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MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE
OF
TECHNOLOGY
DEPARTMENT
OF
CHEMISTRY
ROOM
6-208CAMBRIDGE,
MASSACHUSETTS
02139
JOHNM.
DEUTCH
INSTITUTE
PROFESSOR
TEL
(617)253-1479
FAX
(617)258-5700
E-Mail:
jmd@mit.edu
Senator John Warner, Chairman
Committeeon
Armed Services
Senate
Susan Collins, Chairman
Committee
on
Governmental
Affairs
Senator
Pat
Roberts, Chairman
Senate
Select Committee
on
Intelligence
Senator
Carl
Levin,
Committee
on
Armed Service
Senator
Joseph
LiebermanCommitteeon
Governmental
Affairs
Senator John
D.
Rockefeller,
IV
Senate Select Committee on IntelligenceSenators:
August 14,
2004
The
Senate Select Committee's
Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community PrewarIntelligenceAssessments on Iraq
and the
9-11
Commission Report present a convincingrecordofIntelligence Community
(1C)
deficienciesandprovideacompelling case
that
major
change
is
required. However, successful intelligence depends above
all ondedicatedand
capable individuals
who are
trained
and
motivated
to
work cooperatively.These individuals
in the
1C
must
be
enabled
by a
sound organizational structure with
clearly
aligned responsibilities
and
authorities.
Currently,
the Director of Central Intelligence(DCI)does not have the authoritynecessary
to
perform critical intelligence functions that support
efforts
to
combat
terrorism,
combat
the
spread
of
weapons
of
mass destruction,
and
military operations.
In
considering changes to the structure of the 1C, the central question that Congress
must
decide
is how
much executive authority
to
give
to the new
National Intelligence Director
(NID).My
experience
as DCI and
Deputy Secretary
of
Defense leads
me to
suggest that
the
best
balance is to
increase
the
authority
of the NID for
planning
and
budgeting
but to
leave
authority for
execution
of the NID
approved programs with executive department
and
agency heads.
In
this regard, some
of the
recommendations
of the
9-11 Commission
gotoo far and
others
not far
enough.
I
propose
five
modifications
of the
9-11 Commission
recommendations that I believe
will
better
serve
the
security interest
of the
UnitedStates.
1.
The NID
should
be
directly responsible
to the
President
and
confirmed
by the
Senate.
The
individual should serve at the President's pleasure and should not have a fixed term.
The NID
should
not be
located
in the
Executive
Office
of the
President because
the
1C
isPage 1
 
only one actor in the interagency process. The President should rely on the NationalSecurity Council and National Security Advisor as the single mechanism in the
Executive
Office
of the
President
for
managing
the
interagency
process.
2.
TheNID
must have responsibility
for
planning, programming,
and
budgeting
an
1C
community-wide, multi year program. This means giving the NID budgetary and
planning
responsibility
for all of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP) andJoint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP)andsomeof theactivitiesin theTactical
Intelligence
and Related Activities (TIARA) program. The Secretary of Defense shouldrely
on the NID for the
intelligence planning
and
budgeting required
for
intelligence
support
tomilitary operations. Onlyif the NID isgiven this expanded budgetary
authority
should the position of NID be separated
from
the Director of CIA. If the NID
isnot
given budgetary authority,
the
position will
be
irrelevant.
3.
The NID should have shared, not
sole
authority, with the head of the executive
department
to recommend to the president appointment of individuals to head
1C
agencies. I believe it a mistake to require that positions of deputy NID for foreign
intelligence,
defense intelligence,andhomeland intelligencebecreatedor be
'doublehatted.'
These positions should be
staff functions
for the NID and cannot have lineauthority over the component agencies. Because of the requirements for battlefieldintelligence,theSecretaryof
Defense
must have day-to-day responsibility overthe NSA
(for
example,to provide communications security) and the NGA (for
example,
geospatial
imagery to support tactical targeting). In
today's
world, a
future
Secretary of
Defense
might
well
decide
not to
have
an
Undersecretary
for
Intelligence
but
rather
anUndersecretary for
Command, Control, Communications
and
Intelligence that
is
more
oriented to
support
of
military operations.
The
National Reconnaissance
Office
(NRO)
should
be managed by the Secretary of Defense as part of the DOD space acquisitionsystem, executing a program plan put together by the
NDI.
4. The proposed National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with joint intelligence and
operations
makes sense.But theextensionof the
'center'
concepttoother activitiescannot be made with confidence. The analogy of joint command in the Department of
Defenseis
imperfect, because
all
defense activities
are
under
the
executive authority
ofthe
Secretary
of
Defense.
The
proliferation
of
centers performing collection
and
analysisbegs
the
question about
the
functions
performed under such
an
arrangement
in the
component
1C
agencies, especially
NSA and
DIA.5. The9-11Commission report does not adequately define the relationship of the NID to
the
FBI.
I
believe
the NID
should have planning
and
budgeting authority over
allintelligence
activities of the FBI. This is the only way to have an integrated intelligencecollection
and
analysis
effort
against
the
terrorist threat. Dissemination
of
information
with
national security implications should under
the
direction
of the
NID.
I
regret that
the 9-11
Commission
did not
give favorable consideration
to
separatingdomestic intelligence
from
the FBI andplacing domestic intelligencein a newentityreportingto the NID insimilar alignmentto the CIA andforeign intelligence. Thiswould have permitted the Attorney General to focus on assuring that the rights of
U.S.
Page 2
 
citizens
are
respected
and
that
the
1C
obeys U.S. laws.
The
Attorney General
now is inthe
undesirable position
of
having
a
conflict
between collecting domestic intelligence
anddefending civil
rights.There are many complex issues involved in implementing the recommendations of the9-11 Commission. Moreover, organizing
the
government
tomeetthe
terrorist
threat is
only
one of the serious security challenges we
face.
There are also the problems
posed
by
North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, Iran, and combating the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. All
require intelligence analysis
to
support policy
and
action.
It is
unwise
to
decide on a
major
reorganization of the national security structure in the months
immediately
before
a presidential election, based on the recommendations of a groupchartered for the particular purpose of examining the
causes
of the 9-11 tragedy. The
1947
National Security Act, its 1949 and 1958 amendments and the 1986 Goldwater
Nichols
Actwerenot
adopted
duringapresidential election yearand Isuggestthe
Congress,
as
well
as the
Bush
administration
or a
Kerry
administration, deserve
to
give
intelligence
community organization
further
deliberate thought.Sincerely yours,
John
Deutch
Cc:
Senator Ted KennedySenator
Arlen
SpecterChairman Porter GossCongresswoman Jane
Harman
Page
3
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