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June
24,2004
Honorable Thomas H.
Kean,
Chair
^/Honorable Lee H.
Hamilton, Vice ChairThe National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
301
7
th
Street,
NWWashington, DC 20407
Governor
Kean
and Mr.
Hamilton:The following
sets
forth
my recollection of some of the events of the summer of
2001
relative
to my
meetings with Attorney General John
Ashcroft.
Both your staff
and
the
time
for my
testimony
on
April
13,2004,
did not
fully
explore
these
events.
On
June
22,2001^1
was the
Deputy
Director
of the FBI and since
Louis
J.
Freeh
had
tendered
his resignation,
I was the
de
facto Acting Director.
I was
summoned
to the
Office
of the
Attorney General (AG) John
Ashcroft.
When
I
arrived
at his
office
I was
met
by him, the
Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Larry Thompson
and the
AG's Chief
of
••'•-'
t
••
-;...',•
Staff
David Ayres.
I had not
been
toldthe
subject
of the
meeting.
The AG
told
me hewas
appointing
me the
Acting Director until
a new
director
was
sworn
in by
him.
I
told
him
I was
honored
but if he
wanted
to
select someone else that
I
would continue
to
serve
at his pleasure.
He
;
said that
I was his
choice.
I
then told
him
that
I
planned
to
retire
from
the
FBI by
;
the end
J0f
the
year*
at
the
latest
but
-I
would
assist
the new
director
in his or her
transition
arid
then
retire.
/This
woujld
afford
the new
director
the
opportunity
to
selecttheir
own
candidate
to;
be
[deputy
director.
T^e
AG
told
me I
did
not
have
to
retire
but I
toldhim
after
nearly27yearsmy
wife
and I haddiscussedit and it was time for me to
move
on. The AG then told me he would like to meet with me on approximately aweekly basis if our schedules permitted to be updated on FBI matters. He also reminded
me
that neitherI nor any FBIpersonnel wereto go to theWhite HouseorCapitol Hillwithout
first
notifying
the
Department
and
that
no
press releases were
to be filed
without
notifying
and
coordinating with
the DOJ
Press
Office
first.
On Thursday, June 28, at 4pm, we had the first of our meetings that summer. I
had
prepared a
list
of topics, particularly cases that I wanted to discuss with the AG. Inattendance
at
that
first
meeting were
myself,
the AG,
DAG,
the
AG's
Chief
of
Staff,
and I
invited Ruben Garcia, the FBI's Assistant Director for Criminal Investigations, to the
meeting.
Garcia was next in the chain of command at the FBI. I started the meeting witha discussion of extremely sensitive counterintelligence and counterterrorism cases andprojects and asked if all were cleared for them. Ayres was not and
left
the room. One ofthe matters
I
discussed
was the
increase
in
"chatter"
by the
followers
of
Osama
bin
Laden.
I told the AG that this increase in
"chatter"
may portend an attack againstAmerican facilities
or
interests
and
that
the
conjecture
was
that
it
would occur
in
SouthEast Asia
or the
Middle East,
but
that
was
only conjecture
and
nothing could
be
ruled out.
I
gave
the AG a
short
(five
minutes) brief
on
al
Qaeda
and
their attacks
on the
African
embassies in 1998 and the
USS
Cole
hi
2000.1 also discussed the level of sophistication
and
planning that
this
terrorist group
possesses
as
well
as
their presence
in the
U.S. based
upon
the
full
investigations
the FBI had at that tune. The entire meeting
lasted
for
approximately
an
hour
and the AG
asked
few
questions.
The
Deputy AG called me prior to the next meeting and asked that I
forward
him
my
proposed agendafor
future
meetingsatleast24hoursinadvance.Icomplied with
his
request.
On
July
12,
2001,
at
approximately
1
l:30am,
we had our
second meeting with
the
sameindividuals
as at the
previous meeting. Once again
I
started with
counterintelligence
and counterterrorism matters. David Ayres again
left
this
part of themeeting.
The
fourth
item
I
discussed
was the
continuing high level
of
"chatter"
by
al
Qaeda members.
The AG
told
me "I
don't
want
to
hear about
it
anymore,
there's
nothing
I can do
about it."
For a few
seconds,
I did not
know what
to
say, then
I
replied that
he
should meet with
the
Director
of the CIA to get a
fuller
briefing
on the
matter.
I had not
told
the AG
about
the
meeting
in Malaysia
since
I was
told
by FBI Assistant
DirectorDale Watson that there
was a
"closehold"
on
that info.
This
means that
it was not to be
shared with anyone without
the
explicit
approval
of the
CIA.
I
then strongly suggested
that
the AGmeet with George Tenetto get a
full
briefingon thematter.
I
resumedmyagendabut I wasupset aboutthe
AG's
lackofinterest.He did not
tell
me nor did I learn until April 2004 that the CIA
briefed
him on the increase in chatter
and
levelofthreatonJuly
5,2001.
On
January
21,2004,
the
Commission
staff
interviewed
me
briefly
about
any
dealingswiththe AGduring that summer. Theydid notquestionme indetail aboutthemeetings nor did they present me with any documents to review.
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