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adversaries
with regard to
counterterrorism.
When appropriate, the team will distinguish betweenU.S.counterterrorism policyingeneralandU.S.
efforts
to
fight
al-Qa'idainparticular.The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy when al-Qa'ida
began
toemerge. These earlier terrorists,in thewordsof
RAND's
Brian Jenkins, wanted"a lot ofpeople watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people
dead."
Their goals were usually
tied
to Marxist or
ethno-nationalist
agendas. The most lethal terrorists during this era were thosebacked by states, not those operating independently. In general, terrorism during this period wasviewed as an important but not overriding policy concern.
As
al-Qa'ida
and
affiliated
Islamist groups emerged
and
grew
in the
1990s,
the
focus
slowly
shifted.
The 1993
attack on the World Trade Center marked a turning point. For the
first
time, Islamist
radicals
sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In contrast to the terrorists of the
1970s
and
1980s,
whohad balked at destroying entire buildings, the new radicals wanted a lot of people watching
and
a lot
of
people dead.
Several
government counterterrorism
officials
recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, but U.S. policy
changed
unevenly at best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania elevatedthe importance of terrorism in general and al-Qa'ida in particular, but policy still lagged behind the
immensity
of the threat. It took the September
11
attacks to dramatically change U.S.counterterrorism policy. Even today, counterterrorism policy
is
evolving, with important policy
decisions
being made almost daily.
The
policy team
expects
to
follow
a
normal
investigative regimen of document
requests
and
review,
briefings
by key individuals both inside and outside government, and extensive interviews with those
in
a position to discuss the formulation and implementation of U.S. government policy in thecounterterrorism arena. In addition, the team will draw on the work of the Congressional September
11
Joint
Inquiry
as
appropriate.
Key
Questions
At
the Commission hearings held on March 31 in New York, witnesses described their views of the
September
11
attackers,theintelligence capabilitiesof thegovernment,and thequalityof theUSG's
counterterrorism
policy before September 11. They also suggested improvements in these areas in
order
to prevent another tragedy. Based upon their statements and our research so far, we have
compiled
a list of key questions and issues that we think need to be addressed by the Commission.Thelistisdivided into three parts, correspondingto theoverall statutory structureof theCommission's inquiry. Most of the questions
focus
on Part I (the pre-September
11
era), as this isessential forunderstanding PartsII and
III,
which covertheperiod
after
theattacks.
Part
One: Counterterrorism Policy before September
11,
2001
Background
1.
What shaped counterterrorism policy
before
the
1993 World Trade Center attack?
•
What
was the
"old
paradigm"
regarding
the
threat posed
by
terrorist groups?
•
What instruments (law enforcement, diplomacy, military strikes, financial controls,
and so on)
were
used
for
fighting terrorism?
• How
important
was
terrorism considered,
in
general?.../view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=312&id=2&actionID=113&mime=ec70aeOOe84f263aO 5/1/03
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