns to the different Held: (CONT) departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed pr inciples on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other wo rds is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in acco rdance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, Held: (CONT) Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the const itution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as req uiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the pow er to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present con troversy subject of the instant petitions - whether the filing of the second imp eachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House o f Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, an d whether the resolution thereof is a political question - has resulted in a pol itical crisis. Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato Issue: whether the petitioner has the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this case Held: Yes. Kilosbayans status as a peoples organization give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that the State shall respect the role of independent peoples organizations to enable the people to pur sue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means, that their right to effective and reasonable participation at all leve ls of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abr idged. Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of the Court, even in c ases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and con troversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-ma king in the courts from decision-making Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases i nvolving paramount public interest. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens an d legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing. Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato

Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds. or where a tax measure is ass ailed as unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to question the validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity o f such laws. Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of transcendental importance which must be settle d early. Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of a ny official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives qua l egislators. Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayers suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, to wit: While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of spe cific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or

Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC o r that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neith er do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public fund s through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Besid es, the institution of a taxpayers suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. The Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayers suit should be entertained. Petitioners suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpay ers suits. or

Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato Thus, petitioners right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor a s concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific inj ury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are mem bers of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.

TECSON V COMELEC 7. To what citizenship principle does the Philippines adhere to? Explain, and give illustrative case.

Held: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguin is. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents r egardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Supremacy LAMIBINO ET AL V COMELEC

was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 cons titution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by add ing Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition Supremacy LAMBINO ET AL V COMELEC

due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Sant iago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative p etitions. Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with S ection 2, Article XVII Supremacy LAMIBINO ET AL V COMELEC

of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiativ e; (2) Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to im plement the initiative clause on proposals to Supremacy LAMIBINO ET AL V COMELEC

amend the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition. Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requ irements for conducting a peoples initiative. T

Supremacy LAMIBINO ET AL V COMELEC

he Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing t he Lambino petition. 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the C onstitution on Direct Proposal by the People Supremacy LAMIBINO ET AL V COMELEC

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be info rmed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is dec eptive and misleading which renders the initiative void. Supremacy LAMIBINO ET AL V COMELEC

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowi ng Revision through Initiatives The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and

revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the co nstitution may Supremacy LAMIBINO ET AL V COMELEC

propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision. 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change t

Supremacy OPOSA V FACTORAN

Oposa vs. Factoran Fact: a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippin e rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life su pport systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." Supremacy oposa v factoran

The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselv es and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all Supremacy oposa v factoran

before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their gene ration as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: 1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; 2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental Supremacy oposa v factoran

consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable dem onstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action? HELD: YES Petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest t o all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to Supremacy oposa v factoran

refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious ma nagement of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the governmen t through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the cor relative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. T he right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative dut y. Supremacy MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS Petitioner: Manila Prince Hotel Respondent: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Manila Hotel Corporation , Committee on Privatization and Office of the Government Corporate Counsel Facts: - The shares (31% to 50%) of Manila Hotel Corporation were sold by GSIS through public bidding. Supremacy MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

- There were two bidders Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (Filipino firm) and Ren ong Berhad (Malaysian firm) - Renong Berhad bade higher than Manila Prince Hotel Supremacy MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

Corporation. - Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the highest bidder, MPHC sent a ma nagers check amounting to the same bid by RB. - GSIS refused to accept offer. - Petitioner prayed for writ of mandamus and prohibition. Lower court issued a r estraining order preventing GSIS and Renong Berhad from consummating the sale. - Invoked by petitioners: Section 10 of Article XII. T Supremacy MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

he Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to co rporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned b y such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain ar eas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the fo rmation and operation of enterprises whose capital Supremacy MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

is wholly owned by Filipinos. (Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which S ec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.) - The answer of the respondents are the following: 1. Section 10 of Article 12 is not self-executing. For the said provision to ope rate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done. 2. Granting the provision is self-executing, the Manila Hotel Corporation is not part of national patrimony. The mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State. 3. The Constitutional provision cannot be invoked because what is sold is only 5 1% of the total shares of the corporation, not the building or the land where it is built. 4. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shar es and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a ma tching bid had not yet taken place. 5. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad c ould still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving ris e to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken pl ace. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shar es and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a ma tching bid had not yet taken place. 5. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad c ould still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving ris e to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken pl ace. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995. FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherei n PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per termina annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the sam e as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitu tion. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is n o bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in t he Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to fur ther their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing? HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of t he petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in intere st because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE can not also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparti es before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not . PACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools and col leges as well as teachers parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B. They deprive par ents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficienc y; and PACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation o f legislative # It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioners demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrongnor allege anyfrom the enforc ement PACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 2706 An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is n

ot sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he m ust show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the publi c. PACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION Bona fide suit.Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and cont roversies. a hypothetical threat being insufficient In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education have transcended the governmental power of supervision and regulat ion, the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the sa id Department. However they failed to PACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious, or pain nuisance; and it is one of our decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequate ly argued, the court will not consider it. (Santiago v Far Eastern We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in th e hands of the Secretary of Education complete control of the various activities of private schools, and why the statute should be struck down as unconstitution al. KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA Facts: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, w ith a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease execut ed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system, a lso known as lotto. Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock do mestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national r enewal. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto T aada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippine s. Issue: whether petitioners have legal standing to bring the suit Held: Yes. A partys standing before the Court is a procedural technical ity which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the im portance of the issues raised. KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA This technicality may be brushed aside if the transcendental importance to the p

ublic of the case demands that it be settled promptly and definitely, brushing a side, if the Court must, technicalities of procedure. KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA This technicality may be brushed aside if the transcendental importance to the p ublic of the case demands that it be settled promptly and definitely, brushing a side, if the Court must, technicalities of procedure. Ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations are allowed to initiate and prosecute actions bef ore the Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decis ions, KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA The instant petition is of transcendental importance to the publ ic. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues imme asurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of th e petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA DUE PROCESS AND DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967) Facts: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hote l del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila. They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board t o regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. T hey also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967) and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.0 0 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information. There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, mote ls and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They cl aimed this to be violative of due process Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.0 0 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information. There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, mote ls and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They cl aimed this to be violative of due process Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967) Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause? Held: No. Judgment reversed. Ratio: "The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a cl ear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967) Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court s ufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support th at party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers Sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

TANADA V TUVERA II. Legal Standing Legal Standing, or locus standi, is the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.[21] It satisfies an important requirement before a question involving the constitutionality or legality of a law or other UP study government act may be heard and decided by a court: that it must be raised by t he proper party.[22] Stated otherwise, a court will exercise its power of judici al reviewwhich is the power of courts to determine the constitutionality or legal ity of contested executive and legislative acts[23] only if the case is brought be fore it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or leg al question.[24] The traditional rule is that only real parties in interest or those with standing , as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. TANADA V TUVERA Tanada v Tuvera Real parties in interest are the proper parties in cases that do not also invok e the power of judicial review. In cases that invoke the power of judicial revie w, the proper parties are those with standing. In Morato, even though the power of judicial review was invoked, Court ruled that because no constitutional question was actually involved, the i ssue was not whether petitioners had legal standing but whether they were the re al parties in interest. Tanada v Tuvera(u On this premise the Court declared that the petitioners were not the proper par ties because [i]n actions for the annulment of contractsthe real parties are those

who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respec t to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would posit ively result to them from the contractor who claim a right to take part in a publ ic bidding but have been illegally excluded from it.[27] This ruling in Morato, however, is sandwiched between prior and subsequent Supreme Court decisions which directly c ontradict it.[28] In fact, the argument that actions for annulment of government contracts may be instituted only by those bound by it was rejected as early as 1972 in City Council of Cebu City v. Cuizon,[29]in which legal standing was gran ted to city councilors who assailed a Tanada v Tuvera government contract even though no constitutional question was involved. Fairly recently in 2005, Cuizon was cited in Jumamil v. Caf,[30]also a case where no con stitutional question was involved, in ruling that [a] taxpayer need not be a part y to the contract to challenge its validity. Also, citizens standing (which was asserted in Morato) is granted in public suits because in those cases the people are regarded as the real party in interest.[32] Thus, even if no constitutional question is involved, any person with legal sta ndingalthough not Tanada v Tuvera a real party in interestmay invoke the power of judicial review. Tanada v Tuvera LAMBINO VS. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006] Monday, January 19, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiat ive petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed apetition with the COME LEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 673 5. Lambino group alleged that thepetition had the support of 6M individuals fulf illing what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes t he 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the presentbicameral- pr esidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the p etition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked t he Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initi ative petitions. Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petitioncomplies with Se ction 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution thro ugh a peoples initiative; (2)Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiagodeclaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Cons titution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition. Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requ irements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the C onstitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be info rmed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is dec

eptive and misleading which renders the initiative void. 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowi ng Revision through Initiatives

The framers of revision, it nstitution may lative and the .

the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the co propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legis executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the p resent petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first compl y with the constitution before complying with RA 6735 BACKGROUND Raul Lambino of Sigaw ng Bayan and Erico Aumentado of the Union of Local Authori ties of the Philippines (ULAP) filed a petition for people's initiative before t he Commission on Elections on August 25, 2006, after months of gathering signatu res all over the country. Lambino claimed that the petition is backed by 6.3 mil lion registered voters. The COMELEC denied the petition, reasoning that a lack of an enabling law keeps them from entertaining such petitions. It invoked a 1997 Supreme Court ruling (S antiago vs. COMELEC), where the Supreme Court declared RA 6735 inadequate to imp lement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. COMELEC's ruling prompted Lambino and Aumentado to bring their case before the S upreme Court. However, the Supreme Court upheld COMELEC's ruling on the petition for people's initiative. The decision came out on October 25, 2006, with a close 8-7 vote. SUMMARY OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a peoples initiative. The Constitution requires that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the p eople through initiative upon a petition." Lambino's group failed to include the full text of the proposed changes in the s ignature sheets-- a fatal omission, according to the Supreme Court ruling, becau se it means a majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of t he Constitution and not to its revision. Only Congress or a constitutional conve ntion may propose revisions to the Constitution. A peoples initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. "A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a d eviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself." -- Supr eme Court The Supreme Court sees no need to revisit an earlier ruling since the present ca se (Lambino vs. COMELEC) can be resolved on some other grounds. In a 1997 ruling on Santiago vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court ruled that RA 6735 ( the law regulating the people's right of initiative) was inadequate to cover the system of initiative on constitutional amendments. In the present case, the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requireme nts of the Constitution on conducting a people's initiative. That alone warrants the petition's dismissal. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the its outcome of the pr

esent petition. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Lambino G roup's petition for people's initiative. COMELEC merely followed the Supreme Court's earlier ruling on Santiago vs. COMEL EC LAMBINO VS. COMELEC (PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE) Lambino, et al. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, 25 October 2006) Digest On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (Lambino Group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the1987 Con stitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the Commis sion on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiati ve petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary f orm of government. The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of 6,327,952 i ndividuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legisla tive district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters; and (b) COMEL EC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individual s. The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the Su preme Courts ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections. The Lambino Group elev ated the matter to the Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition. 1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the C onstitution on direct proposal by the people Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that allo ws a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provi sion does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution cl early show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurispr udence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first see t he full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people mu st sign on a petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or rep resentative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a pet ition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amend ments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such comp lete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be eit her written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full te xt of the proposed amendments before not after signing. Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nat ure and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and mis leading which renders the initiative void. In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word , phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Ne ither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is at tached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people appr ove a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary sys tem of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omi

ssion is fatal. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to t he people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, a nd can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. Thats why the Constitution requ ires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x x in a petiti on meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations fundamenta l law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, an d unelected individuals. 2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowi ng revision through initiatives Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitut ion. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Membe rs. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is th rough a peoples initiative. Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to an y amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Arti cle XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to amendments to this Constit ution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Cons titutional Commission. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies on ly to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Con gress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions t o the Constitution. Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Con stitution? Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bic ameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolitio n of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, i s beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic princip le in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or t he system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters th e substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substanti al provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers t o a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle i nvolved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, whil e amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constituti on without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be c onsidered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the vo ting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly , a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or arti cles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or t he system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a rev ision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a re vision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological bas is of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case -by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affect s the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balanc es, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisio

ns of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suit ed to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several pro visions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblie s or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, const itutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deli berative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not re visions. In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-par t test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test as ks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change di rectly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteratio n of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the number of provisi ons affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed chang e in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount t o a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a p roper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes c hanges that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of chec k and balances. Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group pro posed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article VI I on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitutio n. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of gov ernment, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicamera l legislature. A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as wh en the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution a re reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliament ary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alon e of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the sepa ration of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-b alances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is o of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberati ve body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the chan ges. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are call ed amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occu ion, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contra dict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to ame nd the Constitution. There is, therefore, no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential ter ms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. A n affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present

petition. It settled that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds. Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here becaus e the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, whi ch provision must first be complied with even before complying with RA 6735. Wor se, the petition violates the following provisions of RA 6735: a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition as signatories . The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition or the amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the petition and amended petition. b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more than one subject sha ll be submitted to the electorate. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory P rovisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or rev isions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift i n the form of government

ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS APOLONIO EXEVEA ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR, Represented by his H eirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners, vs. Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL Me mbers of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Pre sidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents. ROMERO, J.: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Refo rm Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismiss ed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this pet ition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order. The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Ca shier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989, 1 charged Lu miqued with malversation through falsification of official documents. From May t o September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsificati on by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt wo rth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 f or a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claime d and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqu ed seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it imposs ible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday. In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, 2 private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulatio ns, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and O ctober, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000 .00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government "by deliberately concealing h is unliquidated cash advances through the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on 'Cash advances of other officials' under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules." The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, 3 charged Lumiqued with o ppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous comp

laints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause. ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS APOLONIO EXEVEA The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to in vestigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State Pr osecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecu tor Felix Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation wi thin thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and recom mendation within fifteen days from its conclusion. The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. L umiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his coun ter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondent's complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension. In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, 4 Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, th at the cases were filed against him to extort money from innocent public servant s like him, and were initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certai n Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He claimed that th e apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondent's executio n of an affidavit of desistance. 5 Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted, however, that such consumption was warranted as it was the aggreg ate consumption of the five service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR. He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the course of his tra vels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City, and Lag una, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to him by drivers for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of audi tors and accountants to determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his si gnature on the receipts only to signify that the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that official transactions of the DAR-CAR cou ld be carried out. Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way t o Ifugao when their service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight , they sought the help of the owner of a vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated J une 25, 1990. 6 With respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in t he amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal error or accountability. To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and regulat ions in incurring unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiq ued presented a certification 7 of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash advances on record as of December 31, 198 9. In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued cont ended that private respondent was not terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her duties due to her prolonged absences. While admitting that priv ate respondent filed the required applications for leave of absence, Lumiqued cl aimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval of her applicati on for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her second application for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head off ice or upon her return to work. He also asserted that no medical certificate sup

ported her application ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS APOLONIO EXEVEA for leave of absence. In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash accounta bilities from June 22 to November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although p rivate respondent immediately returned the amount on January 18, 1990, the day f ollowing the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued asserted that she shou ld be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs that would not require handl ing of cash and money matters. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for i ts resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted fo r resolution. On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, 8 al leging that he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to t he Office of the State Prosecutor apparently because the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 19 92, 9 State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz: The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sa cred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date was up on the request of respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that respon dent advised the Investigating committee of his confinement and inability to att end despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel. The records likewi se do not show that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of respondent's condition on any reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that a s early as June 23, 1992, respondent was already being assisted by counsel. Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficie ncy, completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together with the do cumentary evidence annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the c ase based on the pleadings submitted is already possible. Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as Nove mber 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed much longer. Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992, 10finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges again st him. It made the following findings: After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, thi s committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establ ish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the re imbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsifi ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS APOLONIO EXEVEA ed is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the duplicate rec eipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different gasol ine stations where the respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes "G-1" to "G-15" sh ow that the actual average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the resp ondent which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00 . Here, the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming reim bursements of more than 10 times the value of what he actually spends. While onl y 15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motiv e, the pattern and the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the gover nment has, nevertheless, been established. That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the responden t. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment

of an average consumption of 108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also admitted having si gned the receipts. Respondent's act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also a criminal offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents. This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash a dvances in the year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditin g rules. His cash advances totaling to about P116,000.00 were properly documente d. The requests for obligation of allotments and the vouchers covering the amoun ts were all signed by him. The mere certification issued by the Administrative O fficer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences (sic). On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondent's a ct in relieving the complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on Decemb er 1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two w eeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). The recommendation o f Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondent's order relieving the complainant was issued. Hi s act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint she file d constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of the respondent who is a head of office. The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respo ndent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only to have the cases against him dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose. Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or rem oval from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal

ATENEO V COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, die d of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol M edical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injurie s inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent stud ents to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from recei pt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they fai led to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receivi ng the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the La w School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a D isciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board fou nd respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School R ules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty o f dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Admi nistration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all resp ondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioner s from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary r estraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the c

harges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requeste d to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Spec ial Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of d ue process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered ATENEO V COURT OF APPEALS Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students. Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due proce ss. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respo ndent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The natur e and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notice s. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the ins tant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for re consideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and th e Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctr ine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been affo rded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University. Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accu sation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the a ssistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or offic ial designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case GOLDBERG V KELLY People on welfare speaking through lawyers claimed their right to be heard. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). Although the Goldberg decisions place in history has shifted dramatically o ver the past forty three years, it holdings still ring true. Justice Brennans de sire to see those men and women suffering in poverty granted, at the very least, the decency of community and fellowship is an embrace of our potential as a soc iety. His words, using the legal theories of process and notice as a vehicle, f or at least one shining moment remain rightly focused on the humanity and decenc y society rightfully owes the individual who are, for legitimate reasons, unable to propel themselves forward on their own. And aside from the economic benefit , Brennans decision in Goldberg v. Kelly solidified what poverty lawyers had spen t long fought for: the ability of poor people simply to be heard. GOLDBERG V KELLY Social Changes Prior to Goldberg

Social welfare programs had long been the bastion of the church and privat e charity. Hanson, Ph.D., John E., The Federal-State Public Welfare Programs 19 35-1995, The Social Welfare History Project (last accessed February 2, 2013) (av ailable at http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/programs/federal-state-public-wel fare-programs/). While some state and local governments ran modified benefit pr ograms to certain sects of people, wholesale welfare programs were not embraced by the federal government until the need for such programs became overwhelming. Id. During the Great Depression, as unemployment rates reached 25 percent and hundreds of thousands of Americans found themselves homeless, these private char ities could no longer handle the need. Incorporated in the New Deal employment programs, President Roosevelt in 1935 created a federal program of benefits for impoverished children and widowed women. Id. The program grew, and eventually became Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), the nations first robust federal welfare program. Michael Katz, In the Shadow Of the Poorhouse: A Social History Of Welf are In America, New York: Basic Books (1998). The ADC operated by adding federal aid to an impoverished single mothers' pension programs, others. However, the program was not funded through the feder al treasury; instead, federally administered ADC aid was contingent on state con tributions.

UP V HON. LIGOT-TELAN Constitutional Law II: Dea-n Pangalangan Connection of privilege to right. Driver's license: While originally deemed to be a privilege, it is connected to protected rights of property (when it becomes essential to the livelihood) and l iberty (mobility) (Bell v Burson) Privilege turns into right when codified to a rule or a rule-bound exercise. (UP v Hon. Ligot-Telan UP V HON. LIGOT-TELAN Constitutional Law II: Dea-n Pangalangan U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Disciplin e of the University, which according to her, does not authorize the withdrawal o f a degree as a penalty for erring students; and that only the college committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose repor t must be signed by a majority of its members. We find petitioners contention to be meritorious. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the p erformance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and e njoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no ot her plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Univers ity of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, this Court ruled that th e writ was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic free dom. In that case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty and ordered susp ended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition for mandamus and ob tained from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from car rying out the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court t o dismiss the students petition, this Court said: [T]he lower court gravely abuse d its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower courts finding that the impl ementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal would work injusti ce to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and conseque ntly, in getting a decent and good paying job. Sadly, such a ruling considers onl y the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it h as completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provide

s more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction up on an erring student of an institution of higher learning. From the foregoing ar guments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from ass uming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petit ioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. In this case, the t rial court dismissed private respondents petition precisely on grounds of academi c freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. It said: It is worthy to note that during the proceedings ta ken by the College Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioners Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioners subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing. As the f oregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plag iarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed , if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private resp ondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many commit tee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral disserta tion on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. Indeed, in admini strative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to ex plain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the actio n or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. In this case , private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and affo rded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanati on, which she forwarded on September 25, 1993. Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her ca se. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position. It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitl ed to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administra tive context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the cou rts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendan ce of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Re gents. Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, we held: Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine th e written statements which became the basis of petitioners February 14, 1991 orde r, they were denied procedural due process. UP V HON. LIGOT-TELAN Constitutional Law II: Dea-n Pangalangan U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Disciplin e of the University, which according to her, does not authorize the withdrawal o f a degree as a penalty for erring students; and that only the college committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose repor t must be signed by a majority of its members. We find petitioners contention to be meritorious. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the p erformance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and e njoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no ot her plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Univers ity of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, this Court ruled that th e writ was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic free dom. In that case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty and ordered susp

ended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition for mandamus and ob tained UP V HON. LIGOT-TELAN Constitutional Law II: Dea-n Pangalangan from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying o ut the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court t o dismiss the students petition, this Court said: [T]he lower court gravely abuse d its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower courts finding that the impl ementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal would work injusti ce to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and conseque ntly, in getting a decent and good paying job. Sadly, such a ruling considers onl y the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it h as completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provide s more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction up on an erring student of an institution of higher learning. From the foregoing ar guments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from ass uming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal.

UP V HON. LIGOT-TELAN Constitutional Law II: Dea-n Pangalangan Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain rig ht on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an of ficial or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or ju dgment. In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents petition prec isely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding t hat private respondent was denied due process. It said: It is worthy to note tha t during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its recomm endation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioners Ph.D. degree , petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioners subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing. As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, howev er, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private re spondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was h eard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proc eedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual

UP V HON. LIGOT-TELAN Constitutional Law II: Dea-n Pangalangan investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respon dent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis o f which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. Indeed, in administrative proceeding s, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complai ned of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position canno t tenably claim to have been denied due process. In this case, private responden t was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwa rded on September 25, 1993. Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, sh e sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position. It is no t tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audie nce before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does n

ot require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is n UP V HON. LIGOT-TELAN Constitutional Law II: Dea-n Pangalangan ioteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose ca ses are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents. Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafarall a committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, we held: Respondent students may not use the argument that since th ey were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements w hich became the basis of petitioners February 14, 1991 order, they were denied pr ocedural due process.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001 Petitioner: Joseph Ejercito Estrada Respondents: Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the Philippines Ponente: J. Bellosillo FACTS: Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or seri es of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Pe titioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a v iolation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be infor med of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohi bitum. HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of c riminal intent. Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plun der is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or inherently w rong, and are committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally by the offender, alle ging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that co nstruction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordi nance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal may or for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded wit

h the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants wer e charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this a ppeal. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasona ble and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power , and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency i PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO s to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle an d unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in cha racter. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants ju st compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court identified a constitutionally protected ri ght to privacy, which the court reasoned prohibited states from denying birth co ntrol to married couples In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Supreme Court ruled that a state's ban on the use of contraceptives violated the right to marital privacy. The case conce rned a Connecticut law that criminalized the encouragement or use of birth contr ol. The 1879 law provided that "any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purposes of preventing conception shall be fined not less than forty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days." The law further prov ided that "any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands an other to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the pri nciple offender." Estelle Griswold, the executive director of Planned Parenthood League of Connect icut, and Dr. C. Lee Buxton, doctor and professor at Yale Medical School, were a rrested and found guilty as accessories to providing illegal contraception. They were fined $100 each. Griswold and Buxton appealed to the Supreme Court of Erro rs of Connecticut, claiming that the law violated the U.S. Constitution. The Con necticut court upheld the conviction, and Griswold and Buxton appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court, which reviewed the case in 1965. The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision written by Justice William O. Douglas, rule d that the law violated the "right to marital privacy" and could not be enforced against married people. Justice Douglas contended that the Bill of Right's spec ific guarantees have "penumbras," created by "emanations from these guarantees t hat help give them life and opinion." In other words, the "spirit" of the First

Amendment (free speech), Third Amendment (prohibition on the forced quartering o f troops), Fourth Amendment (freedom from searches and seizures), Fifth Amendmen t (freedom from self-incrimination), and Ninth Amendment (other rights), as appl ied against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, creates a general "right to privacy" that cannot be unduly infringed.

People vs Nazario They are suing as members of the Bar pursuant to their oath to uphold the Fundam ental Law of the land, and as citizens suing on an issue oftranscendental import ance, that of upholding, inter alia, the Constitutional right to freedom of spee ch, of expression, and of the press. Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his munic ipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided un der Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manil a and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fis heries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, a nd 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition. Issues: 1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for bein g ambiguous and uncertain 2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto Held: 1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fi shpond thus he comes with the term Manager. He was the one who spent money in deve loping and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national governme nt, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishp ond started operating in 1964. 2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it cant be tha t the amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, t he act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant. People vs Nazario They are suing as members of the Bar pursuant to their oath to uphold the Fundam ental Law of the land, and as citizens suing on an issue oftranscendental import ance, that of upholding, inter alia, the Constitutional right to freedom of spee ch, of expression, and of the press. Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his munic ipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided un der Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manil a and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fis heries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, a nd 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for bein g ambiguous and uncertain 2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto Held: 1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fi shpond thus he comes with the term Manager. He was the one who spent money in deve loping and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national governme nt, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishp ond started operating in 1964. 2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it cant be tha t the amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, t he act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant. AGUSTIN V EDU Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195 Facts: Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Let ter of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commission er Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this. The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device insta lled on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars. The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acq uisition cost. The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or hi ghway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory. Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and due process/ 2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set. Hence the petition. The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to th e unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts. The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road si gns as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power. Issue: Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power? Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed. Ratio: Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is no thing more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty. Th AGUSTIN V EDU e case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare. Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the heal th, morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people. J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also

intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures ca lculated to insure communal peace. There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity. Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the abs ence of factual record in over throwing the statute. Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundati on in overthrowing the statute. Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims th at the statute was oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not expe nsive. SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned. Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because its installed w hen parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drive rs to see clearly. There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate a ny constitutional provision. LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement from any source. The objective is public safety. The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvla ration of principles in the Constitution. On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines. Olmstead v. United States Facts. Various individuals were convicted of liquor related crimes, including co nspiracy. The operation grossed a substantial amount of money. The leading consp irator and the general manager of the business was one of the Petitioners, Olmst ead (the Petitioner). The main office of the business was in Seattle and there wer e three telephones in the office, each on a different line. There were also tele phones in an office the Petitioner had in his own home, at the home of his assoc iates and various other places in Seattle. A lot of communication occurred betwe en Seattle and Vancouver, British Columbia. The information which led to the discovery of the conspiracy and its nature and e xtent was largely obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones of the con spirators by four federal prohibition officers. Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the residences of four of the [suspects] and t hose leading from the chief office. The insertions were made without trespass up on any property of the defendants. They were made in the basement of the large o ffice building. The taps from house lines were made in the streets near the hous es. Various conversations were taped and testified to by government witnesses. Olmstead v. United States

Issue. [W]hether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between t he defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a vi olation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments[?] Synopsis of Rule of Law. A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government officials, would m ake society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known heret ofore. In the absence of controlling legislation by Congress, those who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well deem it wise that the

exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases where rights under the Consti tution would be violated by admitting it. ROE V WADE Roe v. Wade has to be considered as one of the most important cases in the Unite d States history. To give you a little background of the topic, it began with th e desire of a simple woman from Dallas, Texas to go with the easy way and having an abortion, but it turns out that this little choice will create a big controv ersial and political dispute that transformed into a big moral issue of what is the right thing to do, if the abortion should be legal or not. Are we defending womens privacy and liberty to choose about their sexual lives? Are we going again st God and giving us ourselves the power to choose who shall live and who shall not by making legal to murder babies? And, for making the problem even bigger, t here was a big gap in the United States law needed to be fill, thats one of the r easons that this lawsuit took place at final instance in the United States Supre me Court the be review by the justices and help the society to finally resolve t his transcendental dispute. Going deeper in the discussion, first we need to analyze what America was thinki ng in those times about abortion so we can have an idea of how the United States was before and after this case. We have to consider that American society has e volved and changed in a drastically way, they have changed from having legal seg regation (schools, restaurants, universities, etc. only for African Americans) t o nowadays being a country with no barriers against other groups, the diversity of races, religions, ethnics, etc is so big in this country, we have to say this was a huge step for the American society. The first laws that talked about abortion began to appear in the 1800s, and the limit to have an abortion was until the fourth month of pregnancy, this started with Connecticut in 1821 passing a law that prohibited PEO V FAJARDO Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that co nstruction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordi nance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal may or for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded wit h the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants wer e charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this a ppeal. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasona ble and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power , and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighb orhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. PEO V FAJARDO

F As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle an d unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in cha racter. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants ju st compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

Transcendental importance to the public - Tatad v. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436 - Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 - Kilosbayan v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 - Kilosbayan v. Morato (Recon.), GR 118910, Nov. 16, 1995 OPLE V TORRES Republic Act 10173 (Data Privacy Act) on the Can the Government now validly pursue of the n Reference System, notwithstanding previous er Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, 23 July 1998, blic Act 10173 (Data Privacy Act of 2012)? case of Ople vs Torres National Computerized Identificatio constitutional challenges to it und En Banc, Puno [J], in light of Repu

In other words, will Republic Act 10173 (Data Privacy Act) provide sufficient me chanism to the introduction of national ID system in the Philippines without the constitutional issues that has arisen in the case of Ople vs Torres? No, the National ID system introduce under Administrative Order 308 (A.O. 308) i s vast and vague in nature on which the personal information will be gathered fr om the public. The said administrative order does not provide sufficient details in order to secure and determine the reasonableness of collecting personal info rmation. Does R.A. 10173 provide sufficient mechanism? No, because the guideline s, rules, and rights under the said law does not help cure the defect in the Nat ional ID System. First of all, the 1987 Philippine Constitution clearly states the right of priva cy under Sec. 3 paragraph 1. OPLE V TORRES

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolab le except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order require s otherwise, as prescribed by law. The constitution provides the requirement of public safety or order, and the Nat ional ID System in Administrative Order 308 has not provided for such requiremen t because the public doesnt require it. Moreover, there are other provisions whic h also protects the right of privacy under, Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws . Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers , and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and

for any purpose shall be inviolable Filipinos value life and liberty the same as property, this property i OPLE V TORRES

ncludes tangible or non-tangible properties and every kind of property that is v aluable. Data or information are one of those properties, they may be business i nformation or personal information but they provide important matters which cann ot be open to the public with the authorization of the company or the consent of the person. Any breach or violation of such is against the constitutional guara ntee of Right to Privacy. The Internet is a powerful tool for data and informati on collection. Information from the public and private sector can be found in th e Internet and even personal information can also be found in the Internet. Gove rnment nowadays can transact through the Internet. For example, the Department o f Foreign Affairs can provide passport services to the Internet, and citizens sh ould provide personal information in order to give them the privilege to be give n an appointment for their passport needs. These personal information are given through the Internet to the Department of Foreign Affairs, these are vital infor mation which are required for the application or renewal of Philippine Passport. This does not violate Right of Privacy because the public safety requires that only to those people who had qualifications can be given passports and this info rmation is required for the reason that passport is an information document whic h provides proof of entering and leaving a country. However, what if not only one department requires such information but also the whole government has required personal information to be given to them in exchan ge of government services? For the reason of safety and security purposes, which will give the government a better leverage against criminal minds. Well, it see ms that it will constitute a totalitarian government and the government has ever y information and data of every citizens of the country. With the influx of personal information already accessible to the Internet, and with the growing advancement of technology, every individual including me wants to be protected with the data uploaded and collected by the Internet, banks, gov ernment entities, insurance, and other offices which are into data collecting. A s netizens of the Philippines, no one wants to be an open book to the public. We dont want to be watched by big brother or become a trend in the Internet only be cause of data information leakage or breach. Like the movie Enemy of the State whe rein the government can scrutinize and manipulate our daily lives by reason of t echnology and data information, we dont want that to happen. People value their p rivacy in information, and the right of privacy is more paramount than the neces sity of the National ID System. Any single personal information is vital to ever y person. Any breach of such can cause problem and even ruining of life. So ther e must be compelling interests by the government for the national ID system to b e authorized. The Data Privacy Act is not sufficient for the introduction of the A.O. 308, it lacks the mechanism to protect the Right of Privacy under the cons titution, since A.O. 308 will go against the Data Privacy Act in terms of the gu aranteed security of information, transparency, requirements, and authorities in handling those information. Second, the recently passed law Republic Act 10173 (R.A. 10173) or also known as Data Privacy Act of 2012 does not allow the gathering of personal information w ithout the required reasonableness and necessity of such information. The law pr ovides that the information gathered is for the purpose to which it seeks. Accor ding to Sec. 11 of the said law, Section 11. General Data Privacy Principles. The processing of personal informat ion shall be allowed, subject to compliance with the requirements of this Act an

d other laws allowing disclosure of information to the public and adherence to t he principles of transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality. Personal information must, be: (a) Collected for specified and legitimate purposes determined and declared befo re, or as soon as reasonably practicable after collection, and later processed i n a way compatible with such declared, specified and legitimate purposes only; (b) Processed fairly and lawfully; (c) Accurate, relevant and, where necessary for purposes for which it is to be u sed the processing of personal information, kept up to date; inaccurate or incom plete data must be rectified, supplemented, destroyed or their further processin g restricted; (d) Adequate and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are co llected and processed; (e) Retained only for as long as necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes f or which the data was obtained or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims, or for legitimate business purposes, or as provided by law; and (f) Kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer t han is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected and processe d: Provided, That personal information collected for other purposes may lie proc essed for historical, statistical or scientific purposes, and in cases laid down in law may be stored for longer periods: Provided, further, That adequate safeg uards are guaranteed by said laws authorizing their processing. The personal information controller must ensure implementation of personal infor mation processing principles set out herein. Also, under Section 12 of the said law, there are certain criteria that are requ ired of the lawful processing of personal information, SEC. 12. Criteria for Lawful Processing of Personal Information. The processing of personal information shall be permitted only if not otherwise prohibited by l aw, and when at least one of the following conditions exists: (a) The data subject has given his or her consent; (b) The processing of personal information is necessary and is related to the fu lfillment of a contract with the data subject or in order to take steps at the r equest of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the personal information controller is subject; (d) The processing is necessary to protect vitally important interests of the da ta subject, including life and health; (e) The processing is necessary in order to respond to national emergency, to co mply with the requirements of public order and safety, or to fulfill functions o f public authority which necessarily includes the processing of personal data fo r the fulfillment of its mandate; or (f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pur sued by the personal information controller or by a third party or parties to wh om the data is disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by fundamen tal rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under the P hilippine Constitution.

Hence, without adhering to the principles enumerated and without following the g uidelines of processing personal information, there can be no gathering of such information. The National ID system under said A.O. 308 has no definite legitima te purpose of collecting the information and the usage of the said information d oes not state the accuracy, relevancy and necessity for which purpose it will be use. Furthermore, the security to prevent the breach and leakage to the public of the information was absent in A.O. 308 because if given access to the public it will cause greater problem for an individuals right to privacy. So, In order f or the National ID System to prosper there must be guaranteed adequate safeguard s which will protect the information and safely process the personal information of a person. The ruling of Ople vs. Torres has already said the problem, the br oadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented wil l put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger. R.A. 10173 does no t give A.O. 308 the key in order for it to be introduce in the Philippines. To further elaborate, there problems and issues stated in Ople vs. Torres that R .A. 10173 protects because A.O. 308 violates the constitutional guarantee to Rig ht of Privacy. R.A. 10173 has a different purpose, which is to seek the protecti on of data privacy in all sorts of medium while A.O. 308 is to create a system t hat will give the government wider range of access to personal information of an individual. Under Ople vs. Torres the following issues were raise, A.O. 308does not state whet her encoding the data is limited to biological information alone for identificat ion purposes The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a cove rt invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our auth orities to resist said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how the se information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factor s are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the infor mation. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to trac k down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confident ial information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination. The possibi lities of abuse and misuseare accentuated when we consider that the individual la cks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the corr ectness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Righ ts seeks to prevent Third, even though there is already a law, under R.A. 10173, which provides the privacy of data, the law gives guidelines and protection for the public wherein the National ID System did not. There is no particularity on how the system will work; where will the information be stored; who are the persons or government e ntities who will handle the processing and collection of information; and who wi ll guaranty there security and safety, such questions where not answered by A.O. 308 and R.A. 10173 does not also provide for the answer but gives guidelines an d strict rules in order to answer those questions. With the fast growing use of technology, the government must put up more protection to informations gathered, and this is where R.A. 10173 will come in, because the said law helps the publi c to be protected in its right of privacy and does not provide a mechanism that will give the government the power to access information which will jeopardize t he constitutional right of Right to Privacy. In contrast to this the National ID System violates the right of privacy, and as ruled in the Ople vs Torres case Th ey must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism.

Fourth, there is no sufficient mechanism under R.A. 10173 in order to introduce again the National ID System because the said A.O. 308 was passed in order to ga ther personal information from the public for governmental purposes. R.A. 10173 declaration of policy is to protect right of privacy and not to intervene or col lect informations just for the governmental needs. Furthermore in order to prote ct this right, the Data Privacy Act of 2012 gives rights regarding the informati on and data subject. There is no mechanism under R.A. 10173 to allow a computeri zed system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services o n social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions a nd msirepresentations. The purpose of the National ID system does not outhweigh the right of privacy of an individual. There will always be constitutional issue s that will arise if the National ID System will again be re-introduce, and with the passing of R.A. 10173 that gives protection to data and information, such w ill give teeth to the informations collected by the government because the ID sy stem lacks the importance and purpose of data collecting. The R.A. 10173 will no t help to re-introduce the National ID System, there is a great possibility that the right of privacy will be violated if the ID system is again introduce. The guidelines of R.A. 10173 is sufficient to protect the rights of an individual to privacy but not to the introduction of National ID System. The Congress must pu t another law which with particularity and definiteness provide for the purpose and guidelines which will be in line with R.A. 10173. In other words, both the n ew National ID System and R.A. 10173 must be compatible with each other. We must adhere to the wordings of Justice Puno, the right is not intended to stif le scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelli ng interest justify such intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.

End Notes: Sources 1987 Philippine Constitution - The LawPhil Project. Philippine Laws and Jurisprude nce Databank - The Lawphil Project.http://www.lawphil.net/consti/cons1987.html ( accessed May 1, 2013). Republic Act No. 10173 AN ACT PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL INFORMATION IN INFOR MATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, CREA TING FOR THIS PURPOSE A NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as Data Privacy Act of 2012

OPLE V TORRES an information document which provides proof of entering and leaving a country. However, what if not only one department requires such information but also the whole government has required personal information to be given to them in exchan ge of government services? For the reason of safety and security purposes, which will give the government a better leverage against criminal minds. Well, it see ms that it will constitute a totalitarian government and the government has ever y information and data of every citizens of the country. With the influx of personal information already accessible to the Internet, and with the growing advancement of technology, every individual including me wants to be protected with the data uploaded and collected by the Internet, banks, gov ernment entities, insurance, and other offices which are into data collecting. A

s netizens of the Philippines, no one wants to be an open book to the public. We dont want to be watched by big brother or become a trend in the Internet only be cause of data information leakage or breach. Like the movie Enemy of the State whe rein the government can scrutinize and manipulate our daily lives by reason of t echnology and data information, we dont want that to happen. People value their privacy in information, and the right of priv acy is more paramount than the necessity of the National ID System. Any single p ersonal information is vital to every person. Any breach of such can cause probl em and even ruining of life. So there must be compelling interests by the govern ment for the national ID system to be authorized. The Data Privacy Act is not su fficient for the introduction of the A.O. 308, it lacks the mechanism to protect the Right of Privacy under the constitution, since A.O. 308 will go against the Data Privacy Act in terms of the guaranteed security of information, transparen cy, requirements, and authorities in handling those information. Second, the recently passed law Republic Act 10173 (R.A. 10173) or also known as Data Privacy Act of 2012 does not allow the gathering of personal information w ithout the required reasonableness and necessity of such information. The law pr ovides that the information gathered is for the purpose to which it seeks. Accor ding to Sec. 11 of the said law, Section 11. General Data Privacy Principles. The processing of personal informat ion shall be allowed, subject to compliance with the requirements of this Act an d other laws allowing disclosure of information to the public and adherence to t he principles of transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality. Personal information must, be: (a) Collected for specified and legitimate purposes determined and declared befo re, or as soon as reasonably practicable after collection, and later processed i n a way compatible with such declared, specified and legitimate purposes only; (b) Processed fairly and lawfully; (c) Accurate, relevant and, where necessary for purposes for which it is to be u sed the processing of personal information, kept up to date; inaccurate or incom plete data must be rectified, supplemented, destroyed or their further processin g restricted; (d) Adequate and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are co llected and processed; (e) Retained only for as long as necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes f or which the data was obtained or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims, or for legitimate business purposes, or as provided by law; and (f) Kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected and processed: Provided, That personal information collected for other purposes may lie processed for historical, statistical or scientific purposes, and in cases laid down in law may be stored for longer periods: Provided, further, That adequ ate safeguards are guaranteed by said laws authorizing their processing. The personal information controller must ensure implementation of personal infor mation processing principles set out herein. Also, under Section 12 of the said law, there are certain criteria that are requ ired of the lawful processing of personal information, SEC. 12. Criteria for Lawful Processing of Personal Information. The processing of personal information shall be permitted only if not otherwise prohibited by l

aw, and when at least one of the following conditions exists: (a) The data subject has given his or her consent; (b) The processing of personal information is necessary and is related to the fu lfillment of a contract with the data subject or in

order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the personal information controller is subject; (d) The processing is necessary to protect vitally important interests of the da ta subject, including life and health; (e) The processing is necessary in order to respond to national emergency, to co mply with the requirements of public order and safety, or to fulfill functions o f public authority which necessarily includes the processing of personal data fo r the fulfillment of its mandate; or (f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pur sued by the personal information controller or by a third party or parties to wh om the data is disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by fundamen tal rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under the P hilippine Constitution. Hence, without adhering to the principles enumerated and without following the g uidelines of processing personal information, there can be no gathering of such information. The National ID system under said A.O. 308 has no definite legitima te purpose of collecting the information and the usage of the said information d oes not state the accuracy, relevancy and necessity for which purpose it will be use. Furthermore, the security to prevent the breach and leakage to the public of the information was absent in A.O. 308 because if given access to the public it will cause greater problem for an individuals right to privacy. So, In order f or the National ID System to prosper there must be guaranteed adequate safeguard s which will protect the information and safely process the personal information of a person. The ruling of Ople vs. Torres has already said the problem, the br oadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented wil l put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger. R.A. 10173 does no t give A.O. 308 the key in order for it to be introduce in the Philippines. To further elaborate, there problems and issues stated in Ople vs. Torres that R .A. 10173 protects because A.O. 308 violates the constitutional guarantee to Rig ht of Privacy. R.A. 10173 has a different purpose, which is to seek the protecti on of data privacy in all sorts of medium while A.O. 308 is to create a system t hat will give the government wider range of access to personal information of an individual. Under Ople vs. Torres the following issues were raise, A.O. 308does not state whet her encoding the data is limited to biological information alone for identificat ion purposes The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a cove rt invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our auth

orities to resist said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how the se information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factor s are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the infor mation. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to trac k down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confident ial information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination. The possibi lities of abuse and misuseare accentuated when we consider that the individual la cks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the corr ectness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Righ ts seeks to prevent Third, even though there is already a law, under R.A. 10173, which provides the privacy of data, the law gives guidelines and protection for the public wherein the National ID System did not. There is no particularity on how the system will work; where will the information be stored; who are the persons or government e ntities who will handle the processing and collection of information; and who wi ll guaranty there security and safety, such questions where not answered by A.O. 308 and R.A. 10173 does not also provide for the answer but gives guidelines an d strict rules in order to answer those questions. With the fast growing use of technology, the government must put up more protection to informations gathered, and this is where R.A. 10173 will come in, because the said law helps the publi c to be protected in its right of privacy and does not provide a mechanism that will give the government the power to access information which will jeopardize t he constitutional right of Right to Privacy. In contrast to this the National ID System violates the right of privacy, and as ruled in the Ople vs Torres case Th ey must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. Fourth, there is no sufficient mechanism under R.A. 10173 in order to introduce again the National ID System because the said A.O. 308 was passed in order to ga ther personal information from the public for governmental purposes. R.A. 10173 declaration of policy is to protect right of privacy and not to intervene or col lect informations just for the governmental needs. Furthermore in order to prote ct this right, the Data Privacy Act of 2012 gives rights regarding the informati on and data subject. There is no mechanism under R.A. 10173 to allow a computeri zed system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services o n social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions a nd msirepresentations. The purpose of the National ID system does not outhweigh the right of privacy of an individual. There will always be constitutional issue s that will arise if the National ID System will again be re-introduce, and with the passing of R.A. 10173 that gives protection to data and information, such w ill give teeth to the informations collected by the government because the ID sy stem lacks the importance and purpose of data collecting. The R.A. 10173 will no t help to re-introduce the National ID System, there is a great possibility that the right of privacy will be violated if the ID system is again introduce. The guidelines of R.A. 10173 is sufficient to protect the rights of an individual to privacy but not to the introduction of National ID System. The Congress must pu t another law which with particularity and definiteness provide for the purpose and guidelines which will be in line with R.A. 10173. In other words, both the n ew National ID System and R.A. 10173 must be compatible with each other. We must adhere to the wordings of Justice Puno, the right is not intended to stif le scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelli ng interest justify such intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.

Republic Act No. 10173 AN ACT PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL INFORMATION IN INFOR MATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, CREA TING FOR THIS PURPOSE A NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as Data Privacy Act of 2012 order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the personal information controller is subject; (d) The processing is necessary to protect vitally important interests of the da ta subject, including life and health; (e) The processing is necessary in order to respond to national emergency, to co mply with the requirements of public order and safety, or to fulfill functions o f public authority which necessarily includes the processing of personal data fo r the fulfillment of its mandate; or (f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pur sued by the personal information controller or by a third party or parties to wh om the data is disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by fundamen tal rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under the P hilippine Constitution. Hence, without adhering to the principles enumerated and without following the g uidelines of processing personal information, there can be no gathering of such information. The National ID system under sai d A.O. 308 has no definite legitimate purpose of collecting the information and the usage of the said information does not state the accuracy, relevancy and nec essity for which purpose it will be use. Furthermore, the security to prevent th e breach and leakage to the public of the information was absent in A.O. 308 bec ause if given access to the public it will cause greater problem for an individu als right to privacy. So, In order for the National ID System to prosper there mu st be guaranteed adequate safeguards which will protect the information and safe ly process the personal information of a person. The ruling of Ople vs. Torres has already said the problem, the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 w hich if implemented will put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present da nger. R.A. 10173 does not give A.O. 308 the key in order for it to be introduce i n the Philippines. To further elaborate, there problems and issues stated in Ople vs. Torres that R .A. 10173 protects because A.O. 308 violates the constitutional guarantee to Rig ht of Privacy. R.A. 10173 has a different purpose, which is to seek the protecti on of data privacy in all sorts of medium while A.O. 308 is to create a system t hat will give the government wider range of access to personal information of an individual.

OPLE VS TORRES Under Ople vs. Torres the following issues were raise, A.O. 308does not state whet

her encoding the data is limited to biological information alone for identificat ion purposes The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a cove rt invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our auth orities to resist said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how the se information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. said the problem, the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 w hich if implemented will put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present da nger. R.A. 10173 does not give A.O. 308 the key in order for it to be introduce i n the Philippines. To further elaborate, there problems and issues stated in Ople vs. Torres that R .A. 10173 protects because A.O. 308 violates the constitutional guarantee to Rig ht of Privacy. R.A. 10173 has a different purpose, which is to seek the protecti on of data privacy in all sorts of medium while A.O. 308 is to create a system t hat will give the government wider range of access to personal information of an individual.

OPLE VS TORRES These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 m ay interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authori ties to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to acce ss confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination. The possibilities of abuse and misuseare accentuated when we consider that the i ndividual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less ver ify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent

Third, even though there is already a law, under R.A. 10173, which provides the privacy of data, the law gives guidelines and protection for the public wherein the National ID System did not. There is no particularity on how the system will work; where will the information be stored; who are the persons or government e ntities who will handle the processing and collection of information; and who wi ll guaranty there security and safety, such questions where not answered by A.O. 308 and R.A. 10173 does not also provide for the answer but gives guidelines an d strict rules in order to answer those questions. With the fast OPLE VS TORRES growing use of technology, the government must put up more protection to informa tions gathered, and this is where R.A. 10173 will come in, because the said law helps the public to be protected in its right of privacy and does not provide a mechanism that will give the government the power to access information which wi ll jeopardize the constitutional right of Right to Privacy. In contrast to this the National ID System violates the right of privacy, and as ruled in the Ople v s Torres case They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state inte rests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by ns. the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights an d to prevent authoritarianism. Fourth, there is no sufficient mechanism under R.A. 10173 in order to introduce again the National ID System because the said A.O. 308 was passed in order to ga ther personal information from the public for governmental purposes. R.A. 10173

declaration of policy is to protect right of privacy and not to intervene or col lect informations just for the governmental needs. Furthermore in order to prote ct this right, the Data Privacy Act of 2012 gives rights regarding the informati on and data subject. There is no mechanism under R.A. 10173 to allow a computeri zed OPLE VS TORRES systemto properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services o n so cial security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and m sirepresentations. The purpose of the National ID system does not outhweigh the right of privacy of an individual. There will always be constitutional issues th at will arise if the National ID System will again be re-introduce, and with the passing of R.A. 10173 that gives protection to data and information, such will give teeth to the informations collected by the government because the ID system lacks the importance and purpose of data collecting. The R.A. 10173 will not he lp to re-introduce the National ID System, there is a great possibility that the right of privacy will be violated if the ID system is again introduce. The guidelines of R.A. 101 73 is sufficient to protect the rights of an individual to privacy but not to th e introduction of National ID System. The Congress must put another law which wi th particularity and definiteness provide for the purpose and guidelines which w ill be in line with R.A. 10173. In other words, both the new National ID System and R.A. 10173 must be compatible with each other. We must adhere to the wordings of Justice Puno, the right is not intended to stif le scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelli ng interest. OPLE VS TORRES Justify such intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasio METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOC IATION, INC., respondent. D E C I S I O N PUNO, J.: Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urg ent problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the best of i ntention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we le t the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for p ublic use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the genera l welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the ex pense of the rule of law METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOC IATION, INC., respondent. D E C I S I O N FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000] . h Y Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic service s in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a nonstock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village. On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The no tice reads: Court

"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic "Dear President Lindo, "Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to rationalize the use of roads and/or th oroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street shal l be opened to vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996. "In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points of entry and exit on said street. "Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be extended by your association to the MMDA personnel who will be directing traffic in the area . "Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of th e President on the matter. "Very truly yours, PROSPERO I. ORETA Chairman"[1] On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Sppedsc On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Res pondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting t he demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restrain ing order the following day. On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a pre liminary injunction.[2] Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of App eals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street[3] and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDAs proposed action.[4] On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of th e case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune St reet, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls . It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinanc e. The decision disposed of as follows: Jurissc Manotok wrote a letter to the NHA alleging,that ..... Besides, the transcendenta l importance to the public of these cases MANOTOK vs. NHA JUSTICE GUTIERREZ JR. FACTS: June 11, 1977 Pres. issued LOI No. 555 instituting a nationwide slum impr ovement & resettlement program & LOI No. 558 adopting slim improvement as a nati onal housing policy July 21, 1977 - issuance of EO No.6-77 adopting the Metropol itan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area in its priority list for a zonal impr ovement program (ZIP) because the findings of the representative of the City of Manila and the National Housing Authority (NHA) described these as blighted comm unities. March 18, 1978 - a fire razed almost the entire Tambunting Estate, afte r which the President made a public announcement that the national government wo uld acquire the property for the fire victim December 22, 1978 - President issue d Proclamation No. 1810 declaring all sites Identified by the Metro Manila local governments and approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements to be included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The Tambunting Estate and the Sunog -Apog area were among the sites included. January 28, 1980 - President issued PD Nos. 1669 and 1670 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and the Su nog-Apog area expropriated. April 4, 1980- NHA wrote to the Register of Deeds of Manila, furnishing it with a certified copy of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 for registration, with the request t hat the certificates of title covering the properties in question be cancelled a

nd new certificates of title be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philip pines. However, the Register of Deeds requested the submission of the owner's co py of the certificates of title of the properties in question to enable her to i mplement the aforementioned decrees. Subsequently, petitioner Elisa R. Manotok, one of the owners of the properties to be expropriated, received a letter inform ing her of the deposits made with regard to the first installment of her propert y. August 19, 1980- petitioner Elisa R. Manotok wrote a letter to the NHA allegi ng,that the amounts of compensation for the expropriation of the properties do n ot constitute the "just compensation" & expressed veritable doubts about the con stitutionality of the said In the meantime, some officials of the NHA circulated instructions to the tenants-occupants of the properties in dispute not to pay t heir rentals to the petitioners for their lease-occupancy of the properties in v iew of the passage of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670. Hence, the owners of the Tambunti ng Estate filed a petition to declare P.D. No. 1669 unconstitutional. The owners of the Sunog-Apog area also filed a similar petition attacking the constitution ality of P.D. No. 1670. ISSUES: 1. WON PD 1669 & PD 1670 expropriating the Tambunting & SUnog-Apog estat es are unconstitutional? 2. WON the petitioners have been deprived of due proces s 3. WON the taking is for public use 4. WON there was just compensation HELD: T he power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enfor ced. Limitations: 1. taking must be for a public use 2. payment of just compensa tion 3. due process must be observed in the taking... 1. Yes. The challenged dec rees unconstitutional coz they are uniquely unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the respondent NHA. The 2 PDs exceed the limitations in the exercise of the Presidential Decree No. 1669, provides, among others: Expropriation of the "Tamb unting Estate". NHAA- is designated administrator of the National Government wit h authority to immediately take possession, control, disposition, with the power of demolition of the expropriated properties and their improvements and shall e volve and implement a comprehensive development plan for the condemned propertie s. City Assessor shall determine the market value. In assessing the market value , he should consider existing conditions in the area notably, that no improvemen t has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the expropriation cost. TOLENTINO V COMELEC ARTURO M. TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SA perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namel y: (1) a declaration that no special election was held simultaneously with the gen eral elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as ha ving won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01 -006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the specia l election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to compl y with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasans right in the exerc ise of his office as Senator. Petitioners prayer for the annulment of Honasans pro clamation and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the inst

ant petition. On the Mootness of the Petition COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators rende r the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic. Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or bo ard to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[1 1] Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done.[12] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwis e moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[13] Thus, in Alunan II I v. Mirasol,[14] we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceli ng the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4 December 1992 desp ite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken p lace. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order so ught to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petiti on is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in t he Senate in relation to COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the cond uct of such special election is likely to arise in every such election. Such que stion, however, may not be decided before the date of the election. On Petitioners Standing Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed pu blic funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury bec ause of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006. Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act.[15] The requirement of standing, which necessar ily sharpens the presentation of issues,[16] relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[17] Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has perso nally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[18] Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the insta nt petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special electio n on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance . This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election.[19] Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2 001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutio nal protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplic ation of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any impro per purpose.[20] On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage.[2

1] Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22] we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented too general an interest. We held: [T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undou btedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x. Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitu de on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicali ties of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP ha s advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in vi ew of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because pea ce and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal con troversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on s tanding and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied) We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacit y as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.

Manotok wrote a letter to the NHA alleging,that ..... Besides, the transcendenta l importance to the public of these cases MANOTOK vs. NHA JUSTICE GUTIERREZ JR. FACTS: June 11, 1977 Pres. issued LOI No. 555 instituting a nationwide slum impr ovement & resettlement program & LOI No. 558 adopting slim improvement as a nati onal housing policy July 21, 1977 - issuance of EO No.6-77 adopting the Metropol itan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area in its priority list for a zonal impr ovement program (ZIP) because the findings of the representative of the City of Manila and the National Housing Authority (NHA) described these as blighted comm unities. March 18, 1978 - a fire razed almost the entire Tambunting Estate, afte r which the President made a public announcement that the national government wo uld acquire the property for the fire victim December 22, 1978 - President issue d Proclamation No. 1810 declaring all sites Identified by the Metro Manila local governments and approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements to be included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The Tambunting Estate and the Sunog -Apog area were among the sites included. January 28, 1980 - President issued PD Nos. 1669 and 1670 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and the Su nog-Apog area expropriated. April 4, 1980- NHA wrote to the Register of Deeds of Manila, furnishing it with

a certified copy of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 for registration, with the request t hat the certificates of title covering the properties in question be cancelled a nd new certificates of title be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philip pines. However, the Register of Deeds requested the submission of the owner's co py of the certificates of title of the properties in question to enable her to i mplement the aforementioned decrees. Subsequently, petitioner Elisa R. Manotok, one of the owners of the properties to be expropriated, received a letter inform ing her of the deposits made with regard to the first installment of her propert y. August 19, 1980- petitioner Elisa R. Manotok wrote a letter to the NHA allegi ng,that the amounts of compensation for the expropriation of the properties do n ot constitute the "just compensation" & expressed veritable doubts about the con stitutionality of the said In the meantime, some officials of the NHA circulated instructions to the tenants-occupants of the properties in dispute not to pay t heir rentals to the petitioners for their lease-occupancy of the properties in v iew of the passage of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670. Hence, the owners of the Tambunti ng Estate filed a petition to declare P.D. No. 1669 unconstitutional. The owners of the Sunog-Apog area also filed a similar petition attacking the constitution ality of P.D. No. 1670. ISSUES: 1. WON PD 1669 & PD 1670 expropriating the Tambunting & SUnog-Apog estat es are unconstitutional? 2. WON the petitioners have been deprived of due proces s 3. WON the taking is for public use 4. WON there was just compensation HELD: T he power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enfor ced. Limitations: 1. taking must be for a public use 2. payment of just compensa tion 3. due process must be observed in the taking... 1. Yes. The challenged dec rees unconstitutional coz they are uniquely unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the respondent NHA. The 2 PDs exceed the limitations in the exercise of the Presidential Decree No. 1669, provides, among others: Expropriation of the "Tamb unting Estate". NHAA- is designated administrator of the National Government wit h authority to immediately take possession, control, disposition, with the power of demolition of the expropriated properties and their improvements and shall e volve and implement a comprehensive development plan for the condemned propertie s. City Assessor shall determine the market value. In assessing the market value , he should consider existing conditions in the area notably, that no improvemen t has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the expropriation cost. TOLENTINO V COMELEC ARTURO M. TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SA perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namel y: (1) a declaration that no special election was held simultaneously with the gen eral elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as ha ving won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01 -006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the specia l election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to compl y with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasans right in the exerc ise of his office as Senator. Petitioners prayer for the annulment of Honasans pro

clamation and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the inst ant petition. On the Mootness of the Petition COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators rende r the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic. Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or bo ard to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[1 1] Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done.[12] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwis e moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[13] Thus, in Alunan II I v. Mirasol,[14] we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceli ng the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4 December 1992 desp ite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken p lace. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order so ught to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petiti on is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in t he Senate in relation to COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the cond uct of such special election is likely to arise in every such election. Such que stion, however, may not be decided before the date of the election. On Petitioners Standing Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed pu blic funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury bec ause of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006. Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act.[15] The requirement of standing, which necessar ily sharpens the presentation of issues,[16] relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[17] Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has perso nally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[18] Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the insta nt petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special electio n on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance . This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election.[19] Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2 001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutio nal protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplic ation of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any impro per purpose.[20]

On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage.[2 1] Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22] we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented too general an interest. We held: [T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undou btedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x. Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitu de on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicali ties of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP ha s advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in vi ew of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because pea ce and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal con troversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on s tanding and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied) We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacit y as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again. Manotok wrote a letter to the NHA alleging,that ..... Besides, the transcendenta l importance to the public of these cases MANOTOK vs. NHA JUSTICE GUTIERREZ JR. FACTS: June 11, 1977 Pres. issued LOI No. 555 instituting a nationwide slum impr ovement & resettlement program & LOI No. 558 adopting slim improvement as a nati onal housing policy July 21, 1977 - issuance of EO No.6-77 adopting the Metropol itan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area in its priority list for a zonal impr ovement program (ZIP) because the findings of the representative of the City of Manila and the National Housing Authority (NHA) described these as blighted comm unities. March 18, 1978 - a fire razed almost the entire Tambunting Estate, afte r which the President made a public announcement that the national government wo uld acquire the property for the fire victim December 22, 1978 - President issue d Proclamation No. 1810 declaring all sites Identified by the Metro Manila local governments and approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements to be included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The Tambunting Estate and the Sunog -Apog area were among the sites included. January 28, 1980 - President issued PD Nos. 1669 and 1670 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and the Su nog-Apog area expropriated.

April 4, 1980- NHA wrote to the Register of Deeds of Manila, furnishing it with a certified copy of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 for registration, with the request t hat the certificates of title covering the properties in question be cancelled a nd new certificates of title be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philip pines. However, the Register of Deeds requested the submission of the owner's co py of the certificates of title of the properties in question to enable her to i mplement the aforementioned decrees. Subsequently, petitioner Elisa R. Manotok, one of the owners of the properties to be expropriated, received a letter inform ing her of the deposits made with regard to the first installment of her propert y. August 19, 1980- petitioner Elisa R. Manotok wrote a letter to the NHA allegi ng,that the amounts of compensation for the expropriation of the properties do n ot constitute the "just compensation" & expressed veritable doubts about the con stitutionality of the said In the meantime, some officials of the NHA circulated instructions to the tenants-occupants of the properties in dispute not to pay t heir rentals to the petitioners for their lease-occupancy of the properties in v iew of the passage of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670. Hence, the owners of the Tambunti ng Estate filed a petition to declare P.D. No. 1669 unconstitutional. The owners of the Sunog-Apog area also filed a similar petition attacking the constitution ality of P.D. No. 1670. ISSUES: 1. WON PD 1669 & PD 1670 expropriating the Tambunting & SUnog-Apog estat es are unconstitutional? 2. WON the petitioners have been deprived of due proces s 3. WON the taking is for public use 4. WON there was just compensation HELD: T he power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enfor ced. Limitations: 1. taking must be for a public use 2. payment of just compensa tion 3. due process must be observed in the taking... 1. Yes. The challenged dec rees unconstitutional coz they are uniquely unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the respondent NHA. The 2 PDs exceed the limitations in the exercise of the Presidential Decree No. 1669, provides, among others: Expropriation of the "Tamb unting Estate". NHAA- is designated administrator of the National Government wit h authority to immediately take possession, control, disposition, with the power of demolition of the expropriated properties and their improvements and shall e volve and implement a comprehensive development plan for the condemned propertie s. City Assessor shall determine the market value. In assessing the market value , he should consider existing conditions in the area notably, that no improvemen t has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the expropriation cost. TOLENTINO V COMELEC ARTURO M. TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SA perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namel y: (1) a declaration that no special election was held simultaneously with the gen eral elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as ha ving won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01 -006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the specia l election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to compl y with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasans right in the exerc

ise of his office as Senator. Petitioners prayer for the annulment of Honasans pro clamation and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the inst ant petition. On the Mootness of the Petition COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators rende r the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic. Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or bo ard to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[1 1] Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done.[12] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwis e moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[13] Thus, in Alunan II I v. Mirasol,[14] we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceli ng the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4 December 1992 desp ite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken p lace. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order so ught to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petiti on is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in t he Senate in relation to COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the cond uct of such special election is likely to arise in every such election. Such que stion, however, may not be decided before the date of the election. On Petitioners Standing Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed pu blic funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury bec ause of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006. Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act.[15] The requirement of standing, which necessar ily sharpens the presentation of issues,[16] relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[17] Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has perso nally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[18] Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the insta nt petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special electio n on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance . This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election.[19] Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2 001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutio nal protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplic ation of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any impro per purpose.[20]

On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage.[2 1] Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22] we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented too general an interest. We held: [T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undou btedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x. Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitu de on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicali ties of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP ha s advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in vi ew of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because pea ce and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal con troversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on s tanding and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied) We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacit y as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.

PLESSY V FERGUSON BROWN V BOARD OF EDUCATION ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC. V TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY ICHONG V HERNANDEZ TECSON V COMELEC

II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE ART III, SEC. 1 PHILIPPINE CONST ART II, SECS 14 AND 22 PHIL CONST ART IV PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XII, SECS. 2 AND 14.2 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PEOPLE V MARTI NALA V BARROSO JR LIM V FELIX STONEHILL V DIOKNO

BURGOS V CHIEF OOF STAFF ROAN V GONZALES alih v castro nolasco v pano peo v malmstedt peo v burgos almeida-sanchez v u.s. Delaware v. Prouse Valmonte v De Villa In re Umil et al v Ramos Manalili v CA

Malacat v CA David et al v Macapagal-Arroyo Babst v NIB DUE PROCESS acts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement S ection 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, M eTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government of fices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing th e franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vic e-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representative s, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The resp ondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a va lid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process , as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair pl ay. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general m ay be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular a ct assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weap on to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requir es that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both a s to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside ins ofar Philippine Judges Association Vs. Prado Case Digest 1. Secs. 1-19 2. Adjudicatory Power of the Commission on Human Rights Read: 1. Carino vs. CHR, December 2, 1991 2. EPZA vs. CHR, April 14, 1992 Read also: 1) SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO, G.R. No. L-48685, Sept. 30, 1987 POLITICAL LAW

ARTICLE XII SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS TITLE: LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF A GRARIAN REFORM, respondent. FACTS: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. On Januar y 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Proce dures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promul gated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commer cial Farms). Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business al legedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Sect ion 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwi se known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedur es Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof a s promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989. Hence, this petition praying that a foresaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be iss ued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are ma de to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) were unconstitutional. RULING: The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows: ARTICLE XIII x x x AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own direc tly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encour age and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to su ch priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, tak ing into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subjec t to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the Stat e shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. LUTZ x x x" Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitut ionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Cong ress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, i n including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its c overage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represent s no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock

and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all ove r the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestoc k and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processin g corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10) . Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of an imals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor o r consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, ab out 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hect ares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11). On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raisi ng is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise un der Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International D ictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words: "Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harves ting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock , tillage, husbandry, farming. It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . . Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit. Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals ." (Rollo, pp. 82-83). The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in c onstitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the documen t itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary mean ing except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thu s attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is generally held that, in construing constitutional pro visions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what w as meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of t he deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the peop le when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).The transcr ipts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meanin g of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of th e framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the c overage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Governme nt.The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limit ed to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties because all of them f all under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do n ot include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30). It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Sect ion II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commer cial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farm s" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian ref orm. Plessy v Ferguson

: The Plessy v. Ferguson case of 1896 is significant in the course of American his tory, as it's outcome upheld the notion that racial segregation was constitution ally legal under the "separate but equal" doctrine. The Court held segregation was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Equ al Protection Clause, as long as States provided equal accommodations for both r aces (which was rarely the case). The Equal Protection Clause states that "no st ate shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The decision in Plessy validated the practice of segregation and lead to the pro liferation of racist Jim Crow laws in the south, which was a major part of what the Civil Rights movement of the 1950's and 60's hoped to eliminate. Plessy basi cally granted legislative immunity to states regarding race. It is not only pragmatic laymen who must ask if this is a base strong enough to sustain a decision of such transcendent importance Lessons for an endangered movement: what a historical juxtaposition of the legal response to civil rights and environmentalism has to teach environmentalists to day. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R. No. 23794 February 17 , 1968] Post under case digests, Taxation at Thursday, March 29, 2012 Posted by Schizoph renic Mind Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any a nd all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were made, under prote st, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Cour t of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as it s Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitu tional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of unifor mity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionalit y of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifical ly the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringe d? Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legisla tion, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial d istinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classificati on applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substan tially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to tho se who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the ques tioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produce d and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordin ance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently establi shed sugar central for the coverage of the tax. BROWN V BOARD OF EDUCATION Timeline of Events Leading to the Brown v. Board of Education Decision, 1954 1857 Dred Scott, Plaintiff in Error v. John F. A. Sanford

The Supreme Court held that Blacks, enslaved or free, could not be citizens of t he United States. Chief Justice Taney, arguing from the original intentions of t he framers of the 1787 Constitution, stated that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Black people were considered a subordinate and inferior class of beings, "with no rights which the White man was bound to respect." Significance: The Supreme Court denied citizenship to Black people, setting the stage for their treatment as second class citizens. 1865 Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, also known as the Freedme n's Bureau,was established by an act of Congress on March 3, 1865. Its main miss ion was to provide relief and help freedmen become self-sufficient in all areas of life. Significance: The first Black schools were set up under the direction of the Fre edmens Bureau. One of those schools Howard University would eventually train and graduate the majority of the legal team that overturned Plessy, including Charle s Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall. 1865 Black Codes Black Codes was a name given to laws passed by southern governments established during the presidency of Andrew Johnson. These laws imposed severe restrictions on freedmen, such as prohibiting their right to vote, forbidding them to sit on juries, and limiting their right to testify against white men. They were also fo rbidden from carrying weapons in public places and working in certain occupation s. Significance: Segregation Begins - Public schools were segregated, and Blacks we re barred from serving on juries, and testifying against Whites. 1866 Civil Rights Act of 1866 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed Blacks basic economic rights to contract , sue, and own property. Significance: The intention of this law was to protect all persons in the United States, including Blacks, in their civil rights. 1868 The 14th Amendment to the Constitution is ratified. Significance: The 14th Amendment overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford. It guaranteed that all persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the Un ited States and of the state in which they reside, and that no state shall abrid ge the privileges and immunities of citizens, deprive any person of life, libert y, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal prot ection of the law. 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases These cases narrowly defined federal power and emasculated the Fourteenth Amendm ent by asserting that most of the rights of citizens remain under state control. Significance: Pro-segregation states would come to justify their policies based on the notion that segregation in their public school systems was a states rights issue. 1875 Civil Rights Act of 1875 In March, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875, prohibiting discriminati

on in inns, theaters, and other places of public accommodation. It was the last Federal civil rights act passed until 1957. Significance: Discrimination in places of public accommodation was prohibited. 1883 Civil Rights Cases The Supreme Court overturned the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and declared that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit discrimination by private individuals or businesses. Significance: The Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit discrimination by private individuals or businesses, paving the way for segrega tion in public education. 1887 Jim Crow The practices of comprehensive racial segregation known as "Jim Crow" emerged, a nd racial separation becomes entrenched. Significance: Blacks largely disappeared from juries in the South. Florida was the first state to enact a statute requiring segregation in places o f public accommodation. Eight other states followed Florida's lead by 1892. 1896 Homer Adolph Plessy, Plaintiff in Error v. J.H. Ferguson, Judge of Section "A" C riminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans Homer A. Plessy challenged an 1890 Louisiana law that required separate train ca rs for Black Americans and White Americans. The Supreme Court held that separate but equal facilities for White and Black railroad passengers did not violate th e Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Significance: Plessy v. Ferguson established the separate but equal doctrine that would become the constitutional basis for segregation. Justice John Marshall Harlan, the lone dissenter in Plessy, argued that forced s egregation of the races stamped Blacks with a badge of inferiority. That same li ne of argument would become a decisive factor in the Brown v. Board decision. 1899 Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, State of Georgia The Supreme Court upheld a local school board's decision to close a free public Black school due to fiscal constraints, despite the fact that the district conti nued to operate two free public white schools. Significance: The Courts opinion argued that there was no evidence in the record that the decision was based on racial discrimination and that the distribution o f public funds for public education was within the discretion of school authorit ies. 1908 Thurgood Marshall is born in Baltimore, MD, on July 2nd. Significance: Thurgood Marshall would become lead counsel in the Brown v. Board of Education case. 1908 Berea College v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

The Supreme Court upheld a Kentucky state law forbidding interracial instruction at all schools and colleges in the state. Significance: The NAACP became the primary tool for the legal attack on segregat ion, eventually trying the Brown v. Board of Education case. 1909 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People founded W.E.B. DuBois, Ida Wells-Barnett, Mary White Ovington, and others founded the Na tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Their mission was to eliminate lynching, and to fight racial and social injustice, primarily t hrough legal action. Significance: The NAACP became the primary tool for the legal attack on segregat ion, eventually trying the Brown v. Board of Education case. 1927 Gong Lum v. Rice In Gong Lum v. Rice the Supreme Court held that a Mississippi school district ma y require a Chinese-American girl to attend a segregated Black school rather tha n a White school. Significance: The Court applied the "separate but equal" formulation of Plessy v . Ferguson to the public schools. 1935 NAACP begins challenging segregation in graduate and secondary schools. Assisted by his protege Thurgood Marshall, Charles Hamilton Houston, of the NAAC P, began his strategy of challenging segregation in graduate and professional sc hools. Significance: Houston developed a legal strategy that would eventually lead to v ictory over segregation in the nations schools through the Brown v. Board case. H oustons rationale for attacking segregated law schools was largely two-pronged. F irst, the establishment of separate but equal law school facilities for Black an d White students would become too costly for the states. Second, White judges wh o matriculated in some of the nations finest law schools could not, in good consc ience, suggest that Black lawyers in segregated schools received "equal" legal t raining. 1938 State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada The Supreme Court decided in favor of Lloyd Gaines, a Black student who had been refused admission to the University of Missouri Law School. Significance: This case set a precedent for other states to attempt to "equalize " Black school facilities, rather than integrate them. The Court held that the s tate must furnish Gaines "within its borders facilities for legal education subs tantially equal to those which the State there offered for the persons of the wh ite race, whether or not other Negroes sought the same opportunity."

1939 Thurgood Marshall named special counsel of the NAACP Marshall succeeded his mentor, Charles Hamilton Houston. Significance: Thurgood Marshall would eventually lead counsel in the Brown v. Bo ard of Education case. 1948 The NAACP board of directors formally endorsed Thurgood Marshall's view on segre gation strategy. By adopting Marshall's view, the NAACP decided to devote its efforts solely to a n all-out attack on segregation in education, rather than pressing for the equal ization of segregated facilities. Significance: The NAACP defense team attacked the "equal" standard so that the " separate" standard would, in turn, become vulnerable. 1948 Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma A unanimous Supreme Court held that Lois Ada Sipuel could not be denied entrance to a state law school solely because of her race. Significance: The Court ruled denial of entrance to a state law school solely on the basis of race unconstitutional. 1949 Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al. Thurgood Marshall and NAACP officials met with Black residents of Clarendon Coun ty, SC. They decided that the NAACP would launch a test case against segregation in public schools if at least 20 plaintiffs could be found. By November, Harry Briggs and 19 other plaintiffs were assembled, and the NAACP filed a class actio n lawsuit against the Clarendon County School Board. Significance: Briggs v. Elliott became one of the cases consolidated by the Supr eme Court into Brown v. Board of Education. 1950 Sweatt v. Painter The Supreme Court held that the University of Texas Law School must admit a Blac k student, Herman Sweatt. The University of Texas Law School was far superior in its offerings and resources to the separate Black law school, which had been ha stily established in a downtown basement. Significance: The Supreme Court held that Texas failed to provide separate but e qual education, prefiguring the future opinion in Brown that "separate but equal is inherently unequal." 1950 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents The Supreme Court invalidated the University of Oklahoma's requirement that a Bl ack student, admitted to a graduate program unavailable to him at the state's Bl ack school, sit in separate sections of or in spaces adjacent to the classroom, library, and cafeteria.

Significance: The Supreme Court held that these restrictions were unconstitution al because it interfered with his "ability to study, to engage in discussions, a nd exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession. " 1950 Bolling v. Sharpe Charles Houston provided legal representation for the Consolidated Parents Group , who, under the direction of Gardner Bishop, attempted to enroll a group of Bla ck students in all White John Philip Sousa Junior High School, in Washington, D. C. Significance: The Bolling case became one of the consolidated Brown cases. The U . S. Supreme Court would eventually file a separate opinion on Bolling because t he 14th Amendment was not applicable in Washington, D.C. 1951 February On February 28, Brown v. Board of Education was filed in Federal district court, in Kansas.

1951 May Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al. NAACP lawyer Spottswood Robinson filed Davis v. Prince Edward County, a challeng e to Virginia's segregated schools. Significance: Davis et al.ICounty School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia , et al., was another of the cases eventually consolidated as Brown v. Board of Education. Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al. This South Carolina case went to trial. Marshall and the NAACP presented a vast array of social science evidence showing how segregation harmed Black school chi ldren, including evidence from sociologist Kenneth Clark's controversial "Doll S tudy." Significance: The U. S. District Court denied the Briggs plaintiffs request to or der desegregation of Clarendon County, SC, schools and instead ordered the equal ization of Black schools. Judge Julius Waring was the lone dissenter. 1951 June Brown v. Board of Education Robert Carter led the NAACP legal team into trial. Significance: In August, a three-judge panel at the U. S. District Court unanimo usly held in the Brown v. Board of Education case that "no willful, intentional or substantial discrimination" existed in Topekas schools. The U. S. District Cou rt found that the physical facilities in White and Black schools were comparable and that the lower courts decisions in Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin only appli ed to graduate education. 1951 October Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al.; Gebhart et al. v. Bulah et al.; Belton et al. v . Gebhart et al.; Bulah et al. v. Gebhart et al. These cases went to trial. 1952 March

Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, VA The U. S. District court found in favor of the school board under the theory of "separate but equal." Significance: The U. S. District Court unanimously rejected the Davis plaintiffs request to order desegregation of Prince Edward County, VA, schools, ordering th e "equalization" of Black schools instead. 1952 April Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al.; Gebhart et al. v. Bulah et al.; Belton et al. v . Gebhart et al.; Bulah et al. v. Gebhart et al. A Delaware court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to immediate admission to White public schools. Significance: In both of the Gebhart cases, the court ruled that the plaintiffs were being denied equal protection of the law and ordered that the 11 children i nvolved be immediately admitted to Delawares White schools. The board of educatio n appealed the decision. 1952 June The Supreme Court announced that it would hear oral arguments in Briggs and Brow n during the upcoming October 1952 term. 1952 October The Bundling of the Brown v. Board Cases Days before arguments were to be heard in Briggs and Brown, the Supreme Court an nounced a postponement. Three weeks later, the Court announced that it would als o hear the Delaware cases, as well as Davis v. Prince Edward County and the Dist rict of Columbia case, Bolling et al. v. Sharpe et al. Significance: The Supreme Court agreed to hear all five of the school desegregat ion cases collectively. This grouping was significant because it showed school s egregation as a national issue, not just a southern one. [Note: The U. S. Supreme Court eventually rendered a separate opinion on Bolling v. Sharpe because the 14th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution was not applicab le in the District of Columbia.] 1952 December 9th 11th First round of arguments held in Brown and its companion cases. 1953 June The Supreme Court ordered that a second round of arguments in Brown v. Board be heard in October. 1953 September Chief Justice Fred Vinson Jr. died unexpectedly of a heart attack on the 8th. Pr esident Eisenhower nominated California Governor Earl Warren to replace Vinson a s interim Chief on the 30th. The Court rescheduled arguments in Brown for Decemb er. Significance: Justice Earl Warren would go on to deliver the unanimous ruling in the Brown v. Board case. 1953 December 7th 9th Second round of arguments in Brown v. Board of Education. 1954 March

The Senate confirmed Earl Warren as Chief Justice. 1954 May 17 Brown v. Board of Education The Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, and declared that racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe That same day, the Court held that racial segregation in the District of Columbi a public schools violated the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment in Bolling v. Sharpe. The Court scheduled arguments on remedy in Brown for October but eventually put them off until April of 1955. Significance: The Court ruled that state-sanctioned segregation of public school s was a violation of the 14th Amendment and was, therefore, unconstitutional. In the wake of the decision, the District of Columbia and some school districts in the border states began to desegregate their schools voluntarily. State legislatures in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virgini a adopted resolutions of "interposition and nullification" that declared the Cou rt's decision to be "null, void, and no effect." Various southern legislatures passed laws that imposed sanctions on anyone who i mplemented desegregation, and enacted school closing plans that authorized the s uspension of public education, and the disbursement of public funds to parents t o send their children to private schools. 1954 October After the sudden death of Justice Jackson, President Eisenhower nominated John M arshall Harlan, the grandson of the lone dissenter in Plessy, to fill the vacanc y. After long hearings before the Senate, Harlan was finally sworn in as an Asso ciate Justice in March of 1955. 1955 April The Supreme Court heard its third round of arguments in Brown, this time concern ing remedies. May 31: Brown II On the last day of the term, the Supreme Court handed down Brown II, ordering th at desegregation occur with "all deliberate speed." Significance: Brown II was intended to work out the mechanics of desegregation. Due to the vagueness of the term "all deliberate speed," many states were able t o stall the Courts order to desegregate their schools. The legal and social obsta cles that southern states put in place and encouraged, in their effort to thwart integration, served as a catalyst for the student protests that launched the ci vil rights movement. "It takes a long timeto grow an old friend." -John Leonard Serrano v. NLRC There were counterprinciples of transcendent policies like the question: What s anctions are to be imposed on an employer who failed to serve upon an employee a notice of termination?

FACTS: Petitioner was hired by the Respondent Isetann Department Store as a secu rity checker to apprehend shoplifters. As a cost-cutting measure, private respon dent decided to phase out Serrano v NLRC [G.R. No. serrano v nlrc

its security section engage the services of an independent security agency. Pet itioner was then terminated prompting him to file a complaint for illegal dismis sal. NLRC ordered petitioner to be given separation pay holding that the phase-o ut of the security section was a legitimate business decision. However, responde nt was denied serrano v nlrc

the right to be given written notice before termination of his employment. ISSUE: What is the effect of violation of the notice requirement when terminatio n is based on an authorized cause? serrano v nlrc

HELD: The Wenphil doctrine stated that it was unjust to require an employer to r einstate an employee if, although termination is made with cause, if due process was not satisfied. The remedy was to order the payment to the employees of full backwages from the time of his serrano v nlrc

dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But his dismissal must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because the d ismissal is ineffectual. In termination of employment under Art. 283, the violat ion of notice requirements is not a denial of due process as the purpose is not to serrano v nlrc

afford the employee an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him for the re is none. The purpose is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying th e termination of his employment. With respect to Art. 283, the serrano v nlrc

employers failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a de nial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the terminatio n of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual. serrano v nlrc

If the employees separation is without cause, instead of being given separation p ay, he should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or given s eparation pay, he should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance. serrano v nlrc

With respect to dismissals under 282, if he was dismissed for any of the just ca uses in 282, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages fro m the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termina tion is for a just cause because the failure to hear him renders the termination of his employment without legal effect.

ANG TIBAY V CIR We find attendant in the case at bar transcendental considerations which outweig h rules of procedure thereby providing justification for the suspension of their application. Petitioners evidence and arguments in support of her claim of inno cence of the charge of grave misconduct have indeed cast doubt on the veracity o f the Ombudsmans factual conclusions in the subject administrative case. In view of the transcendental importance of the foregoing article (unprecedented Comment of a foreign legal luminary upon a local/Philippine case, involving a m ere private litigant) # ANG TIBAY V CIR We find attendant in the case at bar transcendental considerations which outweig h rules of procedure thereby providing justification for the suspension of their application. Petitioners evidence and arguments in support of her claim of inno cence of the charge of grave misconduct have indeed cast doubt on the veracity o f the Ombudsmans factual conclusions in the subject administrative case. Administrative Due Process In administrative proceedings, the elements were laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary rights" in justici able cases before administrative tribunals: a. There must be a hearing, where a party may present evide nce in support of his case. b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by a party . c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide the case correctly, its decision must be supported by evidence. d. The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accep

t as adequate to support a conclusion. e. The evidence must have been presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record and known to the parties affected. ANG TIBAY V CIR Correlated with doctrine in Navarro v Villegas### The ground invoked by the Mayor for denying the permit was that the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses may say or do something tending to disturb pu blic order. To warrant denial of the permit prayed for PHILCOMSAT V ALCUAZ The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribespeech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statut es in asingle prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitution ally protected expression is deemed tojustify allowing attacks on overly broad s tatutes ### with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own c onduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." Philcomsat v Alcuaz Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecomm unications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by orde r of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunicatio ns Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) x y -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 NON V DAMES Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enroll ment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petitio n the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they signed, and used its enroll ment form x y -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 NON V DAMES Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infrin ged. Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guarantee d by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are l

x y -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 NON V DAMES imitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rig hts within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out o f it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavio r should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disord er or invasion of the rights of others. x y -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 NON V DAMES imitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rig hts within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out o f it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavio r should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disord er or invasion of the rights of others. x