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Lusskin v Seminole Comedy Inc

Lusskin v Seminole Comedy Inc

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Published by pcvanslyke
District court holding in a TCPA case that a person who merely releases his or her telephone number to another party has not consented to be contacted by that party with using any automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.
District court holding in a TCPA case that a person who merely releases his or her telephone number to another party has not consented to be contacted by that party with using any automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.

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Categories:Types, Business/Law
Published by: pcvanslyke on Jul 22, 2013
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


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BRET L. LUSSKIN, JR.,Plaintiff, vs.SEMINOLE COMEDY, INC.,Defendant. _______________________________/
This is a federal case about unwanted text messages. Bret L. Lusskin bought a ticket to acomedy show from the Defendant, Seminole Comedy, Inc. As part of an online transaction,Lusskin provided his cellular telephone number to Seminole Comedy. Lusskin was never askedif it was okay if Seminole Comedy contacted him, via his cell number, using an automatic-telephone-dialing system. Sometime after the ticket purchase, Lusskin began receiving textmessages on his cell phone from Seminole Comedy promoting future events. Lusskin didn’tthink this was funny.Lusskin sued Seminole Comedy for alleged violations of the Telephone ConsumerProtection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”).
Seminole Comedy has moved to dismiss eachof Lusskin’s three counts. For the reasons explained in this Order, the Defendant’s Motion toDismiss is denied.
 When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),the Court must accept all of the Complaint’s allegations as true, construing them in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff.
 Pielage v. McConnell 
, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). pleading need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader isentitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does notrequire ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
 Bell Atl.Corp. v. Twombly
, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Lusskin has dismissed his claims in Count III, brought under the Florida Deceptive and UnfairTrade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.204.
Case 0:12-cv-62173-RNS Document 24 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 1 of 5
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows thecourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ butit asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
“Threadbarerecitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do notsuffice.”
Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaicrecitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive dismissal.
 See Twombly
,550 U.S. at 555. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”
, 556 U.S. at 679. Yet, where the allegations “possess enough heft” to suggest a plausible entitlement torelief, the case may proceed.
 See Twombly
, 550 U.S. at 557. “[T]he standard ‘simply calls forenough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the requiredelement.”
 Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc.
, 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). “And,of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’”
, 550U.S. at 556.
 A.Count I: Negligent Violation of the TCPA
Seminole Comedy’s motion to dismiss the TCPA claim is based solely on its reading of anOrder from the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). Seminole Comedy asserts thatCount I fails to state a claim as a matter of law because Lusskin admits that he provided his cellnumber to Seminole Comedy as part of the ticket-purchase transaction. Despite the fact thatLusskin asserts that he never expressly consented to receiving text-message solicitations,Seminole Comedy argues that anytime a person provides his or her cell number to a vendor, thatperson has, as a matter of law, expressly consented to receive calls (or text messages)
from that vendor. Seminole Comedy’s position is predicated upon a Report and Order issued by the FCC.The FCC Order reads, “persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect giventheir invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent
Neither party disputes that, for purposes of a TCPA analysis, a text message is the same as acall.
 See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.
, 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009).
Case 0:12-cv-62173-RNS Document 24 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 2 of 5
instructions to the contrary.”
 In re Rules & Reg’s Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991
, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752 (1992) (“1992 FCC Order”).
But, the TCPA states, “[i]t is unlawful for any person to “make any call (other than a callmade . . . with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephonedialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a . . .cellular telephone service.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The purpose of the TCPA was to strikea balance between protecting the privacy of individuals while still permitting legitimatetelemarketing practices. Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, 105 Stat.2394 (1991). In enacting the TCPA, Congress considered evidence that individuals “considerautomated or prerecorded telephone calls, regardless of the content or the initiator of themessage, to be a nuisance and an invasion of privacy.”
Congress found that banningautomated calls “except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call . . . is the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.”
The TCPA gives the FCC the authority to establish regulations to implement therequirements of the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2).“When determining whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute itimplements, the court follows the established
 Koch Foods, Inc. v. Sec’y,U.S. Dept. of Labor
, 712 F.3d 476, 480 (11th Cir. 2013). The first step is to ask whether Congresshas directly spoken on the matter at issue.
 See Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
, 681 F.3d 1236,1239 (11th Cir. 2012). “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for thecourt, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”
, 467 U.S. at 842-43. “The court reaches
step two only if thestatute ‘is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue’ being interpreted by theagency.”
 Koch Foods
, 2013 WL 869645, at *3 (quoting
 Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v. F.C.C.
, 457 F.3d 1238, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006)). “Where the court finds that thestatute is clear, as it does here, no deference is accorded to the agency’s interpretation.”
 Koch Foods
, 712 F.3d at 480.Congress has clearly stated that it is unlawful to call a cell phone using an automatictelephone dialing system without the “prior express consent of the called party.” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Because the TCPA does not define the term “prior express consent,” the Court
28 U.S.C. § 2342 does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to consider the FCC’s order because Lusskin’s lawsuit does not seek to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend an FCC order; itis simply an action for damages under the TCPA.
 See Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc.
, No. 11-61936, 2013 WL 1899616, at *5-8 (S.D. Fla. May 8, 2013) (Scola, J.).
Case 0:12-cv-62173-RNS Document 24 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 3 of 5

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