The 24 hr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Reviewer A compilation of case digests, agabin lectures and commentaries from bernas & cr uz etc. rjcasis gegnebab 2005c The compilers shall not be liable for the users passing (or failing) the course W hat Constitutional law is about? It is the balancing of state power against th e individuals rights and deals with the Limitation of Political Power. There exis ts an internal conflict between 1) Police Power, Eminent Domain and Taxation aga inst 2) the Rights of Individual to Life, Liberty and Property. Disclaimer

2 Positive rights what state ought to do Negative rights what state ought not to d o W hat are the various approaches to resolve the conflict? 1. Balancing 2. Prefer red Freedom Approach There are freedoms that are Inherent (ex. freedom of speech , assembly and freedom to assemble for grievance.) The Preferred freedom doctrin e is a hierarchy: 1) the preferred freedom 2) freedom of belief and conscience a nd 3) right to property. 3. Absolutist Approach Some freedoms are considered abs olute that no balancing is necessary or permissible (ex speech) and the absolute rights may override preferred freedoms 1. Due Process in General the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play - Justice Frankfurter kinds: 1) s ubstantive 2) procedural 3) administrative The Due Process Clause ONLY embraces 1. LIFE 2. LIBERTY 3. PROPERTY Person includes both natural (citizens and aliens alike) and artificial persons. But for artificial persons, only their property rights are constitutionally guaranteed since their life and liberty are created by law and thus subject to the legislature Life- integrity of the physical perso n and the enjoyment of all God-given faculties that makes ones life worth living. Liberty- freedom to enjoy all of his faculties tempered by reasonable regulatio ns and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. ELEMENTS (LAUREL): 1) Right to Labor 2) Right to Contract 3) Right to choose ones employment 4) Rig ht to Locomotion Property anything that can come under the right of ownership an d be subject of a contract. It includes all things within the commerce of men. A. Hierarchy of Rights It is an erroneous impression that the Constitution gives the same degree and qu ality of protection that it gives to life and liberty. This is not to say, howev er, that the right to property is not a basic right. Property has an intimate re lation with life and liberty (ex. for the poor, regard property the same way as life and liberty). Property is more closely regulated not in order to oppress th e owner but in order to impress upon him the social character of what he holds; Thus it is that property must also enjoy the protection of the due process claus e.

3 B. Substantive Due Process The due process clause must be interpreted both as a procedural and substantial guarantee. It must be a guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary power even w hen the power is exercised according to proper forms and procedure. requisites: 1. VALID OBJECTIVE-the law must have a valid governmental objective 2. LAWFUL ME ANS- the objective must be pursued in a lawful manner. It originated from the co ncept of laissez-faire, it was translated by the court into freedom of contract protected by the Constitution under due process. In laissez-faire, freedom of co ntract was upheld over police power since there was an assumption of equality be tween contracting parties. In a welfare state, the wealth and power have become concentrated to those who have the capital. Legal realism woke up to this realit y. When parties are not in equal footing, there is no real freedom of contract a nd the concept of equality becomes an illusion. The state was given the mandate to equalize the bargaining power of the parties within its territory. During thi s time, the freedom of contract was limited by the states police power. From the very beginning, the Phil. S.C. gave generous latitude to designation to promote public health, public safety, or public welfare. The Court clearly considers its elf as competent arbiter of the objective reasonableness of legislative action, but it also allowed such competency to be limited by the recognition of the pres umptive reasonableness of governmental action (principle of presumptive validity of official action) In substantive due process, be aware of the social context, economic dogma and prevailing ideologies since these usually influence judges o n what is reasonable or unreasonable restrictions. C. Procedural Due Process The right to be heard in a court of law ELEMENTS: 1) NOTICE & 2) HEARING REQUIRE MENTS: 1. IMPARTIAL & COMPETENT COURT every litigant is entitled to the cold neu trality of an impartial judge a competent court is one vested with jurisdiction over a case as conferred upon it by law 2. JURISDICTION In actions in personam, the court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant by its voluntary appearance o r through service of summons upon him/her. In actions in rem or quasi in rem, th e jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power it may exercise over prope rty. It refers to: 1. Authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of a ction or to administer a particular kind of relief 2. Power of the court over th e parties 3. Power of the court over properties that is subject of the litigatio n. HEARING Notice to a party is essential to enable it to adduce its own evidenc e and to meet and refute the evidence submitted by the other party. A judicial d ecision without a hearing is null and void ab initio and may be attacked directl y or collaterally However, due process is not violated where is a person is not heard because he has not chosen to be heard. One may be heard through pleadings; A full-blown trial is not necessary 3.

4 EXCEPTIONS: 1) Nuisance per se and 2) Presumptions of law. JUDGMENT no judgment s hall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based (Art VIII Sec.14) It was understood i n the early American constitutional law to relate chiefly to the mode of procedu re which government agencies must follow. Among early decisions in Philippine ju risprudence, many of them are generalized definitions which fuse together the el ements of both procedural and substantive due process as well as elements of equ al protection. However, this concept was not a fixed and static one was clearly acknowledged Due process, however is not always judicial process since it includ es quasi-judicial bodies of administrative agencies. Although these agencies are not always bound by the finer points of judicial due process, it is bound by th e due process clause. 4. D. Administrative Due Process The power of administrative agencies are regulatory in nature Due Process was in troduced in administrative agencies, specifically its administrative tribunal, s o that they do not exceed their regulatory power. Due Process applies only in ad judicative/quasi-judicial functions of the administrative agencies. In its regul atory function, procedural due process does not apply; however, substantive due process may come into play in its regulatory functions. REQUISITES: (Ang Tibay v s CIR) 1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case a nd submit evidence in support thereof 2. Tribunal must consider the evidence pre sented 3. The decision must have something to support itself 4. Evidence must be substantial, meaning reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ad equate to support a conclusion 5. The decision must be based on the evidence pres ented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the a ffected parties 6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its own indepen dent consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy 7. The tribunal s hould, in all controversial questions render its decision in such manner that th e parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reaso n for the decision rendered. 2. Equal Protection Clause Equal Protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated s hould be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed . Similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others It also requires that the law b e enforced and applied equally. Every person, both natural and juridical can ava il of the equal protection clause; however, artificial persons are entitled ONLY to protection of their property since they are legislative creations. CLASSIFIC ATION: 1. The equal protection clause DOES NOT REQUIRE UNIVERSAL APPLICATION OF LAWS since it could result to unequal protection. 2. The law is NOT required to provide for equality among all persons if they are not similarly situated. 3. Cl assification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar t o e ach other in certain particulars and different from all others in these particul ars 4. Classification must not be arbitrary. For it to be reasonable, it must co nform to the ff requirements:

5 REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID CLASSIFICATION 1. It must be based on substantial distinctions 2. It must be germane to the pur pose of the law 3. It must not be limited to the existing conditions only 4. It must apply equally to all members of the class Substantial Distinction should be : 1. Natural or a substantive difference 2. Reasonable There are two equalities under the Equal Protection Clause: 1. Procedural equality in the eyes of the law 2. Substantive intrinsic equality between 2 classes Affirmative action is taken by the government to balance unequal footing. 3. SEARCHES & SEIZURES Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers , and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the pe rsons or things to be seized. Section 3. The privacy of communication and corres pondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when publ ic safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Any evidence obtaine d in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any pu rpose in any proceeding. This right against unreasonable search and seizure is P ERSONAL and may be INVOKED ONLY BY THE PERSON ENTITLED TO IT. Simply put, unreas onable searches and seizures are constitutionally prohibited and the evidence fr om the search is generally inadmissible, except when the accused did not raise i ts inadmissibility because it was the fruits of an illegal seizure. This omissio n is considered a waiver of the protection granted by Art. III sec. 3(2) (see Hi zon vs. CA). So what is an unreasonable search and seizure? As a general rule, w henever there is an arrest o search and seizure, if there is NO validly issued s earch warrant or warrant of arrest, the search and seizure is unreasonable. (exc eption: warrantless search and seizure, which will be tackled later on.) When do es a search warrant or an arrest warrant become validly issued? A validly issued warrant presupposes the existence of PROBABLE CAUSE. (which is also one of the requirements for the narrowly drawn instances for warrantless search and seizure ) What then is probable cause? Probable cause must be defined in relation to the action it justifies. Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of an arr est warrant would mean such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonabl y discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by t he person sought to be arrested. Probable cause for a search would mean such fac ts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to b elieve that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connect ion with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In either case, wha t is required is probable cause and not proof beyond doubt. What are the element s of probable cause? Reasonable ground of suspicion Such suspicion is supported by facts and circumstances strong enough to warrant a cautious man in believing accused to be committing the offense or to be guilty of the offense.

6 DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE Who then determines probable cause? Judge PERSON ALLY determines; However, the Immigration Commissioner may order the arrest of a n alien in order to carry out a deportation order that has become final. (note: judge is NOT required to personally examine witnesses and the complainant [Soliv en vs. Makasiar]) On what basis should the judge determine probable cause? Prose cutors report If on the basis of the report, he finds no probable cause, he can d isregard it and require the submission of witnesses supporting affidavits to aid him in arriving at a certain conclusion, possibly to the existence of probable c ause. According to Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the Revised Rules of Court (2001), a sear ch warrant can only be issued if probable cause in connection with ONE OFFENSE i s personally determined by the judge. Obiter1: The prosecutor determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty and should be held for trial and NOT probable cause. Obiter2: This constitutional prohibition is for arrest orders in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative a ction, NOT as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision of a compete nt official. (EX. Carrying out a SC decision) EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT Accordi ng to Rule 126, Sec. 5 RROC (2001), judges must personally examine in the form o f searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant an d the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to t he record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION Section 2 and particularly describing the place to b e searched and the persons or things to be seized. Failure to fulfill this consti tutional requirement may result in an erroneous or arbitrary enforcement of the warrant. (ex. police searching you or your house using a general warrant) Genera l Rule 1: Person to be seized should be identified by name Exception: If there i s some descriptio personae that will enable the accused to be identified by the officer. (ex. may paa sa noo ang suspek!) General Rule 2: Place to be searched s hould be particularly described, which includes the exact address Exception: A d escription of the place is deemed sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be search. [ex. ang gingerbread house ng witch (yung kumidnap kay Hansel at Gretel) sa loob ng guba t ] Obiter: Only the articles particularly described in the search warrant can b e seized, and no other property can be taken unless the law allows it. But not a ll illegally seized objects shall be returned to its owner. Under Rule 126, Sec. 3 RROC (2001), a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of PER SONAL PROPERTY: 1. Subject of the offense

7 2. 3. Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense Property u sed or intended to be used as means of committing an offense To make things very simple and easier to remember, see requisites below: REQUISI TES OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT [Rule 126, Sec. 4 RROC (2001)] 1. Based on Probabl e Cause 2. Probable Cause was personally determined by the judge 3. Judges deter mination was made after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complai nant and the witnesses he may produce 4. Particularity of description of the pla ce to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. However, there are exc eptions: EXCEPTIONS TO WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: 1. Search i ncidental to arrest Rule 126 sec. 13, RROC (2001) A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or const itute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant 2. Search o f moving vehicles (see People vs. Malmstedt) 3. Seizure of evidence in plain vie w (see California vs. Ciraolo) 4. Customs searches (ex. sea-going vessels docked at seaports checked for contraband) 5. Waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. (see Hizon vs. CA) Obiter: Agabin includes the following as exceptions to the warrant requirement: 1) Stop and Frisk search limited to: a) the protective search for concealed weapons [see Terry vs. Ohio] b) the search w ithin the permissible area of search or the place with the immediate control of the accused to prevent the destruction or loss of evidence [see Cupp vs. Murphy] 2) Abandoned property (see California vs. Greenwood) 3) Administrative searches (ex. those conducted by public health officers) ARRESTS While an arrest is a seizure, not all seizures are arrests. An arrest is the taki ng of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the comm ission of an offense [Rule 113, sec.1 RROC 2001] Warrants of arrest must satisfy the same requirements imposed on search warrants. Hence, what has been said abou t probable cause, its determination, the examination of complainant and particul arity of description in the discussion of search warrants can with equal truth b e said of arrest warrants. As with search warrants, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement to arrests: EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT: (Rule 113, sec. 5 RROC 2001) 1. When, in the presence of a peace officer or a private pers on, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attemp ting to commit an offense; [a.k.a. IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO RULE] 2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committe d; and 3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a pe nal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

8 A common application of the in flagrante delicto rule is the buy-bust operations to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act; It is also applied, albeit controversially, to continuing crimes like rebellion. In continuing crimes, the offender is assu med to still be committing the offense, even if he is fornicating. Thus, he coul d be arrested for rebellion while in the act of fornication. A person may waive his right to be arrested by warrantless arrest PROVIDED that he enters a plea wi thout having challenged the validity of the arrest (assuming of course he knew h e had that right and actually intended to relinquish it). Note, too that in the prosecution of peace officers for illegal detention or arrest the defense of goo d faith is frequently used by peace officers and liberally applied by the courts . PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION & CORRESPONDENCE Section 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable e xcept upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires ot herwise as prescribed by law. Invasion of communication and correspondence is on e kind of search In the Olmstead case, the doctrine formulated was that search a nd seizure did not prohibit wire-tap that did not trespass. In this case, there is no actual trespass there is no search, and where the object is not tangible i t cannot be seized. (Tangibles only rule: house, persons, papers and effects wer e the tangibles). This doctrine has been overruled in Katz vs. U.S. which placed wiretapping per se under the ban of the search and seizure clause Exclusionary rule Section 3(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally obtained evidence and is appl icable to evidence under sections 2 and 3(1). The inadmissibility of the evidenc e, however, does not mean that it must be returned where it came from.(ex contra band). 4. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Section 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Section 8. The right of the people, in cluding those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associ ations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Sec tion 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political belie fs and aspirations. Freedom of expression consists of cognate rights to insure free and effective co mmunication of ideas to enhance intelligent political decision-making in society . It is available insofar as it is exercised in the discussion of public matters (Besides, its difficult to externally control private thoughts). It is important to safeguard such freedom because sovereignty, which supposedly resides in the people, would be all for naught if the people would be denied their right to par ticipate in public matters.

9 The freedom of expression is not limited to ideas which is acceptable to the maj ority, or to the powers-that-be, for this freedom is meant to invite fomenting a nd discussing of different ideas in the public arena. Modes of expression : 1) V erbal& Written Language 2) Symbols Elements: 1) Freedom from prior restraint/cen sorship Prohibits the unlawful curtailment of the of the flow of ideas Prohibits censor from applying it own subjective standards in determining whats good or no t There need no be a total suppression; even the restriction of circulation is a n unconstitutional restraint 2) Freedom from subsequent punishment This freedom is included and as important like the first, for it would be absurd that one can be allowed to express yet be held liable for such expression; however, it is su bject to certain limitations as discussed below. Limitations of Freedom of Expre ssion 1. Subject to POLICE POWER and can be regulated to protect public interest 2. Does not include ideas offensive to public order or decency, or reputation o f persons To be able to know whether or not an expression is protected or not, c ertain tests have been developed by the courts: 1. CLEAR & PRESENT DANGER TEST-l iberty over authority If the words or utterances used are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that the state has the right to prevent, such utterance is not protected. Thus, it is a question of proximity and degree since Clear means that there must be a ca usal connection between danger and the utterance while Present refers to time in r elation to Danger that is extremely serious and highly imminent. This gives way to States right to self-preservation Differs from Dangerous Tendency with regards t o proximity 2. DANGEROUS TENDENCY TEST-authority over liberty Also known as Clea r and Probable Danger If the words or utterances create a dangerous tendency tha t the state has a right to protect, such utterance is punishable. It is sufficie nt if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance is to bring abou t the substantive evil that the legislative body seeks to prevent. 3. BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST-liberty or authority When a specific act or conduct is regulate d in the interest of public order but such regulation results in an indirect, co nditional and partial abridgment of expression, it is the courts duty to determin e which of the two conflicting interest it should protect. It resolves the issue in light of the peculiar circumstances of the case. It has an inherent weakness in that it allows the courts freedom to choose which interest to protect. Criti cism of Official Conduct People have the right to criticize or commend the condu ct of elected officials since the public servants acts are legitimate subjects of public discussion. As long as the comments are made in good faith and with just ifiable ends (ex. better public service), such comments are protected. This rule is applicable to both public officers and public figures (ex. Joyce Jimenez or Tom Welling). However, such criticism must always be in respectful language.

10 Art & Obscenity Obscenity is not constitutionally protected, but the problem is, what the hell obscenity means. There have been various tests enunciated in the cases in freedom of the press of this compilation. ASSEMBLY & PETITION FOR REDRE SS The right to lawful assembly is important because there are certain issues be tter resolved after exchanging views in a meeting for that purpose. Such public meeting is effective in airing ideas or concerns affecting the public. This righ t is not subject to prior restraint (ex. the need for a permit) unless the meeti ng takes place in a public area (ex. Rizal Park). Tests for a lawful assembly: 1 . Lawful purpose 2. The group/association holding the meeting is not illegal (ex .ElShaddai) An untoward incident (ex. riot) in a lawful assembly does not make t he assembly unlawful, only unruly. However, the law-enforcers can intervene in s uch incidents in name of public safety. 5. FREEDOM OF & FREEDOM FROM RELIGION Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or proh ibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be a llowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or politic al rights. 2 Aspects: 1) Freedom to Believe (or Disbelieve)- However absurd ones belief is, even if it is deemed by society as heretical or hostile it cannot be punished as long as it remains in the realm of thought. 2) Freedom to Act on Ones Belief As soon as one externalizes his belief, his/her freedom becomes the subj ect of States inherent police power if it the exercise of police power is inimica l or beneficial to society (ex. Prevention of a cults mass suicide) 6. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits presc ribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neithe r shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national secur ity, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. The purpose of this right is to further emphasize individual liberty as safeguarded in the gene ral terms of the due process clause. This right includes the right to choose ones residence, leave it whenever he/she pleases , and travel where he wants. This r ight, as in all rights have limitations; This is limited by a lawful order of th e court and can be impaired in the interest of public safety, security, health a s provided by law. Obiter: The Marcos v. Manglapus Case is unique & is not a pre cedent for normalcases, kung baga pan-diktador lang. 7. ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern s hall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers per taining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government r esearch data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen , subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

11 Access to public info is essential in the exercise of freedom of expression, for every citizen has a right to know what is happening in his/her country and his/ her govt so that he/she can express her views intelligently. It can be limited if the info being sought would endanger national interest or security (ex. The pla n of attack against Abu Sayyaf) As enunciated in the Tanda v. Tuvera case, a law will only be effective upon publication in the Official Gazette, or alternative ly in 2 newspapers of general circulation. 8. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and p rivate sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not cont rary to law shall not be abridged. RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION It is deemed embraced in the freedom of expression because a lawful association or organization can be u sed as a vehicle to express views that affect the public, which can be more effe ctively disseminated by an organization. Art. 3 Sec 8 guarantees private and pub lic employees the right to form unions so long as it is lawful. However in the S SS vs. SSSEA, govt employees were not allowed to strike. 9. EMINENT DOMAIN Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compe nsation. Also known as the power of expropriation (that is govt buying private pr operty to be used publicly), it is primarily lodged in the national legislature. But can be validly delegated and exercised to other govt entities (President, lo cal legislative bodies, certain public corporations, like NAPOCOR) even private companies serving essential public needs or operates public utilities (PLDT or B ayantel) Eminent Domain is different from destruction from necessity in that the latter: 1) property may be taken by private individuals; 2) no need to convert taken property to public use; 3) there is no requirement for just compensation Q uestions of necessity or wisdom of the exercise of the power of expropriation ar e essentially political and not usually subject to judicial review. But when the se questions are decided by a delegate of the national legislature (ex. Local ci ty council), the Supreme Court has assumed the power to inquire into it, whether the delegated authority has been correctly or properly exercised, by looking in to the wisdom or necessity of the expropriation. All real and personal, tangible and intangible properties can be subject to expropriation except money and chos es in action (Choses in action- personal right not reduced into possession but r ecoverable by a suit at law ex. Right to demand & recover a debt). Property alre ady devoted to public use is still subject to expropriation, as long as it is do ne by Congress or under a specific grant of authority to the delegate. It should be observed that the to-be expropriated property must be by its nature and cond ition wholesome, as it is intended for public use. This differs from property ta ken under police power, because the property destroyed, or sought to be destroye d is noxious to the general welfare. Just compensation-a full and fair equivalen t of the property taken from the private owner by the expropriator. The property taken is assessed as to the time of the taking , which usually coincides with t he commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Only the judiciary has the rig ht to ascertain whether or not the compenastion was just (see EPZA vs. Dulay)

12 10. CONTRACTS CLAUSE X. Contracts Clause Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts sha ll be passed. The purpose of the impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements against unwarranted interference by the State. The degree of dimunition is immaterial. As long as the original rights of either parties are changed to his/her prejudice, there is an impairment of the obligat ion of the contract. This clause, however, is not absolute. If the law is a prop er exercise of police power, a contract valid at the time of its execution can b e completely invalidated or modified. 11. EXPOST FACTO LEGISLATION Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. EX POSTO FACT LAW- operates retroactively to affect antecedent facts. Characteristics: 1 ) Refers to Criminal matters; 2) Retroactive application; 3) Prejudicial to Accu sed. BILL OF ATTAINDER-legislative act inflicting punishment without trial. A st atue that applies either to named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment without trial. 12. NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Although a debtor cannot be imprisoned for the failure to pay his debt, he can still be punished in a criminal case if he contracted his debt through fraud. In suc case, the act he is being penalized is the fraud employed to secure the deb t not in the default of payment. 13. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE Section 18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any from shall exist except as punis hment for a crime whereof the party shall be duly convicted. The concept include s slavery (absolute power of one over the other in their civil relation) and peo nage (condition of enforced servitude in which one is compelled to labor in liqu idation of some debt against his will.). Exceptions: 1) Punishment for a crime w here one is duly convicted; 2) Compulsory Military Training 14. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ex cept in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

13 It is the prerogative writ of liberty employed to test the validity of a persons detention. The petition for habeas corpus must be acted upon immediately. It is the privilege itself, and not the writ, which may be suspended. It is available when he is subject to: 1) physical or moral restraint; 2) sentenced to a longer penalty than that is subsequently meted out to another for the same offense; 3) questions courts jurisdiction; 4) unlawful denial of bail. Procedure: As soon as application is filed and the court finds it in the proper form, the issuance of the writ follows. It is only when the person in custody is being held for a crim e mentioned in the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ and in a pl ace where it is effective such petition is denied. In the absence of invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it, privilege of the writ cannot be susp ended. The President has the power to suspend the privilege of the writ and the SC has the power to annul such suspension if not based on the 2 grounds (Art7, S ec. 18). 15. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED Sec. 11 Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal a ssistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Sec. 12 (1) An y person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the rig ht to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and indepe ndent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the serv ices of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived exc ept in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be us ed against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other simil ar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained i n violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of t his section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Section 14. (1) No person shall be hel d to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. In all criminal p rosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved , and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed o f the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartia l, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the ab sence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable Sec. 16 All persons shall have the right to a speedy dis position of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bo dies. A. COLD NEUTRALITY Accused must be tried in an impartial and competent court in accordance with the rules on criminal procedure; His/her constitutional rights must be observed at all applicable times. The basic ingredient is that the trial be conducted in acc ordance with the rudiments of fair play. B. AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 2 Fold Purpose:

14 1) Humanitarian to prevent the State, using its coercive power, from extracting from the suspect testimony which would furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. 2) Practical-Suspect would usually be under the compulsion to co mmit perjury to protect himself. This rule is mandatory and applicable in all ot her government proceedings. It can also be claimed by any witness to whom an inc riminating question is addressed. If it is the accused himself/herself, s/he can refuse at the outset to take the stand as a prosecution witness, on the reasona ble presumption that interrogations purpose is to incriminate him. The right is l imited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, and t hus excludes urine, hair and blood samples, even ocular inspection of the suspec ts body on the proviso that force and torture was not used. This right can be val idly waived if the waiver is certain, unequivocal and made by the accused willin gly, intelligently and understood the consequences of his action. C. RIGHT TO COUNSEL The right to competent and independent counsel, prefereably choice of accused ca n be waived so long as it is written and upon counsels presence and advice of the consequences of his action. Such right attaches upon the start of the investiga tion, when officer asks questions that elicit information, confession or admissi ons of the accused thus has begun to focus on a particular suspect. (please read RA 7438 and the 2001 Rules on Criminal Procedure) D. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF ACCUSATION This necessarily includes the prohibition of changing crime charged in the infor mation without court approval. The information filed must necessarily include th e specific crime committed and the acts/evidences which tends to show the ones gu ilt. E. RIGHT TO BAIL Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclus ion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bail able by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided b y law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the wr it of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. It canno t be impaired even with the suspension of the privilege of the writ. F. CRUEL PUNISHMENTS Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or in human punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. T he employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any pr isoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities unde r subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. Mere fines and imprisonment ar e not violative unless the penalty is barbarous or shocking to the senses or con science and such cruelty is inherent in the penalty. But where an unforeseeable event adds to convicts suffering, penalty is still valid .

15 G. AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDDY Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquitta l under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. I t prohibits the prosecution again of any person for a crime which he has been pr eviously acquitted or convicted. Requisites: Valid complaint conmplaint filed be fore competent court Complaint to which defendant had pleaded Of which he had be en previously acquitted or convicted or otherwise terminated without his consent Crimes covered Doctrine of supervening event-accused may be prosecuted for anot her offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the 1st indictm ent which he may have been charged or convicted. Doctrine of inseparable offense -when one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the same act, th ey cannot be subject of separate prosecutions. However, it is possible for 1 act to give rise to several crimes, in which case separate prosecutions for each cr ime may be filed, provided that the elements of the several crimes are not ident ical. 16. CITIZENSHIP ARTICLE IV Citizenship Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines : Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; Th ose born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citi zenship upon reaching the age of majority; and Those who are naturalized in acco rdance with law. Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfe ct their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accor dance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens . Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner prov ided by law. Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retai n their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Section 5. Citizenship Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

16 A personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community Denote s possession within that particular political community of full civil & politica l rights subject to special disqualifications 3 Modes of Acquiring Citizenship: 1. jus sanguinis = acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relations 2. jus soli = acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth 3. naturalization = legal act of adopting an alien and c lothing him with the privilege of a native born citizen Who are citizens of the Philippines? 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the ado ption of the 1973 Constitution. 2. Those children of Filipino fathers or mothers based on the principle of jus sanguinis applies only to natural filiation and n ot to filiation by adoption 3. Those born on January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothe rs, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority mother mu st be a Filipino citizen, either by birth or by naturalization, at the time of h er marriage. Proof of election may include participating in elections and campai gning for a candidate With the adoption of the 1973 Consti, a child born under t he 1973 Consti of a Filipino mother would not have to make the election in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. He is already a Filipino citizen by birth. 4 . Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Naturalization may be done: Through a general law of naturalization applied through a judicial process [i.e. Revised Naturalization Law] (CA 473) Through a special act passed by the legisl ature. Natural-born Citizen 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines from bi rth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine cit izenship 2. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 of Consti A natural born citizen who loses his citizenship by ren unciation or any other mode recognized by law would no longer be considered a na tural born Filipino even if he reacquires citizenship Loss of Citizenship Common wealth Act No. 63 applies to both natural-born and naturalized citizens citizens hip is lost by naturalization in a foreign country, by express renunciation of c itizenship, by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, by rendering service in the armed forces of a foreign country and by being a deserter of the armed force s Commonwealth Act applies to naturalized citizens only a certificate of natural ization may be cancelled when found to have been fraudulently or illegally obtai ned, or by permanent residence in the country of origin within 5 years from natu ralization, or when the petition is found to have been made on an invalid declar ation of intent, or upon failure to comply with the requirements for the educati on of minor children, or if the person allows himself to be a dummy for aliens.

17 Reacquisition of Citizenship Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides that a Filipino wo man loses her Philippine citizenship upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by vir tue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality. R epealed by 1973 Constitution the fact alone of marriage to an alien cannot strip a Filipino woman of her Philippine citizenship. Only acts and omissions, which Congress may prescribe, constitute explicit or implicit renunciation of citizens hip. If foreign woman, marries a Filipino, she is does not need to go through th e ordinary naturalization procedure and is considered ipso facto naturalized as long as she possess none of the disqualification written in the immigration law. Dual Citizenship Possible under the present Constitution A condition which aris es from the fact that Philippine law cannot control international law and the la ws of other countries on citizenship However, if Philippine citizenship is acqui red by naturalization and not by operation of the Constitution, it is well withi n the power of Philippine law to require prior renunciation of foreign nationali ty as a condition Dual Allegiance Refers to that unsettled kind of allegiance of persons who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be bound by a sec ond allegiance to a foreign country.

C2005 ART.III BILL OF RIGHTS Sec. 1 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro cess of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. HI ERARCHY OF RIGHTS PBM Employees Association v PBM Property rights occupy a lower position in the hi erarchy of rights than human rights. (This doctrine however, should be taken wit h a grain of salt. Sir Agabin) SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS US v Ling Su Fan There is 1. 2. 3. 4. judicial due process if there is: a writte n accusation hearing before an impartial tribunal with jurisdiction accused was heard; and judgment was rendered only after trial Lochner v NY A statute violates due process when there is no reasonable relation between the statutes purpose and the means with which it plans to achieve such purpose. A sta tute setting the maximum hours a baker may work does not have a reasonable relat ion with either health or the quality of bread. A statute setting a minimum wage for women is not violative of due process. Women have less bargaining power and are in need of protection. Statute is a reasonable regulation. A statute granti ng paid pregnancy leaves to women violates due process for impairing the parties right to contract. An intervention in the name of due process presupposes that t here is inequality between parties. In this case, an employer and a woman employ ee were considered on equal footing, which does not justify intervention. A stat ute regulating alien participation in the retail business is reasonable for want ing to protect the national economy from alien control and domination, especiall y when an alien posts only the right to property as a defense. But had Ichong put up his rights to life and liberty (for not being allowed to engage in a lawful profession and calling) in arguing against the validity of the statute, he would have won the case Sir Agabin A statute herding Mangyans in reservations is a rea sonable regulation. The purpose is to educate Mangyans and to make them as close as possible to their civilized Filiipino brothers. The Bill of Rights does not apply to people who have do not understand what freedom and liberty truly mean. A right to due process is a personal right that may be invoked only by a person whose rights are affected by the statute. A statute is presumed constitutional i n the absence of a showing of invasion of a personal right. A statute that prohi bits prescribing contraceptives to unmarried persons is unnecessary and oppressi ve and raises no reasonable relation between means and objective. West Coast Hotel v Parrish People v Pomar Ichong v Hernandez Rubi v Prov. Board of Mindoro Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assocation v City of Manila Grisworld v Connecticut

19 Yu Cong Eng v Trinidad People v Fajardo Ynot v IAC A statute prohibiting the kee ping of books of accounts in any language other than English, Spanish or the loc al dialect violates due process for impairing a persons right to engage in a lawf ul profession or calling. Aesthetic purposes are not sufficient to justify depri ving a person of the right to use his property without just compensation. A stat ute prohibiting the transportation of carabaos and carabeef between provinces vi olates due process for impairing a persons right to use his property while having no reasonable relation with its avowed purpose supposedly to protect a valuable beast of burden. A law allowing for the expropriation of lands to distribute to the poor may not be unconstitutional on its face but it violates due process as applied when what is to be distributed is a small parcel of land to benefit a f ew families. In such a case, the means will not anymore have a reasonable relati on with the purpose of the statute the distribution of landed estates to facilit ate agrarian reform. Guido v RPA PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS Marcos v Sandiganbayan Animas v Min. of National Defense Tanada v Tuvera People v Salas A decision rendered in violation of procedural due process is void. The elements of procedural due process differ. It depends on the nature of the proce edings involved whether judicial, military, legislative, administrative, quasi-j udicial or regulatory. It is unjust to punish a citizen for violation of a law o f which he had not notice, not even a constructive one especially in the case of presidential issuances as opposed to legislative acts where the people would ha ve been free to watch legislative hearings if they desired. Trial in absentia is allowed provided: 1. the accused has been arraigned 2. the accused has been dul y notified of the trial and of subsequent hearings 3. the accuseds failure to app ear is unjustified In a trial in absentia, the accused is said to have waived: 1 . right to present evidence in his behalf 2. right to be informed of subsequent hearings Publication is indispensable in proceedings in rem to satisfy the requi rements of procedural due process. The assumed failure of a clerk of court to no tify defendant of the proceedings does not amount to such an irregularity as to be equal to a denial of due process when constructive notice has been served. Wh en a decision is rendered in violation of due process, it is as if there had no decision at all. It may be attacked directly or collaterally and even when the p eriod for appeal has lapsed. In proceedings in persona where court acquires juri sdiction over the person of an accused, an accused has to be included in the inf ormation to be prejudiced by a decision. When a person has committed indirect co ntempt of court, it is required that he be charged with the offense and a trial be had to determine his guilt; as opposed to when a person is charged with direc t contempt, where the judge may summarily convict him. Banco Espanol v Palanca David v Aquilizan DBP v Bautista People v Peralta ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS Ang Tibay v CIR The cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings are: 1 . right to a hearing, to present ones cause and adduce evidence to defend such ca use 2. the decision must have something to back it up 3. evidence must be substa ntial, which means such relevant facts and circumstances which to a reasonable m ind would suffice to support a

20 conclusion evidence must be considered by the tribunal decision must be rendered on evidence adduced at the trial or at least attached to the record and disclos ed to the parties the administrative official must render judgment based on his independent evaluation of the facts and issues of the case and not merely rely o n the decisions of subordinate officials decision must be written so as to allow the parties to the case to identify the issues and the reasons behind the decis ion 4. 5. 6. 7. De Bisschop v Galang Right versus privilege test when an action is based on a right, due process is r equired; when based on a privilege, due process is not required A license grante d to an alien allowing him to stay in the Philippines is a privilege, not a righ t. To revoke it would not require compliance even the minimum requirements of du e process notice and opportunity to be heard. Severe injury test variation of th e nature of interest test used in Goldberg Welfare benefits, although only a privi lege, would require a full-blown trial before revocation because of its import t o beneficiaries who are mostly oppressed. Hearings are required but they need no t judicial. Nature of interest test when interest is substantial, such as that w hich partakes of life, liberty and property, state would have to accord due proc ess To determine whether due process requirements apply, look not into the weigh t but into the nature of the interests at stake. A universitys decision not to re hire a professor does not cause any prejudice to the professors status nor to his property interests, which in this case are only abstract. Balancing of interest s test -> Due process is flexible and requires for such procedural protections a s the particular situation demands. The revocation of social security benefits d oes not require the same processes as the revocation of welfare benefits it may be revoked absent full-blown hearings. In arriving at the this conclusion, the c ourt considered several factors: 1. private interest affected by official action 2. risk of an erroneous deprivation 3. fairness and reliability of existing pre -termination procedures + probable value of additional and substitute procedural safeguards 4. public interest involved The decision in an administrative case m ust be rendered based on evidence presented at the trial and disclosed to the pa rties. The minimum requirements of due process are applicable to administrative proceedings: 1. notice 2. opportunity to be heard Due process in administrative proceedings does not require trial type hearings. Goldberg v Kelly Board of Regents v Roth Matthews v Eldridge Go v Napolcom Agabin v CA EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE Philconsa v Jimenez Yick Wo v Hopkins DECS v San Diego Brown v Board of Educatio n People v Vera Eisenstadt v Baird A statute granting retirement benefits to leg islators is violative of equal protection for being unduly discriminatory in fav or of lawmakers without raising any substantial distinction that would justify t reating them differently from from other elective officials. A statute prohibiti ng the operation of laundry services in buildings made of wood may not be uncons titutional on its face but may violate equal protection as applied. The law guar antees equality among equals. The three-flunk rule in NMAT is constitutional for being based on a substantial distinction between med students, other students a nd NMAT flunkers. The separate but equal doctrine does not apply to educational institutions. Racial segregation in schools is inherently unequal as measured by

intangibles. There exists no difference between a law which denies and a law wh ich permits denial of equal protection. A probation law, which allows unequal tr eatment for persons convicted under the same penal code, is unconstitutional. A law which regulates the distribution of contraceptives, limiting it to married c ouples, is unconstitutional for being overbroad with respect to the married and discriminatory with respect to the unmarried.

21 Smith Bell v Natividad Aliens enjoy the same rights as citizens. But a law that limits the use of common carriers to citizens does not violate equal protection. Common carriers, as matters of public interes,t are proper subjects of regulati on. The law, in fact, does not discriminate against aliens but is instead viewed as a reasonable means to encourage local ship-building. A law that prohibits no n-Christian inhabitants from possessing liquor does not violate equal protection . It rests on a distinction that is: 1. substantial 2. germane to the purpose of the law 3. not limited to existing to conditions 4. applies equally to members of the same class A law that disqualifies highly urbanized cities from participa ting in provincial elections is constitutional. A distinction based on the incom e of a city is substantial. It is a measure of a citys capability to exist as a s eparate unit apart from the province to which it belongs. A distinction should n ot be limited to existing conditions but to should also apply to future conditio ns substantially identical with the present. The creation of the Sandiganbayan i s constitutional. There exists a substantial distinction between common criminal s and public officers who commit crimes in relation to their offices. General pr ovisions in the Constitution, regarding due process and equal protection, should give way to more specific provisions such as the one creating the Sandiganbayan . People v Cayat Ceniza v Comelec Ormoc Sugar v Treasurer Nunez v Sandiganbayan Sec. 2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, an d effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shal l issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afte r examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person s or things to be seized. Sec. 3 (1) The privacy of communication and correspond ence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public s afety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtaine d in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any pu rpose in any proceeding. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES People v Malmstedt Olmstead v US Katz v US Terry v Ohio Manalili v CA An arrest of a person carrying dried marijuana from Sagada, in flagrante does not require a warrant. A search made incidental to such arrest is equally lawful. Tangibles only rule -> The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and sei zures applies only to material things: houses, persons, papers and effects. When there is no entry, there can be no unlawful search nor seizure. Constitution pro tects people not places. Whatever a person reserves as private should be conside red private whether it be tangible or not. Stop and frisk rule -> A reasonably p rudent officer, warranted by circumstances of a given case, in believing that hi s safety or that of others is endangered, may make a reasonable search for weapo ns of a person he believes is armed and dangerous. The stop and frisk rule is an exception to the general rule against a search without warrant. Its application however, presupposes the minimum requirement of probable cause. An accused who fails to raise the issue of the illegality of a search during trial, is consider ed to have waived his right against such unreasonable search and seizure. The se arch of vessels, aircrafts and motor vehicles has been an exception to the const itutional requirement of a search warrant. These may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured which makes securing a warrant impracticable. Hizon v CA

22 California v Greenwood Ciraolo v California Trash searches are allowed because o f the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the person w ho discarded the trash. The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual cho oses to conceal an assertedly private activity but whether the governments intrus ion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Constitutio n. An area within curtilage does not bar all police observation especially in th is case where there wasnt any reasonable expectation of privacy public navigable airspace which any member of the public who glanced down from a commercial plane would have seen. Saturation drives are violative of human rights. They do not r equire individualized suspicion (that a particular individual has committed a cr ime) and instead rely on guilt by association, which is prohibited. Also, indivi dualized suspicion by itself would not suffice for lack of probable cause. It sh ould be backed up by suspicious acts committed in the presence of an officer. It is reasonable for an officer to expect that the arrestee would use any weapon h e may have or to destroy any incriminating evidence in his possession. A search or seizure in such a case would be justifiable. The minimum requirement of warra ntless searches is probable cause. A waiver against unreasonable searches must b e transmitted in such a language that would leave no room for doubt that the acc used fully understood what he requested. An objection to unreasonable searches a nd seizures is a purely personal right that might be invoked only by the person prejudiced thereby. A warrant issued must satisfy the requirement of particulari ty of description. Exclusionary rule -> Evidence obtained in violation of the co nstitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissib le. The Bill of Rights may only be invoked against the State. Evidence obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity, without intervention of the s tate authorities is valid. Except in cases of search of a dwelling house, person s exercising police authority under the customs law may effect a search without warrant to enforce such customs laws. A general warrant, which does not describe particular objects to be seized, is invalid. Checkpoints, during abnormal times , conducted within reasonable limits are constitutional as long as they are limi ted to visual searches; unless there exists probable cause to conduct full searc hes (i.e., suspicious behavior). A fiscals report must be supported by sufficient records. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. All he is required to do is to personally evaluate the fiscals report or to require the complainants and their witnesses to submit affi davits in support of the complaint if the fiscals report is inadequate. Applicant s for the issuance of a search warrant and their witnesses must testify on facts personally known to them. Sec. 7 Rule 126 No search of a house, room, or any ot her premise shall be made except in the presence of: 1. the lawful occupant ther eof or 2. any member of his family or 3. in the absence of the latter, in the pr esence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same lo cality. Officers are also required to issue receipts for the items seized and to immediately turn over such items to the court. Subversion is a continuing crime . Warrant is unnecessary when arresting a person guilty of such because of Sec. 5(a) Rule 113 When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. Warrantless arrests ap plicable in this case: 1. in flagrante 2. when a crime has just be committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the perso n to be arrested has committed it Warrantless searches applicable in this case: Guazon v de Villa Cupp v Murphy People v Chua Ho San Stonehill v Diokno People v Marti People v CFI Burgos v Chief of Staff Valmonte v Villa Ho v People Soliven v Judge Makasiar

PICOP v Asuncion People v Gesmundo Umil v Ramos Padilla v CA

23 1. 2. 3. Aniag v Comelec Chimel v California Skinner v Railway Labor Association search incidental to lawful arrest plain view doctrine search of a moving vehic le In the face of fourteen armed policemen, an implied acquiescence could not be more than a mere passive conformity to the search. Consent under intimidating and co ercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional righ t to due process. A search made incidental to arrest which went far beyond the a rrestees person and the area from which he may have obtained either a weapon or s omething that could have been used as evidence against him is unconstitutional W hether a private party should be deemed an agent or instrument of the government for constitutional purposes, necessarily turns on the degree of the governments participation in the private partys activities. Special needs doctrine In this ca se there was a special need (determining liability in railroad accidents) that r equired having to do away with the warrant requirement. To require warrants woul d significantly hinder and frustrate the objectives of the statute while adding little assurances of certainty and regularity already afforded by the present re gulations. Rights and duties of persons involved in detentions, arrests or custo dial investigations: 1. arrestee shall be assisted by counsel at all times 2. du ties of arresting officer inform arrestee of his right to remain silent and to h ave competent and independent counsel, in a language understood by him allow cou nsel to confer with arrestee in private at all times provide arrestee with a cou nsel if arrestee cant afford one 3. duties of investigating officer prepare the custodial investigation report which should be in writing explain the report to arrestee in a language understood by him before arrestee attaches his signature or thumbmark to the report otherwise, investigation is null and void 4. extrajud icial confession must be signed upon a valid waiver in the presence of counsel, parents, elder brothers or sisters municipal mayor, municipal judge, district sc hool supervisor, priest, preacher of gospel otherwise, inadmissible 5. visit or conferences must be allowed persons under custodial investigation Definitions: c ustodial investigation practice of issuing an invitation to a person investigate d in connection with an offense without prejudice to the liabilities that the in viting officer may incur assisting counsel - any lawyer except lawyer: 1. direct ly affected by the case 2. conducting preliminary investigation 3. charged with prosecuting offense RA7438 Ople v Torres A statute providing for a national ID system is unconstitutional for want of a r easonable relation between the means and the object. Sec. 4 No law shall be pass ed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of g rievances.

24 FREEDOM OF SPEECH Schenk v US Clear and present danger test when the words used are used under suc h circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to p revent. The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it wa s done. Those, which may be said in times of peace, may be considered a hindranc e to the countrys efforts in times of war. Clear and probable danger test Man mus t be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects which their act s are likely to produce. Holmes (dissenting): The clear and present danger test applies in times of peace and war, although the power of the state is greater in times of war because of the dangers that do not exist in other times. The best test of truth is in the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe tition of the market. Plain statement versus advocacy of action test The state p unishes advocacy of action, not mere advocacy of doctrine (academic discussion n ot inciting to concrete action). Holmes (dissenting): The difference between exp ression of opinion and advocacy is the speakers enthusiasm for result. Dangerous tendency rule The law does not require that there be actual utterances. The stat e may punish even those utterances which may endanger public order. Language use d must be understood in its plain and obvious sense. Speech may take the form of symbols. A complaint is considered to be qualified privileged communication if it is: 1. made in good faith 2. without malice 3. regarding the character or con duct of a public official 4. addressed to the proper officer or board In such a case, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving the speech to be libelous. Rat ional basis test -> Speech may be regulated to prevent the substantive evil of d ebasement of the electoral process. But the regulation should not be overbroad a s to make its application oppressive. Freedom of speech must be treated with utm ost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to ma ke more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. Speech is often provocat ive and challenging. Hence, fighting words are not sufficient to convict a person absent a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil not just public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest. Balancing of interests test choosing between two interests as to which deserves greater weight Preferred freedoms test modif ication of balancing test; between two interests, that which affects liberties g ets preferential treatment; had this been used in this case, Zaldivar would have been acquitted Abrams v US Gitlow v New York People v Nabong US v Bustos Gonzales v Comelec Mutuc v Comelec Terminello v City of Chicago Zaldivar v Sandi ganbayan FREEDOM OF THE PRESS NPC v Comelec A statute except to 1. 2. prohibiting the sale or donation of mass media print space and air time for campaign or political purposes the Comelec h eld to constitutional because of: limited scope, duration, character of restrict ion clear and reasonable relation between statute and objective Osmena v Comelec Content-neutral restriction involves regulation as to time, place and manner; re quires a different standard of review as opposed to content-based restrictions W hen what is restricted is not the content of political ads but only their incide nts, the application of the clear and present danger rule is inappropriate.

25 Times Film Corp v City of Chicago Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo Movies may be regulated through prior restraint. They are primarily used for entertainm ent, as opposed to newspapers and broadcast media that are mainly used to dissem inate public information which info is necessary in a democracy. Right to reply provisions are as unconstitutional as a statute which forbids or compels newspap ers to publish specified matter. White (concurring): A newspaper is not a public utility subject o reasonable governmental regulation in matters affecting the e xercise of journalistic judgment. Content-neutral regulations will be sustained provided: 1. regulation advances important governmental interests unrelated to s uppression of free speech 2. regulation does not substantially burden free speec h more than necessary to further those interests Content-neutral regulations are not invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be l ess burdensome to free speech. Any system or prior restraint comes to court bear ing the heavy presumption against its constitutionality. A public trial is not s ynonymous with a publicized trial. The law prohibits reckless disregard for priv ate reputation, to which even judges have a right. Journalists are required to e xercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of a statement they publish. Th e inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the source. The indispensability of speech to decision-making in a democracy is not less true because the speech comes fro m a corporation rather than an individual. Test of obscenity: whether to the ave rage person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of th e material taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest Even factual errors ar e not sufficient to remove the constitutional protection of free of speech. Actu al malice test knowledge that material is false or with reckless disregard of wh ether or not it was false. Falsity alone does not prove actual malic. The burden of proof of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff. Doctrine of fair comm ent fair commentaries, on matters of public interest, are qualified privileged a nd constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander; in the absence of actual malice, the material is not actionable Even a person who is not a publ ic officer may be involved in a public issue and thence becomes a public figure. Truth is a valid defense in a defamatory statement made against the acts of a p ublic official, regardless of whether or not person acted with good intentions a nd justifiable motives. Even when a material is found to possess the requisite p rurient appeal and is found to be patently offensive ,it cant be proscribed unles s it is found to be utterly without redeeming social value. Guidelines for trier of facts: 1. Roth test 2. work depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patentl y offensive way, which sexual conduct must be specifically defined by the applic able statute or law 3. work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value Freedom of communication applies to both source a nd recipient. Freedom of speech applies even to commercial transactions. Fact th at the advertisers interests are purely economic does not disqualify him from con stitutional protection. Alleged slander is not actionable if it could not have r easonably understood as describing actual facts. To claim damages, plaintiff mus t prove: 1. false statement of facts TBS v FCC NY Times Co. v US In Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage In Re: Emil P. Jurado 1st Nat ional Bank v Belloti Roth v US NY Times Co. v Sullivan Borjal v CA Vasquez v CA Memoirs of a Women of Pleasure v Atty.Gen. of Massachusetts Miller v California Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. Hu

stler Magazine v Fallwell

26 2. actual malice (with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false) FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY US v Apurado Thomas v Collins Primicias v Fugoso An orderly, peaceful assembly e njoys constitutional protection. Clear and present danger test Any attempt to re strict liberties must be justified by clear public interest threatened by clear and present danger. Officers may only regulate (not suppress) public assemblies with respect to time and place in the interest of public order and safety. In ad dition, regulation must not be arbitrary. To justify suppression, there must exi st a clear and present danger of a serious injury and power to suppress must not be uncontrolled. Freedoms of speech and assembly are governed by the same stand ards justifying limitations. Procedures for acquiring permits: 1. applicant shou ld inform authority, ahead of time, where and when assembly will take place to a llow for reasonable period of appraisal 2. if application is denied or modified on the basis of existence of a clear and present danger, the applicant should be heard 3. applicant should be notified of the decision of the officer ahead of t ime so he could have proper recourse to judicial authorities The grant of permit s to assemble should be based on the purpose of the speech, not the applicant fo r the permit, otherwise there would be discriminatory access. Authorities may mo dify place where assembly is to be held in the proper exercise of police power. NOTES: The validity of a modification depends on the test used by the court. 1. preferred freedoms test requires existence of a clear and present danger before allowing modification 2. others (balancing of interests, dangerous tendency) req uires only proof of public convenience and sufficiency of cause In this case, co nvenience was sufficient to validate modification. CPP an illegal association wi th principal object of overthrowing the present government. Refusal to grant per mit to assemble is justified because the state should not be required to wait un til the apprehended danger (of sedition) becomes certain. Principles for guidanc e of school authorities: 1. right to peaceable assembly and free speech guarante ed to students only a showing of clear and present danger would justify previous restraint or subsequent punishment peaceable character is lost by advocacy or d isorder 2. if an assembly is to held in school premises, a permit must be sought from school authorities may not be denied unreasonably or arbitrarily may indic ate the conditions of time and place in case of breach of terms, penalty to be i mposed should be proportionate to the offense Reyes v Bagatsing Ignacio v Ela Evangelista v Earnshaw Malabanan v Ramento Sec. 5 No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit ing the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious prof ession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allow ed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political r ights. FREEDOM OF AND FREEDOM FROM RELIGION West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette Rights may be impaired only to preve nt grave and immediate danger. National unity is not a sufficient justification for compelling Jehovahs Witnesses to perform the flag salute against their religi ous beliefs. Unity may not be obtained through compulsion. There are no threats to public safety when students are exempted from attending the flag ceremony on the basis of religious beliefs. Therefore, the exemption is valid. Ebranilag v Division Superintendent of Schools

27 Students may be disciplined however, should they disrupt the patriotic exercises and commit breach of peace. Aglipay v Ruiz Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos Austria v NLRC The influence of religion on human affairs cant be denied. The printing o f postage stamps on the occasion of a Catholic celebration, when not religiously motivated, is not unconstitutional, even when the Catholic Church received inci dental propaganda thereby. A general regulation of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test nor obstruct or delay solicitation of religious funds , is constitutional. There exists a legitimate government interest in regulating solicitation. The state will not interfere with ecclesiastical affairs (involve s the relations between the Church and its members; relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of Congregation); but the Labor Code is comprehensive enough to include religious corporations in case labor dispute s arise which would require government intervention. The non-establishment claus e does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion. It is viol ated by the enactment of laws, which establish an official religion, whether or not these laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals. The fact, t herefore, that a prayer recited in public schools was denominationally neutral a nd voluntary is immaterial. The non-establishment clause does not prevent a stat e from extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens without regard to th eir religious affiliation. The grant of secular textbooks to all schools, even w hen it includes parochial schools, is therefore constitutional. RA3350 closed-sho p agreements shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibits affil iation of their members with any labor organization does not violate Art. III Sec . 5 because: 1. purpose is secular upholding the constitutional right of freedom of religion 2. no positive act is required, therefore not a religious test for the exercise of a civil right 3. no privilege granted to INC merely places them on an equal footing with members whose religions do not prohibit them from joini ng Exercise of religious freedom (as opposed to realm of religious belief) can b e regulated by the state when it will bring about the clear and present danger o f some substantive evil which Congress has a duty to prevent. The non-establishm ent clause also prohibits any act of the state favoring any religion, by protect ing it against attack by another religion. A flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise of the constitutional privilege of religion, is u nconstitutional. Public welfare legislation, passed to satisfy a public need (th e general education of all children) is constitutional even when it coincides wi th the personal desires of certain religions. Constitution requires the State to be neutral in its relationship with groups of religious believers and non belie vers. It does not requires the state to be their adversary. The states interest i n universal education has to be balanced against the traditional interest of par ents in the religious upbringing of their children. Since there is no showing th at Amish children would become burderns to society minus two extra years of comp ulsory education, the free exercise clause should prevail over state interests. Sec. 6 The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribe d by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither sh all the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Engel v Vitale Board of Education v Allen 1968 Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union 1974 INC v CA 1996 American Bible Society v City of Manila 1957 Everson v Board of Education 1947 Wisconsin v Yoder 1972 LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro Civil liberties should be enjoyed only in civ

ilized communities.

28 1919 Villavicencio v Lukban 1919 Lorenzo v Dir. of Health 1927 Manotok v CA 1986 Marcos v Manglapus 1989 Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon 19 88 Prostitutes, despite being in a sense lepers, are not chattels but Philippine citizens, protected by the same constitutional guarantee of freedom of abode. T hey may not be compelled to change their domicile in the absence of a law allowi ng such. Laws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the world over an d is supported by high scientific authority. Such segregation is premised on the duty to protect public health. Bail posted in a criminal case, is a valid restr iction on the right to travel. By its nature, it may serve as a prohibition on a n accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines where orders of Phili ppine courts would have no binding force. The liberty of abode and the right to travel includes the right to leave, reside and travel within ones country but it does not include the right to return to ones country. NOTE: Court warned that thi s case should not create a precedent because Marcos was a class in himself. Righ t to travel may be impaired in the interest of national security, public health or public order, as may be provided by law. An order temporarily suspending the deployment of overseas workers is constitutional for having been issued in the i nterest of the safety of OFWs, as provided by the Labor Code. Sec. 7 The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertain ing to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government resea rch data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, su bject to such limitations as may be provided by law. ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION Valmonte v Belmonte 1989 Baldoza v Dimaano 1976 Legaspi v Civil Service Commissi on 1987 Chavez v PCGG 1998 The people have a right to access official records bu t they cant compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, su mmaries and the like, such not being based on a demandable legal right. Judges c annot prohibit access to judicial records. However, a judge may regulate the man ner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy records in his office, may exercise their rights. Personal interest is not required in asserting the r ight to information on matters of public concern. What matters constitute public concern should be determined by the court on a case to case basis. Public concern (def.) writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with the ir official functions Ill-gotten wealth is, by its nature, a matter of public co ncern. Sec. 8 The right of the people, including those employed in the public an d private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not co ntrary to law shall not be abridged. FREEDOM OF ASSOCATION PAFLU v Sec. of Labor 1969 People v Ferrer 1972 Dennis v US In Re: Edillon The r ight to self-organization does not include the right to be given legal personali ty. A legislative determination that the CPP is an illegal organization is a jus tified proscription of the preferred position of freedom of association. Congres s was able to show the existence of a substantive evil: an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government to establish a totalitarian regime dominated by alie n power. Act declaring the CP an illegal organization is constitutional for bein g passed in response to a clear and present danger: conspiracy that was ready to make the attempt to overthrow the government, even without acts committed in pu rsuance of the conspiracy. Overriding considerations of public interest and welf are justify intrusion into the personal interests and convenience of individual lawyers.

29 1978 NAACP v Alabama 1958 UPSU v Laguesma 1998 A lawyers freedom of association i s not violated when he automatically becomes a member of the IBP upon admission to the Bar. He is already a member of an unorganized group of lawyers, the integ ration of the bar just provides for official and national organization. Privacy in ones associations is indispensable to the preservation of the freedom of assoc iation, especially where a group espouses dissident beliefs. The right of associ ation guaranteed in the Constitution is subject to the condition that its exerci se should be for purposes not contrary to law. The Labor Code prohibits managerial employees from joining, assisting or forming any labor organization. As such, s upervisors are banned from organizing with rank and file employees. They may how ever, form separate labor organizations of their own, in accordance with RA6715. Sec. 9 Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensa tion. EMINENT DOMAIN City of Manila v Chinese Community 1919 A municipal corporation exercises only a general authority granted by the legislature to appropriate private property for public use. In every case, the court has a duty to ensure that a municipal corpo ration exercises the rights conferred to it in compliance with imposed condition s: 1. that law exists for the exercise of eminent domain 2. that authority is ex ercised in accordance with such law On the other hand, the legislature possesses general power to exercise the right of eminent domain, which it may confer upon a municipal corporation. In such a case, the necessity of conferring is beyond judicial review. There is no taking when the statute permits continued reasonable use of the site as it was used before the regulation and when statute affords op portunities to enhance the property. The report of commissioners on the valuatio n of land for expropriation is not final. The court may increase or decrease the valuation if it is grossly excessive or grossly insufficient even when there is no showing of fraud or prejudice on the part of the commissioners. Just compensa tion is a constitutional right to be protected by the judiciary. As such, the val uation submitted by commissioners is just a guiding principle in determing what is just compensation. Other factors to be considered are: 1. condition of the pr operty 2. surroundings 3. improvements and capabilities Just compensation in land expropriation proceedings should be determined in the light of social justice. P D42 Judge can only choose between the value of the property according to tax dec larations or as declared by owner or administrator, whichever is lower. The Cons titutional provision on expropriation should be liberally construed. Whereas it uses lands instead of landed estates, it should be deemed to include even lands loca ted in urban areas. Congress is free to follow a system of priorities to determi ne what lands would be the first to be the subject of expropriation. The taking of property owned by a municipality in its proprietary character requires just c ompensation. Expropriation does not require information on land size or area. Th e test is the number of people to be benefited by the expropriation and the degr ee of social reform achieved thereby. Public use includes public utility and advan tage not just use by the general public in its literal sense. The power of eminent domain is exercised even when the taking of private property is for the develop ment of housing projects and pilot centers etc. The owner property expropriated should be compensated for what he actually losses. Compensation should be based on the value of the land at the time of taking, not at the time of the filing of the claim, but with legal interest. Compensation payable only in money applies to traditional exercise of the power of the eminent domain. The Comprehensive Ag rarian Penn Central Trans. Co. v New York 1978 MRR v Velasquez 1915 EPZA v Dulay 1987 NHA v Reyes 1983 JM Tuason v Land Tenure Administration 1970 City of Baguio v NA WASA 1959 Mataas na Lupa v Dimayuga 1984 Province of Camarines Sur v CA 1993 Ans aldo v CA 1990 Association of Small Landowners v Adiong

30 1989 Adiong v Comelec 1992 Reform Program is not traditional but revolutionary, where the mode of compensation need not be in cash. When the right to property i s joined by a liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part of the g overnment that justifies intrusion must be exceptionally convincing and irrefuta ble. Sec. 10 No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. CONTRACTS CLAUSE Clemons v Nolting 1922 The following impair the obligation of a contract: 1. A l aw which changes the terms of a legal contract with respect to: a. time or mode of performance b. conditions that which imposes new or dispenses with expressed conditions 2. A law which authorizes for the satisfaction of a contract somethin g different from that provided in its terms A law which compels a creditor to ac cept Philippine pesos when a debt in US currency is owing impairs the obligation of the contract. The state is never presumed to surrender its police power. A f ranchise granted to a company to collect tolls from a bridge is subject to the d uty and power of the state to provide for the improvement of an important line o f travel. The legislature cant bargain away public health, morals & safety. The p olice power is considered a reserved power. The legislature may not impair the o bligation of a contract but may modify, according to its wisdom, the remedy with which the obligations may be enforced. remedy modes of proceeding and forms to enforce the contract provided it does not seriously impair the value of the righ t The reservation of state authority is read into and deemed part of contracts. A statute which subsequently outlaws gambling does not impair the obligation of contract. A lottery charter is only a privilege which may be revoked by the exer cise of the police power of the state, gambling being an appropriate subject of regulation. There is no vested right in remedies or modes of procedure. The legi slature may modify particular remedies for the enforcement of a contract without interfering with the obligation of the contract. Police power may only be invok ed against the impairment of contracts if: 1. justified by an emergency furnishe d the proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the state 2. tem porary in nature operation limited to the exigency which called it forth, which period may be reduced by the court 3. exercised upon reasonable conditions 4. im pairment refers only to remedy and not to substantive right 5. addressed to a le gitimate purpose the protection of the basic interests of society The prohibitio n in the Constitution refers only to contracts with respect to property. It does not apply to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the gene ral legislative powers of the state and involving the right and public welfare o f the entire community affected by it. A law which allows tenants to change thei r contracts from tenancy to leasehold system does not impair the obligation of c ontracts because it was enacted pursuant to social justice precepts of the const itution. Zoning laws, promulgated in the exercise of police power, justify nulli fication of contractual obligations. Contracts of labor are explicitly subject t o the police power. CC1700: Relations between capital and labor are not merely c ontractual but are impressed with public interest and must yield to Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge 1837 Home Building & Loan Assoc. v Blaisdel l 1934 Stone v Mississippi 1879 Manila Trading v Reyes 1935 Rutter v Esteban 1953 Ilusoria v CAR 1966 Ortigas v Feati Bank 1979 Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v POEA 1995

31 the common good Sec. 11 Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal a ssistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Sec. 12 (1) An y person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the rig ht to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and indepe ndent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the serv ices of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived exc ept in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be us ed against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other simil ar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained i n violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of t his section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Sec. 13 All persons, except those char ged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is str ong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impai red even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Sec. 14 (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall e njoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to se cure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. H owever, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unj ustifiable. Sec. 16 All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Sec. 17 No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED COLD NEUTRALITY People v Opida Galman v Sandiganbayan Martelino v Alejandrino Marcos v Sandiganb ayan A judge should refrain from examining witnesses and should limit himself to clarificatory questions. A dictated, coerced, and scripted verdict of acquittal is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it neither binds nor bars anyone. P ublicity does not invalidate a trial in the absence of a clear showing that the judges would not have been able to render impartial judgment. A judgment is inva lid when the judges behavior did not manifest cold neutrality required of officer s of court: discussed case at lunch, not all members were present, a non-member was with group, discussed case outside proper venue.

32 AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION Gutang v People 2000 The constitution prohibits testimonial compulsion or the ex tortion of communication from the accused. It does not prohibit inclusion of an accuseds body in evidence when it may be material and what is involved is only a mechanical act meant to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple obs ervation. Urine samples voluntarily given by the accused are admissible in evide nce and do not violate the constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination . An accused, unlike an ordinary witnesses, may not only refuse to answer incrim inating questions but may also refuse to take the witness stand altogether. The waiver of the constitutional right against self-incrimination must be certain an d unequivocal. On a proper showing and upon order by the court, an ocular inspec tion of the body of an accused is permissible provided torture or force is not u sed. The privilege is not limited to testimonies, but extends to all giving or f urnishing of evidence. An order requiring a fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting to compare with specimens is unconstitutional. It requires not just a mechanical but a positive act and compels the accused to create evidence which would otherwise not be in existence. Officers cant extract by force what is in a n accuseds mind. They also cant extract by force what is in his stomach. Chavez v CA 1968 Villaflor v Summers 1920 Beltran v Samson & Jose 1929 Rochin v California 1952 RIGHT TO COUNSEL Escobedo v Illinois 1964` The right to counsel attaches from the time the invest igation moves from a general investigation to one which has begun to focus on th e guilt or innocence of the accused. It applies even during interrogation, where legal advice is most critical. It would exalt form over substance to say that t he right to counsel would depend on whether or not the authorities had already s ecured a formal indictment. NOTE RA7438 which requires assistance of counsel [de parte] even at the early stage of arrest. In-custody interrogations contain inh erently compelling pressures. Statements obtained during such interrogations, wi thout observing the proper procedural safeguards, are inadmissible in evidence. Procedural safeguards and guidelines: 1. prior to any questioning, accused must be informed that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used as evidence against him 2. at any stage during the investigation, if the ac cused indicates that he wishes to consult an attorney before answering, the inte rrogation must be stopped 3. if the accused is alone and indicates that he does not wish to be interrogated, there can be no interrogation 4. warning does not d epend on the background of the accused nor on his request. It must be accompanie d by a meaningful explanation. 5. waiver of the rights must be knowingly and int elligently given 6. these rights do not distinguish between exculpatory and incu lpatory statements Miranda rights apply to suspects under custodial investigatio n by the police. Oral statements made by a person, while he was yet a suspect, a re admissible in evidence although he has not been warned of his rights. Requisi tes for admissibility of extra-judicial confessions: 1. voluntarily made 2. with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel Counsel for the accused n eed not be retained by the accused himself. The lawyer may be: 1. engaged by any one acting on behalf of the person under investigation Miranda v State of Arizona 1966 People v Logronio 1992 People v Espiritu 1999

33 2. People v Continente 2000 People v Hatton 1992 People v Obrero 2000 People v S evilla 2000 appointed by the court upon petition by person under investigation o r someone acting on his behalf A mere enumeration to the accused of his custodial rights does not satisfy the r equirement required by law. There has to be the transmission of meaningful infor mation as to the nature of the investigation with warnings and advice to the acc used. Effective communication and a full understanding of ones rights are require d. The presence of counsel is indispensable in a post-indictment line-up. But wh ile the accusatory process in a line-up has not yet set in, the right to counsel does not attach. NOTE: Line-up in this case was invalidated however, because it was filled with suggestive influences. An independent counsel cant be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney or counsel of the poli ce whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Statements acquired duri ng a custodial investigation, without the assistance of counsel, are invalid eve n when third degree methods are not employed. Uncounselled extra-judicial confes sions are likewise inadmissible when made without a waiver of the right to an at torney. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF ACCUSATION Webb v De Leon People v Bugayong Pecho v Peop le People v Pailano An accused has the right to move for production or inspectio n of material evidence in the possession of the prosecution. When time is not an essential element in the crime charged, an information that does not specify a precise date does not violate the right to be informed of accusation. An accused may be convicted of a crime, which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. When an accused is charged under one paragraph of a sta tute, he may no be convicted of an offense under a different paragraph without v iolating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation agai nst him. Gladys G. Nebab Comment: RIGHT TO BAIL De la Camara v Enage Bravo v Borja Herras Teehankee v Rovira The constitution pr ohibits the imposition of excessive bail. The amount of bail is not a penalty bu t a mere guarantee that accused will not flee. To determine whether or not an of fense is bailable, one should inquire into the penalty prescribed by law and not the penalty actually imposed after all aggravating and mitigating circumstances have been applied. Persons detained without having been charged with any offens e, also enjoy the right to bail subject to a hearing to determine whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. Sec. 15 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, shall not suspended except i n cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Lansang v Garcia Garcia Padilla v Enrile Aquino v Enrile The privilege of the wr it of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. The suspension of the privilege of the writ suspends a persons right to bail even after charges have been filed in courts against him. The declaration of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ . NOTE: This ruling does not hold anymore in view of the explicit constitutional provision that the declaration of martial law does not automatically suspend th e privilege of the writ.

34 Moncupa v Enrile Ilusorio v Bildner In re: Garcia The writ of habeas corpus is a vailable as long as a person has been deprived of complete freedom such as when his freedom of movement, liberty of abode etc. are curtailed, despite being tech nically free from physical confinement. The purpose of the writ is to inquire in to all manner of involuntary restraint. It may not issue to compel a husband to live with his wife. Habeas corpus is not a writ of error. Mere errors of fact or law must be corrected on appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law and no t by habeas corpus. A person already convicted by final judgment may not avail h imself of the privilege of the writ. Sec. 18 (1) No person shall be detained sol ely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servi tude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the part y shall have been duly convicted. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE US v Pompeya An Act prov iding for the method by which the people of the town may be called upon to rende r assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation of peace and good order is constitutional. It was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the state and does not violate the constitutional prohibition on involuntary servitude. No indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be free from c ompulsory service, and no state can make the quitting of work any component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to la bor. Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor curel, degrading or i nhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress, hereafter provid es for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpe tua. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment agai nst any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facil ities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. Pollock v Williams CRUEL PUNISHMENTS People v Echagaray 1997 Cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment involves mo re than the mere extinguishment of life. For punishment to be cruel, it has to b e inhuman or barbarous, involving torture or a lingering death. The death penalt y is not excessive per se. What is prohibited is discretionary death penalty whe re arbitrariness, prejudice and discrimination pervade its imposition. An order by the court temporarily suspending the execution of its judgment does not encro ach upon the executive power of clemency. The prohibition against cruel punishme nts likewise applies to bails and fines. Theory of proportional punishment > to d etermine whether a punishment is excessive, standards in other jurisdictions sho uld be taken into account The death penalty, although not unconstitutional per s e, may be unconstitutional if it discriminates against a defendant by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position or class and if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices. US SC decision rega rding the constitutionality of the death penalty: 4 justices (not unconstitution al per se but may be unconstitutional in its application) 2 justices (unconstitu tional per se) 3 justices (unconstitutional as applied, no need to decide whethe r it is unconstitutional per se) Following the courts ruling in Furman, the Georg ia legislature adopted the bifurcated scheme, consisting of the guilt, pre-sente ncing and automatic review stages, in the imposition of the death penalty. Becau se of these revised procedural safeguards against discrimination, Georgias statut e was upheld and the death penalty was declared constitutional. Cruelty prohibit ed by the constitution is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. Echegaray v Sec. of Justice 1999 Weems v US 1910 Furman v Georgia 1972 Gregg v Georgia 1976 Louisiana v Resweber 1947

35 The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt consummation of a c onvicts sentence, does not make the subsequent execution cruel and excessive. The constitution cant prevent. People v Dionisio 1968 People v Ching Kuan 1942 It ta kes more than being harsh, excessive, out or proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the constitution. The penalty, to be cruel, must be flagrantl y and plainly oppressive or wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community. In imposing fines, the wealth of the culprit must be taken into account. Sec. 20 No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT Lozano v Martinez 1986 Ganaway v Quillen 1922 Serafin v Lindayag 1975 Ajeno v In serto 1976 BP20 (Bouncing Checks Law) is not unconstitutional for violating the constitutional prohibition on non-imprisonment for debt. It punishes not the fai lure to pay the cheque but the act of making a worthless cheque, which is an off ense against public order. Cheque are not mere contracts but are commercial inst ruments which form part of the banking system. They are not entirely free from t he regulatory power of the state. The Phil. Constitutional prohibition contains no exception (not even fraud on the part of the debtor) to non-imprisonment for debt. An information which merely recites the failure to pay a simple indebtedne ss does not charge estafa and is purely civil in aspects. No one may be arrested and detained under such an information. The prohibition in the constitution app lies to debts arising from a contractual obligation (ex-contractu) and not to de bts arising from a crime (ex-delicto). NOTE however, RA5465 which allows subsidi ary imprisonment only in cases of non-payment of fine, not to non-payment of civ il indemnity. Sec. 21 No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offe nse. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal un der either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY Kepner v US 1904 People v Quijada 1996 People v Obsania 1968 The constitutional provision is not a prohibition against twice being punished but against twice be ing put in jeopardy for the same offense. A defendant, whether convicted or acqu itted, has already been put in jeopardy during the first trial. The state, even in appellate proceedings, cant seek reversal of his acquittal without his consent . Additional element test -> There is no double jeopardy when either of two offe nses, although based on the same act, requires an additional fact which the othe r does not. Requisites for double jeopardy to attach: 1. valid complaint or info rmation 2. before a competent court with jurisdiction 3. defendant has pleaded t o the charge 4. defendant was acquitted, convicted or the case against him was d ismissed without his express consent dismissal was based on the merits or amount s to an acquittal When a defendant moves for the dismissal of the case against h im, double jeopardy does not attach because of the absence of the 4th requisite. Doctrine of supervening event -> If after the first prosecution, a new fact sup ervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the charact er of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offence, the accused cant b e said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new People v Adil 1977

36 offense. Perez v CA 1988 People v Relova 1987 A single act may offend against tw o or more entirely distinct & unrelated provisions of law. If one provision requ ires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquitt al or conviction or dismissal under one does not bar prosecution under the other . When offenses charged are penalized: 1. by different sections of the same stat ute 2. by different statutes focus is on identity of offenses. If offenses are th e same, double jeopardy attaches. When: 1. one of the offenses is charged under a statute 2. the other under a municipal ordinance focus is on the identity of th e acts. If offenses charged are based on the same act, there is double jeopardy. Same offense means: 1. similarity of technical elements 2. one offense amounts to an attempt or frustration of the other 3. one offense is necessarily included in the other If a fact (which changes the character of the offense) was in exis tence at the time of the 1st prosecution, such fact may not be considered a supe rvening event so as to allow a 2nd prosecution. People v City Court of Manila 1983 Sec. 22 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. EX POST FACT O LEGISLATION Republic v Fernandez 1956 US v Gomez & Coronel 1908 Co v CA 1993 P eople v Ferrer 1974 Prohibition in the Constitution applies to criminal or penal matters, not to laws concerning civil matters. Revenue acts have traditionally had a retroactive application. To declare increase in taxes as unconstitutional, the retroactive application must be both harsh and oppressive. A law, although dealing only with procedural matters, cant be applied if prejudicial to the accus ed. A law allowing the fiscal to prosecute adultery absent a complaint from the offended spouse cannot be applied to a case involving n act committed at a time when adultery can only be prosecuted by the offended husband. Decisions of the c ourts, administrative rulings on court decisions (i.e., those issued by the Sec. of Justice) and anything which partakes of the nature and effect of penal statu tes, are covered by the prospectivity principle. The Anti-Subversion Act outlawi ng the CPP is not a bill of attainder for applying to named individuals or to eas ily ascertainable members of a group. The use of the word CPP is only for definitio nal purposes and does not purport refer to only one communist/subversive organiz ation. ART. IV CITIZENSHIP Sec. 1 The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of th is Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippi nes; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Phil ippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are natu ralized in accordance with law. Sec. 2 Natural-born citizens are those who are c itizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acqui re or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizensh ip in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed naturalbor n citizens.

37 Sec. 3 Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided b y law. Sec. 4 Citizens of the Philippine who marry aliens shall retain their cit izenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to hav e renounced it. Sec. 5 Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national i nterest and shall be dealt with by law. CITIZENSHIP Moya Lim Yao v Commissioner of Immigration 1971 An alien woman may be deemed a c itizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen if she possesses none of the disqualifications enumerated in the Philippine Naturaliza tion Law. She is then deemed a Filipino without having to submit to naturalizati on proceedings and may settle the matter of her naturalization by filing a petit ion for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration. The Philippin e jurisdiction applies the principle of jus sanguinis (citizenship by blood) not jus soli (citizenship by birth). A minor child born of a Filipino mother before Jan.17,1973 does not automatically become a Filipino citizen upon his mothers re patriation. One cannot reacquire what one did not lose in the first place. Thus to become a Filipino, he must elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age o f majority. An illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, acq uires his mothers citizenship and is likewise a Filipino. The election of Philipp ine citizenship may be proven by positive acts such as the exercise of the right of suffrage. Philippine citizenship may be lost through: 1. naturalization in a foreign country 2. express renunciation of citizenship 3. subscribing to an oat h of allegiance to a foreign country Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by : 1. direct act of Congress 2. naturalization 3. repatriation Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor 1947 Villahermosa v Commisioner of Immigration 19 48 In Re: Florencio Mallare 1974 Labo Jr. v Comelec 1989

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