• Embed Doc
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
SUGGESTED
QUESTIONS
FOR
COMMISSIONERS' JUNE
26,2003
BRIEFING FROM
FBI
DIRECTOR ROBERT MUELLER,
III
The
FBI's
Shift from Reactive
to
Proactive/Preventative
After
the September
11
attacks, you made a number of statements indicating that the
FBI's
focus
would be shifting
from
reactive to proactive and preventative. What are themost important steps the FBI has taken at this point in its
efforts
to make this dramatic
shift?
What
are the greatest obstacles you've encountered and that still remain for the FBI tosuccessfully make
the
transition
from
having
a law
enforcement
counterterrorism
approach to having more of an intelligence approach?Prior to the September
11
attacks, a
frequent
complaint of FBI counterterrorismpersonnel
was
that despite
the FBI
Headquarters'
official
policies
makingcounterterrorism
a top
priority,
the
field offices
had
sufficient
autonomy
to
ignore thesepronouncements.What steps have you taken to ensure that
FBIHQ
can now enforce its priorities,
and
that each field
office
provides
sufficient
resources and focus tocounterterrorism matters?What flexibility do
Field
Offices
currently have to set their own investigative
priorities?
Analysis
The FBI has been criticized for its inadequate analytic capability prior to September 11,
and
you
have publicly acknowledged this
as a
weakness.
For
example,
a
January 2002internal FBI study
found
that approximately 65% of the FBI analysts in place were
unqualified for the
position.What steps
has the FBI
taken
to
address
the
numerous deficiencies
in the
analyticprogram that existed priortoSeptember
11,
2001?
What
do you
think
the
role
of
analysts should
be at the
FBI,
and how
should
the
field
andHQ
analytic functions
differ?
The
FBI's
pre-9/11
focus
on
prosecutions
has
also served
as a
hindrance
to its
analysts.Analysts were
often
told
not to put
their thoughts
in
writing, because
the
product wouldbe discoverable in any criminal prosecution. To what extent is this still a problem at theFBI,andwhat stepshas the FBItakentoensure
that
analystsare notprevented
from
documenting
their analysis?
How
is the FBI ensuring that the analytic personnel have access to all necessaryinformation
on a
timely
basis,
particularly given
the
FBI's
well publicized technologicalproblems?
1
 
You
have publicly acknowledged that
the
Phoenix
EC was not
properly handled when
itwas
sent
to FBI
Headquarters
in the
summer
of
2001.
If
such
an
analytical product were
sent
from
the
field
to
headquarters today,
how
would
it be
handled today?
Reports
Officers
One of the reforms frequently
cited
by the FBI
since
September
11
has been the creation
of
the
Reports
Officer
position, both
at FBI
Field
Offices
and at FBI
Headquarters.
Can
you
describe what
you
envision
as the
role
of the
Reports
Officers
at the
FBI,
and
how the HQ and
Field
positions
differ
from
one
another?
How
is the FBI
ensuring that
the
Reports
Officers
have access
to all of the
necessary information on a timely basis, particularly given the
FBI's
well
publicized technological problems?
Training
What
counterterrorism training
is now
required
for
agents assuming counterterrorismmanagement
positions
at FBI Headquarters?
The
FBI's
New
Agent training
at Quantico has
been traditionally designed
for
criminal
law
enforcement agents.
Prior
to
September
11 out of the
16
weeks of training, there
were
only approximately three days
of
training
on
National Security matters.
To
what
extent
has the training been revised since
9/11,
and how much counterterrorism trainingis currently provided?
Office
ofIntelligence
One
of the
often
cited
post-9/11
FBI
reforms
has
been
the
creation
of the
Office
of
Intelligence.
What
do you
envision
the
Office's
role
to be in the
FBI's
counterterrorismprogram?
What
will
the
process
be, and who
will have input, into
the
establishment
of the
FBI's collection priorities? Will collection priorities be set entirely by FBI HQ,
or
will Field
Offices
have input into this process
as
well?
How
will
the
collection priorities decided upon
by the
Office
of
Intelligence play
into
specific investigations? Will agents
be
required
to
collect information
in
their investigations
based
on these
collection
priorities?
If
the
office
does
not
have responsibility
for
individual investigations,
how
will
they be
able
to
enforce their priorities
on the
Field
Offices?
 
FBI
Understanding
of
Terrorist Threat
in the
United States
In
your opinion,
what
progress
has the FBI
made since
the
September
11
attacks
inunderstanding the
radical terrorist elements
and
threats within
the
United States?
What are the
biggest intelligence gaps remaining,
in
terms
of the
FBI's
understanding
ofthese
issues?
How
successful
has the FBI
been
in
developing sources
in the
radical Islamic
communities in the
United States since
the
September
11
attacks?
Has it
gotten easier
ormore
difficult,
in
your opinion,
and
what
are the
reasons
for the
change?
Career Track for
Special
Agents
Working
Counterterrorism
Matters
Agents
workingcounterterrorism
and
counterintelligencematters
at the FBI
have
often
complained that they were not promoted as quickly as agents working more traditionalcriminal investigations. One reason cited has been that agents are rated on statisticalaccomplishments, such
as
arrests, search warrants,
and
indictments,
and
counterterrorisminvestigations do not generate as many
"stats."
In
your opinion,
is
this
a
fair
and
accurate complaint?
If so,
what
has
been doneto address this situation?Some have suggested havinga
separate career
trackforagents working counterterrorism
and
counterintelligence matters, both
for the
reason cited above
and so
that there could
bea
cadre
of
agents with significant counterterrorism expertise.
Do you
think this
is a
reasonable suggestion?
The
FBI's
current
policies
allow
HQ
agents
to
apply
for
promotions back
to the
fieldafter
only
18
months
at HQ. In
other words,
by the
time
the
agents learn
how to
manage
a
program,
and
begin
to
develop expertise
in a
particular area, they
are
getting ready
to
leave
HQ. Is
this
still
the
policy,
and
should
this policybe
changed
so
that there
is
greater counterterrorism managerial expertise
at FBI HQ?
Information Technology
Most of the
intelligence shared within
the
intelligence community
is
classified
as
"Top
Secret."
From
an
information technology perspective, however,
the FBI has
traditionallyoperated only
at the
"Secret"
level,
and has
been unable
to
easily handle
and
distribute"Top
Secret"
information
in a
timely fashion
to
other than
a
limited number
of
personnel
in the
field.
What is the
status
of the Top
Secret LAN,
and
what impact
has
this made
to
date
on
the
FBI's
ability
to
handle
and
appropriately manage
Top
Secret
information
received
from
other intelligence community members?
Cooperation with
State/Local
Law
Enforcement Authorities
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...