Canberra’s renewed attention mainly refects concerns that security in the near neighbourhood could deteriorate quicklyin the ace o persistent development and security challenges, requiring the ADF to conduct stabilisation missions. Thechallenges include ast-growing populations, youth bulges, high unemployment, periodic political instability and poorgovernance. Given this scope or trouble (see box), Australia might need to deploy a brigade-sized orce into the nearregion again with little warning.
The 2013 white paper’s regional ocus is also partly cost-driven.
Put simply, an ADF designed around protecting thecontinent and regional stabilisation operations will be less expensive than a orce designed or uture high-end war-ghting in Northeast Asia. The ocus on regional security gives the ADF a coherent oundation or orce structure planningbased on ‘credible contingencies’ that are actually likely, and provides opportunities to retain useul and interesting rolesater Aghanistan.
The regional ocus refects slight anxieties about local ripples rom China’s rise too.
Key actors complicating the regional security ocus
Some o the trends that have sharpened Australian interest in the South Pacic make promoting regional securityharder. For all its clout, Canberra has never had, nor really sought, tight local control. It aspires to great infuence,reaching towards a loose dominance, but has only ever tully devoted the sort o attention that would give it anything likehegemony—loose or tight. The international setting’s now more competitive, and local leaders are ever less receptive toperceived pushiness, so it’s uncertain whether Canberra’s renewed inclination to exercise leadership is matched by theneighbours’ readiness to oer what Graeme Dobell calls ‘ollowship’.
All Australia’s Melanesian, and most Polynesian and Micronesian, partners conront serious, mainly internal,security challenges:
Papua New Guinea (PNG) ended its year-long constitutional crisis with the 2012 election but only ater‘muddling through’ had been stretched to near breaking point. As Australia’s chie diplomat in PNG at the timediplomatically put it, ‘or a moment, there appeared to be a real risk that PNG would walk away rom its prouddemocratic record.’
Mining and shing won’t ully und Solomon Islands’ budget shortall, sustain neo-traditional patronagenetworks, soak up labour rom the country’s youth bulge, or help balance uneven rural–urban developmentexacerbated by the near exhaustion o unsustainable logging.
There’s potential or renewed tension ahead o Bougainville’s reerendum or i the PNG Government reuses toratiy a possible vote or ull independence (as it could under the 2001 peace agreement).
Indonesian President Yudhoyono now lacks spare political capital to invest in Aceh-type concessions to reducerural Papuans’ growing sense o relative deprivation, and it’s uncertain whether this will be a priority orhis successor.
In Tonga, as elsewhere, past tensions, such as those behind the 2006 riots in Nuku’aloa and Honiara, couldreignite with little warning.
As the International Crisis Group recently pointed out, although Timor-Leste (which regards itsel mainly asan Asian country) is growing strongly, its ragile stability remains vulnerable to convulsions in the patronagenetworks underpinning recent progress.
Some areas serious violence could emerge quickly