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Published by: marhelun on Jul 21, 2013
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April 3, 2000Revised: January 19, 2004Vivek H. DehejiaCarleton University and CESifo
Department of EconomicsCarleton University1125 Colonel By DriveOttawa ON Canada K1S 5B6Voice: +1 613 520 6661Fax: +1 613 520 3906E-mail: vdehejia@ccs.carleton.ca
Douglas W. Dwyer Moody’s Risk Management Services 
We acknowledge helpful comments by Fernando Alvarez, Jagdish Bhagwati, Henning Bohn,Andrew Caplin, Richard Ericson, and Boyan Jovanovic, as well as seminar participants at aCEPR/WDI conference in Prague, 1998, at UC – Santa Barbara, 2000, Universities of Winnipeg, Alberta, and Calgary, 2002, University of Copenhagen, Catholic University of Leuven, and Norwegian School of Business Administration, 2003.
This paper examines transition dynamics in a search economy. We contrast two extremecases: a completely unexpected reform and a fully anticipated reform. We view theformer as a metaphor for a reform being announced and implemented with immediateeffect, the latter as a metaphor for a reform being announced in advance of itsimplementation. In contrast to models with convex adjustment costs, we show thatannouncing the reform in advance leads to stagnation in anticipation of the reform andoutput cycles after the implementation that are more volatile than had a reform of identical magnitude been implemented immediately. However, the more volatile outputtrajectory of the anticipated case nonetheless yields a higher PDV of output than anunanticipated reform of equal magnitude. This suggests, therefore, that an anticipatedreform is better than an unanticipated reform, even though the former induces greater volatility.JEL codes: O1, P1Keywords: adjustment costs, industy restructuring, transition dynamics, policy reform
1. Introduction 
One of the leading questions in transition economics research is whether a reformshould be implemented immediately or announced in advance. The argument for animmediate reform – “shock therapy” – is that it is the first best option, barring the presence of other distortions. An argument for delay – which could loosely be termed“gradualism” – is that announcing the reform in advance gives agents an opportunity to begin adjusting and hence makes the realization of reform less painful.
Our goal in this paper is to present a simple but fully specified model of the transition, in which thedynamics of output and unemployment are endogenously determined, and in which thechoice between immediate and delayed reform can be rigorously analyzed. This phenomenon is of more than purely theoretical interest. The short-term economichardships associated with a major reform may lead to a policy reversal before it has had achance to be effective. Further, expectations of short-term hardship may prevent thereform from being introduced in the first place, particularly if reforms develop areputation for being reversed. Evidently, understanding the dynamic forces at work during a transition is a key ingredient in developing sound policy advice on how toimplement a reform and ensure its success.Transition dynamics are difficult to analyze. Models with intertemporaloptimization in an equilibrium context quickly become intractable analytically.Therefore, transition dynamics are usually modeled using numerical techniques (cf. Kingand Rebelo, 1993; Boucekkine, Licandro, and Paul, 1997; and Cooley, Greenwood andYorukoglu, 1997). Such techniques have the advantage that they allow the economist toanalyze more realistic models than can be handled analytically. They sometimes have thedisadvantage, however, of obscuring the intuition behind the results and the causalmechanisms driving the model.In this paper, rather than develop a “realistic” model, we analyze a barebonesmodel -- almost an extended example -- of transition. What we will lose in realism, wehope to gain in intuition: by utilizing a mix of analytical and numerical techniques, we 
Contributions to this literature include Aghion and Blanchard (1994), Atkeson andKehoe (1996), Castanheira and Roland (1996), Ericson (1996), Atkeson and Kehoe(1997), Blanchard and Kremer (1997), and Roland and Verdier (1997).

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