Pedro Albizu Campos:

Strategies of StruggZe and Strategic StruggZes

Carlos Rodriguez-Fraticelli

n one of his many biographical sketches of Pedro Albizu Campos, Juan Antonio Corretjer wrote: El misterio de su existencia es tan llicido que desfila en la extraordinaria versatilidad de su liderato. Ning6n dirigente anterior baraj6, defendiendolo, igual niimero de formas de lucha. La magia de su palabra oral y escrita la enfoc6 en casi todas formas m9s eficaces. La disquisici6r-r filos6fica, la exposici6n juridica, la oraci6n religiosa, politica o agitadora; el folleto, el aruculo y la correspondencia privada, la gesti6n discreta entre amigos y simpa&antes en el campo adversario, el sufragio coma medio de organizacidn politica y discusi6n doctrinaria, el retraimiento coma resistencia y ttcnica revolucionaria, la huelga de obreros y estudiantes, el medio diplomitico, el trabajo international, 10s contactos con gobiernos e instituciones extranjeras en cada moment0 determindado disponible, 10s puertorriquefios residenciados en el extranjero, principalmente

domiciliados en Nueva York.. ., la conspiraci6n, la acci6n directa, la lucha de calle, la insurreccibn; en fin, la mobilizaci6n de todos 10s factores para la fecunda actividad en la que despleg6 su fascinaci6n y eficacia, la mas esplendida imaginaci6n politica de nuestra actividad creadora que respaldaba con un total olvido de sus conveniencias personales, hizo de Cl un gran poeta de la vida. This portrait of the Puerto Rican Nationalist by one of his oldest and closest companions in the struggle differs radically from the vision that has dominated Puerto Rican iconography. For the majority, whatever their political ideology, the name of Albizu Campos evokes violence, whether terrorism for some or revolutionary justice for others. The various constructions of the life of Albizu Campos are founded on the theme of violence: the RIO Piedras Massacre; the execution of Colonel Riggs and the assassination of Rosado and Beauchamp; the Ponce Massacre; the insurrection at Jayuya; the gag laws; the attack on Blair House; and the assault on the U.S.

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ-FRATICELLI is Assistant Professor, Social Science Department, College of General Studies, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras. The article was translated from the Spanish by Jose Medina. n Left to Right, Haitian poet Pierre-Moraviah Morpeau, nationalist Juanita Ojeda and Pedro Albizu Campos, San Juan Puerto Rico. 1947. Ruth M. Reynolds Papers, Centro Library.

Congress. With this history of violence, a greater violence has been perpetrated against history. All the other dimensions of Albizus political work, his strategy and his tactics, are diminished and pale before the imagery of the heroic, the dramatic and the spectacular. If it is true that this one-dimensional image of Albizu has been promoted by defenders of the colonial system, it is no less true that the same view has been consciously or unconsciously nurtured by social scientists committed or sympathetic to the national liberation struggle of Puerto Rico. These researchers of the Al bizu phenomenon, perhaps due to their ideological prejudices, political agendas or simply theoretical or methodological deficiencies, have concentrated on the tactical-military aspect, completely ignoring other elements in Albizus strategy.2 In one of the most recent attempts to re-evaluate the historical figure of Albizu, Luis Angel Ferrao, in his highly controversial Pedro Albizu Catnpos y el nacionalljmo puercom~ueiio, 1930-1939 (1990) reproduces the same view with some variation. According to this author: Previo a noviembre de 1932, Albizu se habia manifestado proclive al uso de las armas coma medio de lucha, pero tambien habia hecho claro en reiteradas ocasiones su firme predilecci6r-r por 10s mttodos pacificos. Para nosouos esto significa que el Partido Nacionalista no habia definido todavia cual seria el medio indicado para llegar al poder y obtener la independencia. Si se nos permite la analogia adrejecista, pensamos que All&u se ha/Ma apenas en la fase initial de lo que w&a un compliczdfiimo y amesgadisimo jucgo politico, acomoaando sus piezas y probando algunas tdcti~s inicioks, para pasar luego a d&nir la twrategik global QUG urihanb e/ rest0 de ia Pam-da.. . Sin embargo, lo que de$nid su tJha&gia globalhe justamente e/ fraaso de cscl tdtfico ekctoral, a raia

delpobre resrikado que obtuvo su pamdo en 80s cominos. Desde ese momento en adekzntc, e/ Pamdo Nacionalista rehusa pam.cipar en has ekcciontzr Iocaks y encauad su /uo$a par otros mtdios no przciramenw pacaifico a Like others before him, Ferrao proposes a direct causal relationship between electoral defeat and a change in strategy when he argues that with the 1932 electoral defeat, the Nationalist Party (read Albizu) opted for strategies that were %ot precisely peaceful (a euphemism used by Ferrao to avoid using the ugly word violence) to attain the independence of Puerto Rico. From then on, according to Ferrao, the strategy that Albizu would utilize until his death was set. Although Ferrao recognizes the existence of other forms of struggle within Albizus arsenal of tactics prior to 1932, he limits these to the electoral arena. Thus, Albizus global strategy is reduced to a choice between two tactics: elections or armed struggle. This narrow view of Albizus global strategy practically dominates the literature on the subjects This formulation of Albizus strategies of struggle has been founded mainly on the study of two historical moments: 1930-1936 and 1950-1954. Both are periods of direct confrontation with the colonial regime characterized by the use of revolutionary violence as an instrument of struggle. Both periods also culminate with the imprisonment of the Nationalist leader. However, few have investigated the periods between 1924-l 9296 and 1943-l 947. The former covers the first years of Pedro Albizu Camposs militancy in the Nationalist Party prior to being elected its president, while the latter covers the time Albizu spent in New York City after his release from Atlanta Federal prison! A study of these two periods would help to create a more rounded picture of Albizus global strategy and demonstrate the methodological limitations of previous studies. Prior to 1930, the year he assumed

the presidency of the Nationalist Party, Albizu had defined the strategies of struggle he was to follow for the rest of his life. Albizu believed in the nullity of the Treaty of Paris, a thesis he had been developing since 1926. He postulated that all forms of struggle were legitimate to eradicate an illegal regime born and maintained by force. Furthermore, Albizus global strategy was also founded on the premise that the struggle against U.S. imperialism was an unequal battle that could not be exclusively undertaken nationally. The fight had to be taken to the very heart of the metropolis by every means necessary. It was also essential that the struggle go beyond the confines of the colonial meuopolitan context, and that it be connected to the debate over the new world order that began to develop after the First World War.9 On the hemispheric level, Albizu had to demonstrate to Latin America that the historical mission to serve as a wall of contention against U.S. imperialism belonged to Puerto Rico. His analysis, correctly or incorrectly, of the conjunctural forces on all three levels-national, metropolitan and international-drove him to favor certain forms of struggle over others at different moments. Albizu understood that Puerto Rico presented a serious international problem for the United States. The colonial reality of Puerto Rico stood in contrast to the rhetoric on Pan-Americanism and hemispherical brotherhood, respect for national integrity, and the international forum that the United States administration was promoting. The isolation of our nation from the rest of Latin America and from the rest of the world had to be broken; the contradictions between the official discourse and the practice of U.S. imperialism had to be unmasked; and the formation of common fronts in every possible sphere had to be achieved in order to exert pressure on the United States to end colonialism in Puerto Rico. Thus, as soon as he became editor in chief of fi/ Nacionaksta de Porn in

1924, Albizu began to mail copies of the newspaper and official declarations of the Nationalist Party to the authorities in Washington, to the different foreign embassies in the United States, and to high officials of Latin American and European governments.0 At the same time, he began an intense campaign to get the support of famous Latin American leaders, writers and journalists to promote hemispheric solidarity with Puerto Rico. Albizus firm belief that the case of Puerto Rico had to be taken before the international community was also reflected in the actions he took as vice-president of the Nationalist Party (1925-1930). During this period, he played an important role in the Nationalist Partys decision to send a representative to the First Anti-Imperialist Congress in Brussels in 1927, where the first international resolution supporting the independence of Puerto Rico was passed. Also, Albizu supported a motion in the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party in 1926 to send a delegate to the Latin American republics to promote the Nationalist cause. His decision to personally undertake this mission, which lasted over two years (19271930), is incontrovertible proof of the tremendous importance international work had in his global strategy.12 At the same time, Albizu did not reject the possibility that the United States would peacefully withdraw from Puerto Rico. He preferred it, recognizing the terrible human cost that war involved. However, he insisted correctly that no empire had ever voluntarily abandoned its subjugated territories. Armed struggle was one of the historic means that oppressed nations, including the United States, had utilized to achieve their independence. Its use, however, would depend a great deal on the capacity of the people to act united, for example, through a constituent assembly, and on the response of the U.S. government and its representatives in the colony. The use of different pressure tactics, in Albizus view, had UI be developed to unveil the true face of colonial-

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ism to his countrymen and to the rest of the world. While Ghandi in India chose non-violence as a strategy for struggle, Albizu maintained early the mOre flexible strategy of civil disobedience. * This ranged from the refusal to pay taxes to disobeying colonial laws and armed confrontation. The forms that these could take would be determined in the final instance, by concrete conditions. Between 1924 and 1934, Albizu accepted participation in the electoral process as a strategy. In fact, he ran as representative from the district of Ponce in 1924 and as senator-at-large in 1932. A study of that era reveals how the Unionists, and later the Socialists, saw the Nationalists as a potential stumbling block, and did everything possible to impede the Nationalist Partys attempts to open up a space in the electoral arena. In 1932, as in 1924 and 1928, this time with Albizu in the presidency, the Nationalist Party participated in the colonial elections. Al bizu ran as a candidate for senator-at-large. As had occurred in 1924 and 1928, the Nationalist Party received few votes. For many, the Nationalists poor showing was due to corruption. The prevailing view has been that, with this electoral defeat, Albizu changed his tactics and chose violence. Contrary to those that defend this thesis, the decision of the Nationalist Party to withdraw from the electoral process and establish the tactic-and it was a tactic and not a principle--of non-cooperation with the regime, was not an automatic one. Two years had passed between the elections and the Nationalist Partys new tactic, which was proclaimed on September 23, 1934. In addition, there were still two more years before the next election. The question we should be asking is: what happened between 1932 and 1934 to convince Albizu and the Nationalist Party that they should reject the electoral process as an arena of contention? The answer is complicated and requires exhaustive study. Nevertheless, it can be argued that until

March 1934 the Nationalist Party still intended to use the electoral process to expose American colonialism in Puerto Rico. With that in mind, Albizu filed a petition in the Legislature requesting that the Nationalist Party be officially represented in the Insular Board of Elections.*5 In response to the demands of the Socialist Party, who also demanded electoral space, the Legislature reformed the Board. The Nationalist Partys petition, however, was denied. There are other factors to consider regarding the Nationalist Partys rejection of the electoral arena. For instance, there was increased governmental repression between 1932 and 1934. The writing on the wall was obvious. With the arrival of Colonel Francis E. Riggs in 1933, the police of Puerto Rico began to modernize and were better equipped. Months later, in February 1934, the National Guard of Nicaragua, organized and armed by the U.S. government, assassinated General CCsar Agusto Sandino, the principal anti-imperialist leader of Latin America.r6 Finally, the decision of the Federal Rehabilitation Administration (1934) to favor the Liberals over Coalitionist elements, granting the latter administrative positions in the Puerto Rican Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Administration (PRRA), intensified the political crisis in the colony. Once again, the impotence of the colonial Legislature, controlled by the Coalitionists, vis a vis the power of the federal authorities was unveiled. Thus, Albizu argued, the illusion that through elections one can attain power was finally dispelled. Moreover, we must remember that Albizus dismissal of the electoral process was determined within the context of an economic crisis of intense proportions. The nation was experiencing a general discontent that affected all classes and was being expressed through nationwide strikes. The crisis was systemic. The Nationalists intensified their agitation in the streets, at sugar cane fields, work centers, and

schools, including the University. Albizu, along with other Nationalist leaders, had come to the conclusion that the regime had lost all legitimacy. It is important to emphasize that the tactic of non-cooperation with the regime did not imply the rejection of peaceful and legal forms of struggle, as it has been commonly understood. Up to the moment of his imprisonment, Albizu continued to promote the formation of a Constituent Assembly represented by all political parties to end colonialism in Puerto Rico. The period between 1934-1936 was one of violent confrontation between the Nationalists and the colonial regime. By 1936, the federal authorities had decided to stop the Nationalists at all cost That year Albizu was arrested and accused of conspiring to overthrow the United States government in Puerto Rico by force. Although Albizu had rejected the electoral process, he had not done the same with the juridico-legal process. Contrary to the expectations of many, Albizu defended himself. He attempted to demonstrate the illegality of the United States judicial system in Puerto Rico.* In a clearly political trial, Albizu was found guilty and sentenced to ten years at the Federal prison in Atlanta.9 In the six years Albizu would remain in prison, the national and international situation changed dramatically. In 1939 the Second World War began. The Allies, seeking international support in their struggle against the Axis forces, promised through a series of treaties such as the Atlantic Charter and the Treaty of Teheran, the creation of a just international order that would recognize the independence of all the nations that united behind the democratic cause. At the same time that the federal authorities in Puerto Rico repressed and imprisoned the Nationalist leadership, they negotiated a solution to the political crisis in Puerto Rico with the recently created Democratic Popular Party, where pro-independence forces had regrouped. If the Popular Democratic Party supported them, Washing-

ton promised to help resolve the political status of Puerto Rico as soon as the war ended. In the 1940 elections, the Popular Party established a precarious control of the colonial legislature. Four years later, it overwhelmingly won the elections. During this period, the Popular Party, under the skillful leadership of MuAoz, rapidly distanced itself from the goal of independence. Meanwhile, in spite of the limitations imposed by prison authorities, Albizu tried to keep abreast of all new events. During his imprisonment, Albizu shared his analysis of the new situation with other political prisoners, including Earl Browder, President of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). By 1942, Albizu had concluded that a favorable juncture had been created for the United States to withdraw peacefully from Puerto Rico.ZO New political fronts had to be opened in the Island, the United States and on the international level. Albizu saw the necessity to create in the United States a powerful solidarity movement with the independence of Puerto Rico. Initially, he counted on the help of the Communist Party of the United States, who had committed itself to financially and organizational support the undertaking. At that moment, the CPUSA, following the political line of the Third International, opposed the European war as an interimperialist war. The case of Puerto Rico was a factor it could exploit: The CPUSA sought to encourage internal opposition in the United States to prevent that countrys entry in the military conflict. Albizu understood that the Communist Party was a national party that was well organized and had important influence in the organized labor movement. Also, as the only party in the United States committed to the independence of Puerto Rico, its support was well received.z In Puerto Rico, Albizu understood that the ideal of independence was still strong despite the repression against the Nationalists. Even though the Popular Party followed an increasingly ambiguous line regarding indepen-

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dence, the independence sector within the party was considerable and influential. The unity of the independentiktas above party loyalties was essential. In 1943, the same year Albizu was released from Atlanta, the Pro-Independence Congress was created in Puerto Rico. Although the Nationalist Party did not officially take part, some of its leaders participated as individuals in the deliberations that helped constitute the Congress. In the meantime, Juan Antonio Corretjer, Secretary General of the Nationalist Party, accepted a suspended sentence on orders from Albizu, and moved to New York, the main center of Nationalist activity in the United States. His mission was to pursue the new political line.= As soon as he arrived in New York, Corretjer contacted the Communist Party who supplied him the necessary funds to publish a newspaper promoting an anti-imperialist line and supporting the independence of Puerto Rico. In PUGblos Hispanos, an intense campaign,was waged to support the Pro-Independence Congress. Corretjer, in spite of the official position of the Nationalist Party of non-cooperation, became the representative of the Congress in the United States. Later, Albizu set inmotion the necessary steps to bring the case of Puerto Rico before the new international forum created at the end of World War II. However, Albizus new strategy soon failed. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Communist Party abruptly changed its position on the war. What was a struggle between imperialists suddenly became a struggle between democracy and fascism. Now the Communist Party maintained that the immediate task of the progressive forces was to support the Allies. From Albizus perspective the situation had not changed. The principal enemy continued to be U.S. imperialism. The rupture was inevitable. After an unsuccessful attempt to convince Albizu to accept the new line, the Communist Party finally withdrew its economic and political supportU

This precipitated a crisis and a division within the ranks of the Junta of the Nationalist Party in New York. Corretjer, who supported the political line of the CPUSA, left the Nationalist Party, followed by other activists that identified with the new political line.2S This signified the loss of a series of respected leaders and valuable activists, and Puddos Hispanos ceased to represent the Nationalist position. Albizu did not allow this to stop him. He immediately developed a new base of support with liberals, progressives and non-communist radicals. This group formed the American League for the Independence of Puerto Rico.% However, the group lacked both a strong social base and a solid organizational apparatus. Although its work was very important, it was also limited. After the loss of Pueblos Hispanos, the Nationalist Party developed another publication, the monthly Puerto Rico aimed at the Puerto Rican community in the United States. Lacking economic support, the publication languished. Nevertheless, Albizu proceeded to take the case of Puerto Rico before the international community. In 1945, official discussions began in San Francisco to create an international organization that would peacefully mediate international conflicts-the United Nations. Albizu Campos was prepared to open another battlefront against U.S. imperialism. From his hospital bed, Albizu established contact with various anticolonial activists. Under his influence and with the active participation of the Nationalist Party, these activists created the Provisional World Congress of Dominated Nations in 1945. The purpose of the organization was to take the case of colonized nations to the San Francisco Conference and demand the complete elimination of imperialism. The delegates to the Congress in San Francisco-among them Julio Pinto Gandia representing the Nationalist Party-succeeded in convincing the Philippines representative to present their case at the Assemblys

plenary. The opposition of the colonial powers was intense. After long debates the delegates reached a compromise. The inclusion of independence was accepted as one of the objectives in the Constitution of the United Nations but it was limited only to those territories that were to be administered and supervised under a system of international trusteeships. For the other territories, Puerto Rico among them, the Assembly approved a clause establishing that colonial powers were to be responsible for their administration. Even so, it established that the administrative nation had to periodically provide information on the economic, social and educational conditions of the territories under its jurisdiction. The activities of the Provisional World Congress proved to be an embarrassment for Washington. Once the conference ended, the federal authorities unleashed a wave of repression. On his return to New York, Pinto Gandia faced arrest for violating the selective service laws. Although recognition of Puerto Ricos right to independence was not immediately obtained, Albizus strategy yielded fruit. The case of Puerto Rico had been brought before and included in the agenda of the recently created United Nations. When the UN began to officially function, the Nationalist Party obtained recognition and accreditation as a non-governmental organization with the right to observer status in all the sessions of the General Assembly, including its committees and subcommittees. Meanwhile, new developments in the Island dealt another blow to

Albizus formulations. Divisions within the Pro-Independence Congress were becoming more evident, endangering the possibility that the organization would become a broad independence front. In 1946 the leading body of the Popular Democratic Party forced a crisis within its ranks by declaring that it was incompatible to be a member of both organizations. A large number of Populares abandoned the Congress. The remaining majority supported the transformation of the Congress into a political party; thus was born the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP). The participation of the PIP in the electoral process created a new obstacle for Albizus plans, since it served to legitimize the new colonial arrangement then being developed, and officially sanctioned in 1952 under the name of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Albizu had to start anew. In December 1947, a few months after completing his sentence, Albizu returned to Puerto Rico to initiate the reorganization of the Nationalist Party and to continue the revolutionary process against colonialism. At that moment, the possibility of achieving independence seemed to have dissipated. However, it was necessary to develop new strategies to prevent the consummation of the new colonial state and to assure that Puerto Rico would never become a state. When asked by the custom inspector if he had brought seeds with him, Al bizu Campos answered with the now famous words: The same seeds I took are the ones I bring back 0

ENDNOTES
1 2 Cited in Juan Mori Brcls, El independentismo en Puerto Rico: su pas&o, su presente y su porvenir. San Juan: Editorial CEPA, 1984, pp. 9 142. Gordon K. Lewis was the first to scientifically validate this myth in his Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in rhe Caribbean ( 1963). Although Lewis revised some of his arguments as to the supposed fascism of Aibizu in his Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution ( 1974), he nonethe less maintained the thesis that Albizu primarily utilized revolutionary violence as his principle strategy. Juan Angel .%I&, first from on apologetic stance in his /-locia uno visi6n positiva de/ puetiorriquefio (1970) and later in Pedro Albizu Campus (1976]- although on attempt at demystification - exalts the violenceterrorism aspect of Albizus strategy. Manuel Maldonado Denis, in his attempt to justify Albizus use of revolutionary violence, postulates thot after 1932, and as a result of the electoral defeat of the Nationalist Party, Albizu would concentrate the Partys political activity on confronting the violence of the regime with revolutionary violence. Beniomin Torres, whose chronology of the life of Albizu Compos is the most widely known at-d disseminated work on the Nationalist leader, emphasized the military aspect of Albizus strategy. Torres, in his work, presents the Nationalist leader as preparing from youth to strike the revolutionary blow to the colonial regimen. See his Pedro Albizu Compos, Un odelon/odo de nuestro tiempo ( 1985). Luis A. Ferroo, Pedro Albizu Compos y el nocionolismo puertorriqueiio (Rio Piedras: Ediciones Cultural, 19901, p. 83. for a more extensive although not exhaustive discussion of methodological errors in Ferraos book, see Taller de Formacibn Politico, Pedro tibizu Compos: gconselvador, fascista o revolucionorio? (Rio Piedras: 199 1). The exception has been Juan Mari BrCls, who like Corretier, has defended the complexity and originality of Albizus global strategy. See Juan Mari BrCrs, El independentismo, pp. 89-l 20. Ironically, in both cases, the orgumenk have fallen on deaf ears among the social scientists who hove researched this theme. At present, Amilcor Tirodo Avik%, of the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios, Hunter College, CUNY is researching this period. His initial studies ore found in to forja de un lider: Pedro Albiw Compos, 1924-l 930, in this issue of the Cenko &I//e/in, pp. 1 G2 1. Albiws stay in New York is the subject of o book in progress ty Carlos Rodriguez-Fraticelli titled fn /OS entraiias de/ monstruo: nocionalismo y anti-imperialismo puertorriqueijo en 10s &ados Unidos, I 926 I 947. So little is known about this period that it is common to hear the phrase on his return from Atlanta, Albizu.. . , * even among those who hove studied Puerto Rican politics. For many this period is considered dead time. Albizus internment, according to some critics, did not allow him to understand in what ways Puerto Rico in 1947 was different from the Puerto Rico he had been exiled from for ten years. Juan Mari Brcls was the first to acknowledge the three pillars of Albizus global strategy: national, imperial and international. However, Mari Br& erroneously posits that between 1930 and 1936, Albizu established the bases of the tripode on which the strategy of the notional liberation struggle of Puerto Rico would be mounted (Mari Br6s, N independentismo, p. 95). 10 Albizu initially transformed El Nocionalista de Ponce into a bilingual weekly with the aim of utilizing it OS a nationalist propaganda organ not only in Puerto Rico but also in the United States. The subscription form states that the newspaper would go to Washington and be read by the President, Senators, Representatives, and other members of the U.S. government, who will by reuding it, be mode generally aware of all political matters associated with this I&d. Subscription form, El Nacionalisto de Ponce, JuIy 13, 1924, p.8. 11 The resolution was presented by the renown Mexican philosopher, politician and educator Jo& Vosconcelos on behalf of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico before the International AntiColonial Congress, N Nacionchto de Ponce, April 9, 1927, pp. 1, 5-6. Vasconcelos had visited the Island the year before. During his visit he met Albizu and was profoundly impressed by him. This episode is discussed in Corlos Rodriguez-F roticelli, Jo& Vosconcelos, Pedro Albizu Campus y lo independencia de Puerto Rico, 1926-l 927 (forthcoming].

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3 4

12 Magna Asamblea del Partido Nocionalista, N Nocionolisto de Ponce, Sept. 12, 1925, pp. 1, 3. Ram& Medina Ramirez, N movimiento libertador en /a historio de Puerto Rico (San

Juan, 19711, pp. 81-82. 13 before leaving for his trip to Latin America, Albizu had proposed transforming the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico into a revolutionary organization throughout the Island that would co nia and [that] would seek the recognition from all the definitivefy break with the lo regimen, I free nations of the world of our independence in order to reconcentrate North American attention ta our situation. Interview with Albizu Campus, los Quijotes, 1926. Reproduced in Manuel Maldonado Denis (ed.), La conciencia national puertorriqueria, (Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1972), pp. 45-46.

14 Pedro Albizu Campos, Pro&ma sobre el Aniversario de la Revolution de tares in Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, Vol. II (San Juan, Editorial Jelofe, 198 1 ), p. 50. 15 letter to Rafael Martinez Nodal, March 1, 1934. Reproduced in Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, I923- I936 [reproduced by, introduction and notes by Benjamin Torres) Vol. ll:24-26.

16 In their response to Sandinos death, the Nationalist Party highlighted the fact that rhe National Guard was organized by the U.S. government. The Party de&red that the imposition of gangster-like tactics in international struggles would bring the bloodiest repressions known to history. Proclama ante la muerte de Sandino, in Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, II:2 l23. 17 Albizu Campos, Proclama sobre el Aniversario de la Revolution de Lares, in Albizu Campus, Obras escogidas, ll:49. 18 Albizus strategy during the thirties was to recognize the legal authority of the [U.S.] courts, accepting their existence de facto. The decision of the Nationalist Party to make demands through the legal system [Albizu] posed was a question of necessity, a de facto situation, a matter of necessity. See Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, Tomo IV [Mexico: Editorial Cloves tatinoamericanas, 1987), p. 127. 19 The 1936 trial is discussed by Harry Rodriguez in his presentation, los proceso judiciales incoados conrrc Don Pedro Albizu Carnpos, at the Pedro AJbizu Campos y la nation puertorriqueria Conference, University of Puerto Rico, September 9-23, 1991. 2 0 See Albizus position on this in Des cartas, Pueblos l-lispanos (NY), June 26, 1943, p. 2. 21 22 23 Ibid. Corretjer irnico delegado del Congreso National Prolndependencia de Puerto Rico en EE.UU. Pueblos l-lispanos, May 29, 1943, p. 4. Entrevista con Albizu Campus en Atlanta, Pueblos Hispanos, May 15, 1943, p. 4. 33

2 4 Vito Marcantonio took the same position as the Communist Party of the United States. Marcantonio, however, never withdrew his support of the Nationalist Party. See Vito Marcantonio to Julio Santiago, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, May 14, 1942. In Vito Marcuntonio Papers, Box 15. Puerto Rico. General Correspondence. 2 5 On November 24, 1943, Albizu officially removed Juan Antonio Corretjer as General Secretary of the Party and U.S. Delegate. The notice of Corretiers ouster from the Party appeared in a short announcement entitled A 10s Nacionalistas Puertorriqueiios, Pueblos Hispanos, December 25, 1943. 2 6 Ruth Reynolds, North American Christtan pacifist, was in charge of organizing the league. The organization was headed by U.S. pacifist leader Jay Holmes Smith; Reynolds was the Secretary. Among its members were the well-known writer Pearl Buck, president of the Indian Famine Committee; the painter Rockwell Kent; the prestigious African American labor leader and excommunist Philip Randolph; Mary Mcteod Bethune, President of the National Congress of Negro Women; Dr. John Haynes, President of the American Civil Liberties Union; Paul Hutchison, Managing Editor of The Christian Cen/ury; and Richard Walsh, editor and publisher of Asia and rbe Americas. Ante Ias Naciones Unidas. La Liga Americana Pro lndependencia de Puerto Rico vs. 10s Estados Unidos, Puerto Rico, [October 1946):7-l 5, 17-24. 2 7 la Awciacibn UniMundial ante el Congreso de los Estados Unidos, Puer?o Rico II (March, 1945):18. 2 8 On January 9, 1947, the United Nations approved the Nationalist Partys petition to have observer status. That status was withdrawn in November 1950 as a result of the Nationalist insurrection of that year. Medina Ramirez, N movimiento libertodor, pp. 440-441.