Tikhonov, Valentín Russia S Nuclear and M

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX The Human Factor in Proliferation
Valentin Tikhonov
A Report by the Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
2001 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 202-483-7600, Fax 202-483-1840 www.ceip.org All rights reserved. The Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project invites the liberal use of the information in this report for educational purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly state: From Valentin Tikhonov, Russias Nuclear and Missile Complex:The Human Factor in Proliferation, 2001, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Copies of this report can be obtained in several ways:

ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION
Download from www.ceip.org/npp or Order a print copy by contacting: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non-Proliferation Project 1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 202-939-2296 npp@ceip.org
RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE VERSION
Order a print copy by contacting: The Carnegie Moscow Center 16/2, Tverskaya str. Moscow, 103009, Russia Tel.: +7(095) 935-89-04 Fax: +7(095) 935-89-06 Email: info@carnegie.ru
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace normally does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Carnegie Endowment, its ofcers, staff, or trustees.
RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX
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F O R E WO R D
This report on the Russian nuclear and missile complex presents the results of a study commissioned by the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project, the Carnegie International Migration Program, and the Carnegie Moscow Center. The study was performed under the supervision of author Valentin Tikhonov, a well-known Russian sociologist specializing in migration problems. During the 1990s he conducted several studies of this nature on the closed nuclear cities (including one for the Rand Corporation), which made it possible to examine in greater detail the development of the situation there. This research project was made possible through the generous support of the John Merck Fund, for which the author and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace are grateful. The report was originally written in Russian and subsequently translated into English. Any errors or conicts resulting from the translation are the responsibility of the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project and not the author.
Alexander Pikayev Scholar in Residence, Carnegie Moscow Center Jon Wolfsthal Associate, Non-Proliferation Project Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CONTENTS
I N T RO D U C T I O N ......................................................................................................................... PA R T 1 : T H E S T U DY vii
Overview ..................................................................................................................................... Findings ......................................................................................................................................

PA R T 2 : T H E S U R V E Y S
2 7 18 20 24 29 36 42 50 52 67 72 74 77 83 93 99 103 106 108 113 117 120 121
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. List of Tables ................................................................................................................................

Nuclear Cities
1. Changes in Specialist Recruitment ....................................................................................... 2. Changes in the Qualitative Composition of Specialists Working in Closed Cities ................................................................................. 3. Living Standards in Closed Cities ......................................................................................... 4. Moonlighting ....................................................................................................................... 5. Specialists Financial Situation .............................................................................................. 6. Potential and Actual Emigration ........................................................................................... 7. Personnel Shift toward Private Business ............................................................................... 8. Personnel Training for the Nuclear Industry ........................................................................ 9. Nuclear Security and Personnel ............................................................................................
Missile Cities
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.
Migration as a Factor in the Evolution of Missile Cities ....................................................... Specialists Qualications ...................................................................................................... Wages and Salaries ................................................................................................................ Income and Housing ............................................................................................................ Moonlighting ....................................................................................................................... Financial Situation ................................................................................................................ Potential Emigration ............................................................................................................. Actual Emigration ................................................................................................................. Personnel Shift toward Private Business ............................................................................... Personnel Training for the Missile Industry .......................................................................... Missile Security and Personnel .............................................................................................
About the Author ........................................................................................................................ 1 2 5 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ............................................................................. 1 2 6
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I N T RO D U C T I O N
Alexander Pikayev Jon B. Wolfsthal
This report examines the situation facing the inhabitants of the Russian nuclear weapons and missile complex. Russia inherited this sprawling network of cities and production facilities after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In its inherited form, this complex represents a serious burden for the troubled Russian economy, is vastly oversized given the current international situation, and is a potential source of nuclear and missile proliferation and instability. Across the entire Russian landmass, hundreds of thousands of previously pampered scientists and technicians face dire economic conditions. Their economic hardship dramatically increases the risk that they will be forced to sell their skills or materials at hand to the highest bidder, and also increases the difculty Russia will have recruiting new scientists and technicians to join its military work force. The potential threats of migrating experts and materials diverted to proliferators have been a major source of concern for the United States and other countries throughout the 1990s. The disturbing demographic trends discussed in this report, however, reveal another growing concern: that it will be increasingly difcult for Russia to train, recruit, and maintain the type of experts it needs to ensure a safe, secure, and reliable strategic nuclear deterrent. This less widely acknowledged problem raises long-term security questions for Russia, the United States, and their strategic partners.
B A C K G RO U N D
After World War II, the Soviet Union applied enormous effort to the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, which was viewed at the timeand even today as a key component of its political and military status. Tens, if not hundreds, of enterprises were built, making it possible for Moscow to achieve nuclear parity with the United States by the early 1970s, but at the price of signicant overtaxing of the nations resources. During the 1940s and 1950s, the closed nuclear cities were developed far away from major cities and were almost totally isolated from the surrounding areas. It was possible to visit or relocate there only with specially issued passes, and the residents of the cities had to get ofcial permission to leave these sites. The cities were not shown on maps, had no names, and were referred to by the names of the nearest administrative centers plus a
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CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
postal code; for example: Chelyabinsk-45 or Krasnoyarsk-26. As a practical matter, however, they had nothing in common with these centers and often were located tens or even hundreds of kilometers from them. As compensation for their remote location, the populations of the closed cities enjoyed signicant privileges and advantages. A much better selection of foods and consumer goods was available than around the country as a whole, and at reasonable prices. Workers received higher pay and generally received free housing. This higher standard of living made it possible for the nuclear and missile enterprises to attract highly qualied specialists, including the top graduates from the countrys most prestigious universities. As a result, the nuclear cities were islands of relative well-being located, as a rule, in the midst of poor, underdeveloped regions, where the standard of living in the last years of the USSR was steadily declining. The situation was similar in the missile cities, although these developed in or near open cities and had fewer restrictions imposed on them. They were not so geographically isolated from the surrounding areas and, in most cases, could be found on a map.
C U R R E N T C I R C U M S TA N C E S
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to the relatively comfortable existence of those in the nuclear-missile complex and raised the specter of nuclear and missile brain drain from the former Soviet Union. A sharp reduction in government funding substantially reduced the standard of living in the nuclear and missile cities. Nuclear experts went months or longer without receiving any pay. Work orders declined, decreasing job satisfaction, and the relative benets that city residents once enjoyed all but vanished, without any real prospect for nding new jobs in their current locations. These circumstances create two potential security concerns. First, they give rise to fears that these highly trained and now disenfranchised workers might be tempted or even compelled to sell whatever was close at hand, or themselves, in order to make ends meet. Despite this potential, there has been only one known attempt at crossing the border by a large group of missile experts from the missile city of Miass in 1992. At the last minute, they were taken from an airplane setting out for Pyongyang, North Korea, from the Moscow international airport Sheremetievo-2. There is some information to indicate that representatives of the group had visited North Korea previously to look into the working and living conditions there. No concrete evidence of additional or individual emigration has come forward. It is known, however, that nuclear physicists have been invited to work in a number of developing countries of proliferation concern. There were unconrmed reports in mid-2000 that three experts from one of the countries of the former USSR had defected to the Taliban Movement. Moreover, the information revolution means that expertise can travel even if the expert stays put, with transfer of information taking place through computer, fax and phone networkstransfers that would be hard to identify and to stop. The threat of the unauthorized use of nuclear materials attracted most of the attention during the nineties; there were several recorded cases of theft, which led to a signicant but arguably underfunded effort to improve the security of and accounting for nuclear materials throughout the former Soviet Union. Second, Russias economic and strategic hard times have long-term implications for its ability to keep the human and technical capabilities necessary to maintain a modern nuclear arsenal. Just as the United States is facing potential problems as its nuclear work force agesand fewer top experts are interested in entering the fieldRussia is already facing a degradation in the skills of its nuclear experts. Without the needed investment
ix
in facilities, education, and living standards, Russia might face serious problems with the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal in the years ahead. Any insecurity in this area has serious implications for Russias perceived security and for international strategic stability. Maintaining systems as complex as nuclear weapons and long-range missiles requires a skilled, experienced, and motivated cadre of experts and technicians. Russia expects to maintain thousands of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. To ensure that its weapons are safe and operate as expected, it will need to address the changes taking place within its weapons complex. The rst step, to which this report contributes, is to help understand the nature and causes of those changes. The risk that a brain drain could lead to additional global proliferation sparked early attention from the United States and its international partners, but was largely overshadowed by concerns over nuclear weapons and materials. In 1991 and 1992, Western countries moved to engage and employ the elite of the ex-Soviet nuclear, chemical, biological weapon and ballistic missile complex through the International Science and Technology Centers, which were described at this time as technical dating services between Western government grants and ex-Soviet experts. The expectation was that the Russian economy would, within a reasonable amount of time, develop to the point where it could provide alternative employment for these experts. This expectation proved very wrong and, almost a decade later, the Russian economy is still unable to provide the necessary conditions for job creation to adequately employ this vast network of experts. Although the science centers and a variety of other unilateral and multilateral projects have made important progress toward employing ex-Soviet experts, the situation in the cities remains a serious concern and a threat to international peace and security. Without concerted and prolonged assistance to these locations, the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. The sponsors of this report hope that this study will be the rst step in a broader effort to better understand the changes going on in the Russian military complex and to develop effective responses to deal with the serious security challenges posed by those developments.
PART 1 The Study
OV E R V I E W
Despite international concern over the potential risks posed by the state of the Russian nuclear and missile complex, little hard evidence has been available to assess actual migration rates and their possible impact on prospects for international proliferation. In 1999 the Carnegie Moscow Center undertook to fill the gap in the study of migration from the nuclear-missile centers by commissioning this sociological eld study, which was conducted in three nuclear and three missile cities. In particular, the migration potential of the cities in question was studied. The results presented here stem from a number of surveys done as part of a larger project that analyzes the effects of migration on national and international nuclear security. It continues research begun in 1992 on potential and real migration of nuclear and missile scientists and specialists.1 This report provides heretofore unavailable information on and analysis of the problems confronted by Russian high-tech industries. The onset of concerns over the brain drain coincided with the transformation of the Russian political and economic system, including the reorganization of the Russian defense industry. Our study focuses on the migration of personnel in nuclear and missile industries and its detrimental consequences on national and international security. The study is based on ofcial statistics and detailed surveys. It analyzes several aspects of migration patterns, including:
s s
How and why people in these industries migrate; Migration of specialists to closed and open cities where nuclear and missile facilities are located; The potential and actual emigration of weapons specialists out of Russia; The private sectors absorption of nuclear and missile experts; and The training of incoming personnel by nuclear and missile industries.
s s s
For the purposes of this paper a specialist is a person who has received a higher education and occupies an executive, administrative, or scientic post in certain organizations.
S T U DY R E S U LT S
The study produced some surprising results. On one hand, the subjects expressed less desire to emigrate from Russia to other countries than in the early 1990s. The bulk of acknowledged migration during this time was to Israel, Germany and the United States, countries that do not represent a threat to Western security interests. The study did not discover a single instance of a departure for such problem countries as Iraq or Iran. On the other hand, the emigration potential in the nuclear-missile complex remains dangerously high. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that there was no signicant improvement in the overall conditions in the enterprises during the 1990s. As a result, while many of the experts were hoping at the start of the decade that the bad times would soon pass and the situation would improve, those hopes had been all but extinguished by the end of the decade. This state of affairs objectively has to push people in the direction of accepting offers of work, regardless of the source. Therefore, it would be a mistake to take the absence of documented brain drain cases to states of proliferation concern during the previous decade as a guarantee that there will be no such problem in the future. In a certain sense, the prevailing disappointment and hopelessness in the nuclear and missile centers more likely points to a growing risk of proliferation, even though a number of formal statistical measures might indicate the reverse. Why should the migration of nuclear and missile experts from the cities be a cause for concern? And why are concerted state policies needed to address these issues? There are a number of reasons:
s
The abundance of nuclear materials in the closed cities is at risk of being unlawfully sold on the open market, thereby exacerbating the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation; Under current conditions there is an equally disturbing possibility that nuclear and missile specialists could be exploited by countries seeking expertise to develop their own nuclear weapons and missiles; Nuclear missiles still exist, and specialists are required to maintain and improve their safety and security; The dismantling of nuclear weapons is a time-consuming and demanding process requiring the mastery of those specialists who were involved in the weapons development and production.
In short, the distinctive services and expertise of specialists in the nuclear and missile cities will be in demand for many years, and their potential migration poses numerous security problems for Russia and the global community. Sources within the industrial cities maintain that, for the time being, the impact of expert migration is under control.Yet the best remedy for missile- and nuclear-related transfers and emigration of specialists to aspiring nuclear countries is to increase salaries and improve job satisfaction, neither of which the Russian system can currently do. According to our study, the attitude of specialists toward their work is changing. In 1992, 20 percent of the specialists surveyed said they were proud of their work in the defense industry; in 1993, this gure had fallen to 15 percent. Certainly the gure is even lower by now. Sense of pride in work as a guard against the leakage of classied missile and nuclear know-how, including manpower and materials, is no longer reliable. The missile and nuclear infrastructures will continue to exist for the foreseeable future, although possibly modied in size and scope. Well into this decade and beyond, hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens will depend on this facet of the military-industrial complex. Consequently, the Russian government and associated experts have a responsibility to
understand the particular social and economic problems that beset these specialists at a time when Russian reforms are evolving. The better these trends are understood, the more effective targeted programs to address current circumstances will be. Balance of Migration. In order to maintain their capabilities, nuclear and missile industries require a balanced inow of a highly skilled and specialized work force to match the skills and numbers of people leaving the centers. The missile and nuclear cities are unable by themselves to provide the number of specialists required to support their large-scale civilian and military activities. Inevitably, some of the manpower must be trained and hired from outside the cities, a common practice in the past. As the departure of skilled specialists threatens the efcient operation of the nuclear and missile complexes, ensuring an inow of experts into the affected cities becomes a matter of Russian national security.Yet at the very time that current economic circumstances are fueling migration out of the cities, the qualities that formerly attracted new talent to the cities have all but disappeared. In the interest of national and international security, it is imperative to strike a balance between the migration into and out of the nuclear and missile cities. This balance must take into account both the number and level of expertise of the personnel. The right balance will be one that maintains the security of the nuclear and missile facilities while retaining adequate defense capabilities. This study aims to identify the predominant factors determining the migration of nuclear and missile specialists.
P L A N O F T H E S T U DY
In addition to studying the actual and potential migration to and from nuclear and missile centers, this study analyzes the general situation of labor markets in the subject cities and in Russia as a whole, as well as the dynamics of living conditions in nuclear and missile cities. Furthermore, the study examines the transfer of specialists from the private sector and the challenges involved in training new employees at the nuclear and missile complexes. The problem of personnel formation and personnel mobility within the missile and nuclear complex was also reviewed to evaluate its impact on the safety of the Russian military capabilities and to examine potential and real emigration of missile and nuclear complex experts. In support of this project, the study also relies on ofcial statistical data in a comprehensive database. The sources of the ofcial data are the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), the Federal Employment Service, the State Statistical Committee of Russia, and the results of specially commissioned sociological surveys conducted in the nuclear and missile industries in 1992 and 1999. These surveys were carried out through the auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences on the ground at nuclear and missile enterprises throughout Russia. The objectives of the study are:
s
To examine the mobility trends of personnel in the Russian missile and nuclear complex and to dene the negative trends in the hiring of new employees. These topics cover the following:
1. overall professional qualications; 2. age and gender of personnel; 3. professional characteristics of those applying for jobs and those leaving the industry; 4. sources of employee inow and quality of newly hired staff; 5. reasons for employee dismissals.
To analyze the structure and scale of potential and real emigration of specialists, including:
1. the direction of and conditions that induce emigration; 2. the possibility of experts emigrating to rogue states; 3. the factors that hinder or facilitate this process. The surveys for this study were conducted in enterprises located in ve of the ten closed nuclear cities under Minatoms jurisdiction and three missile plants in open cities. The Sampling Method. The surveys were conducted in person by two teams in June and July, 1999, at the working facilities of the people surveyed. The locations were chosen in order to cover all types of specialization. For the nuclear cities, this included research centers, production centers, and chemical centers, and for the missile enterprises, predominantly civilian space research, military missile production, and missile development facilities. Within each facility a quota was determined (90100 persons per facility). The size of the quota was determined by funds available for the survey and by the need to have a statistically signicant survey. Within the facility, the quota was distributed among several subdivisions proportionally to their share in the overall quantity of the experts at the facility. Inside the subdivision, the participants were selected randomly. The participants were not paid for their participation in the survey. The selected participants were so thankful for an opportunity to talk about their life to people from Moscow, who during recent years had seemed so far removed, that they were very cooperative and there was no need for additional nancial motivation.
S A M P L E S U R V E Y: N U C L E A R S I T E S
Our sample survey represents the prole of the closed cities as a whole. As table 1 shows, two of the ten closed cities (Sarov and Snezhinsk) specialize in scientic research, three (Lesnoy, Trekhgorniy and Zarechniy) host serial production of nuclear munitions, and ve contain various chemical enterprises supporting the nuclear industry.
Table 1. Specialization of closed cities
CITY S P E C I A L I Z AT I O N
Sarov Snezhinsk Trekhgorniy Lesnoy Zarechniy Zelenogorsk Ozersk Novouralsk Zheleznogorsk Seversk
Scientic research, the Federal Nuclear Center Scientic research, the Federal Nuclear Center Serial production of nuclear munitions Serial production of nuclear munitions Serial production of nuclear munitions Chemical industry complex Chemical industry complex Chemical industry complex Chemical industry complex Chemical industry complex
The sampling method for the study was applied in each category of city (scientic research center, plant producing nuclear munitions, chemical center). The nal set included Sarov and Snezhinsk (scientic research centers), Seversk (chemical center), and Zarechniy and Trekhgorniy (production centers). The survey was conducted among one hundred working specialists at each major enterprise located in the selected cities. All received higher education and occupy managerial positions in scientic research and engineering. The study also surveyed twenty employees who had either left or joined the ve enterprises in 1999.
Table 2. Working and surveyed specialists in selected closed nuclear cities
TOWN UNIVERSE SAMPLE PORTION OF SAMPLE, %
Sarov Snezhinsk Seversk Zarechniy Trekhgorniy Total
10000 5700 4500 4200 2000 26400
100 100 100 100 100 500
1.0 1.8 2.2 2.4 5.0 1.9
In addition, a survey was conducted among thirty final-year students at each of five institutions of higher education that specialize in training personnel for the atomic industry: in the Moscow region, Moscow Physical Technical Institute in Dolgoprudniy; in Tula, Tula State University; in Chelyabinsk, South Ural State University; in Sarov, Sarov Physical Technical Institute; in Obninsk, Obninsk Institute of Atomic Power Engineering.
S A M P L E S U R V E Y: M I S S I L E S I T E S
The sample represents the major enterprises of the missile industry, including both those researching and implementing peaceful uses of outer space and those manufacturing strategic missiles and designing submarine-launched missiles. Our survey included eighty working specialists at each major enterprise located in the three selected towns. All have a specialized higher degree and occupy positions in scientic research, engineering, and administration. The survey also covered twenty employees who had either left or joined the three enterprises in 1999 (table 3). In addition, a survey was conducted among thirty nal-year students at each of three institutions of higher education that specialize in training personnel for the missile industry: in Moscow, Moscow State Technical University in Bauman and the Forestry Technical University in the Mytischi; in St. Petersburg, the Mechanical Institute.
Table 3. Working and surveyed specialists in the missile industry

CITY ENTERPRISE ENTERPRISE S P E C I A L I Z AT I O N UNIVERSE SAMPLE PORTION OF SAMPLE, %
Miass
Rocket Center: Makeev Design Bureau Votkinsk Machine Building Plant Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation
Designing submarinelaunched missiles Production of Topol ballistic missiles Outer space systems, orbiting stations
500
80
17
Votkinsk
1700
80
Korolev
10000 12200
80 240
0.8 2
Total
FINDINGS
NUCLEAR CITIES
The Russian nuclear complex is made up of ten closed nuclear cities spread across the Asian landmass. The skills of the estimated 120,000 workers in these cities were essential to the development of Russias nuclear arsenal, and would be very useful to other would-be nuclearweapon states. Almost 2 percent of the work force in ve of these cities were surveyed for this report, and the major ndings are as follows:
Overall Migration
s
Between 1989 and 1999, the estimated overall migration inow to closed cities amounted to seventy-nine thousand people, or nearly eight thousand people a year. There is a marked reduction both in the absolute value and in the rates of migration inflow to closed cities. This indicates that, while closed cities remain attractive to migrants, the attraction is diminishing rapidly. There are reasons to believe that in two or three years migration to closed cities will reach a zero value, and then quite probably an outow of population will begin. Migration of specialists to closed cities reached its peak in the early 1980s, and then began to decrease. The decrease was accompanied by an increase in the number of permanent residents among the specialists who began to work in closed cities, and this growth noticeably accelerated in the 1990s. The 1990s saw an explosion in the share of closed cities permanent residents taking jobs at the enterprises, from 24 percent in the 1980s to 65 percent in the 1990s. The pattern of migration flow is changing. Before 1990, residents of open cities accounted for more than 80 percent of migrants, and in 1990 residents of closed cities who had studied in open cities formed two-thirds of the migration ow. In the 1990s, there was relatively little migration from open cities. Those who formerly had moved to closed cities to work are being gradually and, of late, ever more rapidly replaced by local residents.
Specialists Recruitment
s
The 1990s marked a turning point in the pattern of personnel recruitment in closed cities. Today nearly 90 percent of specialists working in closed cities are local residents. This represents a sharp contrast with the 1970s and 1980s, when only about one-third of specialists starting work in closed cities were local residents. The closed cities own demographic potential grew sharply (nearly 4.5 times) in the 1990s over the 1980s. Such substantial growth in the cities own labor resources has been a decisive factor in reducing migration inow into closed cities. This process was further intensied in the 1990s by a substantial reduction in demand for specialists by state enterprises. The reduction in state enterprises demand for specialists, combined with a demographic explosion, has led to the present situation in which unemployment among working-age residents of closed cities is 10 percent. The expected continuation of the demographic explosion in the rst decade of the twenty-rst century means that either the state enterprises take advantage of the favorable situation and carry out a substantial rejuvenation of their personnel or the cities will be faced with high numbers of unemployed youth and with all the ensuing negative consequences of that turn of events.
Qualications of Specialists
s
The 1990s saw very serious negative changes in key personnel. Not only was there a reduction in the percentage of staff members holding an academic degree, but the source of their degrees also changed. Before 1990, practically everyone holding an academic degree earned it while working at the enterprises. Peoples work at the enterprises provided them with material for a dissertation. In the 1990s, practically no dissertations were defended at the enterprises, and persons with academic degrees had to be recruited to the enterprises. This is an indication of the gradual disappearance of scientic life at the surveyed enterprises. In an overwhelming majority of cases, specialists for closed cities were trained at educational institutions in Russia. The disintegration of the USSR has not affected the system of personnel training. All major educational institutions offering instruction in the atomic elds have remained in Russia. In the 1990s there was a sharp increase in an adverse trenda rapid growth in the share of specialists receiving an education in closed cities themselves or in the regions where closed cities are located. There was a particularly marked drop in the share of specialists who obtained an education in Moscow and the Moscow Region, where the leading educational institutions are located. This adversely affects the professional standards of specialists. Among graduates holding academic degrees from institutions of higher education, the share of those from schools located in Moscow and the Moscow Region is about ve times greater than those who graduated from institutes in closed cities, and three and a half times greater than those who obtained a higher education in the regions where closed cities are situated.
Age of Specialists
s
Current trends in personnel movement are unfavorable to state enterprises. If they persist in the future, the average age of employees in the work force will increase even more. This will happen through an increase in the share of persons of near-retirement age and an equal reduction in the share of people between the ages of forty and forty-nine. Current patterns of specialist employment and disemployment prevent the rejuvenation of the work force and will result in a failure to maintain the stability of the present age pattern.
Income Levels and Sources

s
The level and structure of pay (in US dollars) received today is practically the same as in 1992, although the cost of living has risen considerably since then. About 60 percent of surveyed specialists receive monthly pay equivalent to less than US$50, and only 3 percent receive US$100 to US$125. Differentiation of pay by position held is minimal and to a relatively small degree depends on a citys primary activity. Average income per family member amounts to about US$46 and is nearly the same in all types of cities. Regular pay has ceased to be the main source of livelihood, giving way to money made by moonlighting. Sixty percent of specialists supplement their salaries by outside work. In most cases incomes earned through outside work are either comparable to or higher than regular pay. This explains why per capita incomes are higher in locations where the share of specialists doing outside work is greater (research and production centers) than in locations where regular pay is higher (chemical centers). In nearly two-thirds of all cases, money made on the side is earned outside a specialists profession. The average monthly income of specialists who do outside work is US$74 as against US$43 earned by those who do not. The average pay that specialists working in closed cities regard as sufcient to ensure themselves of a reasonable subsistence is US$160 a month. This is four times greater than their regular pay and a little more than twice as much as earnings that include money made on the side. An upsurge in the number of specialists who were moonlighting began in 19891992, and spiked in 1993. A combination of increasingly deteriorating economic conditions at state enterprises and the development in closed cities of a locus for outside work the private sectorled to this situation. In all, commercial activities rank rst at the surveyed enterprises, followed by work done under foreign research grants and contracts, and then by work done under domestic research grants and contracts.
Living Standards of Specialists

s
The vast majority of people at the enterprises are provided with housing. Nearly 90 percent of surveyed specialists live in separate apartments. To leave a closed city today means, in effect, to lose ones housing, for the opportunities to sell it are at best limited by a low effective demand, and, in addition, in most cases housing belongs to local enterprises. This circumstance is a major restraint on the outow from closed cities.
10
Between 4 percent and 15 percent of respondents in different types of cities believe that their nancial situation has remained unchanged or has improved over the period of reforms (19921999). About 85 percent to 96 percent of respondents in the surveyed cities are of the opinion that their nancial situation has deteriorated, and 41 percent to 61 percent note that it has deteriorated sharply. If stated in terms of win and loss, then specialists working in closed cities are among those who have suffered losses during the reforms. Engineers and research workers, who account for four-fths of the total number of specialists, give the most negative evaluation of their nancial situation: between 83 percent and 88 percent regard it as difcult or very difcult, and only 1 percent to 2 percent as good. Heads of section are more optimistic: nearly three times as many of them regard their situation as normal, and four to ve times fewer regard it as very difcult.
Attitudes toward Migration

s
Fourteen percent of surveyed employees would like to work abroad. This number has fallen to between one-fth and one-sixth of what it was in 1992. The drop is a result of the fact that low incomes and administrative restrictions make it virtually impossible for residents of closed cities to leave the country on their own. Eighty percent of surveyed experts would be willing to work in the military industry of a foreign country. Only 16 percent of respondents have a negative attitude toward those who are going to emigrate from Russia and therefore cannot be, in principle, regarded as potential emigrants. Nearly 60 percent are neutral (havent given emigration much thought or view it as a personal affair) and 21 percent approve of them or even envy them. Therefore, emigration potential is much greater than appears from the answer to the question about specialists intentions to work abroad. Emigration ow from closed cities started approximately in 1991 and reached its peak in 1996, following which it began to decrease. In the 1990s, about 1 percent of the total number of specialists working at the surveyed enterprises went abroad each year.
Moves to Private Enterprises

s
It is not emigration but specialists taking jobs with private businesses and launching their own businesses that pose the most serious damage to the enterprises by depleting their personnel. In the 1990s, the intensity of the outow from enterprises to private businesses was ve to six times greater than emigration. Specialists who quit their jobs at state enterprises are playing a major part in shaping the new economic entities. Forty percent of them are running their own businesses, and 60 percent are continuing to work for hire.
11
Taking a job in private business entails a change of profession. Less than 25 percent of both men and women who have taken jobs with private businesses are working in the same profession as before. A total of 90 percent of those who have taken such jobs are satised with the fact that they have left state enterprises for their present position. People running their own businesses and those working for hire tend to be equally satised with their decision to quit the state enterprises. It is not by accident that more than 70 percent of those who would like to quit their jobs at the surveyed enterprises wish to take jobs in private business. Of every one hundred specialists who quit their jobs at state enterprises to take jobs with private businesses fewer than sixty return to public sector enterprises.
Education of New Specialists

s
New employees at the enterprises entered graduate schools during the 1990s, a period of low acceptance standards and low competition for available slots. In the present economic situation, 75 percent of students are forced to take jobs while pursuing their studies. Outside work, however, adversely affects grade averages. Among students who did outside work, those who received mostly excellent grades numbered half those receiving mostly satisfactory grades and one and a half times fewer than those receiving mostly good grades. Students who received mostly excellent grades spent more time studying than making money on the side. By contrast, nearly half of those who received mostly satisfactory grades spent as much or more time on outside work than on studying. In all, 43 percent of surveyed graduates would not, under any circumstances, work at state enterprises, and this sentiment is growing. Approximately one-third of respondents would take such a position, but only if circumstances (especially salary levels) in the cities changed signicantly. The better the student, the greater the probability he or she will take a job at a state enterprise. This holds out hope that state enterprises stand a better chance than commercial companies of recruiting specialists whose academic training is of high quality. The survey has shown that the most serious negative aspect of the changes in personnel consists of the aging of the work force in the absence of an inow of young people to the enterprises. As for what the consequences of this aging trend will be, 50 percent of respondents cited a slowdown in scientic research, and 42 percent cited a paucity of new ideas coming from state enterprises. These are alarming symptoms, precursors of a situation in which the nuclear industry is slow to adapt to modern requirements.
Security Implications
s
Forty percent of respondents believe that negative changes in personnel composition at their enterprises have already adversely affected the countrys nuclear security, and 53 percent think such an effect will be felt in the near future. Only 6 percent of respondents believe that changes now taking place will not affect Russias nuclear security.
12
MISSILE CITIES
Russias missile complex is well-developed and has produced a wide range of civilian and military rockets. The skills of the specialists employed in these cities would be valuable for those states interested in developing long-range ballistic missile capabilities. Unlike the nuclear complex, the missile cities were never closed, providing residents with greater access to the outside world and other employment opportunities. Three major missile enterprises were surveyed for this study, and the major ndings are as follows:
Overall Migration
s
Migrants have played a seminal role in providing specialist personnel for the missile industry. Their inuence is greatest in Miass, where they account for 95 percent of currently employed specialists. In Votkinsk and Korolev, migrants make up 50 percent of all specialists. The number of migrants employed by the missile enterprises rose until the 1980s. Thereafter, the number of migrants has rapidly fallen, reecting the general situation of creeping stagnation and degradation in the industry. The bulk of migrants (from 88 percent in Korolev to 49 percent in Votkinsk) are adult outsiders who deliberately decided to move to missile cities. Over the past ten years, the missile industry enterprises have been experiencing a reduction in employment. As the enterprises demand for specialists nose-dived, there was a change in the hiring pattern in the 1990s in favor of local residents. This has radically reduced migration to the missile cities. In the 1990s, migrants came mostly from residential localities within the missile city regions.
Qualications of Specialists
s
Most holders of postgraduate degrees are migrants who moved to missile cities from beyond the regions where the cities are located. Those born outside Russia are the second largest group in this category of migrants. In the missile industry, those with the highest qualications consist mostly of persons born around Russias periphery, including ex-USSR Republics. Therefore, the 1990s slump in migratory inow of specialists to the missile enterprises actually diminished the overall quality of specialists in the missile cities. Educational institutions located in ex-USSR Republics, with a 1 percent to 2 percent share, play a very minor role in training missile industry specialists. The USSRs collapse has had no impact on the personnel training system for research and development establishments or manufacturing enterprises of the missile industry. Moscows educational institutions play a signicant role in the training of missile industry specialists in Korolev only. In Votkinsk and Miass, two-thirds of all specialists were educated either in the cities themselves or within the local regions.
13
The composition of newly hired personnel at missile enterprises demonstrates a continuous replacement of migrants with permanent residents of missile cities who hold diplomas from institutions of higher learning located in the missile cities themselves. The missile industry, which in its prime used to extensively employ personnel from the entire country and used to rely on a broad network of colleges and universities, currently meets its modest demands for specialist personnel mostly by hiring graduates of local colleges and universities who reside in the missile city regions.
Age of Specialists
s
Thus, in the 1990s, the economic crisis and dramatic reduction in missile industry employment helped normalize the specialists age prole. Forced to retrench, the enterprises red older employees rst, while hiring mostly young people. But for the need to retrench, the continuation of negative trends in personnel mix seen in the early 1990s would have meant that an overwhelming share of specialists would be of preretirement and postretirement ages. Such a development could have crippled the industry.
Income Levels and Sources

s
In Votkinsk, 80 percent of all specialists have monthly wages in the range of US$25 to US$50 per month; 50 percent of Miass specialists earn incomes that fall in that range. The average monthly wage levels in Votkinsk and Miass amount to US$40 and US$50, respectively. In Korolev, 40 percent of all specialists make between US$100 and US$150, while 35 percent make between US$50 and US$100 per month. The average monthly wage in Korolev is US$115. In Miass, wage delays average six months virtually across all specialists. In Votkinsk, 50 percent of specialists are owed back wages, and the delay in payment of wages is under one month. Korolev experiences no wage delays. Average wages that, according to specialists themselves, would be commensurate with their occupation and qualications are as follows: in Votkinsk and Miass, US$170 and US$225, respectively; in Korolev, US$420. These gures are about four times as high as actual wages in these cities. In fact, the salaries that specialists consider presently commensurate with their occupation and qualications are unrelated to occupation and qualications; rather, the desired salary levels depend on the enterprises economic situation and actual wage levels. Average monthly income of the specialists families is low and strongly differentiated across various cities. In Miass and Votkinsk, it equals about US$33, while it is about US$80 in Korolev. Average amounts of desired family income per capita are three to four times higher: US$214 in Korolev, and US$123 and US$110 in Miass and Votkinsk, respectively.
Living Standards of Specialists

s
Over 80 percent of specialists live in individual apartments. There is no difference in housing standards between missile cities located in outlying regions (Miass and Votkinsk) and those immediately outside Moscow (Korolev). In order to supplement their low salaries, specialists have to hold second jobs. Overall, 28 percent of specialists in the surveyed cities moonlight.
14
Most specialists began moonlighting between 1990 and 1997. This development was driven both by the progressively worsening economic positions of government enterprises and by an expanding base of moonlighting jobs, that is, the sector of the economy not related to government enterprises expanded in the missile cities. Forty percent of moonlighters in Miass have incomes from their second jobs comparable to their regular wage; the rest claim lower moonlighting incomes. In Korolev, about 70 percent of all moonlighters have earnings from their second jobs that are either comparable to their regular wage or twice as high. The most difcult situation prevails in Votkinsk, where the overwhelming majority of moonlighters make only 30 percent to 70 percent of the lowest wage among the cities surveyed. Missile city specialists have lost out in the reforms. A large majority (66 percent to 86 percent) nd themselves worse off nancially; this gure includes 48 percent in Korolev, 72 percent in Miass, and 79 percent in Votkinsk of respondents who saw a dramatic fall in living standards. None of the respondents consider their current nancial situation to be very good. Virtually no one refers to it as being good. Only between 8 percent and 21 percent view it as normal, whereas the rest mostly consider it difcult or desperate.
Attitudes toward Migration

s
The percentages of persons willing to work abroad varies from 12 percent at the strategic missile plant in Votkinsk to 28 percent and 32 percent in Korolev and Miass, respectively. Between 1992 and 1999, the number of people who wanted to work abroad fell by a factor of 2.5. Those willing to emigrate in 1999 have virtually the same age distribution as in 1992, only their desire is presently 2.5 times less intense. Only one person in ve who is willing to emigrate does something to realize that desire. Only 5 percent of those wishing to work abroad (that is, 2 percent of persons presently employed) take any concrete action by approaching foreign companies. Generally speaking, most persons willing to emigrate merely dream about it. Therefore, emigrating independently from missile cities in order to work abroad is presently next to impossible. People are not ready to take independent action. Their emigration must be properly arranged. Thus, in principle, emigration from missile cities may occur only through an arrangement established by someone other than the person wanting to emigrate, not through individual efforts. Less than one-half of respondents said no in reply to the question whether they would work in the military industry of another nation. One person in ve would agree to do that kind of work, while the rest are either undecided or gave a qualied response. Specialists do not consistently reject working in countries normally referred to as aggressive regimes. Sixty percent of them failed to mention at least one such country among those to which they would refuse to go. Only 16 percent of respondents have negative views of people who leave Russia and therefore may not be regarded as potential emigrants. Almost 40 percent are indifferent, having never given emigration much thought or viewing it as a personal matter, and an equal number approve of emigrants or even envy them. Therefore, emigration potential is much higher than the answers regarding intentions to work abroad might suggest.
15
Eighteen percent of respondents at the surveyed enterprises indicate that some of their former coworkers have gone abroad since working at the enterprise. This gure is highest in Miass, at 21 percent, and lowest in Votkinsk, at 8 percent. Emigration started in 1967, peaked in 1997, and began to decline thereafter. Over the period in question, emigration averaged about 1 percent of all specialists employed by the enterprises surveyed. Eighty percent of those who emigrate are men. Of these, 60 percent are ethnic Russian, and the rest are mostly Jewish. Economic considerations are the main reason for emigration. One person in three left for family reasons, while one in ve had political motives. Specialists from missile cities have no history as yet of going to countries with aggressive regimes. Forty-three percent of all emigrants went to North America, 15 percent to Israel, one person in three to Western Europe, and the rest to Australia and New Zealand. Four-fths of all emigrants left for good; the rest went abroad to work temporarily.
Moves to Private Enterprises

s
Emigration is not the worst problem to hit the enterprises human resources. Migration of specialists to private business and to self-employment has been even more detrimental to the pool of specialists available. The ratio of emigrants to those moving to private businesses and self-employment is 1:6. Specialists leaving missile enterprises play an important role in the development of new economic structures. Thus 48 percent to 53 percent of these specialists have their own business, while the rest remain hired employees, though now in the private, as opposed to the public, sector. As a rule, migration to a business entity involves a change of profession. Only 6 percent to 24 percent of persons taking business jobs have the same profession they had at the public enterprise. The rest have had to change their trade. Professional change does not deter specialists from joining business entities, however. Ninety percent of specialists who have joined business entities are happy to have left the government enterprise.
Education of New Specialists

s
Most young specialists who will become employed in missile cities in the next few years were admitted to college and university at a time of low competition for admittance two to three persons per vacancy or even less. A low competition rate translates into low admittance standards for newly admitted students and consequently into a generally poor quality of graduate. Over half of all students chose their occupation deliberately, in the belief that it is an interesting eld. The share of students selecting their occupation randomly has fallen. Simultaneously, in another development, there is a rise in the share of students attaching a higher importance to advanced education for its own sake, rather than for its value in preparing one for a specic occupation. Deliberate occupational choices are closely related to the academic achievements of would-be specialists. Respondents with an excellent academic record include only students who, on admittance, believed the chosen occupation to be promising.
16
In principle, compared to private businesses, government enterprises have a better chance of hiring mostly B and A students over average ones. It is important that government enterprises not miss this chance while it exists. Research ndings show that, according to respondents, major adverse developments affecting the human resource prole include an aging work force (61 percent), and an inadequate inow of young workers to missile enterprises (48 percent). For the most part, the reasons for the aging of the work force are unrelated to the natural generational change, which has seen older workers retire while fewer younger workers replace them. It is primarily caused by an inadequate inow of young workers. The latter is due to an ongoing decline in the levels of employment at missile enterprises. Missile enterprise employment has fallen not only because of pre-planned retrenchments, but also because promising specialists have left to join private enterprises. The share of specialists in the most productive age bracket, thirty to forty years, among those moving to business entities is almost four times higher than any other age group among all employees. Specialists under thirty are half as likely as those between thirty and forty to leave for jobs in private business. The few young workers hired by missile enterprises have poor engineering training. On the other hand, there are no incentivesfor example, work involving creative selfdevelopment, career prospects, or adequate wagesfor well-trained young specialists to join. Among the adverse developments affecting the employee composition at missile enterprises, 37 percent of respondents cite a slowdown in scientic research, while 62 percent mention a dearth of new ideas and overreliance on earlier research and development projects.
Security Implications
s
Forty-one percent of respondents believe that adverse developments in the makeup of specialist personnel have already affected nuclear security, while 42 percent expect such negative consequences in the near term or longer term. One in four is either undecided or believes that current changes will not affect Russias nuclear security. Most respondents (81 percent) believe that the situation in missile cities, because it affects the countrys defense, endangers Russia. Only 10 percent of respondents refer to a global threat in terms of missile technology proliferation.
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MISSILE CITIES
1 0 . M I G R AT I O N A S A FA C TO R I N T H E E VO L U T I O N O F M I S S I L E C I T I E S
10.1. Migrant1 Specialists in Missile Cities: Changing Numbers
The evolution of the Russian missile industry has been anything but uniform. Its development included a period of gestation and rapid growth from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. As international tensions eased in the 1970s and arms control agreements inuenced the rates of missile production, growth in the missile industries slowed. The industry entered an unprecedented period in the 1990s, however, with the collapse of the USSR and the related economic depression, the effects of which persist to this day. In the 1990s, the industrys employment fell drastically, owing to both insufcient government funding and retrenchments and to the creation of new opportunities in private enterprises in which specialists could earn much more than in government projects.
1. As in our analysis of migratory processes in closed cities, we divide all specialists into migrants and permanent residents of missile cities. Migrants moving into missile cities are those specialists who graduated from colleges and universities outside the missile city and made a deliberate, independent decision to work in missile cities. Migrants include local residents who studied outside the missile cities and outsiders. Local residents include those born in missile cities plus those born outside who moved to missile cities as children with their parents, that is, never selected their present residence in a deliberate, independent manner. By outsiders, we mean those born outside missile cities who moved in after graduation. Permanent residents of missile cities are local residents who graduated from colleges and universities in the missile cities themselves. Such categorization presumes that migration is treated not merely as a change of residence, but rather as an independent, deliberate choice to relocate.
78
This developmental history of the missile industry is manifest in its hiring prole (gure 10-1).
Figure 10-1. Migrants vs. permanent residents taking jobs in missile cities, % of the survey sample 45%
30%
15%
0%
Before 1960 196069 1970-79 Year employed 1980-89 1990-99
All specialists
Migrants
Permanent population
Thus migration of specialists into missile cities peaked in the 1980s and then started to decline. As the number of migrants working in the missile cities began to decline, the number of permanent resident specialists being hired there increased. Growth in resident hiring slowed noticeably in the 1990s, which witnessed a dramatic overall drop in the number of specialists employed at the surveyed enterprises, reversing the trend of the 1980s. Thus, the 1990s represented a profound crisis in the civilian and military rocket industries alike.
10.2. Migrants vs. Permanent Residents of Missile Cities
The impact of migration on the prole of specialists hired is most obvious in the changing ratio of permanent residents to migrants throughout the development of the missile cities (table 10-1).
Table 10-1. Migrants vs. permanent residents of missile cities, time prole, %
Y E A R E M P L OY E D I N MISSILE CITY JOB S P E C I A L I S T G RO U P S ALL SPECIALISTS
Permanent residents
Migrants
1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69 Total sampling
81 47 57 30 49
19 53 43 70 51
100 100 100 100 100
79
Currently, there is virtual parity in the number of migrants and permanent resident specialists employed by missile city enterprises, although one can see a trend toward a growing share of permanent residents among new employees. Figure 10-2 depicts this process in greater detail, illustrating the generally downward trend in the number of migrants employed.
Figure 10-2. Migrants vs. permanent residents of missile cities, %
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
199599 199095 198589 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064 Year employed
Linear (permanent population)
Linear (migrants)
Migrants
In addition to uctuations in hiring patterns throughout the missile industry, research has uncovered divergent hiring patterns in different cities (gures 10-3 and 10-4).
Figure 10-3. Korolev: permanent residents vs. migrants, %
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
199599 199095 198589 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064 Year employed
Linear (migrants)
Migrants
80
In Korolev (g. 10-3) and Votkinsk, there was a persistent upward trend in the percentage of permanent residents hired over time. In Miass (pronounced me-Us), by contrast, the overwhelming majority of specialists are migrants (g. 10-4).
Figure 10-4. Miass: Permanent residents vs. migrants, %
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
199599 199095 198589 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064 Year employed
Linear (migrants)
Migrants
10.3. Structure of Migratory Inows to Missile Cities
According to our denition, specialist migration into missile cities is composed of two groups: local residents and outsiders (table 10-2).
Table 10-2. Specialists migration ow for surveyed cities, time prole, %
Y E A R E M P L OY E D I N M I S S I L E C I T Y J O B LOCAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDERS
1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69 Total sampling
29 6 6 14 8
71 94 94 86 92
In addition to the dramatically lower percentage of migrants taking jobs in missile cities in the 1990s, changes are also affecting migration ow. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s the percentage of returning local residents working in the cities remained effectively stable at 5 percent, in the 1990s local residents accounted for almost one-third of total migration to the missile cities. Figure 10-5 details the shift in balance from outsider to local residents in migration to the missile cities. Moreover, the gures show that the trend toward a higher share of local residents is accelerating, the most signicant changes taking place in the 1990s.
81
Figure 10-5. Migration to missile cities: Local residents vs. outsiders, %
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
199599 199095 198589 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064 Year employed
Linear (local residents)
Local residents
Linear (outsiders)
Outsiders
The lower share of outsiders in the migration ow may be due in part to the unavailability of proper housing in the missile enterprises. At best, outsiders moving to the cities can expect to nd housing in hostel facilities, as wages at enterprises are simply too low to cover the cost of renting a house. This inconvenience substantially dissuades many outsiders from accepting employment in the missile enterprises. Because local residents are divided into migrants and permanent residents depending on where they were educated, it is useful to consider the changing mix of local residents (g. 10-6).
Figure 10-6. Local residents: Permanent residents vs. migrants, %
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

199599 199095 198589 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064 Year employed
Linear (permanent residents)
Permanent residents
Linear (migrants)
Migrants
82
As the gure illustrates, a small number of local residents return to nd employment in the missile cities after receiving their education elsewhere. Moreover, this percentage is decreasing. This suggests that local residents, forgoing an opportunity to study elsewhere, are increasingly choosing to pursue their education in the missile cities.This decision may have something to do with cost considerations, as the costs of an education outside missile cities can be prohibitive. Expenses, including travel, room and board, and tuition, are generally beyond the economic means of most families in the missile cities. Therefore, fewer local residents leave missile cities to obtain specialized education.
10.4. Local Residents Role in Providing Specialist Personnel to Missile Cities
We have already seen that local residents are playing an increasingly signicant role in the cities employment patterns. Table 10-3 shows the outcome of such a process, that is, the makeup of newly hired personnel in terms of local residents versus outsiders.
Table 10-3. Specialists taking jobs in missile cities: Local residents vs. outsiders, %
Y E A R E M P L OY E D LOCAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDERS
1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69 Total sampling
87 50 60 40 53
13 50 40 60 47
Thus, the 1990s witnessed a sea change in the makeup of specialist personnel in missile cities. Today, almost 90 percent of newly hired specialists are local residents, contrasting with the 1970s and the 1980s, when local residents accounted for only 50 percent to 60 percent of all new specialists hired. This trend is also manifest in individual cities (gs. 10-7, 10-8, 10-9).
Figure 10-7. Korolev: Newly hired personnel: Local residents vs. outsiders, %
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
199599 199095 198589 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064 Year employed
Local residents
Linear (outsiders)
Outsiders
83
Figure 10-8. Miass: Newly hired personnel: Local residents vs. outsiders, %
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
199599 199095 198589 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064 Year employed
Local residents
Linear (outsiders)
Outsiders
Figure 10-9. Votkinsk: Newly hired personnel: Local residents vs. outsiders, %
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
199599 199095 198589 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064 Year employed
Local residents
Linear (outsiders)
Outsiders
1 1 . S P E C I A L I S T S Q U A L I F I CAT I O N S
11.1. Changes Affecting Highly Trained Personnel
In the 1990s, some adverse developments affected the best-qualified personnel, and consequently interest in missile-related graduate degree programs has been declining. Only one-fourth of those with postgraduate degrees obtained those degrees in the past decade, mostly prior to 1995. In addition, the average age at which students acquire advanced degrees has been increasing. Whereas prior to 1990, 45 percent of those with advanced degrees obtained them before the age of thirty-nine, only 25 percent fell in that age group between 1990 and 1999 (fig. 11-1).
84
Figure 11-1. Age of specialists with advanced degrees at the time of thesis defense, %
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 30 30-39 Age 40-49 50-59
19901999
Before 1990
Interestingly, all of those in the survey who hold a postgraduate degree are outsiders (table 11-1). Table 11-1 illustrates that most of those with postgraduate degrees have moved to the missile cities from Russia, but from a region other than that of the missile cities. Those born in non-Russian former Soviet Republics come in second in the provision of graduate degree holders, while the missile cities lag far behind. Of those holding advance degrees, only one in seven was born locally.
Table 11-1. Birthplace of advanced degree holders, %
BIRTHPLACE P O S T G R A D U AT E D E G R E E TOTA L SAMPLING
Yes
No
Missile city Missile citys region (Oblast) Other Russian region Ex-USSR Republics Total sampling
0 15 56 29 100
34 32 28 6 100
31 31 30 7 100
In fact, the greatest percentage of advanced degree holders is found among those arriving from outside Russia (30 percent). They are followed by persons born in Russian regions that have no missile cities (table 11-2). The share of postgraduate degree holders among persons born in ex-Soviet Republics is four times above the average and two times above the share of persons born in Russian regions that have no missile cities.
85
Table 11-2. Percentage of advanced degree holders among persons born in various regions, %
BIRTHPLACE P O S T G R A D U AT E D E G R E E TOTA L SAMPLING
Yes
No
Missile city Missile citys region (Oblast) Other Russian regions Ex-USSR Republics Total sampling
0 4 14 30 7
100 96 86 70 93
100 100 100 100 100
Ninety percent of all advanced degree holders in the missile cities surveyed work in Korolev, the remainder in Miass. Table 11-2 indicates that individuals born in Moscow and the Moscow Region contribute only a very small number of highly qualied personnel. In the missile industry, most highly qualied employees are from Russias periphery, including former Soviet Republics. Therefore, the shift in employment pattern from outsiders to local residents has adversely affected the quality of specialists in the cities because outsiders are more likely to have postgraduate degrees.
11.2. The Changing Geography of Specialist Training
Table 11-3 shows that 59 percent of all specialists working in Miass and 81 percent of those working in Korolev graduated from colleges and universities located either in the missile city itself or in the region where such cities are located. The role of Moscow-area institutes in educating missile industry specialists is signicant only in Korolev, which is located in the Moscow Region. Only 1 percent of those working in Votkinsk and 6 percent of those employed in Miass graduated from colleges and universities in Moscow or the Moscow Region. In Votkinsk and Miass, one-third of all specialists were educated in Russian regions other than the Chelyabinsk Region, Moscow Region, and the Republic of Udmurtia. Accounting for only 1 or 2 percent of the share of specialists in missile cities, educational institutions in ex-USSR Republics play a very minor role in training missile industry specialists. From this, one might conclude that the collapse of the Soviet Union has had little impact on the system of specialist training for research and development, manufacturing enterprises, and even for the missile industry.
Table 11-3. Location of colleges and universities attended by specialists, %
COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY L O CAT I O N CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Missile city and its local region Moscow and Moscow Region Other Russian regions Ex-USSR Republics Total sampling
81 81 18 1 100
59 6 33 2 100
65 1 33 0 100
78 67 20 1 100
86
Let us consider the changes experienced during the 1990s in the geographical pattern of higher education, as compared with previous periods. Clearly, in the 1990s, as the populations financial capabilities were dramatically reduced, an increasing number of students could pursue their education only close to home because they could not afford the expense of going elsewhere. In Korolev, where 85 percent of all currently employed specialists studied in the Greater Moscow Region, including Moscow City, the share of those educated in the Moscow Region shows a steady upward trend. Thus, while 69 percent of all specialists were educated in Moscow and the Moscow Region in the 1970s, the gure increases to 100 percent in the 1990s. Simultaneously, the share of specialists educated in other Russian regions dropped from 27 percent to zero. Specialists educated outside Russia were hired only during the 1970s, and their share remains insignicant (table 11-4).
Table 11-4. Korolev: Location of college/university attended by specialists joining the enterprise in various years, %
COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY L O CAT I O N Y E A R E M P L OY E D TOTA L SAMPLING
1990-99
1980-89
1970-79
1960-69
Missile city Missile city region Moscow and Moscow Region Other Russian regions Ex-USSR Republics Total sampling
12 88 100 0 0 100
7 79 86 14 0 100
10 80 90 5 5 100
8 69 77 23 0 100
8 77 85 14 1 100
In Votkinsk, 75 percent of all specialists presently employed were educated either in the city itself or in the Republic of Udmurtia, where the city is located, while 20 percent were educated in other Russian regions. The role of Moscow and the Moscow Region in personnel training is relatively insignicant. The enterprise employs virtually no graduates of colleges and universities located outside Russia proper. In Votkinsk, the personnel training prole has remained rather stable over a long period, with an obvious trend toward an increasing reliance on Udmurtia. This trend began in the 1970s and 1980s and gathered momentum to a point where, in the 1990s, Udmurtia graduates accounted for 89 percent of new employees. Prior to 1970 they made up only 58 percent of new employees.
87
Table 11-5. Votkinsk: Location of college/university attended by specialists joining the enterprise in various years, %
1990-99
1980-89
1970-79
1960-69
67 22 0 11 0 100
50 25 4 21 4 100
64 18 0 18 0 100
50 8 0 42 0 100
57 19 1 22 1 100
In Miass, graduates of colleges and universities located in the city and the local Chelyabinsk Region account for 66 percent of new employees. Six percent of all employees studied in Moscow and the Moscow Region, whereas only 2 percent were educated outside Russia proper. The trend toward a drastic decrease in the share of those educated in the countrys regions (other than the Chelyabinsk Region) is most noticeable in Miass. While prior to 1970, 35 percent of new hires were educated in Russias regions (except for the Chelyabinsk Region), the gure dropped to a mere 13 percent during the 1990s.
Table 11-6. Miass: Location of college/university attended by specialists joining the enterprise in various years, %
1990-99
1980-89
1970-79
1960-69
13 75 0 13 0 100
0 70 0 30 0 100
15 42 8 35 8 100
8 60 12 32 0 100
9 57 6 32 2 100
11.3. Trends in Migrants Education Prole
In Korolev, 69 percent of all migrants employed by the enterprise were educated in Moscow and the Moscow Region. The percentage of those trained in the region where Korolev is located displays a clear upward trend, whereas the other two cities show the opposite trend. Whereas prior to 1970, two-thirds of all migrants were educated in Moscow and the Moscow Region, this gure grew to 100 percent in the 1990s.
88
Table 11-7. Korolev: Location of college/university attended by migrants joining the enterprise in various years, %
COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY L O CAT I O N D E CA D E E M P L OY E D TOTA L SAMPLING
1990-99
1980-89
1970-79
1960-69
Missile city region Moscow and Moscow Region Other Russian regions Ex-USSR Republics Total sampling
100 100 0 0 100
73 73 27 0 100
75 75 12 12 100
67 67 33 0 100
69 69 28 3 100
In Votkinsk, 45 percent of all migrants were educated in the Republic of Udmurtia. The rest studied outside the Republic. Of these, Moscow/Moscow Region and the former Soviet Republics each account for only 3 percent of qualified employees. Votkinsk shows a clear trend toward a greater number of migrants being educated in Udmurtia. The share of migrants educated in Udmurtia rose from 17 percent in the 1970s to 67 percent in the 1990s.
Table 11-8. Votkinsk: Location of college/university attended by migrants joining the enterprise in various years, %
COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY L O CAT I O N D E CA D E E M P L OY E D TOTA L SAMPLING
1990-99
1980-89
1970-79
1960-69
67 0 33 0 100
50 8 42 8 100
50 0 50 0 100
17 0 83 0 100
45 3 52 3 100
In Miass, 62 percent of all migrants were educated in the Chelyabinsk Region, 7 percent in the Moscow region, and 3 percent outside Russia. The shift of personnel training to the Chelyabinsk Region was seen for the rst time in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the falling share of graduates from other Russian regions, including Moscow and the Moscow Region, is another visible trend. Prior to 1970, 35 percent of all migrants were educated in Russias regions outside Chelyabinsk. In the 1980s this gure dropped to 30 percent, falling further in the 1990s to a mere 14 percent.
89
Table 11-9. Miass: Location of college/university attended by migrants joining the enterprise in various years, %
COLLEGE/ UNIVERSITY L O CAT I O N TOTA L SAMPLING
D E CA D E E M P L OY E D
1990-99
1980-89
1970-79
1960-69
86 0 14 0 100
70 0 30 0 100
50 9 41 9 100
65 13 35 0 100
62 7 35 3 100
The composition of newly hired personnel in the missile enterprises has shown a continuous replacement of migrants with permanent residents of missile cities. These experts generally hold diplomas from locally established institutions of higher education. The missile industry, which in its prime used to employ personnel from the entire country, relying on a broad network of educational institutions, now meets its modest demands for specialist personnel mostly by hiring graduates of local colleges and universities who reside in the missile city regions. Throughout the 1990s, employment at missile industry enterprises has been visibly declining.
11.4. Demand for Specialists
The following section reviews the specialist mix in terms of length of service at the missilerelated enterprises (table 11-10).
Table 11-10. Specialists length of service at the enterprises, %
YEAR E M P L OY E D LENGTH OF SERVICE, YEARS CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69 Total sampling
Under 10 10-19 20-29 30-39
12 37 28 23 100
11 26 31 33 100
14 33 33 19 100
12 36 29 24 100
If the total number of personnel at an enterprise remains stable, each subsequent lengthof-service group should be smaller than the previous one. At the enterprises we surveyed, this holds true only for employee groups with ten or more years of service. Specialists with length of service under ten years (that is, hired in the 1990s) number three times fewer than specialists joining the enterprises in the 1980s. This reects the fact that the enterprises had fewer employees in the 1990s than in the 1980s.
90
Overall, the enterprises have an annual personnel attrition rate of 20 percent during an employees rst decade on the job. Therefore, the probability of an employee staying with the company after a year on the job equals 80 percent. With a 20 percent annual attrition rate, in ten years only eleven employees of the original one hundred employed would remain on the job. During the 1990s the annual rate of attrition at the enterprises we surveyed was estimated at about 12 percent. In order to prevent a decline in the overall number of employees, enterprises have had to hire new employees at a rate of 12 percent a year. Given that only 80 percent of those originally employed will stay on the job with every passing year and presuming the enterprises employment has remained stable throughout the 1990s, a 12 percent annual recruiting rate would bring about the projected length-of-service mix shown in gure 11-2. In fact, the actual length-of-service mix, which includes employees hired in the 1990s, differs greatly from the projected length-of-service mix that would have occurred if employment rates had stayed stable throughout the 1990s. The fact that the actual employee length of service is well below our projections clearly demonstrates a rapid decline in the number of specialists working at the enterprises. A drastic fall in the demand for specialists at these enterprises has tilted the hiring prole of the 1990s in favor of local residents, reecting a consequently dramatically reduced rate of migration to the missile cities.
Figure 11-2. Actual vs. hypothetical length-of-service profiles, % 10%
8% 6% 4% 2% 0%
1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Year employed 1993 1992 1991 1990
Actual
Hypothetical
11.5. Age Mix
Figure 11-3 presents data on the age mix of those surveyed in individual cities. There is a clear similarity in the age mix in Korolev and Miass and in both cities the age proles are bell-shaped. The modal age interval is forty to forty-nine years. About 40 percent of all specialists fall in this age group, while a considerable number are either younger or older than this group.
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Figure 11-3. Age of specialists presently employed in various cities, % 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Under 30 3039 4049 Age groups 5059 60 and over
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
In Votkinsk, the specialists age prole is parabolic. The modal interval here is the same, forty to forty-nine years; it accounts for almost as many specialists as in Miass. There are no specialists in Votkinsk over sixty, whereas in Miass and Korolev about 15 percent of specialists fall in that age range. On the other hand, Miass and Korolev have twice as many specialists under thirty as Votkinsk, and half as many specialists as Votkinsk who fall in the thirty to thirtynine age group. The 1992 and 1999 age proles of Energia Corporation employees (g. 11-4) provide some indication of the changes in age proles in missile enterprises during the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the average age was much higher than it is today. In 1992, 40 percent of all specialists belonged to the fty to fty-nine age group. Today, this age bracket accounts for only 20 percent of all specialists. In the absence of active recruitment policies during that period, 1999 would have had the age prole shown in gure 11-5. If that had occurred, 70 percent of all specialists would have been fty and older.
Figure 11-4. Korolev: Age profiles of specialists in 1992 vs. 1999, % 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
1999
1992
92
Figure 11-5. Korolev: Actual age mix of 1999 vs. 1992 age mix projected to 1999, %
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 30 30-39 40-49 Age groups 50-59 60 and over
Actual age structure, 1999
1992 age structure projected to 1999
Due to economic circumstances, management in the missile industry had to take specic steps to prevent a dramatic rise in the average age of employees. Surprisingly, the economic crisis has been instrumental in helping maintain a younger work force in the cities. In the inevitable downsizing, companies have primarily laid off older workers, who could demand somewhat higher salaries. They have been replaced by younger employees, though in smaller numbers (g. 11-6). Thus, in the 1990s, the economic crisis and consequent dramatic reduction in Figure 11-6. Korolev: Age profile of newly hired employment levels in the missile industry specialists, % have helped normalize the specialists age 100% prole. If not for the forced retrenchment, which heavily favored younger employees, 80% the industry would have found itself with a work force predominantly at or 60% beyond retirement age. Such a development could have crippled the industry.
40% 20% 0%
Under 30 Age 30-39
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1 2 . WA G E S A N D S A L A R I E S
12.1. Actual Wages
Wages are a basic determinant of labor mobility. In this regard, missile cities have failed to attract labor. As gure 12-1 shows, wages vary signicantly from city to city. In Votkinsk, 80 percent of all specialists have wages in the range of US$25 to US$50 per month. In Miass, only 50 percent of specialists fall in this earnings bracket. Monthly wage levels in Miass average US$40 to US$50. Workers in Korolev are in better circumstances: there the average wage is US$115; 40 percent of all specialists earn between US$100 and US$150, and 35 percent make between US$50 and US$100. Korolevs proximity to Moscow is partly responsible for the citys higher incomes, compared with outlying regions. A more important factor, however, is that specialists in Korolev are not conned to working for the government, but can work also on international space cooperation projects.
Figure 12-1. Monthly wages of specialists in the cities surveyed (June 1999), %
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 25 2550 50100 100150 US dollars 150200 200250 250 and above
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Figure 12-2 shows data on wages in Korolev in 1992. The wage proles of 1992 and 1999 differ signicantly. Over this period, the average wage tripled, although it remains quite low nevertheless. On the other hand, the wage proles in Miass and Votkinsk have remained at Korolevs 1992 level.
94
Figure 12-2. Wage profiles of specialists in Korolev, 1992 vs. 1999, %
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 25 2550 50100 100150 US dollars 150200 200250 250 and above
1992
1999
12.2. Wage Delays
The economic conditions of specialists are made even worse by the fact that wages in Miass and Votkinsk, low as they are, are not paid on time (table 12-1). Of the missile cities surveyed, Miass has had the most difculty paying its workers regularly, with an astounding 99 percent of wage earners owed back wages. Votkinsk follows with 47 percent still owed back pay. Korolev, on the other hand, has managed to pay a large majority of its employees on time.
Table 12-1. Wage delays, %
COMPLAINTS OF WA G E D E L AY S CITY
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Yes
99
47
Compared to Miass, Votkinsk has a much better record on payment of delayed wages (g. 12-3). Fifty percent of all specialists do not have their salaries delayed by more than one month, while 90 percent experience no delays in excess of two months. In Miass, however, the situation is different, as the average delay in wage payment is six months. Respondents pointed out that their wages and salaries are paid as one-sixth of the accrued overdue wage amount.
95
Figure 12-3. Duration of wage delays, %
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 0.5 0.51 12 23 34 Delays, months 45 56 67 7 and over
Miass
Votkinsk
Table 12-2. Average duration of wage delays, months

CITY
Votkinsk
Miass
Average duration of wage delays, months

12.3. Wage Differentiation by Position
1.1
5.6
Wages should differ signicantly depending on the specialists position, but this is not always the case. Consider the cases in the following cities: Votkinsk. In Votkinsk, wage differentiation by position is minimal (g. 12-4). The modal interval for all position groups is US$25US$50, and over 80 percent of specialists across the spectrum of positions fall into this salary range. Figure 12-4. Votkinsk: Wages of specialists by position, % Miass. Unlike salaries in Votkinsk, those in Miass do differ by position (g. 12-5). Over 60 percent of researchers and 100% engineers make US$25US$50, whereas only 20 percent of executives make that 80% much. The modal interval of executive salaries is US$50US$100. Notably, unlike 60% the asymmetric wage prole of engineers and technicians, the executives feature a 40% normal distribution in the US$25US$150 wage range. The average executive wage 20% is US$85, while lower-level employees 0% average US$38.
Under 25 2550 US dollars 50100
Scientific and technical personnel
Managers
96
Figure 12-5. Miass: Wages of specialists by position, %
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 25 25-50 50-100 US dollars 100-150 200-250
Managers
Korolev. The situation in Korolev is similar to that in Miass (fig. 12-6). While a disproportionate wage distribution exists among rank specialists (over 90 percent of them receive salaries in the range of US$50 to US$150), there is a more uniform distribution among executives, with a range of US$100 to US$250. Meanwhile, the average executive salary is US$143, or double the salary of engineers and technicians, which averages US$78.
Figure 12-6. Korolev: Wages of specialists by position, %
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 25 50-100 100-150 US dollars 150-200 200-250 250 and above
Managers
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12.4. Wages Commensurate with Specialists Occupation and Qualications
Specialists clearly recognize that their salaries cannot be regarded as commensurate with their occupation and qualications in present-day Russia. As can be seen in gure 12-7, a remarkably similar number of specialists in the different cities believe they deserve higher salaries to more accurately reect their qualications and positions.
Figure 12-7. Wages presently matching specialists occupation and qualifications in Russia, % of actual wages
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

200 200400 400600 US dollars 6001000 More than 1000
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
In sum, 40 percent to 55 percent of all specialists believe that their actual salary is two to three times lower than the amount warranted by their occupation and qualications. This holds true despite substantial differences in actual wages from city to city. The difference between actual salaries and salaries commensurate with respective occupations and qualications varies from the average ratio of 3.7 in Korolev to a ratio of 4.3 to 4.5 in Votkinsk and Miass. There is no standard by which to compare the salaries that specialists believe they deserve, given their qualications and employment position. The specialists we surveyed are approximately equal in terms of labor quality. Therefore, if salaries reected this fact, salary levels for similarly qualied specialists would have been roughly equal across different missile cities.Yet, as gure 12-8 illustrates, this is not the case: salary proles differ signicantly from city to city.2
2. All the enterprises we surveyed belong to the Russian Space Agency (RSA); similarly, all of them used to belong to the USSRs Ministry of Medium Engineering. However, in the Soviet era, salaries of industry specialists were centrally regulated; in other words, all specialists of similar quality (occupation, qualication, and position) received approximately similar wages. Today this is not the case. Being a part of the RSA is not the same as being a part of the Ministry of Medium Engineering. These days, each enterprise fends for itself, doing its best to survive. There is no centralized redistribution of funds from some enterprises to others. Presently, the missile industry is not a single organism but rather a collection of enterprises that compete with each other. Whereas previously, technological achievements of some enterprises were automatically made available to other enterprises of the Ministry, today they become a trade secret. So far, in our opinion, the present approach of de-monopolizing the industry by splitting it into absolutely independent enterprises has produced only negative results. Whereas in the West, missile and aerospace corporations strive to attain the consolidation level achieved in the ex-USSR, Russia, as usual, takes its special path. Apparently this path leads nowhere.
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Figure 12-8. Wages presently matching specialists occupation and qualifications in Russia, %
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 100 100200 US dollars 200500 500 and above
Korolev desirable
Miass desirable
Votkinsk desirable
The difference in wages paid to specialists of the same level reects the varying economic situations of the missile cities. Thus, in Korolev, the economic position of Energia Concern is strong enough to allow it to pay its specialists much higher salaries than enterprises in Votkinsk and Miass. Still, local specialists in all three cities believe that their occupation and qualications merit a much higher salary. Differences of wages commensurate with occupation and qualications across specialists working in various cities are closely related to actual wage differentiation (table 12-3). While the average amount of actual wages in Miass and Votkinsk equals 3543 percent of Korolev wages, average salaries commensurate with specialists occupation and qualications in these cities are nearly similar, at 4053 percent.
Table 12-3. Average monthly actual salary vs. salary commensurate with specialists occupation and qualications, US$ and %
S A L A RY C O M M E N S U R AT E WITH SPECIALISTS O C C U PA T I O N A N D Q U A L I F I CAT I O N S , AV E R A G E
CITY
A C T U A L S A L A R Y, AV E R A G E
US$
US$
Korolev Miass Votkinsk
121 50 40
100 43 35
420 225 170
100 53 40
Table 12-3 shows the relatively low remuneration Russian missile specialists believe is presently commensurate with their occupation and qualications.3
3. Some people are of the opinion that low wages in Russia are evidence of poor labor quality. With regard to missile specialists, this suggestion is disputable. The quality of strategic missiles and space stations that Russian missile specialists have created are unparalleled even in countries where the pay scales for such specialists are much higher.
99
12.5. Income of Specialists Family Members
There is evidence that actual wages in different cities are unrelated to the qualications of specialists, but depend rather on the economic situation of the respective enterprises and the regions level of economic development. This assessment is borne out by data on incomes received by members of specialists families (g. 12-9).
Figure 12-9. Distribution of specialists by total monthly income of their family members, % 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Under 25 25-75 75-125 US dollars 125-175 175-225 Over 225
Miass
Votkinsk
Korolev
Incomes of members of specialists families vary across cities as much as the salaries of specialists themselves. In Votkinsk and Miass, the income proles are similar, while in Korolev wages differ signicantly. Not all members of specialists families are employed by missile manufacturers; in fact, most work outside missile companies. Therefore, incomes earned at other enterprises in these cities are as strongly differentiated as the salaries of missile enterprise specialists. This conrms the idea that, given the existing economics and organizational conditions faced by the missile enterprises, specialists salaries do not depend on the quality of their work. Rather, they are driven by the economic situation of the enterprises and the local regions.
13. INCOME AND HOUSING
13.1. Total Income of Specialists Families
Incomes of specialists families are an even more important indicator of specialists standard of living than their salaries.
100
Figure 13-1. Total monthly income of specialists families, % 80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Under 25 25-75 75-125 US dollars 125-175 175-225 Over 225
Miass
Votkinsk
Korolev
Votkinsk and Miass have similar proles of total family income (g. 13-1). Over 50 percent of families in those cities have total monthly incomes between US$25 and US$75. The Miass missile center has the lowest level of total family income, 40 percent of all families there having incomes below US$25. Only 15 percent in Korolev and Votkinsk fall into this total income range. Against such a background, Korolev stands out. While 2 percent of families have income in excess of US$125 in Votkinsk and Miass, over one-third of families in Korolev fall within this income bracket. The modal income interval in Korolev is US$75 to US$125; for Votkinsk and Miass, this represents the highest income interval.
13.2. Per Capita Income
Given a certain level of total family income, the per capita gure depends on family size (table 13-1). Family size is larger in Votkinsk and Miass than in Korolev. Votkinsk and Miass families tend to be small. The average family size in Votkinsk and Miass is effectively similar at 3.6 to 3.7 persons, while in Korolev it is lower, at 3.4 persons. In Korolev, therefore, not only are family incomes higher than in Votkinsk and Miass, but, because families there are smaller, so is per capita income.
Table 13-1. Distribution of specialists families by size, %
FA M I LY S I Z E , PERSONS CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
2 3 4 5+ Average family size
13 43 40 4 3.4
4 25 61 9 3.7
5 32 62 2 3.6
7 33 54 5 3.5
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Figure 13-2 shows the survey sample distribution by total income per family member. As can be seen, the prole is effectively identical in Votkinsk and Miass. In Korolev, the distribution is shifted toward high-income groups. This is borne out by the data on average family income. In Miass and Votkinsk, the gure amounts to about US$33; in Korolev, it is US$80.
Figure 13-2. Distribution of specialists by actual monthly average income per capita, %
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Under 50 50-100 100-150 US dollars 150-250 250500
Miass
Votkinsk
Korolev
Figure 13-3 proles the specialists according to the amount of monthly average family income per capita that they wish to earn. Clearly these income objectives differ signicantly from actual income. The modal interval of actual income in Korolev falls between US$50 and US$100, whereas the desired income interval is US$150 to US$250, representing a difference of US$100. In Votkinsk and Miass, the modal interval variance is of a similar magnitude with actual earnings falling under US$50 and desired earnings ranging from US$50 to US$150. Interestingly, the Miass prole of desired per capita income is almost the same as the actual per capita income in Korolev. This indicates the degree to which both actual and desired incomes vary across different missile cities. Average gures of desired family income per capita are as follows: Korolev US$214, Miass US$123, and Votkinsk US$110. The desired per capita income in Korolev is 2.7 times the actual, while the Miass and Votkinsk ratios are 3.7 and 3.3, respectively.
102
Figure 13-3. Distribution of specialists by desired monthly average income per capita, %
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

Under 50 50100 100150 US dollars 150250 250500 500 and above
Korolev (desirable)
Korolev (actual)
Miass (desirable)
Miass (actual)
Votkinsk (desirable)
Votkinsk (actual)
13.3. Housing Conditions
Housing ranks as one of the most pressing problems affecting migration. The level of housing available in missile cities remains quite high; over 80 percent of specialists we surveyed live in individual apartments (table 13-2). The share of so-called communal apartments, those shared by several families, is insignicant. Indeed, there is no difference in housing standards between missile cities located in outlying regions (Miass and Votkinsk) and those right outside Moscow (Korolev).
Table 13-2. Housing situation of specialists, %
PRESENT HOUSING CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Individual apartment Freehold house Communal apartment Hostel Privately rented housing Total sampling
89 4 3 4 1 100
87 0 2 9 2 100
83 9 0 5 3 100
85 4 2 6 2 100
Over 90 percent of families live in individual apartments. Divorced people either rent residential space privately or live in communal apartments, since the rights to individual apartments are divided in the divorce settlement. Leaving a missile city, however, effectively means losing ones residential space because low demand limits the chances of selling it at a good price (even though an apartment is owned by a company, residents typically charge a potential new resident for the right to move in). Moreover, the company owns the residence in the missile city. These circumstances seriously constrain migration out of the missile city because leaving means giving up a rent-free apartment and then nding housing in the new city, which is bound to be expensive. Under
103
prevailing wage levels, it is very difcult for wage earners to save enough money to buy, or even rent, a house. Therefore, the unavailability of comfortable housing is a major disincentive for residents to migrate out of a missile city. On the other hand, availability of corporate residential space and opportunities for obtaining such housing for comparatively modest amounts of money may be one of the few factors encouraging migration into the missile cities.
14. MOONLIGHTING
14.1. Extent of and Reasons for Moonlighting
In order to supplement low salaries many specialists choose to take a second job. Overall, 28 percent of specialists in the cities we surveyed moonlight (table 14-1).
Table 14-1. Specialists who moonlight, %
CITY % OF SAMPLE
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Moonlighters
29
33
19
28
The lowest incidence of moonlighting is found in Votkinsk, where wages are lowest. Korolev and Miass are close in terms of the percentage who moonlight, with about one-third of all specialists taking second jobs. As table 14-2 illustrates, between 67 percent and 83 percent of all moonlighters cited economic difculties alone as the reason for choosing to work an additional job. Notably, in Votkinsk and Miass, where wages are lowest, most moonlighters cite economic difculties as the chief reason for moonlighting. Between 8 percent and 24 percent take a second job primarily because it is interesting work. The highest share of those moonlighting for this reason is found in Korolev and Miass.
Table 14-2. Reasons for moonlighting, %
REASON CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Economic difculties only Interesting job only Economic difculties and interesting job Total sampling
67 24 10 100
83 8 8 100
79 21 0 100
69 23 9 100
As table 14-3 shows, missile city residents usually take second jobs that are unrelated to their primary occupation, jobs in which their primary professional skills are irrelevant. Only 21 percent to 29 percent of specialists have second jobs that are totally in line with their regular occupation.
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Table 14-3. Nature of moonlighting jobs, %

I F YO U A R E M O O N L I G H T I N G , I S J O B I N L I N E W I T H YO U R R E G U L A R O C C U PA T I O N ? TOTA L SAMPLING
CITY
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
In line Mostly in line Mostly out of line Totally unrelated Close Total sampling
14.2. Opportunities for Moonlighting
29 24 10 34 5 100
28 28 4 40 0 100
21 0 21 57 0 100
28 22 10 32 4 100
Most specialists who take an additional job do so in a eld unrelated to their primary professional occupation because well-paying jobs in their primary elds are hard to nd. Given that a desire for a higher total income motivates their decision to take a second job, they are driven to jobs that have little to do with their specialized skills. Most moonlighters are workers and technicians, while most moonlighting jobs are found in private business in such areas as sales, where technological expertise is irrelevant. More than 90 percent of specialists believe that it is difcult to earn additional income (table 14-4). This percentage is virtually constant across all cities.
Table 14-4. Whether additional earnings are difcult to come by, % of all replies
D O E S A P E R S O N O F YO U R O C C U PAT I O N A N D S K I L L F I N D I T D I F F I C U LT TO IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL EARNING OPPORTUNITIES?
CITY
TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Difcult Easy Total sampling

14.3. Moonlighting Potential
89 11 100
97 3 100
97 3 100
90 10 100
Table 14-5 shows the moonlighting intentions of specialists who do not have a second job.
Table 14-5. Non-moonlighting specialists intending to moonlight, %
IF NOT MOONLIGHTING, WO U L D YO U L I K E TO B E ? CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Yes No Undecided Total sampling
45 36 19 100
53 28 19 100
39 38 23 100
44 36 20 100
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14.4. Time of Taking Moonlighting Jobs
Figure 14-1 proles moonlighters by the duration of their second job. It is reasonable to assume that moonlighting existed even before the current economic crisis began. The number of moonlighters, however, was very low (about 10 percent). Most specialists began moonlighting between 1990 and 1997. This development was driven both by progressively worse economic conditions and an expanding base of typical moonlighting jobs.
Figure 14-1. Duration of moonlighting, % of total moonlighters
16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%

1961 1983 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Year starting outside work
14.5 The Nature of Moonlighting Jobs in Missile Cities
As is evident from table 14-6, different moonlighting activities predominate from city to city. Overall, business is rst among the enterprises we surveyed. In Votkinsk and Korolev, approximately 75 percent of moonlighters are involved in this sector, and in Miass about 60 percent. Domestic grants and orders of Russian enterprises, especially in Korolev and Miass, are second. In Votkinsk, only 7 percent of moonlighters service domestic orders. The third most common moonlighting job is teaching. In Miass, one in every four moonlighters is teaching.
Table 14-6. Major types of moonlighting jobs, %
ACTIVITY CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Business (selling, work for private businesses) Domestic orders (contracts and research grants) Teaching (college professors and after-hours tutors) Total sampling
75 20 5 100
59 14 27 100
79 7 14 100
75 18 7 100
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14.6 Moonlighting Earnings
What level of income do moonlighting jobs provide? As can be seen from gure 14-2, incomes vary signicantly across different cities. Forty percent of moonlighters in Miass earn secondary incomes comparable to their regular wages; the rest earn lower moonlighting incomes. In Korolev, the situation is more favorable, about 70 percent of moonlighters earning secondary incomes that are either comparable to their regular wage or twice as high. The most difcult situation prevails in Votkinsk, where the overwhelming majority of moonlighters make only 30 percent to 70 percent of the lowest wage among all cities surveyed.
Figure 14-2. Moonlighting earnings vs. regular wages, %
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

0.10.2 0.30.4 0.50.7 1 Additional job income to official salary ratio 2 3 and over
Miass
Korolev
Votkinsk
1 5 . F I N A N C I A L S I T U AT I O N
15.1. Changes in Specialists Financial Situation during the Reform Period
Table 15-1 shows that between 4 and 22 percent of those surveyed believe their nancial situation has improved during the period between 1992 and 1999. Across every missile city, only 3 percent to 4 percent see a dramatic improvement. The nancial position of 1 percent to 5 percent of all respondents has remained at pre-1992 levels. A large majority (66 percent to 86 percent) has experienced a dramatic decline in living standards. In Korolev this included 48 percent of workers, while in Miass and Votkinsk the gures are 72 percent and 79 percent, respectively. Therefore, overall, missile city specialists have been disadvantaged by economic hardships. This is particularly true in Miass and Votkinsk, which are far from Moscow; but also applies to Korolev.
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Table 15-1. Changes in specialists nancial situation during the reform period (199299), % of denitive answers
CHANGE CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Dramatic improvement Slight improvement Unchanged Slight decline Dramatic decline Undecided Total sampling
4 18 4 18 48 10 100
4 2 1 7 79 6 100
3 1 5 13 72 6 100
4 15 4 16 52 9 100
6.2. Current Financial Situation of Specialists
Table 15-2 reects the respondents view of their current nancial situation. None of the respondents considered their current nancial situation to be very good, and virtually no one referred to it as good. Between 8 percent and 21 percent viewed it as normal, whereas the majority considers their current nancial position difcult or dire. Specialists in Miass and Votkinsk have a more negative view of their nancial situation than those in Korolev. In those two cities, 27 percent describe their nancial situation as dire or desperate. In Korolev this gure is half that of Miass and Votkinsk.
Table 15-2. Respondents views of their nancial situation, %
CURRENT F I N A N C I A L S I T U AT I O N CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Good Good, compared to the country in general Normal Difcult Dire Dire and desperate Undecided Total sampling
1 1 21 58 14 0 5 100
0 0 9 62 26 1 2 100
0 0 8 60 27 0 5 100
1 1 19 58 16 0 5 100
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1 6 . P OT E N T I A L E M I G R AT I O N
16.1. Emigration Intentions
Table 16-1 presents data on the percentage of those willing to work abroad, by individual cities. The gures vary from 12 percent at the strategic missile plants in Votkinsk to 28 percent to 32 percent in Korolev and Miass. In principle, such intentions display a typical trend across age brackets: the share of those wishing to emigrate quickly declines with age.
Table 16-1. Desire to work abroad, % of denitive answers
DESIRE TO WO R K A B ROA D CITY % OF SAMPLE
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Yes
28
32
12
25
Figure 16-1. Persons wishing to work abroad, by age group, % 50% 40% 30%
Linear trend
20% 10% 0%
A comparison of the Korolev data with a similar survey taken seven years earlier (g. 16-2) indicates differences in the percentage of persons willing to work abroad, virtually across all groups. Whereas in 1992, 72 percent of persons giving denitive answers would have liked to work abroad, 72 percent of those polled in 1999 had no such desire. This represents a decline of more than two and a half times in seven years. On the other hand, we see very similar age proles in the two surveys. While the age distribution of those willing to emigrate in 1992 and in 1999 is roughly the same, the desire is two and a half times less intense in 1999 than in 1992.
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Figure 16-2. Korolev: Persons willing to work abroad, 1992 vs. 1999, by age group, %
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

1999
1992
16.2. Steps Taken to Realize Desire to Go Abroad
Generally, those who would like to take a job abroad are very passive when it comes to trying to realize that desire (table 16-2).
Table 16-2. Steps taken by specialists to realize desire of going abroad, % of total number wishing to emigrate
A R E YO U TA K I N G A N Y S P E C I F I C S T E P S TO G E T A J O B A B ROA D ? %
Yes No Undecided Total sampling
20 74 6 100
Only one person in ve of those willing to emigrate takes any action to succeed in that desire, while 74 percent of persons willing to emigrate do not actively pursue a job abroad.
Table 16-3. Measures taken to realize desire of going abroad, % of persons taking any measures
I F TA K I N G S P E C I F I C M E A S U R E S TO G E T A J O B A B ROA D , W H AT D O YO U D O ? PERCENT
Establish useful contacts Approach foreign companies Rely on relatives and friends Only daydream Work for a foreign company
49 24 1 1 24
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For the most part, specic efforts made toward realizing the desire to work abroad are rather abstract, such as relying on relatives and friends or establishing useful contacts. Only 24 percent of persons who claim to take measures to secure a jobthat is, 5 percent of those wishing to work abroadactually approach foreign companies. Generally speaking, most persons willing to emigrate merely dream about emigration.
16.3. Countries of Destination
As a rule, specialists would like to emigrate to developed countries in Europe and America (table 16-4). While the global community holds the view that developers and manufacturers of missile weapons should not go to countries with aggressive and totalitarian regimes, the opinions of specialists surveyed are at odds with this sentiment.
Table 16-4. Countries and regions to which persons wishing to work abroad would like to go, % of denitive replies
COUNTRIES AND REGIONS %
North America Western Europe Israel Others
63 79 9 6
Table 16-5 presents the attitudes of persons wishing to work abroad to emigrating to selected countries, some of which are characterized as aggressive or totalitarian. It is worth noting that almost 60 percent of respondents did not mention any of the countries listed in table 16-5 as an undesirable place to work.
Table 16-5. Countries atly rejected by persons willing to work abroad, % of denitive answers
COUNTRIES TO WHICH SPECIALISTS WOULD N OT E M I G R AT E U N D E R A N Y C I R C U M S TA N C E S %
Mentioned none of the countries listed below Israel China Pakistan Iran Iraq India North Korea Libya
56 18 17 16 11 7 6 5 1
It turns out that Israel, China, and Pakistan have the highest rejection rate, as between 16 percent and 18 percent of respondents would never go to those countries. Between 5 percent and 7 percent would not go to Iraq, India, or North Korea, while 1 percent of the respondents would not go to Libya. It appears that specialists in the Russian missile industry have their own view of missile technology nonproliferation; and it differs signicantly from the perspective shared by most countries in the international community. The difference is easy to explain: Specialists in
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present-day Russia face a heretofore unknown problem, that of survival. Had the nancial situation of specialists in the Russian missile industry been the same as or better than before, their opinions on where to seek work and whether to emigrate at all would have denitely been much closer to the generally accepted views of the international community.
16.4 Reasons for Interest in Working Abroad
For two-thirds of respondents, the main reasons for an interest in working abroad (table 16-6) are related to economic situation. Purely professional motivations are claimed by 40 percent of persons seeking work abroad, while 10 percent are interested for political reasons.
Table 16-6. Main reasons for interest in working abroad, %
REASON %
Economic Professional Political

16.5. Work Abroad
66 39 10
Fewer than half of respondents answered with a denitive no when asked if they would work in foreign defense industries (table 16-7). One person in ve did say they would work for such industries, and the rest are either undecided or qualify their reply in some way.
Table 16-7. Willingness to work for foreign defense industries, %
WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRIES %
Agreed Disagreed Undecided Agreed, provided it is not against Russia
21 46 29 5
About two-thirds of those willing to work abroad said they would accept a job unrelated to their occupation, provided that they are able to perform well in it. The rest would work only within their occupation.
16.6. Attitude toward Others Emigration
In our opinion, specialists potential willingness to emigrate may be more accurately gauged from their attitude toward other emigrants. Generally, persons with negative attitudes toward emigration and emigrants would be unlikely to go abroad to work. Alternatively, persons who approve of emigrants or who feel neutral (considering it a personal matter) might work abroad under certain circumstances. Table 16-8 presents some data on respondents attitudes toward emigrants.
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Table 16-8. Specialists attitudes toward emigrants, %

AT T I T U D E TOWA R D E M I G R A N T S %
Negative Neutral (havent given it much thought because it is a personal matter) Positive (approval or envy) Total sampling
16 42 42 100
Only 16 percent of respondents have a negative view of people leaving Russia. Therefore, as a matter of principle, this percentage may not be regarded as potential emigrants. Forty-two percent are neutral, having never thought much about emigration or viewing it as a personal matter; a like number approve of emigrants or even envy them. Emigration potential, therefore, is much higher than the answers regarding intentions to work abroad might suggest. Engineers, technicians, and scientists have the lowest percentage of neutral responses regarding emigration (59 percent). The rest are almost evenly split among those holding negative and positive views of emigrants. Among executives, approximately 80 percent are neutral, while virtually all the rest have negative attitudes toward emigrants.
Table 16-9. Specialists attitudes toward emigrants, by position held, %
POSITION AT T I T U D E TOWA R D E M I G R A N T S TOTA L SAMPLING
Negative
Neutral (havent given it much thought, as it is a personal matter)
Positive (approval or envy)
Researchers, engineers, and technicians Executives Total sampling
23 18 22
59 81 64
19 2 15
100 100 100
Both negative and positive attitudes toward emigrants are closely related to age (g. 16-3): the share of specialists holding negative views of emigrants increases with age. The percentage of neutral views is constant across all age groups.
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Figure 16-3. Attitudes toward emigrants, by age, %
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 30 30-39 40-49 Ages 50-59 60 and over
Negative
Positive (approval, envy)
Neutral (haven't given it much thought because it's a personal matter)
1 7 . A C T U A L E M I G R AT I O N
17.1. Emigration from Missile Cities
Although difcult to measure, some emigration from missile cities is clearly taking place. The extent of migration may be approximately gauged by respondents answers to whether any ex-coworkers of theirs have gone abroad (table 17-1). Presumably the data thus obtained generally reect emigration-related processes in missile cities.
Table 17-1. Emigrants from missile cities, %
H AV E A N Y E X - C OWO R K E R S E M I G R AT E D ? CITY % OF SAMPLE
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Yes
19
21
18
Table 17-1 shows that 18 percent of the surveyed respondents at the enterprises indicate that some of their former coworkers have gone abroad. The gure is highest in Miass, at 21 percent, and lowest in Votkinsk, at 8 percent.
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17.2 Emigration Dynamics
Figure 17-1 shows the time prole of emigration ows. Emigration started in 1967, peaked in 1997, and then began to decline. Over the period in question, emigrants averaged about 1 percent of all specialists employed by the enterprises we surveyed.
Figure 17-1. Dynamics of emigration from missile cities, % of total sampling
4%
3%
2%
Linear trend
1%
0%
1967 1971 1980 1984 1988 1990 1992 Year 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999
17.3. Emigrants Demographics
Males account for 80 percent of emigration ow. Sixty percent of emigrants are ethnic Russian, and the majority of the remaining 40 percent are Jewish (table 17-2).
Table 17-2. Ethnic composition of emigrants, by sex, % of total
ETHNICITY SEX TOTA L SAMPLING
Male
Female
Married couple
Russian Jewish German Ukrainian female Jewish female and Ukrainian male Total sampling
55 45 0 0 0 100
86 8 0 6 0 100
11 0 78 0 11 100
59 37 2 1 0 100
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Emigrants tend to be younger than average compared with all current employees: 90 percent are under the age of forty (g. 17-2).
Figure 17-2. Emigrants vs. total current employees: Age profile, %
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

under 30 3039 4049 Age groups 5059 60 and over
Emigrants
Total employed
17.4. Reasons for Emigrating
According to respondents, economic considerations are the main reason for emigrating. One person in three emigrated for family reasons, one in ve for political motives, and a small proportion of emigrants, 8 percent, emigrated for occupational reasons (table 17-3).
Table 17-3. Reasons for emigrating, %
REASON %
Economic Career Political Family Total sampling

17.5. Country of Destination and Reason for Emigrating
56 8 22 36 100
Forty-three percent of all emigrants emigrated to North America, 15 percent to Israel, one in three to Western Europe, and the rest to Australia and New Zealand. We are not aware of any cases in which specialists from missile cities have traveled to countries with so-called aggressive regimes.
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Table 17-4. Country of destination, %

C O U N T RY %
Canada Israel USA Italy Germany France Australia New Zealand Total sampling
28 15 15 14 13 7 7 2 100
An overwhelming majority of cases involve persons leaving missile cities to take up permanent residence abroad. Only specialists going to France and Italy went to those two countries to take temporary jobs (table 17-5).
Table 17-5. Country of destination and reason for emigrating, %
C O U N T RY REASON TOTA L SAMPLING
Permanent residence
Temporary job
Undecided
France Germany Israel USA New Zealand Canada Australia Italy Total sampling
0 100 100 100 80 100 100 0 79
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 20
0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Whereas 100 percent of Jews and Germans emigrated for good, only two in every three Russians, who make up the bulk of specialists at the enterprises we surveyed, go abroad for permanent residence (table 17-6). Thus, the emigration of Jews and Germans may reect repatriation, that is, a return to their historic homelands. The emigrants from the remaining ethnic groups represented in the survey also tended to emigrate permanently.
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Table 17-6. Reason for emigrating and ethnicity, %

ETHNICITY REASON TOTA L SAMPLING
Permanent residence
Temporary job
Unclear
Russian Jew German Ukrainian Jewish female and Ukrainian male Total sampling
65 100 100 100 100 79
35 0 0 0 0 20
1 0 0 0 0 0
100 100 100 100 100 100
1 8 . P E R S O N N E L S H I F T TOWA R D P R I VAT E BU S I N E S S
18.1. Extent, Composition, Dynamics
It is not emigration that hits the enterprises human resources worstin fact, its incidence is quite lowbut rather migration of specialists to private business jobs and self-employment (table 18-1).
Table 18-1. Colleagues who have taken jobs with private businesses or started their own businesses, %
D O YO U H AV E C O L L E A G U E S W H O H AV E TA K E N P R I VAT E BU S I N E S S J O B S O R H AV E S TA R T E D A BUSINESS OF THEIR OWN?
CITY
TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Yes No Yes, many Total sampling
58 42 0 100
75 24 1 100
48 52 0 100
58 42 0 100
Overall, 58 percent of respondents had colleagues who moved to private business entities or started a business of their own. This share is highest in Miass, at 75 percent. In Korolev and Votkinsk, the gures are much lower, at 48 percent and 58 percent, respectively. Let us consider the types of cities chosen by persons moving to private business entities (table 18-2). In Korolev, located right next to Moscow, the number of those working in the open city is six to seven times higher than the number of those working in the missile city proper. Therefore, the high percentage of persons opting for private business jobs in Korolev, in fact, has to do with Moscows proximity. The lower percentage in Miass and Votkinsk is due to the fact that the relatively fewer business entities set up in the missile cities offer fewer possibilities.
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Table 18-2. Cities in which former specialists have jobs in private business, %
L O CAT I O N O F S P E C I A L I S T S ' NEW JOBS CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
City in question Closed city Open city Total sampling
43 5 52 100
91 2 7 100
91 0 9 100
51 4 45 100
As follows from table 18-3, specialists who leave missile enterprises play an important role in developing new economic structures. Of all specialists who moved to the private sector, 48 percent to 53 percent have their own businesses, while the rest remain hired employees. Interestingly, the share of former missile specialists running their own business is higher in Miass and Votkinsk than in Korolev. This may indicate that specialists in Miass and Votkinsk have to create jobs for themselves, whereas those in Korolev have less need to establish a business of their own because nearby Moscow offers ample job opportunities.
Table 18-3. What ex-specialists of missile enterprises do for a living, %
PLACE OF WORK CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Working for hire in private business Running own business Total sampling
52 48 100
37 63 100
47 53 100
51 49 100
As can be seen from gure 18-1, specialists movement to business entities and selfemployment has had some temporal cycles. Between 1989 and 1993, the number of specialists moving to the private sector rose; in 1993, the numbers started to fall. From 1990 to 1998, 58 percent of specialists left the surveyed enterprises to work in the private sector, meaning that about 6 percent of all specialists leave enterprises for business entities every year. The outow of human resources from missile enterprises to private businesses between 1991 and 1998 was almost six times greater than the 1 percent of outow due to emigration over the same period.
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Figure 18-1. Time of specialists move to business entities, % of total sampling
12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%
1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Year of transfer 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
18.2 Reasons for Moving to Business Entities
As follows from table 18-4, some 94 percent of the job shifts are driven by economic considerations, while only 6 percent are career-related.
Table 18-4. Reasons for moving to business entities, %
MAIN REASON %
Economic Boredom Space industry degradation Total sampling

18.3. Becoming Employed in Business Entities vs. Profession
94 4 2 100
As a rule, becoming employed in a business entity involves a change of profession (table 18-5). Less than 25 percent of persons taking business jobs do so in the same profession they had at the public enterprise.
Table 18-5. Business jobs of ex-specialists: Professional prole, %
P R I VAT E BU S I N E S S J O B VS. MISSILE ENTERPRISE P RO F E S S I O N TOTA L SAMPLING
CITY
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Same profession Different profession No information Total sampling
24 71 5 100
16 82 2 100
6 91 3 100
22 74 4 100
Having to change profession, however, does not deter specialists from moving to business entities. This is evidenced by data showing that people are generally satised with their shift to private business (table 18-6). Because the overwhelming majority of those moving to business entities are forced to change the profession they used to have at the missile enterprise,
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the success or failure of such change ought to be affected by their satisfaction with the new job. In fact, almost nine-tenths of specialists joining business entities are happy to have left their government enterprise for private business. It is no coincidence that over 50 percent of those wishing to leave the enterprises we surveyed would like to move to business entities.
Table 18-6. Satisfaction with new jobs, %
CITY % OF SAMPLE
Korolev
Miass
Votkinsk
Satised
86
100
92
88
1 9 . P E R S O N N E L T R A I N I N G F O R T H E M I S S I L E I N D U S T RY
19.1. Selection of Students
Currently, the enterprises hire graduates who started their higher education at least six years ago (table 19-1).
Table 19-1. Competition for admittance to colleges and universities, %
COMPETITION YEAR ADMITTED TOTA L SAMPLING
1993
1994
Less than 1 person per vacancy 2-3 persons per vacancy 3-5 persons per vacancy Over 5 persons per vacancy Total sampling
35 65 0 0 100
31 56 6 6 100
33 61 3 3 100
Most students were admitted to colleges and universities when competition was still quite limited, less than one person per vacancy or two to three persons per vacancy. In fact, a trend toward stiffer competition has appeared only in recent years. Clearly, a low competition rate at colleges and universities translates into low standards for newly admitted students and generally poor quality of graduates.
19.2. Occupational Choices
Over half of all students chose their occupation deliberately because they regarded it as an interesting career (table 19-2). In fact, the percentage of college and university students that chose their occupation deliberately is higher among students admitted in 1994 than among those admitted in 1993. The share of students selecting their occupation by chance falls from 19 percent among 1993 admittees to 10 percent in 1994. Simultaneously, there was a rise in the percentage of students attributing more importance to higher education than to occupation. While 6 percent of students admitted in 1993 felt that higher education mattered more than occupation, this opinion was held by 14 percent of students admitted in 1994.
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Table 19-2. Reasons for students occupational choices, %

R E A S O N F O R C H O O S I N G O C C U PA T I O N YEAR ADMITTED TOTA L SAMPLING
1993
1994
Consider it promising and interesting Random choice Occupation does not matter, higher education does Other reasons Total sampling
55 19 6 19 100
66 10 14 14 100
60 15 10 17 100
Deliberate occupational choices are closely related to the academic achievements of would-be specialists (table 19-3). Almost all respondents (92 percent) with mostly excellent academic records believed their chosen occupation to be promising and interesting. This compares with 59 percent of students with mostly good academic records and 22 percent of students with mostly satisfactory academic records who considered their chosen occupation to be promising and interesting. The highest percentage among students with satisfactory academic records are persons choosing their occupation by chance (44 percent) and those who care more about earning a diploma than securing an occupation (33 percent).
Table 19-3. Determinants of students occupational choices vs. academic record, %
REASON FOR O C C U PA T I O N A L C H O I C E GENERAL ACADEMIC RECORD AT C O L L E G E / U N I V E R S I T Y TOTA L SAMPLING
Mostly satisfactory
Mostly good
Mostly excellent
Consider it promising and interesting Random choice Occupation does not matter, education does Other reasons Total sampling
22 44 33 0 100
59 14 8 22 100
92 0 0 8 100
60 15 10 17 100
20. MISSILE SECURITY AND PERSONNEL

20.1. Aging of the Work Force
Respondents believe that among the major developments adversely affecting the personnel prole at missile enterprises are an aging work force (61 percent) and a reduced inow of young workers (48 percent). For the most part, the reasons for the aging of the work force are unrelated to the natural rollover of generations (that is, the process by which older workers retire and are replaced by fewer younger workers). Largely, it is caused by an inadequate inow of young workers, which is due in turn to an ongoing decline in missile enterprise employment. The drop in employment level in missile enterprises has occurred not just through preplanned retrenchments. In addition to the retrenchments, many promising specialists have left the enterprises to join the private business sector. Specialists in the particularly productive
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years of thirty to forty move to private business in the largest numbers and highest percentage compared to any other age group. Even those under thirty are half as likely to leave for private business jobs. Even the few young workers hired by missile enterprises face a lot of difculties, some arising from poor engineering training of young graduates. The following is a sampling of respondents perspectives on newly hired young specialists: young workers of poor engineering education; well-connected easy riders (children of higher-ups); many have jobs unrelated to their professions; the enterprise has no inow of personnel trained in core occupations; and inadequately trained specialists are hired. Over 45 percent of those polled named the shift of specialists to private business as being among the causes most detrimental to the personnel prole. Meanwhile, only 1 percent of respondents considered emigration abroad as an adverse factor. Clearly, specialists themselves believe that the main threat in terms of human resources comes not from emigration, but from the movement of specialists to private business.
20.2. Surveyed Attitudes
Asked to name the potential consequences of the various developments adversely affecting the employee mix at missile enterprises, 37 percent of respondents referred to a slowdown in scientic research, while 62 percent point to a dearth of new ideas and an overreliance on older research and development projects. Such deciencies are a troubling indication that the missile industry is likely to fall hopelessly behind contemporary standards. The following list of some typical statements made by specialists will convey a better idea of their thinking on these issues (table 20-1). The statements are, in fact, a cry of desperation.
Table 20-1. Respondents personal opinions on the consequences of adverse developments affecting the enterprises
Slowdown of scientic research Dearth of new ideas and overreliance on earlier R&D projects We largely work for some upstart overseas Work quality has gone downhill They dont apply themselves at work Operations are unstable There will be no one to carry out routine work Bedlam We live one day at a time; there is no prospect for the future The enterprises potential is in decline Sudden increase in the number of bosses with no responsibilities The government does not care We wont be able to redo anything the way we used to Gradual decline in work efciency Lost parity in terms of military hardware would be hard to regain Production of submarine missiles is dying with a corresponding dearth of designers and technology experts
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Table 20-1. Respondents personal opinions on the consequences of adverse developments affecting the enterprises (Continued)
No chance for passing on our knowledge and experience to young workers New R&D projects are few and far between; young workers are not properly taught, as we have nothing to teach them with; some of them have gone away. The older generation is going, some leave for private business; new R&D projects, if any, would be difcult to see through. Older workers knew a lot; they remembered our ops. The young ones would have to start from scratch The enterprise is quietly decaying Loss of crucial information that might be needed to develop similar systems Decline in the enterprises R&D potential Lack of funding Lack of priorities in the governments technology policy, if the things happening in Russia may even be called a policy Complex technological problems would be harder to address There is no line of succession Further retrenchments would cripple the work force The enterprise has collapsed The remaining specialists have heavier workloads, with one employee doing the work of two or three. This leaves little time for young workers who once again have started joining the enterprise. For this reason, the experience sharing fails to reach deep enough, only skimming the surface Fearing layoffs, many pensioners try to become indispensable and deliberately avoid sharing their experience with younger workers. Yet, sooner or later, they will have to go, while young employees would make poor specialists or simply go away, having no interest in manufacturing They will have to start from square one Management has no fresh ideas
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20.3. Nuclear Security and Personnel
Table 20-2 shows that 41 percent of respondents believe that adverse developments in the makeup of specialist personnel have already affected nuclear security, while 42 percent expect negative consequences to be felt in the near term or longer term. One in every four respondents is either undecided or believes that the current changes will not affect Russias nuclear security.
Table 20-2. Can changes in the specialist personnel makeup adversely affect the nations nuclear security?, %
%
Adverse effects already present It may be affected in the near term It may be affected in the longer term Such changes will have no effect Adverse effects already present, as operational reliability declined Given ten more years of such policies, the nuclear security issue would be irrelevant Undecided Total sampling
20.4. Who Is Threatened?
41 32 10 3 1 1 18 100
Who is threatened most by the decline of the missile cities? As can be seen in table 20-3, most respondents (81 percent) believe that the situation in missile cities endangers Russia. Only 10 percent of respondents cite a global threat.
Table 20-3. Who is under the worst threat from adverse developments affecting the specialist personnel of missile cities?, %
IN CASE ADVERSE CHANGES CONTINUE TO AFFECT SPECIALIST P E R S O N N E L , W H O WO U L D B E T H E M O S T T H R E AT E N E D ? %
Russia Entire world Nobody Undecided Total sampling
81 10 2 8 100
These results should not be surprising. Missile specialists have been making weapons to deter, not commit, aggression. Therefore, they view the signs of weakness in the nations missile potential as threatening Russia and its security.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Valentin Alexeevich Tikhonov is a leading research fellow with the Institute of Economic Forecasts of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a position he has held since 1993. He received his Ph.D. from the Russian Academys Institute of Sociological Sciences in 1978. Prior to joining the Institute of Economic Forecasts, he worked for the Institute of Problems of Employment and the Institute of Social and Economic Problems of Population and Labor Resources, both afliates of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is the author of numerous reports on labor, living conditions, and migration related to the Russian military-industrial complex. His other publications include:
s
Russias Atomic Cities: Migration Phenomena, Nuclear Proliferation Journal, Issue 28, February 1999 (in Russian), Carnegie Moscow Center. Closed Cities in Open Society, March, 1996 (in Russian), Institute of Economic Forecasts. Closed Cities of Open Russia, Problemy prognozirovaniya, No 6, March, 1996 (in Russian). Migration Potential within Russias Military-Industrial Complex, Studi Emigrazione, 117, 1995, Centro Studi Emigrazione Roma. Closed Cities: Dynamics of Migration Capability of Experts, Migration of Experts in Russia: Reasons, Consequences, Estimates, 1994 (in Russian), Institute of Economic Forecasts, RAND (USA). Emigration Capabilities of Highly Qualied Experts of Russias Military-Industrial Complex, Brain Drain: Potential, Problems, Prospects, 1993, (in Russian), Institute of Economic Forecasts, RAND (USA).
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CA R N E G I E E N D OW M E N T F O R I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E A C E
The Carnegie Endowment is a private, nonprot organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. Through research, publishing, convening, and, on occasion, creating new institutions and international networks, Endowment associates shape fresh policy approaches. Their interests span geographic regions and the relations between governments, business, international organizations, and civil society, focusing on the economic, political, and technological forces driving global change. Through its Carnegie Moscow Center, the Endowment helps to develop a tradition of public policy analysis in the states of the former Soviet Union and to improve relations between Russia and the United States. The Endowment publishes Foreign Policy, one of the world's leading magazines of international politics and economics, which reaches readers in more than 120 countries and in several languages.
OFFICERS
Jessica T. Mathews, President Paul Balaran, Executive Vice President and Secretary Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Studies Carmen MacDougall, Vice President for Communications
B OA R D O F T R U S T E E S
William H. Donaldson, Chairman Gregory B. Craig, Vice Chairman Bill Bradley Robert Carswell Jerome A. Cohen Richard A. Debs Susan Eisenhower Donald V. Fites Leslie H. Gelb William W. George Richard Giordano Jamie Gorelick Stephen D. Harlan Donald Kennedy Robert Legvold Wilbert J. LeMelle Stephen R. Lewis Jr. Jessica T. Mathews Zanny Minton Beddoes Olara A. Otunnu Geneva Overholser William J. Perry W. Taylor Reveley III Strobe Talbott
17
PART 2 The Surveys
18
FIGURES
1-1. 1-2. 1-3. 1-4. 1-5. 2-1. 2-2. 2-3. 2-4. 2-5. 3-1. 3-2. 3-3. 3-4. 4-1. 4-2. 4-3. 4-4. Actual and hypothetical length-of-employment structure, % ................................................ Total number of ofcially registered unemployed ................................................................. Demand for labor in Russia and in closed cities .................................................................... Labor market stringency (number of registered unemployed per job vacancy) in Russia and in closed cities ..................................................................... Ratio between labor market stringency in Russia as a whole and in closed cities (Russia=100%) ...................................................................................... Distribution by age of the local residents and newcomers at the time of their taking a job at the enterprises, % ..................................................................... Specialists age/sex pattern: Percentage share of the total number of respondents ......................................................................................................... Age pattern of working specialists by individual types of cities, % .................................................................................................................................. Age distribution of specialists who took and who quit jobs in 1999, % ............................................................................................................................. Specialists current (1999) and forecast age pattern, % ......................................................... Distribution of specialists in the surveyed cities by the level of pay received (June 1999), % ............................................................................................. Distribution by rate of pay of specialists working in Sarov in 1992 and 1999, % ................................................................................................................. Distribution by level of pay and position held, % ................................................................. Distribution of specialists by actual average monthly per capita income in their families, % ......................................................................................... Duration of moonlighting, % of total moonlighters ............................................................. Proportion of income from outside work to regular pay, % ................................................. Distribution of specialists by regular pay and by actual earnings including money earned on the side, % ................................................................. Distribution of specialists by regular pay, by actual earnings including money earned on the side, and by pay ensuring reasonable subsistence, % ....................................................................................................... Distribution of specialists in Sarov by pay ensuring reasonable subsistence, 1992 and 1999, % ............................................................................................. Share of those who wish to work abroad, by age group, % .................................................. Sarov: Intention to work abroad in 1992 and 1999, % ......................................................... Attitude toward emigrants, by age, % .................................................................................... 26 27 28 28 29 30 34 35 35 36 37 38 39 40 46 47 48
48 49 52 53 62
4-5. 6-1. 6-2. 6-3.
19
6-4. 6-5. 7-1. 9-1. 10-1. 10-2. 10-3. 10-4. 10-5. 10-6. 10-7. 10-8. 10-9. 11-1. 11-2. 11-3. 11-4. 11-5. 11-6. 12-1. 12-2. 12-3. 12-4. 12-5. 12-6. 12-7. 12-8. 12-9. 13-1. 13-2. 13-3. 14-1. 14-2. 16-1. 16-2. 16-3. 17-1. 17-2. 18-1.
Dynamics of emigration from closed cities, % of sample total ............................................. Emigrants vs. total current employees: Age prole, % ........................................................... Distribution of specialists who took jobs with private businesses by year of their taking such jobs, % ...................................................................................... Distribution by age of those who are working at state enterprises and those who have left to take jobs with private businesses, % .......................................... Migrants vs. permanent residents taking jobs in missile cities, % of the survey sample .......................................................................................................... Migrants vs. permanent residents of missile cities, % ........................................................... Korolev: Permanent residents vs. migrants, % ....................................................................... Miass: Permanent residents vs. migrants, % .......................................................................... Migration to missile cities: Local residents vs. outsiders, % .................................................. Local residents: Permanent residents vs. migrants, % ............................................................ Korolev: Newly hired personnel: Local residents vs. outsiders, % ......................................... Miass: Newly hired personnel: Local residents vs. outsiders, % ............................................ Votkinsk: Newly hired personnel: Local residents vs. outsiders, % ........................................ Age of specialists with advanced degrees at the time of thesis defense, % ............................ Actual vs. hypothetical length-of-service proles, % ............................................................. Age of specialists presently employed in various cities, % .................................................... Korolev: Age proles of specialists in 1992 vs. 1999, % ....................................................... Korolev: Actual age mix of 1999 vs. 1992 age mix projected to 1999, % ............................ Korolev: Age prole of newly hired specialists, % ................................................................. Monthly wages of specialists in the cities surveyed (June 1999), % ..................................... Wage proles of specialists in Korolev, 1992 vs. 1999, % ..................................................... Duration of wage delays, % ................................................................................................... Votkinsk: Wages of specialists by position, % ........................................................................ Miass: Wages of specialists by position, % ............................................................................. Korolev: Wages of specialists by position, % .......................................................................... Wages presently matching specialists occupation and qualications in Russia, % of actual wages ............................................................................ Wages presently matching specialists occupation and qualications in Russia, % ..................................................................................................... Distribution of specialists by total monthly income of their family members, % ................................................................................................................ Total monthly income of specialists families, % ................................................................... Distribution of specialists by actual monthly average income per capita, % .......................................................................................................................... Distribution of specialists by desired monthly average income per capita, % .......................................................................................................................... Duration of moonlighting, % of total moonlighters ............................................................. Moonlighting earnings vs. regular wages, % ......................................................................... Persons wishing to work abroad, by age group, % ............................................................... Korolev: Persons willing to work abroad, 1992 vs. 1999, by age group, % ..................................................................................................................... Attitudes toward emigrants, by age, % .................................................................................. Dynamics of emigration from missile cities, % of total sampling ......................................... Emigrants vs. total current employees: Age prole, % ........................................................... Time of specialists move to business entities, % of total sampling ......................................
63 65 69 75 78 79 79 80 81 81 82 83 83 84 90 91 91 92 92 93 94 95 95 96 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 105 106 108 109 113 114 115 119
20
TA B L E S
1-1. 1-2. 2-1. 2-2. 2-3. 2-4. 2-5. 3-1. 3-2. 3-3. 3-4. 3-5. 3-6. 3-7. 4-1. 4-2. 4-3. 4-4. 4-5. 5-1. 5-2. 5-3. 5-4. 6-1. 6-2. 6-3. 6-4. Distribution of specialists children by age and year of birth, % ........................................... Distribution of specialists by length of employment at enterprises, % ................................. Distribution of persons taking jobs at enterprises based on possession of an academic degree and where it was earned, % ............................................ Location of the educational institutions from which specialists graduated, % ...................... Location of migrants training, % .......................................................................................... Territorial distribution of places where newcomers acquired an education, % .................... Possession of an academic degree by a specialist and the location of the institution of higher education he or she attended, % .................................................... Average salary received at surveyed enterprises in June 1999 (US dollars) .......................... Delays in pay, % ..................................................................................................................... Average monthly pay by position held (US dollars) .............................................................. Distribution of specialists by family size, % .......................................................................... Distribution of specialists by number of children, % ............................................................ Housing conditions of specialists working at the enterprises, % .......................................... Distribution of specialists by marital status and housing conditions, % ............................... Reasons for moonlighting, % ................................................................................................ Distribution of moonlighting specialists based on reason for doing so and on nature of work, % ................................................................................................. Difculty of nding moonlighting opportunity, % of respondents ...................................... Moonlighting intentions of specialists who are not doing outside work, % ........................ Main types of outside work performed by specialists, % ...................................................... Change in specialists nancial situation during the reform period (19921999), % of denitive answers .................................................................................. Change in specialists nancial situation according to employment position over the reform period (19921999), % of denitive answers .............................. Evaluation of nancial situation by specialists in various types of cities, % .......................... Evaluation of nancial situation by specialists holding different positions, % ...................... Desire to work abroad, % of denitive answers .................................................................... Typical responses about obstacles to going abroad ................................................................ Steps taken to realize desire of going abroad, % of total number wishing to emigrate ............................................................................................................... Steps taken to realize desire of going abroad, % of the total number taking such steps .................................................................................................................... 24 25 31 31 32 33 33 37 38 39 40 40 41 42 42 43 44 45 46 50 50 51 51 52 54 56 56
21
6-5. 6-6. 6-7. 6-8. 6-9. 6-10. 6-11. 6-12. 6-13. 6-14. 6-15. 6-16. 6-17. 6-18. 6-19. 6-20. 6-21. 7-1. 7-2. 7-3. 7-4. 7-5. 7-6. 7-7. 8-1. 8-2. 8-3. 8-4. 8-5. 8-6. 9-1. 9-2. 10-1. 10-2. 10-3.
Intermediaries in going abroad to work, % of the total number of those wishing to emigrate to work abroad ..................................................................................... Countries and regions to which persons wishing to work abroad would like to go, % of the number of countries named by respondents ......................................... Countries atly rejected by persons wishing to work abroad, % of the number of countries named by respondents ......................................................................... Main reasons for specialists interest in working abroad, % of those wishing to live and work abroad ........................................................................................... Willingness to work in foreign defense industries, % of respondents .................................. Specialists attitude toward emigrants, % ............................................................................... Desire to work abroad among specialists holding different attitudes toward emigration, % ................................................................................................................ Attitude of specialists in different positions toward emigrants, % ........................................ Specialists attitudes toward emigrants depending on whether ex-colleagues have gone abroad, % ....................................................................................... Emigrants from closed cities, % ............................................................................................. Specialists countries of destination, % of total number who have emigrated ....................................................................................................................... Ethnic composition of emigrants by sex, % of total .............................................................. Possession of an academic degree by those who have gone abroad, % ................................ Reasons for emigrating, % ..................................................................................................... Distribution of emigrants by country of destination and by reason for emigrating, % ........................................................................................................................ Distribution of emigrants by reason for emigrating and by ethnic origin, % ....................... Distribution of emigrants by ethnic origin and by country of destination, % ...................... Cities where specialists have private enterprise jobs, % ........................................................ What ex-specialists of state enterprises do for a living, % .................................................... Distribution of those who have taken jobs at commercial companies by sex and age, % .................................................................................................................. Reasons for moving to business entities, by sex, % ............................................................... Distribution by profession and sex, % ................................................................................... Distribution of those who have taken jobs with private businesses, by profession and occupation, % ........................................................................................... Specialists leaving private business and state enterprises to take a job at a state enterprise, % ........................................................................................................ Competition for admittance to an institution of higher education, % .................................. Making money on the side and average grades, % ................................................................ Proportion of time spent on outside work and on studying and average grades, % ................................................................................................................... Students attitudes toward working at nuclear industry enterprises in closed cities, % ....................................................................................................................... Students plans and average grades, % ................................................................................... Students intended place of work and average grades, % ...................................................... Effect of moonlighting for domestic and foreign income on specialists main work, % ........................................................................................................................ Can negative changes in specialist personnel makeup of an enterprise adversely affect the nations nuclear security?, % .................................................................. Migrants vs. permanent residents of missile cities, time prole, % ....................................... Specialists migration ow for surveyed cities, time prole, % ............................................. Specialists taking jobs in missile cities: Local residents vs. outsiders, % ................................
57 57 58 59 59 60 61 61 62 63 64 64 64 65 66 66 67 68 68 69 70 70 70 71 72 72 73 73 74 74 75 76 78 80 82
22
11-1. Birthplace of advanced degree holders, % ............................................................................. 11-2. Percentage of advanced degree holders among persons born in various regions, % ................................................................................................................. 11-3. Location of colleges and universities attended by specialists, % ............................................ 11-4. Korolev: Location of college/university attended by specialists joining the enterprise in various years, % ............................................................................. 11-5. Votkinsk: Location of college/university attended by specialists joining the enterprise in various years, % ............................................................................. 11-6. Miass: Location of college/university attended by specialists joining the enterprise in various years, % .......................................................................................... 11-7. Korolev: Location of college/university attended by migrants joining the enterprise in various years, % .......................................................................................... 11-8. Votkinsk: Location of college/university attended by migrants joining the enterprise in various years, % .......................................................................................... 11-9. Miass: Location of college/university attended by migrants joining the enterprise in various years, % .......................................................................................... 11-10. Specialists length of service at the enterprises, % ................................................................. 12-1. Wage delays, % ...................................................................................................................... 12-2. Average duration of wage delays, months ............................................................................. 12-3. Average monthly actual salary vs. salary commensurate with specialists occupation and qualications, US$ and % ........................................................... 13-1. Distribution of specialists families by size, % ....................................................................... 13-2. Housing situation of specialists, % ........................................................................................ 14-1. Specialists who moonlight, % ................................................................................................ 14-2. Reasons for moonlighting, % ................................................................................................ 14-3. Nature of moonlighting jobs, % ............................................................................................ 14-4. Whether additional earnings are difcult to come by, % of all replies ................................. 14-5. Non-moonlighting specialists intending to moonlight, % .................................................... 14-6. Major types of moonlighting jobs, % .................................................................................... 15-1. Changes in specialists nancial situation during the reform period (19921999), % of denitive answers .................................................................................. 15-2. Respondents views of their nancial situation, % ................................................................ 16-1. Desire to work abroad, % of denitive answers .................................................................... 16-2. Steps taken by specialists to realize desire of going abroad, % of total number wishing to emigrate ................................................................................ 16-3. Measures taken to realize desire of going abroad, % of persons taking any measures ............................................................................................................... 16-4. Countries and regions to which persons wishing to work abroad would like to go, % of denitive replies ............................................................................... 16-5. Countries atly rejected by persons willing to work abroad, % of denitive answers .......................................................................................................... 16-6. Main reasons for interest in working abroad, % .................................................................... 16-7. Willingness to work for foreign defense industries, % ......................................................... 16-8. Specialists attitudes toward emigrants, % ............................................................................. 16-9. Specialists attitudes toward emigrants, by position held, % ................................................. 17-1. Emigrants from missile cities, % ............................................................................................ 17-2. Ethnic composition of emigrants, by sex, % of total ............................................................. 17-3. Reasons for emigrating, % ..................................................................................................... 17-4. Country of destination, % ...................................................................................................... 17-5. Country of destination and reason for emigrating, % ...........................................................
84 85 85 86 87 87 88 88 89 89 94 95 98 100 102 103 103 104 104 104 105 107 107 108 109 109 110 110 111 111 112 112 113 114 115 116 116
23
17-6. Reason for emigrating and ethnicity, % ................................................................................. 18-1. Colleagues who have taken jobs with private businesses or started their own businesses, % ................................................................................................................. 18-2. Cities in which former specialists have jobs in private business, % ...................................... 18-3. What ex-specialists of missile enterprises do for a living, % ................................................ 18-4. Reasons for moving to business entities, % ........................................................................... 18-5. Business jobs of ex-specialists: Professional prole, % .......................................................... 18-6. Satisfaction with new jobs, % ................................................................................................ 19-1. Competition for admittance to colleges and universities, % ................................................. 19-2. Reasons for students occupational choices, % ...................................................................... 19-3. Determinants of students occupational choices vs. academic record, % .............................. 20-1. Respondents personal opinions on the consequences of adverse developments affecting the enterprises .................................................................................. 20-2. Can changes in the specialist personnel makeup adversely affect the nations nuclear security?, % .................................................................................................. 20-3. Who is under the worst threat from adverse developments affecting the specialist personnel of missile cities?, % ................................................................................
117 117 118 118 119 119 120 120 121 121 122 124 124
24
NUCLEAR CITIES
1. CHANGES IN SPECIALIST RECRUITMENT
Over the past decade, two factors have considerably changed personnel recruitment in the nuclear complex cities: A sharp increase in the number of local residents and a reduction in the demand for incoming specialists. Let us examine these factors.
1.1. The Growth of Local Labor Resources in Closed Cities
Unfortunately, data on the age structure of the population of nuclear complex cities remain classied. In order to estimate the demographic potential of closed cities, therefore, we had to determine indirectly how the number of natives at local enterprises has been changing. In short, it was necessary to assess the change in the number of children born in closed cities over a prolonged period of time. To develop our estimate, we relied on data from our surveys of the number of children of different ages born into the families of specialists working at the covered enterprises. Our results show that the number of children born varied greatly at different times (table 1-1).
Table 1-1. Distribution of specialists children by age and year of birth, %
CHILDRENS YEARS OF BIRTH YEARS WHEN THEY CAN/ C O U L D S TA R T WO R K I N G CHILDRENS A G E G RO U P S P E R C E N TA G E SHARE
1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69
2010-19 2000-09 1990-99 1980-89
under 10 10-19 20-29 30-39
18 45 30 7
Children born in the 1970snow twenty to twenty-nine years oldaccount for 30 percent of the total number of the specialists children. This means that most of them (70 percent to 80 percent) would have graduated from institutions of higher education and taken jobs at enterprises in closed cities during the 1990s. Accordingly, the children born in the 1960s, now thirty to thirty-nine years old and, having graduated from institutions of higher education, might potentially have taken jobs at the enterprises in the 1980s. This latter group is 4.5 times smaller than that of children born in the 1970s.
25
It follows that the closed cities demographic potential grew sharply (4.5 times) in the 1990s as compared with the 1980s. This dramatic explosion in local population may explain to a certain extent the change in the ratio between local residents and migrants among those taking jobs at the enterprises. Based on birthrates alone, one could assume that this employment trend will continue. There will be a 50 percent increase in the number of residents who will reach working age during the current decade as compared with the 1990s. The years 20002009 will be the most difcult period in terms of ensuring the employment of local labor resources, as there is a dramatic drop in the number of children born in the 1990s; this in turn will result in a dramatic drop in the number entering the labor pool in 20102019. The nuclear cities are therefore facing major challenges in adapting to future swings in the growth of their labor resources. In the 1980s, 36 percent of those beginning to work in closed cities were local residents and 64 percent were newcomers. In the 1990s, 87 percent of those beginning to work in closed cities were local residents and 15 percent were newcomers. We believe that the substantial increase in the closed cities internal labor resources was at least partially responsible for the sharp drop in recruitment of outside personnel that these cities witnessed during the 1990s, as compared with the previous decade
1.2. Demand for Specialists in Closed Cities in the 1990s
The demographic factor in itself means little if the demand for specialists is not considered. For the demographic factorsharp growth in the number of local residentsto play its part, the demand for specialists in the 1990s would have had to be considerably lower than the growth in the number of local residents. This presupposes, at a minimum, that the number of those employed at the enterprises would not increase. Let us look at the distribution of specialists by length of employment at an enterprise (table 1-2).
Table 1-2. Distribution of specialists by length of employment at enterprises, %
Y E A R E M P L OY E D L E N G T H O F E M P L OY M E N T P E R C E N TA G E S H A R E OF SPECIALISTS
1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69 Before 1960 Total sampling
Fewer than 10 years 10-20 years 20-30 years 30-40 years More than 40 years
31 31 27 10 1 100
As can be seen, 31 percent of those working at enterprises began their jobs during the 1990s. This does not mean, however, that those who took jobs at enterprises constituted precisely 31 percent of the total number of employees because there is a considerable attrition rate of new employees at these enterprises. A total of 45 percent of the respondents have colleagues who quit in the 1990s to take jobs with private businesses. Owing to this factor alone, then, the annual percentage share of those who quit their jobs at the surveyed enterprises was at least 4.5 percent (this number does not include those who left to settle abroad, took jobs at other state enterprises, or retired on a pension).
26
According to the ndings of a survey of those who left their jobs at the enterprises, approximately half took positions with private businesses, the other half taking jobs at other state enterprises or retiring. Thus for each year in the 1990s, at least 9 percent of those working at the enterprises quit their jobs for various reasons. One-third, or 33 percent, of those who left their jobs had been working at the enterprises for fewer than 10 years, that is, they were among those who joined the enterprises in the 1990s. From this one can calculate the rate at which employees started work at the enterprises in the 1990s and then quit within ten years. This number is equal to the ratio of those who worked for however many years among the total number of those who quit their jobs to the percentage of those who are still working and who have been working for a similar number of years. This ratio is 1.06 (33 percent : 31 percent). The average annual probability that an employee who has worked fewer than ten years will quit an enterprise equals the product of the average annual level of quitting (9 percent) and the average rate of quitting by members of a given length-of-employment group (1.06), which amounts to 9.6 percent. In other words, 90.4 percent of employees hired in the 1990s did not quit. Given that the average level of quitting was not less than 9 percent in the 1990s, a hiring rate of 9 percent would have had to be maintained to ensure constant personnel levels. If the number of enterprise personnel in the 1990s had been stable, the hiring of 9 percent of new personnel annually would have resulted in the hypothetical length-of-employment structure shown in gure 1-1. As can be seen, the actual length-of-employment structure relating to those who took jobs at the enterprises in the 1990s differs substantially from the hypothetical length-of-employment structure. The values of the corresponding length-of-employment groups of the actual structure are, without exception, lower than the values of the hypothetical structure, leading one to conclude that in the 1990s the number of specialists working at the enterprises decreased rapidly.
Figure 1-1. Actual and hypothetical length-of-employment structure, %
10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%
1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 Year employed at an enterprise
Hypothetical structure
Seversk
Zarechny
Sarov
Actual structure
The decrease in the number of specialists working at the enterprises, combined with a demographic explosion, has led to a substantial reduction in the inow of migrants to closed cities. As a result, the makeup of the work force at the enterprises in the 1990s changed in favor of local residents.
27
Our hypothesisthat the number of those working at major state enterprises in closed cities were employed under conditions of a sharp increase in the cities own labor resources can be corroborated by data on the level of unemployment in closed cities in the 1990s.
1.3. Demand, Supply, and Stringency in the Labor Markets of Russia and Closed Cities
Figure 1-2 shows that unemployment gures in Russia and in closed cities are closely aligned. In this respect, one can say that closed cities, far from contrasting with Russia as a whole, are in fact microcosms of it. Increased unemployment was largely caused by an explosive growth in local labor resources in the 1990s as compared with the 1980s. The impact of the demographic wave on unemployment, however, would have been less had there been substantial growth in labor demand in closed cities.
Figure 1-2. Total number of officially registered unemployed (in thousands)
3,000 2,500
Russia
25 20 15
Closed cities
2,000 1,500 10 1,000 500 0

1992 1993 1994 1995 Year 1996 1997 1998
5 0
Russia
Linear trend (Russia)
Closed cities
Linear trend (closed cities)
In 1998, total unemployment in the nuclear cities surveyed amounted to 17,000 people. Considering that the ratio between the ofcially registered and actual number of unemployed is 1 : 3, there are actually about 51,000 unemployed in closed cities. In other words, of the 510,000 residents of working age in the surveyed closed cities, one in ten is unemployed. Labor demand trends in Russia and in closed cities are different in absolute terms, albeit synchronous (g. 1-3). The demand for labor dropped sharply in 1992 (by approximately two-thirds) and stabilized in 19931998 at a level of 300,000 in Russia and 2,000 in closed cities. Judging by the trend lines, one sees in Russia a weak trend toward growth in demand, and in closed cities an even weaker trend toward a reduction in demand. As a result of this labor supply and demand dynamic, labor market stringency in Russia and in closed cities is growing rapidly (g. 1-4). Between 1992 and 1995, labor market stringency in Russia and in closed cities was practically the same, but subsequently the situation
28
Figure 1-3. Demand for labor in Russia and in closed cities (in thousands)
450 400
Russia
25 20 15 10 5 0
1992 1993 1994 1995 Year 1996 1997 1998 Closed cities
350 300 250 200
Russia
Linear trend (Russia)
Closed cities
Linear trend (Closed cities)
began to change rapidly, adversely affecting the nuclear cities. This leads us to believe that, because labor market stringency in these cities is much greater than in Russia as a whole, the migration attractiveness of closed cities in terms of their employment potential is quite low.
Figure 1-4. Labor market stringency (number of registered unemployed per job vacancy) in Russia and in closed cities 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0
1993 1994 1995 Year 1996 1997 1998
Russia
Russia=1
Closed cities
29
Considering that the rst decade of the new century will witness even greater local resident growth than the 1990s did (a 1.5-fold growth), the level of unemployment may double if low labor demand persists. It is quite probable, therefore, that the growth in migration to closed cities seen early in their evolution may well be replaced by an outow of migrants. Otherwise social tension is likely to develop because of the extremely high unemployment levels. As can be seen from gure 1-5, the level of labor market stringency in closed cities is higher than in Russia as a whole, and this gap is clearly trending toward widening even more.
Figure 1-5. Ratio between labor market stringency in Russia as a whole and in closed cities (Russia=100%)
200%
150%
Linear trend
100%
50%
0%
1993 1994 1995 Year 1996 1997 1998
2 . C H A N G E S I N T H E Q U A L I TAT I V E C O M P O S I T I O N O F S P E C I A L I S T S WO R K I N G I N C L O S E D C I T I E S
In closed cities, the inow of migrants is relatively easy to regulate. The fact is that not everyone who wishes to move to a closed city can do so; one must have reasonable grounds. For most migrants who used to reside permanently outside closed cities, it is precisely the need of the cities enterprises for a sufcient number of specialists of an appropriate class that offers such grounds. That is why the bulk of the migrants who came to closed cities did so on assignment.1 From the early 1990s, however, the assignment system has been inoperative, as specialists of the appropriate class are invited to and offered jobs in closed cities. Because the number of people employed at enterprises in these cities steadily decreased in the 1990s, ever fewer specialists came to work there. At the same time, fundamental changes have taken place in the qualitative composition of specialists coming to work in closed cities.
1. In Soviet times, the term assignment meant, as a rule, sending graduates of higher education establishments to work at predesignated places. On the one hand, this guaranteed them jobs but, on the other hand, such jobs were not always concordant with the wishes of those who were given assignments. At the same time, the graduates assignment to jobs did not mean that they were given these jobs for life. More often than not they had to work at the jobs they were assigned for two or three years, after which they could look for another job on their own.
30
2.1. Age Structure of Those Taking Jobs at Enterprises in Closed Cities
As can be seen from gure 2-1, incoming specialists taking jobs at closed city enterprises in the 1990s were much older than local residents taking jobs there. This is a radical departure from the preceding period, when those moving to the cities to take jobs were somewhat younger than locals taking such jobs.
Figure 2-1. Distribution by age of the local residents and newcomers at the time of their taking a job at the enterprises, % 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% -20%
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50 and over
Local residents (before 1990)
Local residents (1990-98)
Newcomers (1990-98)
Newcomers (before 1990)
2.2. Changes in Key Personnel
The 1990s saw very serious negative changes in key personnel. In particular, there was not only a reduction in the percentage of staff members possessing advanced academic degrees, but also a change in where they defended their dissertations. Table 2-1 shows that among those who began working in closed cities in the 1960s and 1970s, a total of 16 percent to 18 percent of the respondents had academic degrees. In most cases, respondents had received their degrees while working at the enterprises. In other words, their work at an enterprise provided them with material for their dissertation. In the 1980s there was a radical change in this situation. Only 2 percent of those who began working in closed cities during that period possessed academic degrees. And among those who began working in the 1990s only 1 percent had received an academic degree before coming to a closed city.
31
Table 2-1. Distribution of persons taking jobs at enterprises based on possession of an academic degree and where it was earned, %
WHERE EARNED Y E A R E M P L OY E D I N A C L O S E D C I T Y
Before 1960
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
1991-99
Total sampling
While working at an enterprise Before taking a job at an enterprise Had no academic degree Total sampling
0 0 100 100
18 0 82 100
13 3 84 100
2 0 98 100
0 1 99 100
7 1 92 100
2.3. Changes in Location of Specialist Training
More than half of the specialists working in closed cities (table 2-2) obtained an education either in the closed city itself (31 percent) or close to it (the same region in which the enterprise is located [23 percent]). Almost one of seven studied in Moscow or the Moscow Region. The share of those who graduated from institutions of higher education located in other non-Russian Republics of the former USSR is quite small (1 percent). The disintegration of the USSR thus did not adversely affect the personnel training system for closed cities.
Table 2-2. Location of the educational institutions from which specialists graduated, %
Y E A R E M P L OY E D IN A CLOSED CITY L O CAT I O N O F T H E I N S T I T U T I O N O F H I G H E R E D U CAT I O N F RO M W H I C H S P E C I A L I S T S G R A D U AT E D
Closed city
Region in which closed city is located
Moscow and the Moscow Region
Other regions of Russia
Republics of the former USSR
1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69 before 1960 Total sampling
65 22 22 15 0 31
23 29 22 16 0 23
4 6 17 41 100 14
7 40 38 28 0 30
1 2 1 0 0 1
The following trends can be observed in employment dynamics: First, there has been a dramatic rise in the percentage of people receiving their advanced degrees in or near the closed city where they are employed. In the 1990s, nearly 90 percent of specialists who began working in closed cities had obtained an education there, while in the 1980s that share was 51 percent, and in the 1970s, 44 percent. Second, there has been a rapid decrease in the share of specialists taking jobs in closed cities who have graduated from the best colleges and universities offering instruction in the atomic eld (that is, those located in Moscow and the Moscow Region). The localization of education in these cities can be explained by the economic crisis of the 1990s, whose consequences are of a dual character. First, the cities have seen a sharp drop in labor demand and substantial unemployment as well as a reduction in labor remuneration. These factors make the closed cities relatively unattractive for graduates of educational institutions
32
situated far from closed cities. Second, families with students who are living in closed cities have grown much poorer. They do not have the means to send their children to a college or university located far from their hometowns, above all, to those in Moscow and the Moscow Region. Transportation, tuition, and room and board are prohibitively expensive. Such families are forced to send their children to college in the vicinity of their place of residence. What educational institutions did migrants to closed cities graduate from? (See table 2-3.)
Table 2-3. Location of migrants training, %
Y E A R E M P L OY E D IN A CLOSED CITY L O CAT I O N O F T H E I N S T I T U T I O N S O F H I G H E R E D U CAT I O N M I G R A N T S G R A D U AT E D F RO M
Total sampling
66 37 28 19 0 34
12 8 22 49 100 20
19 51 49 32 0 44
3 3 1 0 0 2
100 100 100 100 100 100
Nearly one-third of the migrants received an education in the regions where closed cities are located (table 2-3). This percentage has increased decade after decade and continues to rise. In the 1990s, two-thirds of the migrants taking jobs in closed cities were trained in the cities themselves. Every fth migrant out of the total number received an education in Moscow or the Moscow Region, but in the 1990s only one of every eight received a degree in and around Moscow. A similar situation is observed with regard to those who graduated from institutions of higher education in other regions of the country. In all, 44 percent of the migrants received an education in other regions, and in the 1990s only 19 percent. This trend is hardly surprising, considering that nearly two-thirds of incoming migrants during the 1990s were, in fact, former residents of the cities who had left in order to go to school. And, as noted earlier, the economic situation in closed cities often forces students from these cities to study as close to home as possible. In addition, a growing number of new migrants not originally from closed cities are also graduating from higher academic institutions located in the vicinity of the cities in which they come to work.
33
Table 2-4. Territorial distribution of places where newcomers acquired an education, %

T E N - Y E A R G RO U P S B Y Y E A R E M P L OY E D IN A CLOSED CITY L O CAT I O N O F T H E I N S T I T U T I O N S O F H I G H E R E D U CAT I O N F RO M W H I C H N E W C O M E R S G R A D U AT E D
Total sampling
44 29 24 17 0 26
28 10 25 50 100 24
21 57 50 33 0 48
7 4 1 0 0 2
100 100 100 100 100 100
Thus, the structure of personnel training in the 1990s was strongly affected by the economic crisis.This manifested itself in the fact that a growing number of closed cities residents, because their families are being compelled to save on education costs, chose to acquire their education close to home rather than in places with the highest standards of training. On the other hand, the same need to minimize costs forces the management of enterprises to offer jobs to incoming specialists who have graduated from nearby educational establishments and who are living in the vicinity of the closed cities. As a result, closed cities, which were once closely connected with the countrys centerabove all, Moscowand were supplied with top-class specialists who were graduates of the most prestigious educational institutions, are becoming self-sufcient in terms of labor supply. Undoubtedly, this reversal adversely affects specialists professional standards.
2.4. The Need for Migrating to Closed Cities
The importance of training personnel outside closed cities will be more evident if we look at the relation between the institutions of higher education a specialist attended and his or her possession of an academic degree (table 2-5).
Table 2-5. Possession of an academic degree by a specialist and the location of the institution of higher education he or she attended, %
POSSESSION OF DEGREE L O CAT I O N O F T H E I N S T I T U T I O N O F H I G H E R E D U CAT I O N S P E C I A L I S T S AT T E N D E D
Closed city
Region in which the closed city is located
Total sampling
Yes
21
11
Migrants attending institutions of higher education outside closed cities are more likely to earn an academic degree than are students of such institutions located in closed cities. Thus, among those attending institutions of higher education located in the vicinity of closed cities, the share holding an academic degree is greater by half than among those who studied at institutions located in closed cities. The share of persons holding academic degrees among students of higher education institutes located in Moscow and the Moscow Region is ve times
34
greater than those graduating in the closed cities. Even among those attending other institutions of higher education, the share of those who hold an academic degree is two and a half times greater than among the specialists who obtained a higher education in closed cities. Because the training of personnel in the 1990s was concentrated in the regions where closed cities are situated and in the cities themselves, there has been a decline in the professional standards of specialists and in particular of those holding higher academic degrees, namely, Candidate and Doctor of Sciences.
2.5. Age/Sex Pattern
Two-thirds of the surveyed specialists are men. The modal interval of age is forty to forty-nine years for both men and women. It includes about 40 percent of the specialists. The number of men and women under forty is approximately the same, while those above forty-nine years of age make up only 13 percent of the women and 26 percent of the men.
Figure 2-2. Specialists' age/sex pattern: Percentage share of total number of respondents
30%
20%
10%
0%
Under 30 30-39 40-49 Age groups, years of age 50-59 60 and over
Men
Women
Figure 2-3 shows data about the age pattern of surveyed specialists by individual types of cities. Research centers have the oldest age pattern, every third specialist who works in them being fty years old and older. The youngest age pattern is in the chemical centers. Production centers are in between.
35
Figure 2-3. Age pattern of working specialists by individual types of cities, %
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Scientific centers
Production centers
Chemical centers
The age patterns develop under the inuence of two processes: the outow and inow of personnel.
Figure 2-4. Age distribution of specialists who took and who quit jobs in 1999, %
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Both sexes (those who took jobs)
Both sexes (those who quit jobs)
As follows from gure 2-4, the age pattern of those taking jobs is characterized by a large share of specialists under forty years of age (70 percent) and a small (3 percent) share of persons in the age group of fty to fty-nine years. The age pattern of those who quit their jobs is rather similar to that of those who took jobs: about 60 percent of those who quit jobs are under forty years of age and 16 percent of them are fty years old and up. In the forty- to forty-nine-year age group, the share of those who quit and those who took jobs is the same.
36
Proceeding from the age pattern of the specialists who are working and who took jobs and quit jobs, we tried to forecast changes in the age pattern in ve years and ten years (g. 2-5).
Figure 2-5. Specialists' current (1999) and forecast age pattern, %
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1999
2004
2009
As can be seen, if current trends in personnel movement persist in the future, the ages of those working in the collectives will become even more advanced. This will happen, in the rst place, through an increase in the share of persons of near-retirement age and an equal reduction in the share of people between the ages of forty and forty-nine. Thus, current patterns of specialists taking and quitting jobs not only inhibit the rejuvenation of the work force, but do not even maintain the stability of the present age pattern. If a rejuvenation of the work force is to occur, therefore, the pattern of personnel ow rates has to be modied. Such modication can be accomplished by making the enterprises more economically attractive to young people. This is precisely the problem that has to be solved, for demographically the number of young people living in closed cities looks quite favorable in 20002009: the growth in their number is expected to be the highest in the entire period in which closed cities have existed. Otherwise, closed cities will be faced with a situation in which the aging of the enterprises personnel will be accompanied by the presence of large numbers of jobless young people.
3 . L I V I N G S TA N DA R D S I N C L O S E D C I T I E S
3.1. Salary Structure
Salaries are a major determinant of the mobility of the labor force. Although information about the salaries received by specialists in closed cities in the past is not available, according to academician Andrei Sakharov, who used to work in the city of Sarov (also known as Arzamas-16), salaries were enormous compared with the average rate of pay in the country at large. As early as 1994, however, the average rate of pay in closed cities was only 20 percent greater than the national average pay in Russia. The once enormous differences in pay between closed cities and the country as a whole no longer exist. In terms of salary, therefore, the attractiveness of closed cities as immigration destinations has dropped sharply.
37
Figure 3-1. Distribution of specialists in the surveyed cities by the level of pay received (June, 1999), %
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 25 25-50 50-75 US dollars 75-100 100-125
Research centers
Production centers
Chemical centers
Total sampling
As can be seen from gure 3-1, some 50 percent of the surveyed specialists receive monthly pay equivalent to US$25 to US$50, about 12 percent get less than US$25 a month, 22 percent $50 to $75, and the rest $100 to $125. The distribution of salary rates in research and production centers is similar. The primary activities of these two types of cities, however, differ greatly. Research centers are the brains of the closed cities, while production centers are engaged in the comparatively less demanding work of assembly and disassembly of nuclear munitions.Yet the average level of pay in the cities is practically identical (table 3-1). In chemical centers, where uranium is enriched, salary rates are nearly twice as high as in research and production centers, yet even here it is extremely small, amounting to US$64 per month (1,600 rubles at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of the survey).
Table 3-1. Average salary received at surveyed enterprises in June 1999 (US dollars)
TYPE OF CITY $ U. S . / M O N T H
Research center Production center Chemical center Total sampling
37 39 64 43
Data on the rate of pay received by specialists in Sarov in 1992 are shown in gure 3-2. As can be seen, the distribution by rate of pay received in 1992 and 1999 coincides exactly. In other words, between 1992 and 1999 the level and structure of pay remained unchanged even though the cost of living increased considerably over that period.
38
Figure 3-2. Distribution by rate of pay of specialists working in Sarov in 1992 and 1999, %
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Under 25 25-50 US dollars 50-75 75-100
1992
1999
3.2. Delays in Pay
Yet even this pay, low as it is, is not paid in timely fashion (table 3-2). In all, a total of 74 percent of specialists at the surveyed enterprises noted delays in receiving their pay. The greatest number of specialists indicating delays work in production centers (83 percent). The corresponding gure for production centers is 70 percent, while the fewest delays in pay, experienced by 47 percent of the specialists, occur in chemical centers. Overall, the average length of delay in pay is about 2 months.
Table 3-2. Delays in pay, %
TYPE OF CITY
Delays
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Total sampling
Yes No Sometimes Not now, but in the past Total sampling
83 10 5 2 100
70 30 0 0 100
47 52 0 1 100
74 21 3 1 100
39
3.3. Differentiation of Pay by Position Held
It might seem that level of pay should vary substantially depending on the position a specialist occupies at an enterprise, but such is not the case. At present, differentiation of pay by position is minimal (g. 3-3). The modal interval for all positions is US$25 to US$50, a level of pay received by some 60 percent of specialists in all positions. The distribution of pay for engineers and research workers practically coincides. This is corroborated by data on the average monthly rate of pay (table 3-3). The average pay received by heads of sections is 25 percent higher than that received by engineers and research workers.
Figure 3-3. Distribution by level of pay and position held, %
60%
40%
20%
0%
Under 25 25-50 50-75 US dollars 75-100 100-125
Engineers
Heads of sections
Research workers
Table 3-3. Average monthly pay by position held (US dollars)

POSITION AV E R A G E PA Y
Engineer Head of section Research worker

3.4. Level of Monthly Family Income
41 53 41
The level of monthly income of the specialists families is an even more important indicator of their standard of living than salaries of individual employees. Figure 3-4 shows the distribution of the respondents by size of aggregate income per family member. As can be seen, it is practically identical in research and production centers, while in chemical centers the distribution shifts toward groups with smaller incomes. This is corroborated by data on the average income per family member, which amounts to about US$48 in research and production centers, about US$40 in chemical centers, and US$46 in the sample as a whole.
40
Figure 3-4. Distribution of specialists by actual average monthly per capita income in their families, %
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Under 20 20-40 40-60 US dollars 60-80 80-100
Research centers
Production centers
Chemical centers
Total sampling
The average size of a specialists family is three persons (table 3-4). Thus an average family composed of parents and children has only one child. This is explained by the fact that among specialists living and working in closed cities nearly every fth one has no children, and about half of them have one child (table 3-5). Only 28 percent of the respondents have two children, and as few as 5 percent have three children.
Table 3-4. Distribution of specialists by family size, %
TYPE OF CITY
Number of family members
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Total sampling
1 2 3 4 5 Average number of family members
17 16 34 28 6 2.93
17 20 34 24 4 2.75
9 9 57 23 3 3.05
16 16 38 26 5 2.91
Table 3-5. Distribution of specialists by number of children, %

TYPE OF CITY
Number of children
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Total sampling
0 1 2 3 Total sampling
22 42 29 6 100
25 44 27 4 100
11 59 27 3 100
21 46 28 5 100
41
It should be noted that salaries received in chemical centers are highest, amounting to US$64 as compared to US$37 in research centers and US$39 in production centers. At the same time, chemical centers show the lowest per capita income. This cannot be explained by differences in the sizes of families. It may be assumed, however, that the share of those who supplement their salaries by outside work (moonlighting) is lowest in chemical centers 50 percent as compared with 60 percent in research and production centers. Considering that in most cases incomes earned through outside work are either comparable to or higher than regular pay, it can be said that higher family incomes in cities with lower pay are exclusively the result of moonlighting. Regular pay is becoming less signicant as a source of income. It is not by accident that specialists taking jobs in closed cities prefer to work at state enterprises, thereby ensuring themselves of certain social guarantees albeit with a small (yet stable) salary, and then supplement their salaries with outside work, done mostly for private enterprises. Respondents commonly stated that it is better to make money on the side by doing some work at commercial companies, while having a regular job at a state enterprise and a state enterprise is more reliable; I dont trust commercial companies because they exist today but may vanish tomorrow.
3.5. Housing Conditions
Housing is one of the most acute problems affecting migration in Russia. A high percentage of residents in the closed cities have been provided with housing. Nearly 90 percent of the surveyed specialists live in what are ofcially known as separate apartments (table 3-6). The number who live in shared apartments and hostels is quite small. On the other hand, some of the specialists note that, although formally they are living in separate apartments, these are in fact shared because they live together with their parents.
Table 3-6. Housing conditions of specialists working at the enterprises, %
PRESENT HOUSING TYPE OF CITY
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Total sampling
Separate apartment House Separate apartment (living with parents) Shared apartment Hostel Rented dwelling Total sampling
75 1 13 6 3 2 100
75 0 16 6 1 2 100
87 1 4 4 3 1 100
77 1 12 5 2 2 100
Specialists who have families live, as a rule, in separate apartments. Those who are divorced live mostly in shared apartments, which were separate apartments prior to their divorce, or in rented dwellings. Nearly 75 percent of those who indicated that they were living in separate apartments with their parents are single (table 3-7).
42
Table 3-7. Distribution of specialists by marital status and housing conditions, %

PRESENT HOUSING M A R I TA L S TAT U S
Married
Single
Divorced
Widower (widow)
Total sampling
Separate apartment House Separate apartment (living with parents) Shared apartment Hostel Rented dwelling Total sampling
83 100 21 10 42 13 69
4 0 77 14 7 45 14
8 0 3 69 42 37 12
4 0 0 0 9 0 4
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Leaving a closed city in effect means the loss of ones housing because the opportunities to sell housing are limited by low demand. In most cases, housing belongs to local enterprises and is provided free of charge. This acts as a major restraint on the outow from closed cities in that those leaving will not be given free housing anywhere else. Once having left a closed city, people must purchase their housing, an extremely difcult proposition given the low salaries and difculty of saving the large amount of money required to purchase good housing outside of the enterprises. On the other hand, the availability of housing owned by enterprises and the possibility of acquiring it for relatively little money is one incentive for migrating to closed cities.
4. MOONLIGHTING
4.1. Extent of and Reasons for Moonlighting
In order to supplement their low salaries, specialists are forced to moonlight. In all, nearly 60 percent of specialists in the surveyed cities are making money on the side. The lowest level of income earned on the side is earned by those who work in chemical centers, where salaries are highest. In research and production centers, where pay is comparablebut much lower than in chemical centersthe level of income earned by moonlighting is higher, although the share of specialists doing so is equal. Clearly the level of income earned on the side is closely related to primary salariesthe higher the salary, the lower the level of income earned on the side. Given present economic conditions, moonlighting may be regarded not as a hobby but a condition of survival.
Table 4-1. Reasons for moonlighting, %
REASONS TYPE OF CITY
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Total sampling
Economic difculties only Interesting work only Both economic difculties and interesting work Total sampling
70 26 5 100
78 9 13 100
46 19 35 100
68 20 11 100
43
From table 4-1, it can be seen that between 46 percent and 78 percent of those moonlighting are doing so only because of difcult economic circumstances resulting from low pay. In research and production centers, where pay is lowest, the greatest number of those doing outside work indicate difcult economic circumstances as the main reason for moonlighting. By contrast, just 9 percent to 26 percent perform outside work only because the work is of interest to them. The greatest share of people moonlighting for this reason is found in research and chemical centers. These are mostly specialists teaching at branches of the Moscow Physical Engineering Institute and the Tomsk Polytechnic Institute. Between 5 percent and 35 percent of those earning money on the side do so because of economic circumstances, but also engage in work that is of interest to them. The share of this category is greatest in chemical centers, where the share of specialists doing outside work is lowest among the surveyed cities. Table 4-2 shows that because of lack of demand for their professional skills specialists working in closed cities overcome their difcult economic circumstances mainly by working outside their regular profession. Thus, those who are making money on the side solely because of difcult circumstances are in most cases (43 percent) doing outside work that is outside their regular profession. Only 25 percent of them are moonlighting in their profession.
Table 4-2. Distribution of moonlighting specialists based on reason for doing so and on nature of work, %
I F YO U A R E D O I N G O U T S I D E WO R K , A R E YO U D O I N G S O I N YO U R R E G U L A R P RO F E S S I O N O R N OT ?
REASONS FOR MOONLIGHTING
Difcult circumstances only
Interesting work only
Both difcult circumstances and interesting work
Total sampling
Only in my profession Mostly in my profession Mostly outside my profession Entirely outside my profession Hard to say Not exactly in my profession, but close to it Total sampling
25 17 9 43 3 2 100
79 7 7 4 0 3 100
73 27 0 0 0 0 100
41 16 8 31 2 2 100
Radically different from moonlighters who work in their profession are those who do outside work only because it is of interest to them. Not surprisingly, a total of 79 percent of them are moonlighting only within their profession, and only 4 percent of them are doing so in an area that is entirely outside their profession. Earning extra money by working outside ones profession is related to the fact that in closed cities it is very difcult to nd any opportunities for moonlighting, let alone opportunities for doing so in ones regular profession. Responses to our survey included such comments as, How can I do outside work thats in my profession? Maybe sell the equipment I operate? The point is that respondents are mainly specialists in technical elds, whereas the outside work they do is mostly basic trade. What relation can selling bear to nuclear physics?
44
Knowledge in a technical eld is absolutely unnecessary for engaging in commercial activities (individual small trade or work at a private business enterprise), the main type of outside work being done in closed cities. Nearly two-thirds of the specialists believe that nding outside work is difcult, and only 3 percent believe it is easy (table 4-3). Of special interest are the statements that nding outside work is easy if the boss lends a hand and things will be the way the boss wants them to be. Such views are related to the fact that in some cases outside work is done at the very enterprises where the specialists work. In such cases, undoubtedly, it is the bosses who have the nal say as to who should be given an opportunity to do outside work and who should not.
Table 4-3. Difculty of nding moonlighting opportunity, % of respondents
I S I T D I F F I C U LT F O R A P E R S O N O F YO U R P RO F E S S I O N A N D Q U A L I F I CAT I O N S TO F I N D AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO OUTSIDE WORK?
TYPE OF CITY
TOTA L SAMPLING
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Difcult Easy Hard to say Easy: just wish for it strong enough Things will be the way the boss wants them to be Easy if the boss lends a hand Not so easy It can be found, but not easily Very difcult Difcult, yet I try because I need it to survive Difcult, so one has to ght hard to get it Total sampling
63 3 26 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 100
74 0 25 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 100
66 3 26 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 100
66 2 26 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 100
4.2. Potential for Making Money on the Side
The share of specialists making money on the side is constantly growing. For example, in 1992 in Sarov only 11 percent were doing outside work, whereas in 1995 the gure had risen to 40 percent, and today it is 70 percent. And the limit has not been reached. Table 4-4 gives data about the moonlighting intentions of those who have not yet taken on outside work.
45
Table 4-4. Moonlighting intentions of specialists who are not doing outside work, %
I F YO U A R E N OT D O I N G OUTSIDE WORK, WOULD YO U L I K E TO ? TOTA L SAMPLING
TYPE OF CITY
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Yes No Hard to say No, Im occupied with my family Hard to say, and where could I do it? No, because who will take care of my family? Hard to say; my husband is doing outside work because we have a large family Yes, I would, only there is nowhere to do so No, I wouldnt because a man has to have some private life and some rest from his work Total sampling
4.3. Duration of Outside Work
9 40 45 5 1 1
12 40 39 7 0 0
12 52 26 4 0 0
10 42 40 5 1 1
0 0
1 0
0 4
0 1
0 100
0 100
2 100
0 100
Figure 4-1 shows the distribution of persons moonlighting by duration of outside work. A small number of people did outside work before the reforms were launched. An upsurge in the number of moonlighters began in 19891992, but it was in 1993 that the greatest number of specialists began taking on outside work. This was the result of both the increasingly deteriorating economic situation at the state enterprises and of the development in closed cities of the economic base for undertaking outside work, that is, the private sector.
46
Figure 4-1. Duration of moonlighting, % of total moonlighters
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1970-79 1980-89 1990-91 1992-93 Year starting outside work 1994-95 1996-97 1998-99
Research centers
Production centers
Chemical centers
Total sampling
4.4. Nature of Outside Work in the Various Types of Cities
Table 4-5 shows the main types of outside work being done by specialists in the various types of cities. In all, commercial activities rank rst at the surveyed enterprises, followed by work under foreign research grants and contracts, then by work under domestic research grants and contracts.
Table 4-5. Main types of outside work performed by specialists, %
N AT U R E O F OUTSIDE WORK TYPE OF CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Commercial companies and private enterprises (trade, repair, order fulllment) Foreign research grants and contracts with foreign customers Domestic contracts and domestic research grants Teaching and tutoring Odd jobs Total sampling
55
40
33
49
17 13 24 2 100
6 52 7 9 100
65 2 0 0 100
23 22 16 4 100
In research centers, the main type of outside work being done by specialists is commercial activity. Nearly 60 percent named commerce as among the main types of outside work. Onefourth are moonlighting by teaching at branches of institutions of higher education in closed
47
cities and by tutoring college and school students. One-sixth are working under foreign contracts and grants. Only 13 percent have work under domestic contracts and grants as a source of extra income. Clearly, extra income is earned mainly through work outside the domestic sphere. In chemical centers, the pattern of outside work done by specialists is radically different from that done in research centers, in that nearly two-thirds of specialists making money on the side are earning foreign income under nondomestic contracts. As can be seen, the specialists outside work is related to their regular work. This close connection of outside work with foreign funds shows that a substantial share of the income received by specialists for their regular work is also of foreign origin. In production centers, domestic contracts and grants account for nearly half of the specialists outside work, and 40 percent of specialists make extra money by engaging in commercial activity. As can be seen, secondary income in production centers comes mainly from domestic funds. Among the surveyed cities, the share of remuneration for outside work stemming from foreign funds is lowest here (6 percent).
Figure 4-2. Proportion of income from outside work to regular pay, %
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Times 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
4.5. Income Earned from Outside Work
Figure 4-2 shows that about 70 percent of specialists doing outside work are earning extra income comparable to their regular pay. The remainder of moonlighting specialists earn income greater than their regular pay, resulting in a substantial increase in their earnings. Figure 4-3 shows the proportion between the regular pay received by the specialists at the enterprises and their actual earnings including money made on the side. As can be seen, the modal interval is shifted from the US$25$50 group to the US$50$75 group. As a result, the average monthly income of specialists doing outside work is US$74 dollars, compared to the US$43 earned by those who do not make any money on the side.Yet even this amount is obviously too small. This is corroborated by data on the amount of pay specialists regard as sufcient to ensure themselves a reasonable subsistence (g. 4-4).
48
Figure 4-3. Distribution of specialists by regular pay and by actual earnings including money earned on the side, % 60%
40%
20%
0%
Under 25 25-50 50-75 75-100 US dollars 100-150 150-200
Regular pay
Actual earnings
Figure 4-4. Distribution of specialists by regular pay, by actual earnings including money earned on the side, and by pay ensuring reasonable subsistence, % 60%
40%
20%
0%
Under 25 25-50 50-75 75-100 100-150 US dollars 150-250 250-400 400-600 600-1000
Pay ensuring reasonable subsistence
Regular pay
Actual earnings
4.6. Pay Ensuring Reasonable Subsistence and Money Made on the Side
The average amount of pay that specialists working in closed cities regard as sufcient to ensure themselves of a reasonable subsistence is US$160 a month. This is four times greater than their regular pay and a little more than twice as much as actual earnings including money made on the side. It is interesting to note that, although the distribution by pay regarded by specialists as ensuring themselves a reasonable subsistence and its average size both changed in the period between 1992 and 1999, the change was not as substantial as one might have expected considering the rise in the cost of living during the same period.
49
Figure 4-5 shows the distribution of specialists working in Sarov by the pay they consider necessary to ensure themselves of a reasonable subsistence. The distribution did not change substantially in the two surveys, although the level of pay regarded by specialists as sufcient in 1992 was greater than that in 1999. Indeed, the average monthly pay ensuring a reasonable subsistence in Sarov was US$140 in 1999, as against US$185 in 1992. Does this mean that after a period of seven years, less pay became sufcient to ensure a reasonable existence?That would be possible if the cost of living had decreased, but in fact it has risen.
Figure 4-5. Distribution of specialists in Sarov by pay ensuring reasonable subsistence, 1992 and 1999, %
40%
20%
0%
25-50 50-75 75-100 100-150 150-250 250-400 400-600 600-1000 US dollars
Sarov 1992
Sarov 1999
We assume that the reduction in level of pay deemed sufcient to ensure a reasonable existence is related to a change in the specialists sense of themselves. The year 1992 was a euphoric period. It seemed that the reforms mapped out at the time would soon help Russia overcome the economic crisis, and one had only to be patient for a while. Conversion from military production was expected to be carried out so that enterprises would start turning out civilian products instead of military ones. Indeed, it made no difference to the specialists whether they would be producing guns or butter. In 1992, a total of 54 percent of specialists believed that Russias reduction in defense expenditures was the right policy. In 1999, only 7 percent expressed this opinion. Over a period of seven years, the share of those approving of the reduction in defense expenditures fell to less than one-seventh of what it had been. The decrease is not surprising, for the conversion that was expectedspecialists switchover from military to civilian productiondid not materialize. What actually happened was that the enterprises, receiving no orders for either military or civilian products, disintegrated. In 1992 there was no unemployment in closed cities. Today, the level of unemployment in these cities is higher than the average level of unemployment throughout Russia. Over the period 19921999, the cities underwent changes their residents could not ever have imagined, and in response people now are demanding not conversion but increased defense expenditures. The Russian-style conversion in closed cities has become fully discredited, turning specialists from doves advocating reduction in defense expenditures in 1992 into hawks demanding an increase in 1999.
50
5 . S P E C I A L I S T S F I N A N C I A L S I T U AT I O N
5.1. Changes in Specialists Financial Situation during the Reform Period
Nearly 90 percent of those who gave a denitive answer to the question about the change in their nancial situation said that it had deteriorated, and nearly every other person noted that it had deteriorated sharply (table 5-1). Judging by the share of those who believe that their nancial situation has sharply deteriorated over the reform period, chemical centers are in the most difcult position (61 percent), followed by production centers (55 percent) and research centers (41 percent).
Table 5-1. Change in specialists nancial situation during the reform period (19921999), % of denitive answers
CHANGE TYPE OF CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Dramatic improvement Slight improvement Unchanged Slight decline Dramatic decline Total sampling
2 2 11 44 41 100
0 0 4 41 55 100
1 4 2 32 61 100
2 2 8 41 48 100
Specialists in all employment positions experienced deterioration in their nancial situation (table 5-2). Heads of sections suffered less than engineers and research workers over the reform period.
Table 5-2. Change in specialists nancial situation according to employment position over the reform period (19921999), % of denitive answers
CHANGE POSITION TOTA L SAMPLING
Engineer
Head of section
Research worker
Dramatic improvement Slight improvement Unchanged Slight decline Dramatic decline Total sampling
1 2 5 40 52 100
4 0 20 48 28 100
3 3 9 39 46 100
2 2 8 41 48 100
5.2. Specialists Current Financial Situation
Table 5-3 shows respondents evaluation of their present nancial situation. None evaluated their current nancial situation as very good, and practically no one evaluated it as good. Only every sixth respondent described it as normal. The others described their situation as difcult or very difcult. The lowest evaluation of current nancial situation was given by specialists in chemical centers: 94 percent regarded it as difcult and very difcult. In production centers, the comparable gure was 86 percent, and in research centers, 79 percent.
51
Table 5-3. Evaluation of nancial situation by specialists in various types of cities, %

CURRENT FINANCIAL S I T U AT I O N TYPE OF CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Very good Good Normal Difcult Very difcult Total sampling
0 1 20 55 24 100
0 0 14 62 24 100
0 0 6 50 44 100
0 1 16 56 28 100
Table 5-4 shows that engineers and research workers, accounting for four-fths of the total number of specialists, gave the most negative evaluation of their nancial situation. Between 83 percent and 88 percent of this group regard their current economic situation as difcult or very difcult, and only 1 percent to 2 percent as good. Heads of section are more optimistic. Compared with engineers and research workers, nearly three times as many section heads regard their situation as normal, and four to ve times fewer regard it as very difcult.
Table 5-4. Evaluation of nancial situation by specialists holding different positions, %
CURRENT FINANCIAL S I T U AT I O N POSITION TOTA L SAMPLING
Engineer
Head of section
Research worker
Very good Good Normal Difcult Very difcult Total sampling
0 1 12 57 31 100
0 0 35 58 7 100
0 2 14 49 34 100
0 1 16 56 28 100
The following examples of responses given by those surveyed convey an idea of what the specialists mean by difcult and very difcult nancial situation: It is hard to tell and even to imagine what s we are living in; Very difcult situation, even people in Zambia do not live in this way; Very difcult situation, it cant be worse. Here are examples of responses given by those who evaluated their situation as normal: Normal, better than what many others are in, although money is a bit tight; Normal, but my wife says its difcult; Normal with no frills. Thus, evaluating ones nancial situation as normal does not necessarily mean that it is so in reality. Indeed, if others are in even more desperate straits, ones own situation begins to seem normal in comparison.
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6 . P OT E N T I A L A N D A C T U A L E M I G R AT I O N
6.1. Emigration Intentions
Figure 6-1 shows data about the share by age group of those who wish to work abroad. We note that in general the level of intention to work abroad is rather low, amounting to 14 percent (table 6-1). The greatest share of those who wish to work abroad is observed in chemical centers (18 percent), and the smallest in production centers (10 percent).
Table 6-1. Desire to work abroad, % of denitive answers
DESIRE TO WO R K A B ROA D TYPE OF CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Yes
15
10
18
14
The trend in intention to emigrate is, in principle, a standard one: the share of those who wish to emigrate decreases rapidly with increase in age (g. 6-1).Yet the way in which specialists intentions to emigrate change over time is interesting.
Figure 6-1. Share of those who wish to work abroad, by age group, %
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Linear trend
One explanation for this trend is the more realistic view of emigration that has formed since 1992. In 1992, Russia established itself as an independent state and launched reforms. Freedom and openness were the catchwords of the day, and the sudden euphoria of the time undoubtedly had an impact on the residents of closed cities, enticing them with alluring prospects for going abroad to work. Peoples heightened desire to leave the country was not substantiated either by knowledge of the sober reality of emigration or existing administrative restrictions or by adequate nancial resources. It was during this time that the specter of nuclear specialists going abroad en masse to work in countries with aggressive regimes took shape. The passage of seven years reduced the intentions of specialists to emigrate. The residents of closed cities were confronted by realityabove all, by nancial problems, which were only beginning to be felt in the early 1990s.
53
Data from Sarov, where a survey was conducted in 1992 (g. 6-2), show in the rst place a great difference from 1992 to 1999 in the share of those wanting to work abroad. In 1992, 57 percent of those who gave a denitive answer expressed a desire to work abroad, and in 1999 only 9 percent dida reduction to less than one-sixth over a period of seven years! On the other hand, one can see that the distribution by age groups is identical for both years. Those wanting to go abroad in 1999 are distributed among age groups in exactly the same way as those in 1992; only the desire to go abroad has become six times less intense.
Figure 6-2. Sarov: Intention to work abroad in 1992 and 1999, % 16%
90%
12% 60%
1992 1999
8% 30% 4%
0%
Under 30 30-39 40-49 Years of age 50-59 60 and over
0%
1992
1999
Before 1992, about 15 percent of specialists working in closed cities traveled abroad, mainly on short-term business trips. Nearly 90 percent of all trips made abroad were to countries of the socialist camp. Thus, in the past trips made abroad were not independent and self-arranged but rather working trips arranged by the state. One did not need either to be able to speak a foreign language or adapt to a different social environment. The way in which the trips were arranged obviated such requirements. In the years since 1992, specialists have become aware that they can live and work abroad only by cutting through a lot of red tape and negotiating a mass of ofcial procedures related primarily to security matters. Even if one managed to do this, one had to be sufciently well off to be able to bear the expense of migrating, and one had to nd a country interested in ones services and capabilities.
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6.2. Obstacles to Working Abroad
Cited in table 6-2 are the most typical responses given by those surveyed about the obstacles preventing them from working abroad.
Table 6-2. Typical responses about obstacles to going abroad
I F YO U W I S H TO WO R K A B ROA D , W H AT I S P R E V E N T I N G YO U F RO M D O I N G S O ?
Both the system and people and the authorities and empty pockets. I have neither money nor good connections, so I am living like on a volcano. Everything prevents me from achieving my dream of going abroad, and I do not know how it can be realized. No money, a gloomy present, and a misty future. Everything and everybody pose obstacles, no money either in the purse or in view, and no one has any use for us anywhere. In a word, this is a dogs life. Not everything is so simple as is described in the stories told by the free dermo-cratic press. [Trans. note: The respondent made a pun combining democratic with a Russian scatological term.] Everythingred tape, lack of money (I dont even have enough to get to Chelyabinsk), and the whole of this Russian bedlamprevents me from going abroad. Everything, just everything prevents me from going abroadthings like where can I get the money and how can I get through the bureaucratic red tape? Lack of money and every kind of hindrance. One has to have money and good connections, and I have so little of both that my dream will hardly come true.The Muscovites have got hold of all the money and left nothing to us. The most terrible thing is that no one is waiting for us anywhere, either abroad or in this godforsaken country. I have neither the money nor the willpower to go abroad. Empty pockets and various conditions. Everything prevents me from going abroadabove all the fact that weve been clipped so short that if you really decide to leave here all the conditions will be turned against you and your family. The local authorities and the management of our enterprise, however, are glad of this regime of unlimited abuse, to which they take like a duck to water. Bad workers often blame their tools. To be able to leave here, one has to have everything: money, a footing in society, weight, etc. What prevents me from going abroad is lack of money and various thinkable and unthinkable obstacles. So far everything has been preventing me from going abroad, but one should strictly follow ones own program, which I have. No money. Everything seems to prevent me from doing this, and so far I dont know how I can overcome all this, yet something must be done. Lack of money and terrible obstacles in the way of everyone who would like to go abroad. No money, no connections, no nothing that could help me run away to where people live like human beings.
55
I F YO U W I S H TO WO R K A B ROA D , W H AT I S P R E V E N T I N G YO U F RO M D O I N G S O ? ( C O N T I N U E D )
Lack of money, absolute gloom, hopelessness, lack of prospects for going abroad, lack of sense. I would go abroad with great pleasure, but sometimes I dont have enough money even to buy cigarettes, so I am in the depths of despair. The authorities do everything to prevent a person from going abroad, like depriving him of money, imposing conditions on him, and putting obstacles in his way. Where will I get the money and where will I nd an open corridor so that I could y away from here forever? It is difcult to achieve this and make this dream come true. One has rst to earn enough money and then start thinking about how to go about emigrating. Not enough money, and I havent decided yet how I am to go about this; I think that no one has any use for us anywhere. These responses conrm that there are two main obstacles to going abroad: lack of money and administrative restrictions. One has to have money and good connections to be able to go abroad, and most of the respondents have neither. Moreover, respondents suspect that all of the obstructions, including administrative restrictions and low, irregularly paid salaries, have been deliberately imposed by the authorities to prevent specialists from going abroad. Specialists working in the atomic cities actually suffered losses during the period of reforms. Just as in the days of the ex-USSR, they are not free to go abroad, as the restrictions preventing them from leaving the country still exist. Formerly the lack of freedom to leave the country was compensated for by high living standards, but today the standard of living has sharply deteriorated. The small share of those wishing to live and work abroad in 1999 as compared with 1992 should not serve to ease the anxiety of those who are aware of the potential danger of specialists going to near-nuclear countries to work. The past few years have shown that for the time being one can go abroad to work only on ones own, but specialists have no money to do so. The situation in closed cities is no different in that low incomes and administrative restrictions make it impossible for residents to leave the country on their own. That is why the share of those who would like to work abroad is so small. The situation may change radically, however, if, in order to ensure the departure of necessary specialists from the country, sponsors appear with enough money at their disposal to get around administrative restrictions.
6.3. Steps Taken to Realize Desire of Going Abroad
Yet those who would like to live and work abroad are on the whole passive in the extreme when it comes to trying to realize their desire (table 6-3). As can be seen, only every third person of those wanting to leave the country is taking steps to do so, while two-thirds are doing nothing.
56
Table 6-3. Steps taken to realize desire of going abroad, % of total number wishing to emigrate
I F YO U A R E I N T E R E S T E D I N WO R K I N G A B ROA D , A R E YO U T A K I N G A N Y PA R T I C U L A R S T E P S T O F I N D E M P L O Y M E N T T H E R E ? %
Yes Yes, but it is a very difcult proposition here No Hard to say Total sampling What steps are being taken by those who would like to go abroad (table 6-4)?
Table 6-4. Steps taken to realize desire of going abroad, % of the total number taking such steps
I F T A K I N G PA R T I C U L A R S T E P S T O F I N D E M P L O Y M E N T A B ROA D , W H AT A R E YO U D O I N G ?
33 2 41 24 100
Establishing useful contacts Making use of the potential of relatives Applying to foreign companies For the time being, gathering information about how this can be done Keep going on business trips So far doing nothing Applying to people everywhere I can, but few can really help I have no connections and it is highly difcult to achieve anything without them I am leaving no stone unturned, but it is not that simple, for who will encourage the young? I am doing something, but this process is extremely difcult I would like to go, but I dont know how I should go about it Using everything I can You have to make some money rst, because you cant go anywhere if youre broke
56 46 9 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
These are mostly rather hypothetical steps, for example, using the positions of ones relatives and friends to establish useful contacts. Only 9 percent of those who are taking any steps at all (and this amounts to a mere 2 percent of the total number of those who would like to work abroad) are taking practical steps to this end, for example, by applying to foreign companies. Apparently those wishing to go abroad are regarding such a change at the level of wishful thinking, not at the level of taking practical steps. This reading is supported by the fact that among those who wish to work outside the country no one has a clear notion of the conditions under which they would accept a job abroad. Just over 50 percent of those wishing to work abroad have only a vague notion of what they would like, and the rest have no notion at all. In a situation in which those who would like to work outside the country do not have a clear notion of the conditions of getting a job abroad the prospects for their going abroad on their own are ruled out. Intermediaries are needed to make arrangements (table 6-5).
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Table 6-5. Intermediaries in going abroad to work, % of the total number of those wishing to emigrate to work abroad
I F I N T E R E S T E D I N WO R K I N G A B ROA D , W H AT I N T E R M E D I A RY O R G A N I Z AT I O N A L F O R M WO U L D YO U P R E F E R ? %
Any form Special state-run agency only Friends and acquaintances only I would say thanks a million to anyone who will help! Private agency only If only someone could help me get out of this hole I would prefer to make my own arrangements Hard to say Total sampling
64 24 7 2 1 1 0 8 100
As is clear from table 6-5, among those wishing to work abroad no one would like to do so on ones own. Preference is given to a special state-run agency and to ones friends and acquaintances. It should be noted, however, that 60 percent would agree to any form of intermediacy. Thus, under present conditions, it can practically be ruled out that a person from a closed city will go abroad on his own. People are not ready to act independently. Their departure has to be organized. That is why emigration from closed cities can in principle occur only if it is organized by someone, not on an independent basis. This is not surprising. Specialists working in closed cities have been living in a special world all their lives, a world that has been and continues to be different from that inhabited by their fellow citizens, to say nothing of that known to people in other countries.
6.4. Destinations
As a general rule, the respondents expressed a preference to go to industrialized countries in Europe and America (table 6-6). Another aspect, however, is of more interest: countries the respondents would not go to under any circumstances. From the industrialized countries point of view, specialists who develop and produce nuclear weapons and their components should not go to countries with aggressive, totalitarian regimes, to near-nuclear countries, or to countries that have only just begun producing nuclear weapons.
Table 6-6. Countries and regions to which persons wishing to work abroad would like to go, % of the number of countries named by respondents
REGIONS %
Europe North America Middle East Asia Any place at all Any civilized country Total sampling
45 28 10 6 6 5 100
58
Respondents were asked to name three countries to which they would not go under any circumstances, in decreasing order in terms of their negative attitude toward each. The countries most often named are given in table 6-7. It may be assumed that if respondents took an equally negative attitude toward all of these countries, the distribution of specialists in table 6-7 would be random and uniform: 26.8 percent of the respondents would not wish to go to any of these countries. Such, however, is not the case. As can be seen, specialists are most averse to going to Iraq, Pakistan, and Libya. On the other hand, the share of specialists who are ill-disposed toward going to Iran, with which Russia is cooperating in the nuclear sphere, just as it is with India and China, is smaller than would follow from the uniform distribution. Neither is there any strong antagonism toward Israel and North Korea. In sum, a ready source of experts is apparently willing to at least entertain the idea of going to countries interested in or engaged in developing nuclear weapons.
Table 6-7. Countries atly rejected by persons wishing to work abroad, % of the number of countries named by respondents
% OF RESPONDENTS WHO NAMED T H E C O U N T RY D E V I AT I O N F RO M UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION
COUNTRIES
UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION, %
Iraq Pakistan Libya Iran North Korea Israel India China
59 42 33 24 16 16 13 11
26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8
32.3 15.3 6.3 -2.8 -10.8 -10.8 -13.8 -15.8
Thus, specialists in the Russian nuclear complex have their own view of the problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and it is radically different from that of the industrialized countries.This nonconcurrence of views is easy to explain. Specialists are faced with the problem of survival under conditions in Russia todaya problem that did not exist in the past. Undoubtedly, if the nancial situation of the specialists were the same as it was before or if it were the same as that of the majority of residents of the industrialized countries, opinions about which countries people would work in would be much closer to what is generally accepted.
6.5. Reasons for Specialists Interest in Working Abroad
The main reasons for specialists interest in working abroad (table 6-8) are those related to the economic situation, whereas purely professional motives were given only by every seventh person of those wishing to work abroad. About 25 percent of those wishing to work abroad named a combination of economic and professional interests.
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Table 6-8. Main reasons for specialists interest in working abroad, % of those wishing to live and work abroad
REASON %
Economic Professional and economic Professional Total sampling

6.6. Work Abroad
61 24 15 100
The fact that intentions to work abroad are economically determined is corroborated by the following statements made by respondents:
s s
I am simply fed up with this kind of life. Even if I couldnt go abroad forever, I would like to work there for some time, since here Ill soon kick the bucket. We live like paupers, so I would go anywhere someone would pay for my work.
Not only would specialists go anywhere on condition that they were paid for their work, but they would agree to work in a foreign countrys military industry (table 6-9).
Table 6-9. Willingness to work in foreign defense industries, % of respondents
I F I N T E R E S T E D I N WO R K I N G A B ROA D , WO U L D YO U WO R K I N T H E M I L I TA RY I N D U S T RY O F A F O R E I G N C O U N T RY ? %
Yes No Its all the same to me where I will be working so long as I receive good pay for my work. What does it matter where I would be working? I would agree if it caused no harm to Russia. The military industry of the West has no use for such specialists. I would agree to work in any industry, including the military industry. I would, but why ask this question? What does it matter, the main thing is that I should be paid money; after all, I will be working, not robbing or killing. I would because things are so bad here that you would agree to anything at all. Hard to say.
46 18 6 4 3 2 2
2 1 24
Only every fth person answered no concerning their willingness to work in the military industry of a foreign country. Quite remarkable are such answers as Its all the same to me, What does it matter where I would be working? Things are so bad here that you would agree to anything at all, What does it matter, the main thing is that I should be paid money; after all, I will be working, not robbing or killing. It appears that producing nuclear weapons
60
for those who are capable of killing is gainful employment, not direct complicity in murder. It follows that any hope that some moral factor will under certain conditions prevent specialists from going abroad to help produce nuclear weapons is a delusion. Clearly, either measures must be taken to improve the nancial situation of nuclear industry specialists or the readiness of members of this extremely dangerous profession to work abroad will persist. Indeed, efforts are being made to prevent such an outow. But they are purely administrative measures (bans on going abroad in view of the classied character of the work) and economic measures (extremely low payone of the respondents noted, One cannot afford to go even to Moscow, let alone abroad). This feeling of hopelessness paralyzes peoples will to look independently for means of going abroad. The situation, however, will change radically if those who recruit specialists employ different tactics, namely, if they emphasize organized, not independent, departure, the latter being practically impossible. We believe that the conditions encouraging stasis may change if the government agencies of the countries concerned, having sufcient funds at their disposal, show an interest in nuclear specialists. In this case, the obstacle hindering specialists independent departure lack of moneywill be obviated. Given their current desperate straits, specialists will work even for relatively small sums of money. Nearly two of every three respondents who would like to work abroad would work for less than US$1,500 per month.
6.7. Attitude toward Others Emigration
In our view, specialists attitudes toward those who are going to emigrate may be a more accurate indicator of their potential readiness to emigrate. The fact is that only those who have a negative attitude toward emigration will not work abroad under any circumstances. By contrast, people whose attitude toward those who are planning to emigrate is positive or neutral (that is, who believe it to be a personal matter) may under certain circumstances leave to work abroad. Table 6-10 gives data about respondents attitudes toward those who are going to emigrate.
Table 6-10. Specialists attitudes toward emigrants, %
AT T I T U D E TOWA R D EMIGRANTS TYPE OF CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Negative Neutral (havent given it much thought because it is a personal matter) Positive (approval, envy) Total sampling
14
19
16
16
66 21 100
54 27 100
67 17 100
63 21 100
As can be seen, only 16 percent of respondents have a negative attitude toward those who are going to emigrate from Russia and therefore cannot in principle be regarded as potential emigrants. Nearly 60 percent are neutral (havent given much thought to emigration or view it as a personal matter), and 21 percent approve of or even envy them. Therefore, emigration potential is much greater than appears from the answer to the question about specialists intentions to work abroad.
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The assessment that specialists holding a negative attitude toward those who are going to emigrate cannot be regarded as potential emigrants is corroborated by the fact that there is a direct correlation between a persons view of others emigrating and expressing a negative view regarding their own emigration (table 6-11). From table 6-11 it follows that groups with neutral or positive attitudes may, under certain circumstances, be willing to work abroad. True, the share of those wishing to work abroad among those who take a neutral attitude toward emigrants is radically different (nearly fourteen times smaller) from the corresponding share of those who approve of emigrants or envy them (4 percent as against 54 percent, respectively). The point, however, is not the size of the share of those who would like to emigrate at present. What really matters is the emigration potential, which is signicant.
Table 6-11. Desire to work abroad among specialists holding different attitudes toward emigration, %
AT T I T U D E TOWA R D T H O S E W H O A R E G O I N G A B ROA D D E S I R E TO WO R K A B ROA D TOTA L SAMPLING
Yes
No
Negative Neutral (havent given it much thought because it is a personal matter) Positive (approval, envy) Total sampling
100
100
4 54 14
96 46 86
100 100 100
Let us take a closer look at those who are potentially capable of emigrating from Russia (table 6-12).
Table 6-12. Attitude of specialists in different positions toward emigrants, %
POSITION AT T I T U D E TOWA R D E M I G R A N T S TOTA L SAMPLING
Negative
Neutral (havent given it much thought because it is a personal matter)
Engineer Head of section Research worker Total sampling
13 33 18 18
62 50 58 59
25 17 23 24
100 100 100 100
The most negative attitude toward potential emigration is held by heads of section. One-third of this group is immobile in terms of emigration. Engineers and research workers equally have the most positive attitude toward emigrants, one quarter approving or envying steps taken by emigrants. A neutral attitude prevails in all positions (about 50 percent to 60 percent).
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Figure 6-3. Attitude toward emigrants, by age, % 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 and over
Negative
Positive
Neutral (haven't given it much thought because it's a personal matter)
Specialists negative attitudes toward emigrants are closely related to their age (g. 6-3). As can be seen, the older the age, the greater the share of specialists with negative attitudes toward emigrants. Among people less than thirty years old who took jobs at the enterprises in the 1990s, almost none has a negative attitude toward emigration. This group makes up the lions share of those holding positive and neutral views of emigration. By contrast, among older people there are fewer whose attitude toward emigrants is neutral, and the number of those offering a denite, mostly negative opinion is greater. Specialists attitudes toward emigrants are closely related to whether they have had contact with people who have gone abroad. As can be seen from table 6-13, those who have former colleagues who have gone abroad have a more positive attitude toward emigrants. In fact, they are three times more likely to have a positive attitude (and four times more likely to have a neutral attitude) toward migration than those with no colleagues who have left Russia. Thus, the better a person knows people who have gone abroad and why and how they have settled there, the more positive his attitude toward their actions. However, so long as the number of specialists from closed cities who have gone abroad and, accordingly, the number of colleagues who had contact with them are not large, the share of those who have a negative attitude toward migration will remain quite substantial.
Table 6-13. Specialists attitudes toward emigrants depending on whether ex-colleagues have gone abroad, %
H AV E A N Y O F YO U R EX-COLLEAGUES G O N E A B ROA D ? AT T I T U D E TOWA R D T H O S E W H O A R E E M I G R AT I N G TOTA L SAMPLING
Negative
Neutral (havent given it much thought because it is a personal matter)
Yes No Total sampling
4 17 16
40 66 63
56 18 21
100 100 100
63
6.8. Actual Emigration: Scope and Pattern
There is a certain amount of actual emigration from closed cities. One can get a rough idea of its scope from respondents answers to the question of whether any of their former colleagues have gone abroad (table 6-14). The ndings seem, on the whole, to reect the emigration processes going on in closed cities.
Table 6-14. Emigrants from closed cities, %

H AV E A N Y O F YO U R EX-COLLEAGUES G O N E A B ROA D ? TOTA L SAMPLING
TYPE OF CITY
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Yes
11
A total of 9 percent of respondents at the surveyed enterprises said that they had former colleagues who had gone abroad. This gure is highest in research centers (11 percent) and lowest in the production centers where warheads are manufactured. Figure 6-4 shows changes in emigration ow over time. As can be seen, emigration began approximately in 1991 and reached its peak in 1996, following which it began to decrease. In all, during the eight-year period between 1991 and 1998, about 1 percent of the total number of specialists working at the surveyed enterprises on average went abroad each year.
Figure 6-4. Dynamics of emigration flow from closed cities, % of the sample total
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
1991 1992 1993 1994 Year 1995 1996 1997 1998
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Table 6-15. Specialists countries of destination, % of total number who have emigrated
C O U N T RY O F D E S T I N AT I O N %
Germany Israel Sweden United States Finland France India Unknown Total sampling
33 32 12 11 5 3 3 1 100
About two-thirds of the emigrants went to two countries, Germany and Israel; approximately one-tenth went to Sweden and one-tenth to the United States. As can be seen, among those who have gone abroad none, as far as we were informed, went to countries with aggressive regimes. Men represent 60 percent of emigrants. More than 50 percent of emigrants are Russians, and the rest are mostly Jews and persons whose nationality was unknown to respondents (table 6-16). At the same time, if one looks at the distribution by destination of persons whose nationality is unknown, one may conclude that they are most likely not Germans, for every third one went to Israel. It may be assumed that they are Russians and Jews.
Table 6-16. Ethnic composition of emigrants by sex, % of total
SEX
Ethnicity
Male
Female
Total sampling
Russian Jew Do not know Volga Area German Total sampling
34 33 28 4 100
100 0 0 0 100
54 23 20 3 100
One-third of those who have gone abroad are research workers, and the other two-thirds are engineers and technicians. The share of persons holding an academic degree among those who have gone abroad is the same as among those working at the surveyed enterprises in general (table 6-17).
Table 6-17. Possession of an academic degree by those who have gone abroad, %
POSSESSION OF AN ACADEMIC DEGREE ETHNICITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Russian
Jew
Do not know
Volga Area German
Yes
32
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Figure 6-5. Emigrants vs. total current employees: Age profile, %
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Emigrants
All those who are working
Emigrants tend to be younger than average compared with all specialists working at the enterprises: 61 percent of them are under forty years of age (g. 6-5).
6.9. Reasons for Emigrating
In the respondents opinion, emigrants go abroad mainly for family reasons. Every sixth emigrant has gone abroad for economic reasons, and every third one for professional reasons. A total of 9 percent of emigrants have gone abroad for political reasons (table 6-18).
Table 6-18. Reasons for emigrating, %
REASON %
Family Professional Economic Unknown Political reason Total sampling
40 30 17 10 9 100
About 60 percent of emigrants have gone abroad permanently, the rest for a temporary job or to undergo practical training (table 6-19). As can be seen, the reasons for going abroad vary depending on the respondents country of destination. Those who emigrate to Israel and Germany tend to go there to reside permanently, and emigrants to other countries as a rule emigrate in order to take a temporary job.
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Table 6-19. Distribution of emigrants by country of destination and by reason for emigrating, %
C O U N T RY R E A S O N F O R E M I G R AT I N G TOTA L SAMPLING
Permanent residence
Temporary job
Practical training
Hard to say
Israel Germany United States France Sweden Finland India Total sampling
96 58 50 0 0 0 0 56
4 16 50 100 100 100 100 35
0 9 0 0 0 0 0 3
0 16 0 0 0 0 0 5
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
This situation is closely related to the emigrants ethnic composition (table 6-20).
Table 6-20. Distribution of emigrants by reason for emigrating and by ethnic origin, %
REASON F O R E M I G R AT I N G ETHNICITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Russian
Jew
Do not know
Volga Area German
Permanent residence Temporary job Practical training Hard to say Total sampling
38 50 7 5 100
100 0 0 0 100
69 31 0 0 100
100 0 0 0 100
60 33 4 3 100
Whereas 100 percent of Jews and Germans go abroad in order to take up permanent residence there, Russians, constituting an absolute majority of specialists at the surveyed enterprises, emigrate for the purpose of establishing permanent residence abroad in only four cases out of ten. The majority of Russians go abroad to take a temporary job or to get practical training. Because the persons of unknown nationality, as we have assumed, are either Russians or Jews, it follows from this table that Jews do not go abroad to take a temporary job: this means that two-thirds of the total number of persons of unknown nationality are Jews and one-third are Russians. Thus, the emigration of Jews and Germans is, in effect, repatriation, a return to their historical homeland. People of other ethnic origins mostly go abroad to permanently settle there.
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Table 6-21. Distribution of emigrants by ethnic origin and by country of destination, %

C O U N T RY O F D E S T I N AT I O N ETHNICITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Russian
Jew
Do not know
Volga Area German
Germany Israel United States Sweden Finland France India Total sampling
55 0 13 20 6 7 0 100
0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100
0 35 35 0 15 0 15 100
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
33 30 14 11 6 4 3 100
To summarize, emigration from closed cities has been relatively limited in scope during the 1990s. Over that period, about 9 percent of specialists working at enterprises in closed cities have gone abroad: of these, 60 percent have emigrated in order to settle permanently abroad, and the rest to take temporary jobs. Therefore, the enterprises unrecoverable losses amounted to about 5 percent of their specialists over an eight-year period. It is mostly young people (under forty-ve years of age) who emigrate. One in ve of those who emigrated to Israel and one in twenty-ve of those who emigrated to Germany held an academic degree. For Jews and Germans, emigration has the character of repatriation in that they are going to their historical homeland. Russians mostly go to Germany and the United States both in order to settle in those countries for good and to take a temporary job.
7 . P E R S O N N E L S H I F T TOWA R D P R I VAT E BU S I N E S S
7.1. Extent, Composition, Dynamics
The number of specialists taking jobs with private businesses and starting their own businesses is large enough to seriously damage the enterprises by depleting them of personnel. A total of 45 percent of respondents have former colleagues who have taken jobs with private businesses or started their own businesses. The largest share of these is in production centers, where it amounts to 60 percent. This is half again as much as that in research and chemical centers, which have identical gures in this category. Let us examine the data on the types of cities in which specialists who have taken jobs with private businesses are working (table 7-1). As can be seen, people tend to take private enterprise jobs in the same city in which they were formerly employed. Open cities offer, in principle, more opportunities for private enterprise, although closed cities enjoy certain tax privileges.2
2. Closed cities enjoy tax privileges in that they do not pay taxes to the federal budget. This should attract business people to these cities. It actually does, but this does not result in the development of production in closed cities: they are used only for registering commercial companies. In other words, actual production facilities are located in open cities and their legal addresses are in closed cities. This poses certain problems for the centers of the regions in which these closed cities are located. Taxes are thus being diverted from regional centers to closed cities. As a rule, such problems are solved by allowing only newly formed commercial companies to be registered in closed cities.
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Table 7-1. Cities where specialists have private enterprise jobs, %

WHERE IS SPECIALIST WORKING W I T H A P R I VAT E BU S I N E S S O R RUNNING HIS OWN BUSINESS? TOTA L SAMPLING
TYPE OF CITY
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
In the same city In an open city In a rural area Total sampling
77 20 3 100
55 44 1 100
88 9 3 100
71 27 2 100
From table 7-2 it follows that specialists who have quit their jobs at state enterprises are playing a major part in the development of new economic entities. Forty percent of former enterprise employees are running their own businesses, and 60 percent are continuing to work for hire, only now in the private instead of the public sector.
Table 7-2. What ex-specialists of state enterprises do for a living, %
TYPE OF CITY TOTA L SAMPLING
Research center
Production center
Chemical center
Working for hire at private businesses Running own businesses Total sampling
62 38 100
60 40 100
56 44 100
60 40 100
As can be seen from gure 7-1, the movement of specialists out of state enterprises and into jobs with private businesses and their own businesses did not occur simultaneously in all types of cities. However, an overall tendency toward growth in the period between 1991 and 1996, followed by a downtrend, can be clearly observed. The percentage of specialists quitting their jobs at state enterprises to take jobs with private businesses can be estimated. Over the eight-year period from 1991 to 1998, 45 percent of the total number of specialists left the surveyed enterprises and took jobs with private businesses. This means that not less than 5 percent to 6 percent of the specialists quit their jobs at the enterprises each year, with the respective figures for production centers being approximately 7 percent to 8 percent and for research and chemical centers about 5 percent. Comparing these data with data on emigration outow, which in that period amounted to about 1 percent a year, one can say that in 19911998 the intensity of outow from enterprises to private businesses was ve to six times greater than that owing to emigration.
69
Figure 7-1. Distribution of specialists who took jobs with private businesses by year of their taking such jobs, %
15% 12% 9% 6% 3% 0%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Year 1995 1996 1997 1998
Research centers
Production centers
Chemical centers
Total sampling
Three-fourths of the specialists taking jobs with private businesses are men. As a rule, specialists who quit their jobs at enterprises tend to be young: 77 percent of the men and 87 percent of the women leaving the enterprises are under forty years of age (table 7-3).
Table 7-3. Distribution of those who have taken jobs at commercial companies by sex and age, %
A G E G RO U P S O F T H O S E W H O H AV E TA K E N J O B S W I T H P R I VAT E BUSINESSES, YEARS OF AGE TOTA L SAMPLING
SEX
Male
Female
Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 Total sampling
24 53 21 2 100
24 63 13 0 100
24 56 19 1 100
Eighty percent of specialists taking jobs with private enterprises are engineers and technicians, 17 percent are research workers, and the rest are heads of section. As a rule, few of those taking jobs with private enterprises hold an academic degree.
7.2. Reasons for Moving to Business Entities
Table 7-4 shows that men and women have very different reasons for taking jobs with private businesses. Although both sexes cite economics as their primary reason for changing jobs, women are four times more likely than men to do so for personal or family reasons and seven times less likely to do so for professional reasons. Professional reasons appear to have little signicance to women. The most important factors for them are economic and personal.
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Table 7-4. Reasons for moving to business entities, by sex, %

REASON SEX TOTA L SAMPLING
Male
Female
Economic (low pay) Other (personal or family reasons) Professional (uninteresting work, absence of prospects for career development) Hard to say Total sampling
75 9
61 38
71 17
14 3 100
2 0 100
10 2 100
7.3. Becoming Employed in Private Business vs. Specialists Profession
As a rule, becoming employed in private business requires specialists to change the focus of their profession (table 7-5). Only 25 percent of both men and women who have moved to private business work in the same profession as before. The rest have been forced to change.
Table 7-5. Distribution by profession and sex, %
SEX TOTA L SAMPLING
Male
Female
Different profession Same profession No information Not quite same profession Total sampling
60 23 15 2 100
66 24 9 2 100
62 23 13 2 100
Not surprisingly, a greater number of those who start their own businesses are forced to change profession than those who continue to work for hire (table 7-6).
Table 7-6. Distribution of those who have taken jobs with private businesses, by profession and occupation, %
W H AT S P E C I A L I S T IS DOING WORKING FOR H I R E AT A P R I VAT E BU S I N E S S RUNNING OWN BUSINESS TOTA L SAMPLING
Different profession Same profession No information Not quite same profession Total sampling
58 27 14 1 100
70 20 8 2 100
63 24 11 2 100
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It turns out, however, that there are no fundamental differences in level of satisfaction felt by those running their own businesses and those working for hire. A full 90 percent of those who have left state enterprises to work in private business are satised with the change. It is not accidental that more than 70 percent of those who would like to quit their jobs at the surveyed enterprises wish to take jobs precisely with private businesses.
7.4. Returning from Private Business to State Enterprises
Also of interest are where people who have quit their jobs at state enterprises have gone to work afterwards. Our results show that more than 60 percent of both men and women leave state enterprises to work at commercial companies, while the remainder work at other state enterprises, further adding to the drain away from state enterprises. The characteristics of those who take jobs at state enterprises show a different trend. Approximately half of them come from other state enterprises, and the other half from private business. Women return from private business to state enterprises more often than men.
Table 7-7. Specialists leaving private business and state enterprises to take a job at a state enterprise, %
W H E R E S P E C I A L I S T S C O M E F RO M W H E N T H E Y TA K E J O B S AT S TAT E E N T E R P R I S E S TOTA L SAMPLING
SEX
Male
Female
Private business Another state enterprise Total sampling
43 57 100
63 37 100
49 51 100
These ndings may be interpreted as follows. Approximately one-third of specialists taking jobs at state enterprises are graduates of institutions of higher education, and two-thirds of them previously worked either in private business or at state enterprises. Therefore, about one-third (two-thirds x 49 percent) of the total number of those taking jobs at state enterprises come from private businesses. Of the total number of those quitting their jobs at state enterprises, only 10 percent retire on a pension, and the remaining 90 percent take jobs in private business or at other state enterprises. Considering that 61 percent of them leave to take jobs in private business, it can be stated that a little more than half (90 percent x 61 percent) of those who quit their jobs at state enterprises do so in order to take jobs in private businesses. Assuming that the inow and outow of personnel are equal in magnitude, it follows that for every fty specialists who quit their jobs at state enterprises to take jobs in private businesses, thirty-three eventually return to enterprises in the public sector. The share of returnees thus amounts to two-thirds. Actually this number is slightly lower because state enterprises are reducing the number of employed, and the outow from the enterprises is thus greater than the inow. The trend in the movement of specialists in closed cities is denitely toward private businesses.
72
8 . P E R S O N N E L T R A I N I N G F O R T H E N U C L E A R I N D U S T RY
8.1. Selection of Students
People currently taking jobs at state enterprises are graduates who began their studies at least ve to six years ago. The early to mid-1990s was a rather difcult period for technical schools, as the majority of students entering advanced education programs were interested in studying economics or law. Competition among entrants to technical schools was not very strong (table 8-1).
Table 8-1. Competition for admittance to an institution of higher education, %
COMPETITION YEAR ADMITTED TOTA L SAMPLING
1993
1994
1995
Less than 1 person per vacancy 1-2 persons per vacancy 2-3 persons per vacancy 3-5 persons per vacancy Hard to say Total sampling
0 27 31 5 36 100
4 9 45 15 28 100
0 33 33 22 11 100
2 17 39 12 31 100
Even in the areas of strongest competition among the surveyed students there was, in fact, very limited competition for positions, averaging three to ve persons per vacancy. Only in the last few years has there been a trend toward increased competition. In 1993, only 5 percent of respondents entered an advanced school in which competition for places averaged three to ve persons per vacancy. In 1995, that percentage was 22 percent. It follows that low competition for positions means reduced entrance requirements, which in turn results in lower professional standards of graduates.
8.2. Economic Situation and Professional Standards of Young Specialists
In the present economic situation, 75 percent of students are forced to work while they are in school. This adversely affects their grades (table 8-2).
Table 8-2. Making money on the side and average grades, %
DID THE STUDENT MAKE MONEY WHILE S T U DY I N G ? GENERAL ACADEMIC RECORD TOTA L SAMPLING
Mostly satisfactory
Mostly good
Mostly excellent
Yes No Total sampling
82 18 100
75 25 100
63 38 100
76 24 100
There is a clear and direct correlation to working and grades: students are less likely to have excellent or good grades if they work at outside jobs. The adverse effect of outside work on students average grades is corroborated by the data in table 8-3.
73
Table 8-3. Proportion of time spent on outside work and on studying and average grades, %
P RO P O R T I O N O F T I M E S P E N T O N S T U DY I N G AND ON OUTSIDE WORK GENERAL ACADEMIC RECORD TOTA L SAMPLING
Mostly satisfactory
Mostly good
Mostly excellent
Studying took more time than outside work Studying took approximately as much time as outside work Studying took less time than outside work Total sampling
56 38 6 100
83 17 0 100
100 0 0 100
76 22 2 100
As can be seen, students who received mostly excellent grades spent more time studying than making money on the side. By contrast, nearly half of those who received mostly satisfactory grades spent as much or more time on outside work as on studying.
8.3. Graduates Plans
Because the surveyed institutions of higher education specialize in training personnel for the nuclear industry, it is important to have an idea of graduates attitudes toward working in closed cities (table 8-4). Let us look particularly at the response, No, under no circumstances. In all, 43 percent of the respondents do not plan, under any circumstances, to work in closed cities, and there is a trend upward in that number. Approximately one-third of respondents would plan on doing so, but only under certain conditions, one of which, naturally, is that current levels of remuneration in closed cities change for the better.
Table 8-4. Students attitudes toward working at nuclear industry enterprises in closed cities, %
WO U L D YO U WO R K AT A N U C L E A R I N D U S T RY ENTERPRISE IN A CLOSED CITY? YEAR ADMITTED TO COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY
TOTA L SAMPLING
1993
1994
1995
Yes, under certain conditions Yes, but only in Moscow No, under no circumstances Hard to say
30 6 41 24
41 0 44 16
33 0 67 0
33 3 43 20
About 90 percent of the students intend to work in Russia upon graduation, and the rest are going to continue studying (table 8-5). Signicantly, not one of the respondents expressed a desire to work or study abroad. Apparently, the belief that a majority of students in Russia are eager to emigrate to the West is unfounded. Students academic achievements have an evident inuence on their plans. The share of those who would like to continue their education among the students who received mostly excellent grades is nearly four times as large as the respective share among those who received mostly good grades, and eight times as large as it is among those who received mostly satisfactory grades.
74
Table 8-5. Students plans and average grades, %

PLANS GENERAL ACADEMIC RECORD TOTA L SAMPLING
Mostly satisfactory
Mostly good
Mostly excellent
Continue studying Work in Russia Hard to say Total sampling
5 90 5 100
11 89 0 100
38 54 8 100
13 87 2 100
Our surveys indicate that the better a student did, the greater the probability that he or she will take a job at a state enterprise (table 8-6). This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that students receiving mostly satisfactory and good grades have much closer connections with private business as a result of doing outside work during their years in school. For the time being, work in private business does not call for the same high professional standards required at state enterprises. This circumstance holds out hope that state enterprises stand a good chance of getting better specialists than private businesses can get, but they are letting the opportunity slip by.
Table 8-6. Students intended place of work and average grades, %
WHERE WOULD THE STUDENT LIKE TO WORK U P O N G R A D U AT I O N ? GENERAL ACADEMIC RECORD TOTA L SAMPLING
Mostly satisfactory
Mostly good
Mostly excellent
Preferably at a state enterprise Preferably at a private business Makes no difference Hard to say Total sampling
5 41 55 0 100
22 33 44 2 100
62 15 23 0 100
22 32 43 1 100
9. NUCLEAR SECURITY AND PERSONNEL

9.1. Aging of the Work Force
The survey has shown that the makeup of the state enterprise work force is changing. In particular, employees are getting older, and there is a reduced inow of younger employees. About 45 percent of respondents noted these two factors. The aging of the work force stems from a lack of natural rollover of generations. The number of elderly people who retire on pension is greater than the number of young people who are available to take their jobs. The most productive people in terms of developing science and production thus are leaving the enterprises. These specialists (between the ages of thirty and forty) are quitting their jobs at defense enterprises to take jobs in private business. In gure 9-1 one can clearly see that the share of specialists under forty years of age among those who take jobs at private business entities is several times greater than the share of specialists of the same age who continue to work at state enterprises. This indicates an increased intensity in outow of this group from state enterprises.
75
Figure 9-1. Distribution by age of those who are working at state enterprises and those who have left to take jobs with private businesses, % 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Working at state enterprises
Left for jobs with private businesses
More than one-third of respondents cited specialists taking jobs with private business as a cause of the deterioration of personnel composition at state enterprises. At the same time, only 1 percent of respondents named emigration to other countries as a factor adversely affecting personnel composition. Thus, in the opinion of the specialists themselves, it is people leaving jobs at state enterprises to take jobs in private business that constitutes the principal threat to the personnel composition of state enterprises. Table 9-1 shows how moonlighting done for domestic income (trade, work in private business, fullling domestic orders, work under research grants, etc.) and for foreign income (foreign orders, foreign research grants, etc.) affects specialists main work.
Table 9-1. Effect of moonlighting for domestic and foreign income on specialists main work, %
I F YO U A R E M O O N L I G H T I N G , W H AT E F F E C T D O E S I T H AV E O N YO U R M A I N WO R K ? MOONLIGHTING FOR FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INCOME
Foreign
Domestic
Foreign and domestic
Benecial Mutually benecial None Hard to say Adverse Total sampling
92 5 2 0 0 100
16 0 58 19 5 100
52 0 37 11 0 100
As can be seen from table 9-1, nearly 90 percent of those doing outside work for foreign income believe that it has a benecial effect on their main work. By contrast, only one-sixth of specialists note that the work they do outside for domestic income has a benecial effect on their main work. This can be explained by the fact that the majority of domestic extra
76
work is outside a specialists profession and educational background. Thus, foreign money, in fact, has a benecial, stabilizing effect on the work of enterprises in closed cities, making it possible for a substantial share of specialists to continue working within their profession.
9.3. Foreboding of a Catastrophe
Forty percent of respondents believe that negative changes in the personnel makeup of their enterprises have already adversely affected the countrys nuclear security (table 9-2). Over 53 percent think that such an effect will be felt in the near future, and one-third of them are of the opinion that it will happen in the distant future. Only 5 percent of respondents believe that the changes now under way will not affect Russias nuclear security.
Table 9-2. Can negative changes in specialist personnel makeup of an enterprise adversely affect the nations nuclear security?, %
PERCENT
Yes, they can in the very near future They have already affected it Yes, they can in the distant future Hard to say No, they cannot affect it
53 40 34 11 5
Russias Nuclear and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation

Introduction Part One: The Study Overview Findings Part Two: The Surveys List of Figures List of Tables Nuclear Cities 1. Changes in Specialist Recruitment 2. Changes in the Qualitative Composition of Specialists Working in Closed Cities 3. Living Standards in Closed Cities 4. Moonlighting 5. Specialists' Financial Situation 6. Potential and Actual Emigration 7. Personnel Shift toward Private Business 8. Personnel Training for the Nuclear Industry 9. Nuclear Security and Personnel Missile Cities 10. Migration as a Factor in the Evolution of Missile Cities 11. Specialists' Qualifications 12. Wages and Salaries 13. Income and Housing 14. Moonlighting 15. Financial Situation 16. Potential Emigration 17. Actual Emigration 18. Personnel Shift toward Private Business 19. Personnel Training for the Missile Industry 20. Missile Security and Personnel About the Author About the Carnegie Endowment

Tikhonov, Valentín Russia S Nuclear and M

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RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX The Human Factor in Proliferation

Copies of this report can be obtained in several ways:

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

Overview ..................................................................................................................................... Findings ......................................................................................................................................

2 7 18 20 24 29 36 42 50 52 67 72 74 77 83 93 99 103 106 108 113 117 120 121

List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. List of Tables ................................................................................................................................

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

PART 1 The Study

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Sarov Snezhinsk Seversk Zarechniy Trekhgorniy Total

10000 5700 4500 4200 2000 26400

100 100 100 100 100 500

1.0 1.8 2.2 2.4 5.0 1.9

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

Table 3. Working and surveyed specialists in the missile industry

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

Income Levels and Sources

Living Standards of Specialists

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Attitudes toward Migration

Moves to Private Enterprises

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

Education of New Specialists

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

Income Levels and Sources

Living Standards of Specialists

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Attitudes toward Migration

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

Moves to Private Enterprises

Education of New Specialists

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69 Total sampling

100 100 100 100 100

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

Figure 10-2. Migrants vs. permanent residents of missile cities, %

Linear (permanent population)

Figure 10-3. Korolev: permanent residents vs. migrants, %

Linear (permanent population)

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Figure 10-4. Miass: Permanent residents vs. migrants, %

Linear (permanent population)

10.3. Structure of Migratory Inows to Missile Cities

1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69 Total sampling

RUSSIAS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COMPLEX

Figure 10-5. Migration to missile cities: Local residents vs. outsiders, %

Linear (local residents)

Figure 10-6. Local residents: Permanent residents vs. migrants, %

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

Linear (permanent residents)

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69 Total sampling