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Nietzsche Late Notebooks 35 [55]

Nietzsche Late Notebooks 35 [55]

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Published by Willem de Phoops
Nietzsche notes
Nietzsche notes

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Categories:Types, Research
Published by: Willem de Phoops on Jul 16, 2013
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On Nietzsche’s Late Notebooks 
Notebook 35, May - July 188535[55]
‘Timeless’ to be rejected. At a particular moment of a force, an ab-solute conditionality of the redistribution of all its forces is given: itcannot stand still. ‘Change’ is part of the essence, and therefore sois temporality which, however, just amounts to one more conceptualpositing of the necessity of change.
 This is one of the more obscure notes in Nietzsche’s notebooks.Obscurity is one of the distinguishing features of philosophy when itis genuinely practiced. It is precisely when the otherwise lucid exposi-tion winds away into an eddy that we have the emergence of a new idea.Clarity may come later or it may not. In any case, it is not necessarily theideal to which philosophical exposition should aspire. (The previous noteon the limitations of exposition serves as good context here.)As mentioned before, Nietzsche’s quite
insistence on locatingthings in time and space, even when that insistence leads to scrutiny of the inner world, behind the ego, characterized mainly by its causal aspect— dominates. Here in this note he expressly rejects the ‘timeless’, and itis ultimately on account of the fact that what is ‘timeless’ runs contraryto his experience of the world as being a never-ending web of causalinterrelations.Interpreting this note would seem to require a distortion, an impo-sition of clarity where none exists. It would appear that a force can becomposed of still other forces, though whether the relationship between
the rst force mentioned and the others is that of a whole and its parts
is unclear. The term ‘conditionality’ naturally echoes the ‘conditional’of note 35 [51]. In that note, Nietzsche states the radical dependence of any given thing on its conditions. As one might expect from a thinkerof Eternal Recurrence, the absolutely singular and unique preoccupiesNietzsche. After the realization that everything is causally related witheverything else, and after realizing that everything is in motion, it canonly follow that everything is absolutely unique. Moreover, everythingis
in relation to everything else: becoming for Nietzsche is not
a bounded property like that of being, it is not simply being-in-motion.Becoming for Nietzsche is the situation when a thing changes because itsrelation(s) to other things change(s). A thing is the sum of its relation-ships, and those relationships are always changing, therefore everything
is always changing. The specically causal aspect to this, which on a
deeper level means the
aspect to this, is the point of coinci-dence between things as they exist in an unfolding time and space, onthe one hand, and the mind that discovers them by way of movementthrough a certain time and space. Again, the unity of the epistemologicaland the ontological, the continuum of consciousness is what we see here.Reading the obscure clause “an absolute conditionality of the redistri-bution of all its forces is given” in this context makes it at least possible. The absolute conditionality is a way of saying everything is absolutelyconditional, the sum of its conditions, its relationships. It is logicallydependent for its logical meaning on everything else. The term ‘redis-
tribution’ here suggests a reconguration of those relationships whereby
the thing changes. Paraphrasing, we might say: ‘At any given moment
in the ‘life’ of a force, a total reconguration of that force is in principle
possible’. Here Nietzsche locates change in a force’s essence. He goes onto say, apparently in line with some contemporary physics, that changeis the primary fact from which ‘time’ is inferred. Thus, time as such maynot even exist, with the primary fact being change. This note of Nietzsche’s is a kind of inverted Leibnizism. Leibnizconceived of the monad along the lines of a formal-logical value, but oneto be thought of as radically prior to any relation (monads have no win-dows). Nonetheless, what was important about the monad was
 within it, even when construed as a set of instructions whereby the objectmight behave in the physical world. In Nietzsche’s note above, what iscontained inside — here, a force — is a dynamic, constantly changingoverall relationship to the outside. The sum of the relationships
thething. It can never be
in relation to something else (contra Leibniz), it
is always dened in relation to something else. The sum of these den
-ing relations is all that a thing is. And these relations keep changing. There are two ways to go with ‘change’ in this note. The one closerto Nietzsche’s sense would involve the admission that what he is tryingto construct here, in a way, is a kind of fanciful metaphysics. One thataccounts for the facts, surely, as he sees them. But to say ‘change is part
of its essence’ is to give the usual kind of tautological denition we see in

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