at ISKCON's Mayapur Chandrodaya Mandirin Çrédham Mayapur, W.B., IndiaPreface to the Second Edition
Preface
Seeing his book reprinted, an author likely feels a sense of accomplishment, evenvanity. With the second printing of Substance and Shadow, I simply feel greatrelief. The first edition was rushed to the printer along with numerous errata soas to be offered during Çréla Prabhupäda's Centennial year (1996). Still, in themain, the reaction to the book was favorable. Brisk sales prompted me to revisethe manuscript for a second edition. And this is the result a polished text in anew size under a new cover. Not that I claim it perfect; but I am relieved to sayI've done all that I could to make it better. Most of the corrections are minormatters of spelling and punctuation. But there are some revisions of content too.Several of these deal with science. At least one reader with a scientificbackground was unsatisfied by how the first edition handled certain scientificissues. I've done what I can to show sensitivity to his complaint. But I won't besurprised if this edition also attracts criticism, since I have no formal training in,for example, quantum mechanics though in Substance and Shadow I dare makecomments about it. What are my intentions (or pretensions) towards science? Inanswering that question, I offer six points here.
The narrow basis of science
First, the main purpose of Substance and Shadow is to distinguish the Vedicmethod of knowledge from other methods. Humanity has different methods of knowledge available to it. I hold that only through Vedic knowledge can we gradethe validity of these methods. Substance and Shadow examines four suchmethods: empiricism, scepticism, rationalism and authoritative testimony. I holdthat Western science isn't capable of comparing and contrasting the validity of one method of knowledge against others. Why? Because its own basis is toonarrow. That basis was summed up by Albert Einstein in Out of My Late Years(1936):Out of the multitude of our sense experiences we take, mentally and arbitrarily,certain repeatedly occuring complexes of sense impression ... and we attribute tothem a meaning the meaning of bodily objects.Einstein admitted that this method cannot even prove the existence of theexternal world. So how can we be sure that the bodily objects scientists study arereal things? Aren't such objects just mental interpretations of a jumble of sensedata that, with a nonhuman mind, or even with a human mind culturallydifferent than ours, could be interpreted in a very different way? Wouldn't adifferent interpretation of sense data reveal a very different world? Whichinterpretation is the right one? And how, by this method Einstein described, canwe ever know whether there is a reality outside the range of our senseexperiences? These questions are not for science to answer. They are for
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