| ANAKAINOSIS ! A Journal For Reformational Thought Volume Three, No. 1 September 1980 Editorial: World-view and Philosophy The distinction between "world-view" and "philosophy" in the technical sense of a non-scientific versus a scientific totality view, seems to go back to German philosophy sometime in the mid-nineteenth century. I am not sure who first made the distinction between Weltanechauung and Philoeopkie in this way. Dooyeweerd, in his discussion of the distinction (which he adopts), mentions Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, and Theodor Litt as holding it before him (A Hew Critique of Theoretical Thought, 1, 120-128), and it is common enough in German philosophical writings to find the term weltanschaulich used almost in the sense of "unphilosophical", or “unworthy of (strict, rigorous, scientific) philosophy.” It was perhaps Dilthey's influence which caused the cumbersome term "world and life view" to gain currency as an equivalent for Weltanschauung in this technical sense; at any rate Dilthey does commonly use the expression Welt- und Lebensanechauung (or, indiscriminately, Lebens- und lWettanechauung) in this sense, and Abraham Xuyper transmitted it to the Dutch Neocalvinist tradition. It is clear, however, that the more cumbersome phrase means nothing more than the handier "world-view". Witness the fact that Weltanschauungelehre is rendered "theory of life-and world-views" in the wev Critique (T, 120), land that "world-view" entered the English language as a direct translation lof weltanschauung (see the relevant entry in the Oxford English Dietion- lary). In my experience the expression “world and life view", when used in English, almost always betrays a connection with Dutch Neocalvinism; the shorther "world-view" has the advantage of wider English currency, closer resemblance to the relevant German original, and easier pronun- ciation. lerminological considerations aside, it is of interest to consider the systematic relationships of world-view and philosophy, if they are indeed distinct. To my mind it certainly makes sense to draw a distinction between "philosophy" in the professional and academic sense of the word, land the more general and less sophisticated life perspective which is loosely referred to as “system of values" or “ideology” in current parlance, and which also (confusingly) goes by the name "philosophy". Whatever the precise difference between "scientific" and "non-scientific" Imay be, there seems to be a prima facie validity to distinguishing between a scientific "philosophy" and a non- or pre-scientificvworld-view", both of which refer to an overall conception of reality. If'so, the name philosophy can be reserved for the special study by that name pursued in university courses and professional journais, and we can dub "world-view" a5 the global vision of life which seems to be unrestricted to specialists and amateurs, but to be common to humankind in general. If this is true, then the specialists and amateurs in philosophy have both a world-view and a philosophy. How do the two relate, or how ought they to relate? According to the German philosophers who used the distinction in the late nineteenth century, the rela- tion between the two was one of strict separation. Philosophie should be kept clear of Weltanachauung, because the former was neutral and objective and the latter was stamped by the idiosyn- crasies of personality and history. Especially the passions and prejudices of religion, so characteristic of weltanschauliche differences, were to be refused entrance into the rigorous portals of scientific philosophy. According to the Dutch Noocalvinists, however, although they admitted the distinction, the relationship between the two was seen quite differently. Philosophy, the view of men like Kuyper, Bavinck, Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd, and Stoker, was not to negate, but to affirm a world-view. Both philosophy and world-view were to be made captive to Christ, and were therefore called to be in harmony with each other. Despite differences in precise formulation (Dooyeweerd prefers to speak of philosophy, not as a theoretical elaboration of one's world-view, but as a different task sharing a common root with one's world-view: 1G I, 128), the proponents of a Calvinistic philosophy agree that one's world-view both is and ought to be presupposed in one's philosophy. If they are right, then it seems thet there must be weltbancchauliche components of their philosophies which precede the explicitly theo- retical formulations and distinctions of their systematic concep- tions. Those components, like regulative ideas, would be common to all philosophers who Share a given world-view, though they may differ significantly on matters of systematic insight. It strikes me as an important task for philosophers of all schools and traditions, but certainly also the reformational one, to reflect on the world-view background of their philosophisizing. For one thing, it can help in assessing which philosophical dif- ferences are important and which are secondary. It can also help Sort out where differences of systematic insight can be looked for in further empirical research, and where it calls for a dialogue on a world-view level. In short, the explicit acknowledgement of the difference between world-view and philosophy can be of prime significance in fostering communication in philosophy. (A.W.)Toward an Ecumenical Historical Consciousness by Bob Sweetman The Reformational tradition lives with an acute awareness of the gradual erosion of Christian influence upon Western intellectual culture. Our thinkers and writers have expended large amounts of time and energy probing the roots of this growing impotence and their concern is easily understood. All men, but Christians especially, live as the heirs of God's cultural mandate, and Christians live with the promise of Christ's Enabler. Yet, though Western intellectual culture is in some sense the+ fruit of Christian cultural formation, we have long lacked the power to direct its development; Western intellectual culture seems increasingly to fuel the fires of the Adversary rather than sound the praises of the Lord. Reformational explorations into the roots of Western intellectual cul- ture have often focussed upon a number of flaws in the Christian foun- dations of thet culture. Recognition of these flaws helps us to ex- plain the historical drift of our intellectual culture from its Chris- tian origins. The Christian foundations were not so Christian; they were succoured by a pagan compost which, in time, both seeded and fertilized the flowers of modernity, i.e. the Renaissance, the Enlight- enment, etc. Our rejection of the current drift of Western intellectual culture and of those elements in its Christian foundations which allowed this development at times produces a revulsion for the Christian intellectual tradition as well as for modernity. While the Reformation remains a shining light within our historiography, on the whole Catholic and Protestant alike have been blind to the real flaws in the Christian intellectual tradition, and hence in part unaware of the apostate in modernity. Reformational attitudes toward the medieval period are a curious mix- ture of admiration and disappointment. On the one hand we are dazzled by an age in which the Western intellectual tradition was born of Christian hearts and minds, for the middle ages is the time par eacellence of Christian cultural formation. Inasmuch as this cultural formation was touched by the gospel, it exhibited much which we would hold to be normative, Even where the medievals failed, writers like St. Thomas Aquinas were at least keenly aware of norms created by the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. On the other hand, medieval Christians also built into their intellec- tual edifice the possibility that became modern intellectual culture. Hence, the medievals disappoint us bitterly for having allowed the ghosts of their pagan past to live a shadowy existence till the moment of their renaissance. Catholic Christianity, which we tend to identify 3