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Introduction
According to a report in the
Financial Times 
,
‘European nations are to draw up radical proposals to improve transparency in financial markets and to change the way credit rating agencies operate in anattempt to prevent any recurrence of the financial turmoil arising from the credit squeeze.
1
Are transparency in financial markets and betterdesigned rating agencies indeed key to preventing arecurrence of the kind of mess we have been experienc-ing in the world's most developed financial economiesfor these past four months? I intend to take a rompthrough the crisis to see what lessons it holds for poli-cymakers and market participants.The problems we have recently witnessed across theindustrialised world (but not, as yet, in the emergingmarkets), were created by a 'perfect storm' bringingtogether a number of microeconomic and macroeco-nomic pathologies. Among the microeconomic sys-temic failures were: wanton securitisation, fundamentalflaws in the rating agencies' business model, the pro-cyclical behaviour of marked-to-market leverage (seeAdrian and Shin (2007a,b) and also of the Basel capitaladequacy requirements, privately rational but sociallyinefficient disintermediation, and competitive interna-tional de-regulation. Proximate local drivers of the spe-cific way in which these problems manifested them-selves were regulatory and supervisory failure in the UShome loan market.In the UK, the problems were aggravated by:1.a flawed Tripartite arrangement between theTreasury, the Bank of England and the FinancialServices Authority (FSA) for dealing with finan-cial crises;2.supervisory failure by the FSA;3.flaws in the Bank of England's liquidity-orientedopen market policies (too restrictive a definitionof eligible collateral and an unwillingness to tryto influence market rates at maturities longerthan overnight, even during periods of seriouslack of market liquidity);4.flaws in the Bank of England's discount windowoperations (too restrictive a definition of eligiblecollateral; only overnight lending; too restrictivea definition of eligible discount window counter-parties). Both shortcomings in the Bank of England's operatingarrangements and procedures were due to a flawedunderstanding in that institution of (1) the nature anddeterminants of market (ill)liquidity, of (2) the Bank of  England's unique role in the provision of market liquid-ity because of its ability to create unquestioned liquid-ity instantaneously and costlessly, and of (3) the condi-tions under which there is a trade-off between moralhazard (bad incentives for future bank behaviour) andthe
ex-post 
provision of liquidity to (a) markets and (b)specific individual institutions with the aim of prevent-ing unnecessary collateral damage to the financial sys-tem and the real economy.Among the macroeconomic pathologies that con-tributed to the crisis were the following:(1) An
ex-ante 
global saving glut, brought about bythe entry of a number of high-saving countries (notablyChina) into the global economy and a global redistrib-ution of wealth and income towards commodityexporters that also had, at least in the short run, high-er propensities to save than the losers from the globalincrease in commodity prices.(2) Excessive liquidity creation by the world's twoleading central banks, the Fed and (to a lesser extent the ECB) reinforced by the desire of many new industrialis-ing and oil and gas exporting countries to limit theappreciation of their currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar.
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POLICY INSIGHT
No. 18
abcd
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Lessons from the 2007 FinancialCrisis
 WILLEM H.BUITEREuropean Institute,LSE,Universiteit van Amsterdam and CEPR
a
Author’s note: 
This paper was submitted to the UK Treasury SelectCommittee, as background for my appearance before the Committeeon Tuesday, November 13, 2007.1
 
The behaviour of these central banks may be in partrationalised as a response to the Keynesian effectivedemand weaknesses that many feared would resultedfrom (1).
The microeconomic pathologies of modern finance
Securitisation
Origins 
Traditionally, banks borrowed short and liquid and lentlong and illiquid. On the liability side of the banks' bal-ance sheets, deposits withdrawable on demand andsubject to a sequential service (first come, first served)constraint figured prominently. On the asset side, loans,secured or unsecured, to businesses and households were the major entry. These loans were typically held tomaturity by the banks (the 'originate and hold' model). Banks therefore transformed and extended maturity andcreated liquidity. Such a combination of assets and lia- bilities is inherently vulnerable to bank runs by depositholders. Banks were deemed to be systemically important, because their deposits were a key part of the paymentmechanism for households and non-financial corpora-tions, because they played a central role in the clearingand settlement of large-scale transactions and of secu-rities. To avoid systemically costly failures by banks that were solvent but had become illiquid, the authoritiesimplemented a number of measures to protect andassist banks. Deposit insurance was commonly intro-duced, paid for either by the banking industry collec-tively or by the state. In addition, central banks provid-ed lender of last resort (LoLR) facilities to individualdeposit-taking institutions that had trouble financingthemselves.In return for this assistance and protection, banksaccepted regulation and supervision. This took the formof minimum capital requirements, minimum liquidityrequirements, other prudential restrictions on what the banks could hold on both sides of their balance sheets,as well as reporting and transparency obligations.In the 1970s, Fannie Mae (Federal National MortgageAssociation), Ginnie Mae (Government National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) began the process of secu-ritisation of residential mortgages. Asset securitisationinvolves the sale of income generating financial assets(such as mortgages, car loans, trade receivables (includ-ing credit card receivables) and leases) by a company(the originator of the financial assets) to a special pur-pose vehicle (SPV). The SPV, which might be a trust ora company, finances the purchase of these assets by theissue of bonds, which are secured by those assets. TheSPV is supposed to be bankruptcy-remote from theoriginator, that is, it has to be an off-balance sheet enti-ty vis-à-vis the originator. Cash-flow securitisation works in a similar way, as when the UK governmentagreed to create the International Finance Facility whichis supposed to securitise future development aid com-mitments. Private institutions, especially banks, immediatelytook advantage of these securitisation techniques toliquefy their illiquid loans. The resulting 'originate anddistribute' model had major attractions for the banksand also permitted a potential improvement in the effi-ciency of the economy-wide mechanisms for intermedi-ation and risk sharing. It made marketable the non-marketable; it made liquid the illiquid. There wasgreater scope for trading risk, for diversification and forhedging risk.Securitisation generally involves the 'tranching' of thesecurities issued against a given pool of underlyingassets or cash flows. The higher tranche has priority(seniority) over the lower tranches. This permits thehighest tranche secured against a pool of high-riskmortgages, say, to achieve a much better credit ratingthan the average of the assets backing all the tranchestogether (the lower tranches, of course, have a corre-spondingly lower credit rating). In addition, various'enhancements' are frequently packaged with the secu-rities. A common example is insurance against defaultrisk, which was obtained from specialised financial insti-tutions, called 'monolines ' that had sprung into beingto enhance the creditworthiness (and credit ratings) of securities issued by US municipalities.
Problems 
There are three problems associated with securitisation(and the generally associated creation of off-balancesheet vehicles).1.The greater opportunities for risk trading created by securitisation not only made it possible tohedge risk better (that is, to cover open posi-tions); it also permitted investors to seek out andtake on additional risk, to further 'unhedge' riskand to create open positions not achievable before. When risk-trading opportunities areenhanced through the creation of new instru-ments or new institutions, and when new popu-lations of potential investors enter the risk-trad-ing markets, we can only be sure that the risk willend up with those most willing to bear it. Therecan be no guarantee that risk will end up being borne by those most able to bear it.2.The 'originate and distribute' model destroysinformation compared to the 'originate andhold' model. The information destruction occursat the level of the originator of the assets thatare to be securitized. Under the 'originate andhold' model the loan officer collecting the infor-mation on the creditworthiness of the would-be borrower is working for the Principal in theinvesting relationship (the originating bank ornon-bank lending institution). Under the 'origi-nate and distribute' model, the loan officer of the originating banks works for an institution(the originating bank) that is an Agent for thenew Principal in the investing relationship (theSPV that purchases the loans from the bank andissues securities against them). With asymmetricinformation and costly monitoring, the agencyrelationship dilutes the incentive for information
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gathering at the origination stage. Reputationconsiderations will mitigate this problem, but will not eliminate it.3.Securitisation also puts information in the wrongplace. Whatever information is collected by theloan originator about the collateral value of theunderlying assets and the credit worthiness of the ultimate borrower, remains with the origina-tor and is not effectively transmitted to the SPV,let alone to the subsequent buyers of the securi-ties issued by the SPV that are backed by theseassets. By the time a hedge fund owned by a French commercial bank sells ABSs (asset backedsecurities) backed by US sub-prime residentialmortgages to a conduit owned by a smallGerman Bank specialising in lending to small andmedium-sized German firms, neither the buyernor the seller of the ABS has any idea as to whatis really backing the securities that are beingtraded.
Partial solutions 
The problems created by securitisation can be mitigatedin a number of ways.
1. Simpler structures.
The financial engineering that went into some of the complex securitised structuresthat were issued in the last few years before the ABSmarkets blew up on August 9, 2007, at times becameludicrously complex. Simple securitisation involved thepooling of reasonably homogeneous assets, say, resi-dential mortgages issued during a given period with agiven risk profile (e.g. sub-prime, alt-A or prime). These were pooled and securities issued against them weretranched. However, second-tier and higher-tier-securi-tisation then took place, with tranches of securitisedmortgages being pooled with securitised credit-cardreceivables, car loan receivables etc. and tranched secu-rities being issued against this new, heterogeneous poolof securitised assets. Myriad credit enhancements wereadded. In the end, it is doubtful that even the design-ers and sellers of these compounded, multi-tiered secu-ritised assets knew what they were selling, knew its riskproperties or knew how to price it. Certainly the sellersdid not.There is a simple solution: simpler structures. This willin part be market-driven, but regulators too may put bounds on the complexity of instruments that can beissued or held by various regulated entities. Central banks could accept as collateral in repos or at the dis-count window only reasonably transparent classes of ABS.
2. Unpicking' securitisation.
This 'solution' is theultimate admission of defeat in the securitisationprocess. A number of American banks with residentialmortgage-backed securities (RMBS) on their balancesheets have been scouring the entrails of the asset pools backing these securities and have sent staff to specificaddresses to assess and value the individual residentialproperties. This inversion of the securitisation matrix is,of course, very costly and means that the benefits fromrisk pooling will tend to be ignored. It is an ignomin-ious end for the securitisations involved.
3. Retention of equity
tranche by originator. Whenthe originator of the loans is far removed from the ulti-mate investor in the securities backed by these loans,the incentive for careful origination is weakened. One way to mitigate this problem is for the originator toretain the 'equity tranche' of securitised and tranchedissues. The equity tranche or 'first-loss tranche' is thehighest-risk tranche - the first port of call when theservicing of the loans is impaired. It could be made aregulatory requirement for the originator of residentialmortgages, car loans etc. to retain the equity tranche of the securitised loans. Alternatively, the ownership of theequity tranche could be required to be made publicinformation, permitting the market to draw its ownconclusions.
4. External ratings.
The information gap could beclosed or at least reduced by using external rating agen-cies to provide an assessment of the creditworthiness othe securitised assets. This has been used widely in thearea of RMBS and of ABS. This 'solution' to the infor-mation problem, however, brought with it a whole slewof new problems.
 Rating agencies
A small number of internationally recognised ratingagencies (really no more than three: Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch) account for most of the rating of complex financial instruments, including ABS. They gotinto this business after for many years focusing mainlyon the rating of sovereign debt instruments and of largeprivate corporates. They have been given a formal reg-ulatory role, (which will be greatly enhanced under theabout-to-be-introduced Basel 2 Capital Adequacyregime) because their ratings determine the risk weight-ing of a whole range of assets bank hold on their bal-ance sheets.Their role raises a number of important issues becauseit creates a number of problems.
Problems 
1. What do they know?
This is a basic but importantquestion. One can imagine that, after many years, per-haps decades, of experience, a rating agency would become expert at rating a limited number of sovereigndebtors and large private corporates. How would therating agency familiarise itself with information avail-able only to the originators of the underlying loans orother assets and to the ultimate borrowers? How wouldthe rating agency, even if it knew as much about theunderlying assets as the originators/ultimate borrowers,rate the complex structures created by pooling hetero-geneous underlying asset classes, slicing and dicing thepool, tranching and enhancing the payment streamsand making the ultimate pay-offs complex, non-linearfunctions of the underlying income streams? These rat-ings were overwhelmingly model-based. The modelsused tended to be the models of the designers and sell-ers of the complex structures, who work for the issuersof the instruments. The potential for conflict of interestin the design and use of these models is obvious. Inaddition, even honest models tend to be useless duringperiods of disorderly markets, because we have too few
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